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ABSTRACT 
THE RESTRUCTURING OF AN EMPLOYMENT SYSTEM: THE EXPERIENCE OF 
NORTH SEA OIL AND GAS IN THE NORTH EAST OF ENGLAND 
ANDREW CUMBERS 
The concern of this thesis is the impact of incoming oil 
related activities (in the form of rig fabrication) upon the 
existing industrial work force in the North East of England. 
It examines how the interrelationship of two processes (the 
increasing centralisation of the international oil industry 
and the historical development of the labour force in the 
North East) has shaped the precise pattern of labour 
relations within the fabrication sector in the North East. 
In particular it notes how a mixture of political indecision 
in the 1970s and ideological dogma in the 1980s has allowed 
the international oil industry to dictate the terms of North 
Sea oil developments. As a consequence, fabrication firms 
have been forced to marginalise large elements of the work 
force. It is this process, set in the context of past 
industrial development, that is the principle focus of this 
thesis. 
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PREFACE 
The purpose of this thesis is to explain the impact of the 
development of North Sea oil related forms of activity upon 
employment in the North East of England. Since the late 
1960s, the region has been an important location for the 
construction of equipment for the offshore oil and gas 
industries. Although these North Sea oil related 
developments have brought net gains in employment to the 
region, during a period in which traditional manufacturing 
activities experienced declining fortunes, this situation 
cannot simply be described as a "new jobs for old" scenario. 
Whilst there has been much that is "new" to the region as a 
consequence of the arrival and subsequent establishment of 
the offshore construction industry in the North East, there 
has also been a surprising degree of continuity with 
traditional forms of employment. 
To understand this situation, the argument advanced here is 
that oil-related developments need to be analysed in the 
context of past and existing forms of work organisation in 
the North East. In adopting this position, the conceptual 
framework that is used in the following chapters is 
identifiable with a growing tendency, within the social 
sciences, to place contemporary patterns of change in the 
organisation of work within an historical context.' 
In the past twenty years, the United Kingdom (and the 
"advanced industria 1" w:->rld in general) has witnessed a 
1Like any work of tLi.s length there are marked 
differences between the researc~ project as it was initially 
conceived and the final form c.,f this thesis. The changes 
that have occurred in the i~tervening period are a 
reflection of both force of circumstance and the development 
of the author's own methodological perspective. An account 
of these developments is given as an appendix. 
viii 
period of dramatic employment restructuring, unprecedented 
since the 1930s. Dramatic shifts in the wider world economy 
have wrought havoc to specific industries and regions within 
the United Kingdom, resulting 1n the decline of large 
sectors of manufacturing industry and the return of mass 
unemployment in many areas. Even for those companies and 
individuals, that have escaped the worst effects of 
recession, there have been significant changes to the way 1n 
which production is organised, and as a corollary of this, 
to what "being in work" actually means. 
Responding to these events, a significant debate has 
developed within the social sciences about the most 
appropriate conceptual framework for the analysis of 
employment change. The intensity of this debate signifies 
the inapplicability of existing theories and models, within 
the neoclassical and behavioural traditions, to explain 
contemporary economic and social restructuring. 
Probably the most useful outcome of this debate has been the 
recognition amongst the more radical approaches that surface 
level changes (at the empirical level) in the organisation 
of emnlovment need to be firmlv arounded within the context 
of underlying capitalist social relations. Explanations of 
change need to demonstrate awareness of both the structures 
underpinning, and the relationships within, production. In 
addition, the recognition that these structures and power 
relations exist necessitates that analyses are firmly 
located in historical context. Put simply, if something is 
claimed to exist it then becomes necessary to describe and 
understand its historical formation. 
In the case of this study, incoming oil companies were 
confronted with a particular form of work organisation in 
the North East of England that was a legacy of the region's 
lX 
historical economic development. To understand the outcome 
of the oil-related impact upon this "employment system" 2 it 
lS firstly necessary to understand the latter's historical 
foundation. In the following chapters therefore, the nature 
of incoming oil-related activity is not viewed in isolation 
from past processes of capitalist development within the 
North East, but lS instead set (and indeed can only be 
understood) within this particular socio-historical context. 
The new employment opportunities, brought by the discovery 
of oil (and to a lesser extent gas) in the North Sea during 
the 1960s, were set against a background of long term 
economic decline in the region's traditional industries. In 
the 150 years prior to the arrival of oil-related 
activities, the employment experience within the North East 
had been dominated by the development of a narrow range of 
industries under the capitalist mode of production. Outside 
of the coalfield areas, the principal industrial 
developments were associated with the coastal strip, and in 
particular the rivers of the Tyne, Tees and Wear. In these 
areas the early development of iron and steel activities led 
to the creation of a manufacturing sector, that was to 
become dominated by the "heavy" industries of shipbuilding, 
mechanical engineering and structural engineering, to the 
detriment of more diverse forms of economic development. 
With the gradual decline of this industrial base during the 
twentieth century, through a failure to introduce an 
adequate level of capital restructuring in response to 
increasing overseas competition, the region became 
increasingly peripheral to the process of capitalist 
accumulation. 
2A term that is developed in Chapter 2 to describe the 
historical evolution of work in a specific regional 
industrial context. 
X 
Accompanying the growth of these industries, the North East 
witnessed the development of a particular form of work 
organisation; the principal features of which were a craft-
based production process and a local labour market structure 
in which the vast majority of workers remained marginalised 
from permanent employment. The historical evolution of this 
form of work organisation was marked by its resilience to 
change, either within the production process or in the 
structure of the labour market. Indeed any changes to the 
nature of employment tended to be slow and incremental, 
rather than involving any fundamental transformation of the 
physical process of production or the social relations 
underpinning it. 
The advent of oil activity, whilst on the one hand 
representing a new market for the region's ailing 
industries, also brought to the North East a new set of 
capitalist social relations. Control over production became 
increasingly external to the region, taking place within the 
context of the international oil industry. Under these 
circumstances one might have expected there to be dramatic 
changes in the organisation of production and employment 
relations within the region. The situation however has been 
rather more complicated and whilst those firms that have 
engaged in oil-related activity have experienced substantial 
reorientation within the global capitalist system, an 
accompanying process of change to the actual organisation of 
work has been less discernible. Instead, the forms of 
employment organisation, brought by incoming oil activities 
(particularly with regard to the offshore construction 
industry), are more remarkable for their similarities to the 
"traditional way of doing things". In fact, as the following 
pages will demonstrate, the present pattern of labour 
organisation 1n the offshore construction industry 1s 
heavily influenced and indeed underwritten by past forms of 
xi 
employment. This concern, to integrate oil related 
developments within the context of past processes of change 
within the North East, is subsequently reflected in the 
structure of this thesis. 
Chapter 1 begins by tracing the development of the 
international oil industry, examining firstly how the majors 
came to dominate the global oil market, before tracing the 
background to the emergence of OPEC as the major price 
determinator in the industry. The development of North Sea 
resources is seen as one strategy employed by the 
multinationals in their attempt to retain global hegemony in 
the international industry, against the background of the 
OPEC revolution in the 1970s. The role of the British state, 
in pursuing a rapid depletion policy to improve its ailing 
macroeconomic position, happily coincided with the interests 
of the multinational oil companies. The implications of 
these events for the structure of the oil industry within 
the North Sea and the consequences for regional policy are 
then considered. The chapter concludes by suggesting that 
not only have the politicians given scant regard to the 
implications of oil developments for patterns of employment 
change in depressed peripheral industrial regions, but there 
has also been a deficit of academic work on the 
Such stark realities provide the justification 
study. 
subject. 
for this 
Chapter Two examines the various recent theoretical 
approaches to the study of employment, evolving from both 
neoclassical theory and the Marxist theory of the labour 
process. Evolving from neoclassical theory, recent work from 
the labour market segmentation tradition is seen as an 
important contribution to the study of employment, 
recognising the diversity of forms of labour organisation 
across different industrial sectors. However it is argued 
xii 
that even the most recent contributions within this 
tradition do not 
underlying social 
organisation. 
fully take on board the significance of 
relations in structuring employment 
The historically constructed labour process theory is seen 
as a better means of explaining contemporary and past trends 
and processes within the labour market. However departing 
from Braverman's (1974) viewpoint~ the labour process is not 
viewed 1n terms of a dominant form of organisation, 
underpinned by a dominant paradigm such as mass production, 
but as a more open ended process that can take upon a 
variety of forms, conditioned by specific social 
circumstances. The concept of an employment system, 
representing the integration of labour process theory within 
a broader segmentation framework, is then introduced to 
represent a less rigid framework for the historical analysis 
of work organisation. 
Chapter Three uses the conceptual framework elaborated upon 
in Chapter Two to place the arrival of North Sea oil related 
activities, in the context of past industrial development 
within the North East of England. North Sea oil impacts did 
not occur in a vacuum but partially compensated for the 
severe post war decline of the traditional markets of the 
shipbuilding and engineering industries within the North 
East. 
The evolution of these industries and the employment 
structures that accompanied them, prior to the advent of 
North Sea oil in the late 1960s, are therefore the dominant 
concern of this chapter. The principal theme to emerge from 
this analysis is the absence of any fundamental elements of 
restructuring, either in the methods of production, or in 
the organisation of labour, since the beginnings of 
xiii 
largescale capitalist industrial development during the 
latter half of the nineteenth century. 
Having outlined the two important underlying processes 
responsible for the nature of the oil impact in the North 
East, Chapter 4 places the offshore oil industry within the 
region in context. This begins with an analysis of the 
nature of the product market, and subsequently the structure 
of the offshore supplies industry. Put simply, the oil 
companies have attempted to pursue vertical disintegration 
strategies, amongst their suppliers, to compensate for the 
dynamics of the product market. Nowhere lS this situation 
more prevalent than ln the fabrication sector of the 
offshore supplies industry, the area that has become the 
most significant for the North East. 
In the second part of the Chapter, the role of the North 
East, and especially the aforementioned fabrication sector, 
is expanded upon. The analysis emphasises the peripherality 
of the region to the core oil activities and the fluctuating 
fortunes of its fabricators as a result of the uncertainties 
inherent in the oil market. The strategies of the oil 
companies and their consequences for the North East are also 
considered, i.e. as a marginal location within the 
international oil industry. 
In Chapters 5 and 6 the implications of this chaotic market 
environment for contemporary patterns of labour organisation 
are analysed. Whilst Chapter 5 examines labour market trends 
and underlying processes of change at the level of the local 
labour market and regional employment systems, Chapter 6 
focusses upon the role of labour strategies within 
individual firms in the organisation of work. This allows us 
to trace important changes in the nature of work and the 
employment experience, wrought by North Sea oil developments 
xiv 
at the general level, whilst at the same time examining the 
specific constraints facing individual firms. 
What emerges from this analysis is the complex interplay of 
manager ia 1 strategy (conditioned largely by corporate and 
product market forces) with existing social structures in 
restructuring employment systems. Whilst initially offshore 
firms drew upon traditional employment mechanisms in the 
organisation of work, their strategies of casualisation and 
short-termism have interacted with wider economic trends to 
transform the nature of contemporary employment organisation 
within the North East. Thus firms are both reactive and 
creative/destructive in their relationship to employment 
structures. 
In the concluding chapter the various strands of the 
argument are brought together. This involves charting in 
brief the processes of employment change, and their 
consequences for new divisions of labour within the North 
East. We note how the lack of effective state policy in the 
oil industry has left the development of North Sea resources 
firmly in the hands of the private sector. Consequently 
development decisions are made according to corporate 
strategy, rather than in terms of a well-defined national, 
or perhaps more poignantly a regional, strategic interest. 
Against the background of wider industrial decline, and 
under the prevailing political economy of the British North 
Sea oil sector, the arrival of the offshore fabrication 
industry in the North East has helped to transform what was 
a relatively stable post-war employment regime into a 
dynamic labour market environment. Under these 
circumstances, firms have been forced to adopt labour 
strategies that marginalise large sections of the workforce, 
around a shrinking, but highly skilled core. With the break 
XV 
down in the training environment, commonly manifested in the 
rundown in apprenticeship schemes, again a consequence of 
unfettered market forces, a possible scenario for the future 
is likely to be severe skill shortages coinciding with high 
levels of unemployment. 
In the penultimate section of the conclusion, the 
implications of the research findings are used to signpost 
the direction for future work into the area of employment 
change. The main lesson to emerge from this study, it is 
argued is the diversity of historical experience that exists 
across the arena of capital accumulation. 
Finally, we suggest that the offshore fabrication industry, 
as it stands, cannot hope to resuscitate the North East's 
declining economy, but is able to offer an alternative 
avenue for development. This involves the consolidation of 
existing employment structures, by building upon traditional 
informal mechanisms, through the formation of regional 
combines geared increasingly towards a production for long 
term European wide strategic interest, rather than for 
profit. 
xvi 
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CHAPTER 1 
GLOBAL CHANGE AND LOCAL IMPACT IN THE OIL INDUSTRY 
1.1 Introduction 
The international oil industry lS often held up as the 
archetypal example of capitalist development ln the 
twentieth century. But whilst it is certainly an important 
strategic sphere of capitalist relations, this very fact has 
resulted in a unique pattern of development. The strength of 
its importance to successful capitalist operations accounts 
for the extent to which governments have been prepared to 
intervene, at an international level, to ensure regular and 
stable supplies to their domestic economies. At the same 
time, the large-scale exploitation of oil has only been 
possible through the early development and sustenance of 
large corporate entities, whose earnings and scale of 
operations are often larger than those of medium sized 
developed countries. 
This chapter will place the development of the political 
economy of North Sea oil within this wider context. To 
achieve this, it is first necessary to understand the 
historical evolution of the oil industry and the 
restructuring that has occurred in the wake of the OPEC 
"Revolution" of the early 1970s. The exploitation of North 
Sea resources is seen as one of the responses to this 
restructuring process. 
The remainder of the chapter will then chart the evolving 
political economy of North Sea oil, and (in brief) the 
implications this has for the development of the offshore 
supplies industry. In conclusion the regionally specific 
nature of the industry is noted, and the similarities with 
past forms of economic activity in the North East of 
2 
England. 
1.2 changing structures in the international oil industry 
The development of the international oil industry has long 
been associated with the emergence of the "Seven Sisters" 
{Standard Oil's offshoots: Exxon, Mobil and Socal; Gulf, 
Texaco, B.P. and Shell). Up until 1968 these companies still 
retained a large degree of control over 80% of world 
production (outside of North America and the Communist 
Bloc), 70% of world refining capacity and 56% of the world's 
marketing facilities (al-Sowayegh.A, 1984: 10}. 
Below the surface however, the "Sisters" power had long 
since been eroded by the emergence in the international 
arena of other large American companies such as Amoco, 
Continental and Occidental. In tandem with the development 
of these private companies, various state supported concerns 
such as E.N.I. in Italy and Petrobras of Brazil were 
becoming increasingly important players on the international 
stage. Although the "Seven Sisters" has become a meaningless 
term, the role of the multinational, in a wider sense, 
remains dominant, whether epitomised by the actions of older 
international corporations, such as B.P, younger ones, such 
as Amerada Hess, or state sponsored entities (e.g. the 
Kuwait International Oil Company). 
The centralisation and internationalisation of capital 
within the oil industry can be subdivided into three stages: 
the period up until 1945 when the "Seven Sisters" colluded 
to dominate the industry, supported by the imperialist 
tendencies of certain western governments; the post-war era, 
during which the oil market experienced a gradual process of 
restructuring, that was to culminate in the O.P.E.C. 
revolution; and finally, a phase after 
tumultuous events of that year forced 
1973, when 
the various 
the 
oil 
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companies to pursue alternative strategies, to protect their 
capital interests from other emerging actors within the oil 
industry. 
1.2.1 Monopoly Capitalism and the development of the 
international industry 1880-1945 
The large-scale exploitation of oil was not possible until 
the development of drilling technology, capable of 
retrieving oil from great depths under the earth's surface. 
The credit for this technological breakthrough, is usually 
given to Edwin Drake, whose revolutionary drill bit reached 
depths of 650 feet below the surface of the Pennsylvanian 
Coalfield, in 1859. At the time, the principle market for 
oil was as a replacement for coal in kerosene lamps. Not 
only was oil increasingly recognised as a cheaper and more 
efficient form of energy, but it was also much easier to 
handle and distribute from supply areas. Consequently, 
during the last one hundred years, oil has gradually 
overtaken coal as the principle form of energy in the 
transportation and electricity sectors of most 
industrialised economies. 
More specifically, it was the advent of the internal 
combustion engine, that was most significant for the future 
growth and strategic importance of the oil industry within 
the context of twentieth century capitalist development. In 
particular, the rapid growth of the automobile industry 
during the early decades of the twentieth century, within 
the United States, associated with the introduction of the 
production line was a major factor in the exponential 
increase in the demand for oil. As Baran and Sweezy (1966: 
217), in their seminal work, note: 
"The petroleum industry, with more capital investment 
than any other American industry, is in large part a 
creation of the automobile .. " 
4 
In their view (1966: 215-243}, the automobile was the last 
in the line of three major technical innovations (the others 
being the steam engine and the advent of the railway 
system), into which the surplus arising from monopoly 
capitalism could be channelled, to ensure the continuation 
of the prevailing mode of production. In this context, the 
importance of oil to the development and sustenance of the 
capitalist mode of production cannot be overemphasised. If 
the automobile is held up as the motor of growth for the 
major part of the twentieth century, then petroleum has 
certainly been the lubricant. 
The strategic importance of oil to the development of 
twentieth century capitalism1 , added to the tendency for the 
rate of profit in the oil market to rise disproportionately, 
through economies of scale, accounts for the extent to which 
capital became highly concentrated and centralised within 
the industry at an early stage. 
In the United States, the oil market during the 1860s was 
inherently unstable as thousands of small producers undercut 
each other to maintain market share. John D. Rockefeller, 
quick to realise the benefits to be achieved through 
vertical integration, set about stabilising the market, 
through the mechanism of refining operations. Between 1870 
and 1880, Rockefeller's company, Standard Oil of New Jersey, 
pursued an effective purchasing policy (with regard to 
refinery capacity) until by the latter year it controlled 
90% of the U.S industry. By establishing a monopsonist 
position within the market, he was able to achieve effective 
1Mandel (1962: 393-4} has even suggested that the 
United States' early abundance of petroleum resources was a 
major factor in its displacement of the United Kingdom as 
the world's principal economic power during the first half 
of the twentieth century. 
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control over the fledgling American oil industry2 
Although the break up of Standard Oil by the U.S. government 
in 19113 represented an attempt to arrest the oil market's 
tendency towards concentration and centralisation, the 
measure proved to be no more than a temporary reverse. 
Within a few years, even the offshoots of Standard Oil were 
suspected of colluding in a covert manner regarding 
strategic aspects of the oil market. As Roncaglia (1985: 51) 
remarks: 
"Senate documents from 1914 still refer to the 
''invisible government" of Rockefeller and his partners, 
and in 1915 a commission of inquiry concluded that the 
concentration of ownership of the shares in the new 
companies born out of the Trust were so similar to the 
pattern of shareholding in the old Standard Trust that 
it constituted a restraint on competition." 
Despite the hysteria generated, regarding its size and 
control over the national oil market, it is unlikely that 
Standard would have realised a situation of absolute 
monopoly. Whilst in the early years, when oil production had 
been concentrated primarily on the Pennsylvanian coalfield, 
it had been able to establish control with relative ease, it 
2Standard Oil is best perceived as the forerunner of, 
and standard bearer for United States multinationals in the 
twentieth century. As Baran and Sweezy (1966: 198) have 
since noted: 
"It thus appears both from the record of the past and 
from the plans and hopes of the future that American 
corporate business has irrevocably embarked on the road 
long since pioneered by standard Oil. standard is still 
the model of a multinational corporation, but it is no 
longer an exception. It simply shows us in the most 
developed form what the other giants either already are 
or are in the process of becoming." 
3The U.S. supreme Court, acting on the basis of the 
1890 Sherman Anti-Trust Act, had decreed that Standard Oil 
should be divided into 34 independent companies, in the 
interests of competition. 
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was slower to pursue the opportunities 
availability of supplies elsewhere 
presented by the 
(see Williamson, 
Andreano, Daum and Close, 1963). Instead, other companies 
were able to establish powerful bases, by capitalising on 
the various sources of supply then being discovered. In 
particular, Gulf and Texaco (as their names suggest) became 
prominent in the increasingly important producing regions of 
the Gulf Coast and Texas. 4 
outside the United States, Standard Oil had already 
attempted to establish itself in the European market during 
the last decade of the nineteenth century, aware of the 
importance ln maintaining its hitherto dynamic rate of 
expansion. However, as in the U.S, its attempts at market 
domination were hindered by the existence of other actors, 
whose entry into oil operations had been achieved through 
the harnessing of large-scale resources elsewhere. 
In particular, the formation of Royal Dutch Shell, ln 1907 a 
merger of British and Dutch imperial interests, utilising 
extensive reserves in Russia and the Dutch East Indies, was 
principally a protective action against 
international threat of Standard Oil. 
the growing 
Another important corporate entity, Anglo-Persian (B.P.) was 
established in 1914, when the British government became 
aware of the increasing strategic importance of oil for both 
4As a consequence of the establishment of such powerful 
domestic bases, these companies were subsequently able to 
pursue their expansionist interests in the international 
arena, albeit having a smaller range of operations than the 
various Standard oil offshoots. Gulf's international 
interests were principally associated with Kuwaiti oil 
development, whilst Texaco embarked upon a succession of 
ventures with Socal in Latin America. 
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its domestic and imperial interests. As a result, the state 
became a "sleeping" partner in the company, providing the 
finance to exploit the rich oil potential of the Persian 
fields. Similarly, the French company, Compagnie Francaise 
de Petroles was given backing by its national government to 
develop the Mesopotanian oil fields. (C.F.P. is often 
referred to as the "eighth major", although its operations 
were on a smaller scale than those of the other majors.) 
The 1920s were characterised by a series of confrontations 
between the majors as international competition intensified. 
These disputes partially reflected the growing American 
challenge, both politically and economically, to the older 
European colonial powers. In particular, it was the global 
hegemony enjoyed by British capital interests in the 
nineteenth century that was under threat (Baran and Sweezy, 
1966: 182). The most important disputes concerned attempts 
by the U.S. majors to gain access to the emerging large-
scale oil province in the Middle East, which was largely the 
preserve of the European companies. 
The structural changes wrought in the world political 
economy by the effects of the Great War, 1914-1918 (in 
particular, the displacement of Great Britain by the United 
States as the major economic power) were reflected in the 
drawing up of the Achnacarry Agreement in 1928. This 
document accepted the claims of the Americans and 
effectively installed an atmosphere of consensus amongst the 
multinationals by recognising spheres of influence for each 
major company. More importantly, for the future economic 
development of the industry, a pricing agreement was 
negotiated, termed the "Gulf Plus system''· The significance 
of this was that the price of oil at any one trading point 
would be uniform, irrespective of the point of origin. Thus, 
oil companies were able to make vast profits from their 
8 
Middle Eastern operations (where production costs were 
comparatively low), whilst at the same time, subsidising 
their more expensive American operations5 • 
From this point until 1939, the oil industry was effectively 
run as a cartel of the "Seven Sisters". Indeed new producing 
areas were often exploited through joint ventures, e.g. the 
formation of the Kuwait Oil Company by Anglo-Persian and 
Gulf, or collaboration by Socal and Texaco in the creation 
of Caltex to develop Arabian oil. 
1.2.2 Implicit change in the post-war era 
The importance of the Second World War as a destabilising 
influence on the world capitalist economic system cannot be 
5This type of monopoly profit is termed "cartel rent". 
Mandel (1962: 421) explains how the Achnacarry system worked 
in practice: 
"The most striking example of cartel rent as a form of 
monopoly profit is certainly that of the world oil 
cartel. An official inquiry published in 1952 by the 
U.S. Department of Commerce revealed that the "Big 
Seven" of the oil industry... had over a period of 
years imposed common prices for the oil produced in the 
Western hemisphere and that produced in the Middle 
East, though the latter's cost of production was four 
to six times lower than that of American oil. 
During the war and in 1945, the American navy had to 
pay 1.05 dollars the barrel for oil, the cost of 
production of which (including taxes and royalties 
payable to the local rulers) was 0.4 dollars in Saudi 
Arabia and 0.25 dollars in Bahrein. The cartel rent was 
thus 65 cents per barrel produced in Saudi Arabia and 
80 cents per barrel produced in Bahrein, which gives a 
monopoly rate of profit of nearly 200 per cent in the 
former case and over 400 per cent in the latter ... 
"In the post-war years these prices were raised to 2.22 
dollars, then lowered to 2.03, 1.88 and 1.75 dollars 
per barrel, without the costs of production having been 
noticeably changed, with the sole aim of bringing 
prices into line with those of the American producers." 
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overstressed. More important than the obvious physical 
damages to the infrastructure of the western developed 
countries, were the underlying structural implications for 
the world economic and political order. Nowhere was this 
situation more prevalent than in the international oil 
industry. 
Although the majors (at least from all outward appearances) 
were still dominant within the international oil economy 
from 1945 until the late 1960s, their stranglehold on oil 
affairs was gradually weakened during this period, due to 
changes in the underlying structure of the industry, as 
Table 1.1 illustrates. 6 
In particular, there were two fundamental processes behind 
these structural changes: firstly, the collapse of colonial 
rule in various parts of the globe, and subsequently the 
gradual emergence of the OPEC producer nations as important 
actors within the international oil industry, and secondly, 
the reconstruction of Western Europe, based upon oil and 
sponsored by the United States (through the auspices of the 
Marshall Plan) . 
The breakdown of colonialism and the integration of 
producing regions into the World Capitalist system 
The weakening of the western powers' grip on their colonies, 
in the aftermath of the war, allowed the latter to pursue 
forms of political and economic independence, often with the 
tacit support of the United States. Within the oil industry, 
this development was especially pertinent in the 
increasingly important producing regions of the Middle East. 
6N.B. The tables and figures for this thesis are 
located at the end of the respective chapters. 
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As Bina (1985) notes, the growth of the producing countries 
as a dominant force in the world oil market can only be 
fully appreciated through an awareness of the changing 
relationship between them and the major oil companies in the 
post war period. In particular the exchange relations 
between the two parties underwent a fundamental change, away 
from a predominantly pre-capitalist regime towards full 
integration within the framework of the wider international 
oil market. 
During the pre-war period, concession rights granted to oil 
exploration companies were in the form of property rights 
for which a royalty was received, rather than the granting 
of exploration rights for a particular area. Decisions made 
by the sovereign power over the granting of concession 
rights were often in accordance with pre-capitalist values. 
Bina describes the situation at that time (1985: 24): 
" .. the financial obligation of the oil companies to the 
ruling authorities during the early period represents a 
primitive form of economic royalty and the genesis of 
oil rent today. The origin of this primitive form ... 
was the existence of old property relations in 
conjunction with the political climate within which the 
surrender of property rights had taken place." 
In the period up until the OPEC crisis, the relationship 
between the international oil companies and the major 
producing nations underwent a period of transition, towards 
full integration within 
relations7 • In particular 
international capitalist social 
50-50 profit-sharing schemes, 
reflecting producer countries' concerns about issues of 
sovereignity, were gradually imposed upon the companies to 
70PEC was formed in 1960 in response to the oil 
companies unilateral decision to reduce the "posted price" 
of oil on the world markets in the face of a "glut". At the 
time, this did not constitute a radical attempt to change 
the structure of the industry, but rather to stabilise the 
revenues of producer countries. 
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replace existing royalty schemes. By the early 1970s these 
changes were widespread, as Table 1.2 illustrates. 
The reconstruction of Western Europe: the changeover from a 
coal-based to an oil-based economy 
A second contributory factor to the restructuring of the 
international oil industry was the growth in importance of 
the demand within Europe (and Japan) for oil products. 
The rebuilding of Western European economies was largely 
achieved through the switch away from coal to oil (Odell, 
1986) 8 • 
The importance of this new development was twofold. Firstly, 
the new sources of supply that became available, to match 
the increased demand, were often in areas outside the 
control of the majors, e.g.in North Africa and Nigeria. 
Secondly, as their economies became increasingly dependent 
upon imported supplies of oil, European consuming nations 
sought to reduce their dependence upon the multinational oil 
companies either through the establishment of state oil 
companies, or by championing the interests of domestically 
based oil companies abroad (Tanzer, 1974: 78-91) . 9 This 
situation coincided with the emergence of formerly domestic 
8The switch to oil had been fostered by the terms of 
the Marshall Plan (for economic aid to Europe) which 
insisted that the price of oil should be reduced to reflect 
true costs. Prior to this, oil prices had included the cost 
of transportation from the Mexican Gulf, irrespective of the 
source of origin. 
9In many countries there was also an expansion in 
refinery capacity so that they could benefit from the high 
value added during the production process. An alternative 
means of avoiding the control of the majors was demonstrated 
by West Germany, which pursued a policy based upon the 
increased import of Soviet oil. 
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oriented U.S. companies, at the international level. 10 
Before 1945 only six non-majors were involved in 
international exploration, but by 1953 twenty-eight u.s. 
companies were working in this field (Ghadar, 1977: 7) . 11 
1.2.3 The OPEC revolution and its aftermath 
As Bina notes (1985: 110-119) the OPEC revolution 
represented the climax to a period of implicit, but 
fundamental change, rather than a process of restructuring 
itself. It also marked the beginning of the "Era of 
Integrated Oil Operations" 
extensive transition period. 
(Bina, 1985: 27) following an 
At the same time, the ability 
of the OPEC countries to express themselves as fully-fledged 
capital entities would not have been possible without the 
element of developing European demand and the accompanying 
weakness of the "Sisters's" position illustrated by Table 
1. 2. 
The rise of OPEC 
Notice of OPEC's intention to achieve control over upstream 
oil operations had been served in the form of a "Declaratory 
Statement•• in 1968. This represented the culmination of what 
Bina would describe as the transitionary phase of 
10For a detailed account of this process see Jacoby 
(1974: 120-149). 
11 Several factors were responsible for this development: 
(a) U.S. government taxation policies such as the "depletion 
allowance" encouraged companies to engage in overseas 
operations. 
(b) "Independents" were encouraged to enter by producing 
countries, determined to loosen the grip of the "sisters" 
(Sampson, 1975: 140-155). 
(c) Finally technological changes that made exploration 
cheaper in real terms, reducing the "economies of scale" 
effect, which had initially contributed to increasing 
centralisation of control within the industry. 
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international oil operations 12 • From this time onwards, oil 
operations within the OPEC countries were to be fully 
integrated into the global capitalist economy, whilst the 
controlling forces in these areas became important actors in 
the international oil market. As Bina writes {1985: 115): 
"Since 1970 the international oil industry developed 
into an organic entity composed of different oil 
regions of the world. The consequence of such a 
development was a major reorganisation through crisis 
that swept through the entire structure of the oil 
industry at the global level. Therefore the oil crisis 
of 1973-74 was historically the first economic crisis 
of the oil industry at the international level." 
The first phase of this reorganisation occurred in the 
period from 1968 to 1973 with negotiations between the oil 
companies and the various governments, concerning the price 
structure of the oil market. The issue was over posted 
prices in the oil market, traditionally the principle method 
of control prior to the era of fully integrated production. 
During this period, OPEC achieved small increases in the 
price of oil after negotiations with the oil companies. At 
the same time, Libya {the world's largest oil exporter 
outside the Soviet Union and especially important as a 
12Despite the general excellence of his analysis, Bina 
does not satisfactorily account for the aggressive change in 
attitude by the OPEC countries. Whilst there is not the 
space here to investigate this issue in detail, one should 
stress the importance of the social reproduction process in 
altering the perceptions of actors in this situation. There 
is little consideration given to the fact that the old 
decision makers of the colonial world {in the OPEC 
countries) had largely been replaced by a new generation 
more familiar with the workings of capital. Thus, Libya's 
radical policies after 1969 have to be seen in the light of 
the overthrow of King Idris and his replacement by the 
regime of Qadhafi in that same year. Similarly Saudi 
Arabia's policies in the 1970s were shaped by Sheik Yamani, 
probably the most poignant example of this "New Wave" of 
thinkers. 
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source of supply to Western Europe) unilaterally 
nationalised the marketing side of the industry and 
successfully imposed stricter production limits upon the 
international companies. Its lead was followed by similar 
policies from the Algerian government. 
But the situation changed fundamentally on October 16th 
1973, when OPEC unilaterally announced a 70 per cent price 
increase13 • This event coincided with action by certain Arab 
producers, 1.e. withholding oil supplies, against pro-
Israeli western consuming nations during the Yom Kippur War. 
OPEC's success in both these ventures established the 
organisation as the principal determinator and administrator 
of the price of oil on the world market. 14 
13Th is measure circumvented the posted price system and 
introduced the "spot market" as the principle determinant of 
international oil prices. This was a crucial moment, 
representing as it did, the first instance of OPEC countries 
acting independently of the multinational companies in an 
oil market and secondly, the full integration of the oil 
market into the capitalist market system of exchange. Prior 
to this, the agreements reached between Arab producer 
countries and the oil companies had still contained elements 
that were a throwback to the colonial age. 
140ne theory especially popular amongst Europeans during 
the 1970s (Chevalier, 1975) was that the United States 
covertly supported the measures adopted by OPEC. Its import 
quota policy had supported inefficient domestic producers 
during the 1960s, keeping u.s. fuel prices well above those 
of her main competitors. Therefore rising prices in the 
international oil market helped to improve the 
competitiveness of U.S. firms. However this seems unlikely, 
given the obvious effect of a regime of rising oil prices on 
the wider U.S. economy, heavily based, as it was, on 
petroleum. Indeed the U.S. suffered a depression in its 
major manufacturing areas several years earlier than Europe, 
where state intervention in ailing industrial sectors proved 
to be more durable. 
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The organisation maintained this hegemony (with the tacit 
support of the majors) over the oil market up until the 
second major price shock (1979/80), when the diversification 
strategies of multinational capital into other oil regions 
(aided and abetted by Western nations) was to undermine the 
position of OPEC (El Mokadem et al, 1984) . 15 They were to 
benefit in this respect from the discovery of large energy 
supplies in hitherto unexploited regions such as Alaska and 
the North Sea during the 1950s and 1960s. But only after the 
restructuring of the oil market and the subsequent price 
increases of the 1970s were these high cost oil provinces 
considered viable. 16 
OPEC's price increases of the late seventies underestimated 
the changing structure of the oil market, and in particular 
the growth of other suppliers (see Figure 1.1) Prices rose 
from a range of $12-14/barrel in 1978 to $31-43/barrel by 
the end of 1980. But, as a result, non-OPEC oil became 
more in an increasingly "soft" considerably 
market with OPEC 
competitive 
losing its role as the main price 
market ( Ahrar i, determinator to the 
1985; Gately, 1986) . 17 
international "spot" 
15The strategies of the international oil companies also 
included diversification away from the oil sector, 
particularly into mineral and metal extraction during the 
1970s and 1980s (Mikdashi, 1986: 13-14). 
16Multinational companies also intensified their 
interests into downstream activities such as petrochemicals, 
and alternative sources of energy, e.g. ESSO's involvement 
with oil shale developments in Australia, Texaco's work on 
gasohol and coal gasification (Croll, 1980) 
17The role of the international companies, in 
restructuring the oil market, was crucial in this respect. 
They were primarily responsible for the exploitation of 
alternative sources of energy, that had previously been 
unprofitable. Following the events of 1973-4 the real price 
of oil fell on the world market, thus reducing this new 
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Since 1980 OPEC producers have attempted to reduce output to 
regain market supremacy without success. This has favoured 
other more, high cost producers especially the United 
Kingdom, whose output, from a starting point of zero in 
1974, had reached 100 million tonnes per annum by 1983, 
making it the world's fifth largest producer. OPEC's share 
of production dwindled from 60% in 1978 to 50% by 1984 
(Ahrari, 1985). The market became increasingly unstable 
during the middle years of the 1980s (prices fell to 
$10/barrel in 1986) leading to restructuring amongst the 
multinationals, the most significant being the takeover of 
Gulf by Socal. Despite this there are signs that OPEC's long 
term strategic advantage, given the relative wealth of the 
Middle East's resources, may lead to a tighter market in the 
1990s. 
1.3 North Sea Oil in a global framework 
The integration of North Sea oil into the system of global 
oil operations has to be seen in the context of the events 
outlined above. Since the late 1960s it had been recognised 
that the region was potentially rich in carboniferous fuels 
but the high costs of extraction precluded development, 
whilst the multinational companies could extract large 
profits and control production in their traditional areas of 
operation. Thus, it is no coincidence that interest and 
development expenditures in the area grew substantially in 
the aftermath of the OPEC Revolution. IR Not only were the 
profitability. With this in mind the second price shock of 
1979-80 clearly benefitted the international companies 1n 
their new areas of operation, a fact that has led some 
commentators (e.g. Andreasjan, 1989) to suggest that they 
engineered the change. 
'~Such was the intensity of exploration and development 
activity in the U.K. sector of the North Sea following OPEC 
events, that the short time-lag between the first discovery 
(1970) and first production {1975) was almost unprecedented 
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international oil companies favourably disposed towards an 
area that offered opportunities for the production of oil, 
within an established framework of relatively stable 
capitalist social relations, but the price increases that 
accompanied the OPEC restructuring had transformed the 
economic nature of the North Sea. 
Development of the United Kingdom's oil resources has become 
increasingly dependent upon events in the wider 
international oil sphere during the 1980s. The lack of 
government involvement or regulation in the industry (see 
below) has resulted in the growing strength of international 
oil operators, who will base their development decisions 
according to their expected rates of return on ventures 
elsewhere. The consequence of this is that extraction of 
North Sea resources (particularly with regard to the more 
marginal fields) has become almost completely contingent 
upon the dynamic price of oil on the world's spot markets. 
This was vividly illustrated during the sharp price fall of 
the middle eighties (Figure 1.2) when the North Sea 
experienced its first major slump. We now examine the 
development of North Sea oil and policy responses in more 
detail. 
1.3.1 The evolution of state policy prior to 1979 
In the period following the Second World War, Britain 
imported increasing quantities of energy. This was 
associated with a change in the structure of the demand for 
energy, as Table 1. 3 illustrates. Domestic coal gradually 
lost its position to cheaper imported oil, predominantly 
from the Middle East. This change in the structure of energy 
demand was associated with a switch away from a coal based 
in oil history. 
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economy to one powered by more fluid hydrocarbons such as 
oil and gas. The increasing dependence upon imported oil 
became especially prevalent following the O.P.E.C. 
revolution in the 1970s, when inflated oil prices became a 
major factor behind the growing deficit in the Balance of 
Payments' Current Account (see Figure 1.3). 
Therefore the discovery of oil in the North Sea, not only 
made the United Kingdom a net energy exporter for the first 
time since 1945, but also coincided with a period of rapid 
price increases during the 1970s. Clunies-Ross (1986) 
reminds us that "United Kingdom oil came in on the crest of 
a high price wave". Under these circumstances, the issues of 
energy self-sufficiency and the increased government 
revenue, arising from the exploitation of North Sea oil, 
have tended to underpin national policy at the expense of 
alternative strategies. 
The legislative framework for the exploitation of North Sea 
resources was laid down in the 1964 Continental Shelf Act. 19 
This was in response to the discovery of hydrocarbons in the 
southern sector of the North Sea and at Groningen ln the 
Netherlands. The main rationale behind this legislative 
19The act introduced a licensing system based upon a 
grid network. Within this network individual blocks (of 250 
square kilometres) were allocated to companies on a 
discretionary basis. Grid systems were also used in Holland 
(550 square kilometres) and Norway (450 square kilometres), 
whereas Denmark and West Germany preferred to give 
exploration rights to individual consortiums. 
Initially the bulk of the exploration blocks taken up were 
in the southern North Sea with gas production under way in 
the British sector from the Sole gas field (discovered in 
1965) by the end of the 1960s. The vast majority of the 475 
blocks taken up in the first two rounds (1965 and 1966) were 
in the southern North Sea. 
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framework was to encourage a rapid rate of exploration. 
At the time, the North Sea was only considered to be a 
marginal hydrocarbon province. With larger and cheaper 
supplies available elsewhere, the government, lacking the 
indigenous expertise 1n the oil sphere, felt compelled to 
offer an environment favourable to the large oil 
multinationals. The clauses relating to the extraction of 
mineral resources represented an almost wholesale 
transference of the landward 1934 Petroleum Production Act 
to the offshore sector. This gave private companies the 
right to acquire mineral rights under licence from the 
sovereign power. 
In addition, companies were offered a highly favourable 
taxation regime, a rate of 50-60%, compared to other areas 
such as the Middle East (75-80%) or Nigeria (70-75%). The 
annual rental was also kept at a low level: £6,250 per block 
for the first six years, subsequently rising in £10,000 
stages to a maximum of £72,500 (MacKay and Mackay, 1975). To 
stimulate exploration a total of 2655 blocks (each 250 
square kilometres) was made available in the first four 
licensing rounds, between 1964 and 1970. 
During the 1960s the government's primary concern was with 
the extraction of Natural Gas in the southern sector of the 
North Sea. But the discovery of the huge Ekofisk and Forties 
oil fields in more northern waters (in 1969 and 1970 
respectively) heralded a new era in the development of the 
North Sea. This upturn in the North Sea's fortunes was 
reflected in both the number of blocks on offer and in the 
number of interested parties in the Fourth Round of 
licensing {Table 1.4). During this period, the Forties, 
Claymore and Piper fields were all discovered and declared 
commercially viable in the Central Graben off the east coast 
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of Scotland. 
Towards the end of 1972 a larger oil province was discovered 
to the north in the Viking Graben, which included Brent, 
Maureen and Thistle (see Appendix 1 for a map of North Sea 
fields up to 1985). By the end of 1974 Argyll, Auk, Brent 
and Montrose had all been declared commercially viable 
(Table 1. 5 illustrates the levels of production from the 
major fields since 1975). 
The new developments presented the opportunity for a 
reassessment of government policy which had, up until this 
point, been characterised by 
earlier government report (Dept 
25.1.1973 "North Sea Oil and Gas: 
four objectives were outlined: 
nonintervention20 • In an 
of Trade and Industry, 
a report to Par 1 iament) 
to reduce dependence on 
imported oil; to use the revenue to redress the country's 
Balance of Payments' deficit; to gain exchequer revenue from 
rents and royalties; and (almost as an afterthought) to 
encourage new employment and technology, particularly ln 
Scotland. However the basic political framework for, and 
underlying rationale behind, oil exploitation did not change 
during the 1970s. Although legislation was passed, for all 
practical purposes, policy objectives remained the same. If 
anything the rapid price rises associated with the OPEC 
revolution only reinforced government determination to 
pursue the rapid depletion policy. 
Government policy was increasingly dominated by concern over 
the macroeconomy and tackling the recurring Balance of 
Payments problem (Table 1. 6). As a result the first three 
objectives tended to override the fourth, oil revenues were 
20This was inspite of a Labour Party White Paper (1967) 
which advocated some degree of state control in the sector. 
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perceived as a quick and efficient means of putting the 
country back into the black11 • Little attention was given to 
the opportunities presented to ailing sectors of British 
industry by the market for engineering goods that the North 
Sea presented. Only in 1974 was the Offshore Supplies Office 
set up as a reaction to the highly critical International 
Management and Engineering Group (I.M.E.G.) report in 1972. 
This had noted that British companies were only achieving a 
25-30 per cent share of a market worth £500-600 million. The 
O.S.O. was given the task of "encouraging" British companies 
to take advantage of this market. Its principle instrument 
for achieving this was the "Full and Fair Opportunities 
Policy" to ensure that British companies were not being 
discriminated against by foreign oil companies in the 
granting of contracts. Although more British companies did 
enter the North Sea market after this point (the share 
rising to 40 per cent by 1976), they tended to operate in 
areas that were peripheral to the core of decision making 
and new technology. In this sense, the FFO can largely be 
regarded as a rearguard action, which as Cameron {1986: 18) 
notes: 
11 
•• implies a 
firms in many, 
recognition of dependence 
if not, most areas." 
upon foreign 
By the early 1970s multinational oil companies held sway 
over the North Sea oil market. The absence of government 
intervention had led to the incorporation of the British 
21 The most obvious and frequently quoted contrast in 
policy is with Norway (Earney, 1982; Lind and Mackay, 1980; 
Noreng, 1980). Here, the greater level of government 
regulation and the slower rate of depletion have been 
directed towards a conscious effort to upgrade the economic 
structure of the less developed areas of northern Norway. As 
Mariussen (1987: 6) notes: 
"In Norway, the development of "petroleum regions" 
through decentralisation of petroleum administration 
has been instrumental in a decentralization policy." 
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North Sea into the international capitalist arena. As such 
the terms of development were decided almost exclusively by 
large corporations, whose aims happened to coincide with a 
benevolent British state during the 1970s. 
However by the time of the Labour Party's second election 
victory in 1974, circumstances had altered the international 
oil situation. Having lost control over the means of 
production in the OPEC countries, the multinationals were 
intent on diversifying into other regions. On the new 
balance sheet, the North Sea (with new and substantial 
discoveries occurring almost weekly) was now a positive 
asset. As we have already noted, the huge increases in the 
oil price instigated by OPEC (see Figure 1.2) had given 
North Sea oil an acceptable aura of profitability. 
In addition to the improved relative economic position of 
North Sea oil, the stable political situation in the United 
Kingdom, allied to cultural similarities with the United 
States (the host nation for the majority of multinationals) 
further enhanced the international oil community's 
perception of the North Sea sector. 
It was this situation that encouraged the new Labour 
government to establish a state oil company, under the terms 
of the Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act, 1975. 
Although, at the time, this decision appeared to herald the 
onset of a new era, ultimately this piece of legislation 
proved to be an exercise in cosmetics. 
The new entity was to be based upon the Norwegian model, 
statoil, with the aim of participating in all aspects of oil 
activity. It was hoped that such action would limit the 
power of the international oil companies and ensure the 
development of marginal fields, that were unattractive to 
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the private sector. Not only would this prolong North Sea 
developments but also partially stabilise an historically 
dynamic market. From 1976 onwards, the company was to have a 
51% stake in all future field developments and the 
government had the legal ability to control the rate of 
production. Between 1976 and 1979 B.N.O.C. was active in the 
development of the Thistle, Ninian, Dunlin, Statfjord and 
Murchison fields. 
Although its terms gave the government much scope for 
intervention to encourage alternative policies (especially 
linked to regional development within Scotland) in reality 
the conservative Labour government sought to allay the fears 
of the private sector, rather than change the terms of 
reference on which oi 1 production had been based. 22 Indeed 
public organisations established to oversee offshore 
developments, such as the Offshore Energy Technology Board, 
were often dominated by oil industry personalities (Jenkin, 
1981: 104). 
The government remained committed to a policy of rapid 
development, as the first North Sea fields began to pump 
oil, until the objective of energy self-sufficiency had been 
achieved23 • The reality of the situation was that the 
unstable political and economic climate of the 1970s caused 
22The government also faced a hostile campaign against 
interventionist policies by various sections of the media, 
whose sympathies were largely with the oil companies. Indeed 
in some cases media organisations (most notably the Thomson 
group) actually had business interests in North Sea 
developments (McBarnett, 1980). 
23Concern about the rapid depletion rates was expressed 
by both Conservative and Labour M.P.s at the time (Robinson 
and Morgan, 1978), but the government persisted in the 
policy despite protests from other interest groups 
(especially the Scottish Nationalists). 
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the government to neglect longer term structural strategies 
towards oil development. Instead it was hypnotised by the 
possibilities that huge revenues from North Sea oil offered 
for solving its short term problems. The government 
viewpoint was neatly encapsulated in a contemporary article 
by Adrian Hamilton for the Financial Times: 
"Here the new Chancellor, Mr Dennis Healey, told the 
Commons was the light at the end of the tunnel, the 
asset against which the country could borrow to see it 
through its current difficulties. Here, the Energy 
Secretary informed the Press, was the development which 
would make the country the strongest energy nation in 
the West. And here, the Prime Minister told the 
country, was the God-given asset which the state would 
control and which would turn the country's difficulties 
into short-term problems rather than long term 
disaster." 
(Financial Times, 8.1.1975: 9) 
It so happened that the government's 
coincided with the diversification 
aims in this respect 
strategies of the 
international oil companies in the wake of global 
restructuring. Indeed the level of collaboration with the 
private sector (especially with B.P.) was such that B.N.O.C. 
was commonly perceived as an ally of multinational industry, 
rather than an instrument of state regulation.N 
The government's unwillingness to 
the private sector in the 
understandable during the sixties 
challenge the hegemony of 
North Sea was perhaps 
and early seventies. It 
lacked the experience required to develop oil, whilst the 
Continental 
hydrocarbon 
companies 
elsewhere. 
Shelf had not proved itself to be a major 
province. Additionally the multinational 
retained control over large scale oil assets 
But in the late seventies, the Labour government 
Mindeed the new nationalised oil entity exhibited all 
the features of state capitalism practised in other sectors 
of the economy during this period (Beynon et al, 1986). 
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failed to capitalise on the vulnerability of the 
international oil companies, in a changing economic and 
political climate.~ 
1. 3. 2 Ten years of "enterprise culture" in the North Sea 
1979-89 
The election of a radical Conservative government, on the 
platform of free enterprise, heralded a marked change of 
attitude towards North Sea developments. Whereas preceding 
governments in the post war era could be defined within the 
Keynesian consensus, the Thatcher government was novel in 
its initial adherence to the concepts of Monetarist 
ideology. One of the cornerstone's of this approach was the 
dismantling of the apparatus of state control, which 
hindered competition in the private sector. As such, the 
existence of a state-owned oil company was clearly anathema 
to such a government. Indeed the dismantling of B.N.O.C. had 
been propounded as part of the 1979 Tory election manifesto. 
Despite the nature of its political rhetoric, the new 
government found it convenient to use B.N.O.C. to surmount 
its initial economic 
corporation was used 
difficulties. 
to bolster 
Ironically the 
the Conservatives' 
monetarist experiment, e.g. in 1980 B.N.O.C. was persuaded 
to delay development of the Clyde field, because the capital 
costs would increase the Public Sector Borrowing 
25A note of qualification should be made here with 
regard to the British political situation at the end of the 
1970s. The Keynesian post war consensus had largely become 
discredited due to the United Kingdom's poor economic 
performance, and rising levels of unemployment accompanied 
by a growing inflation problem. As such, a strong state 
involvement in oil affairs would have been against the tide 
of opinion in government circles. What Gamble ( 1988: 17 4-
207} describes as a new hegemonic project was emerging, for 
freeing the economy from state controls, into which a state 
oil company did not fit. 
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Requirement, damaging the government's Medium Term Financial 
Strategy. The Tories also increased Petroleum Revenue Tax to 
70 per cent in 1981, again in pursuance of their M.T.F.S. 
After surviving its early economic and political 
difficulties, the government was able to pursue its radical 
privatisation policies. The important legislation regarding 
B.N.O.C. had to wait until 1982, and the Oil and Gas 
Enterprise Act. This reduced B.N.O.C. to an oil trading role 
as a private company (the National Oil Account was 
abolished) , whilst the exploration and development interests 
were incorporated into a newly privatised company, Britoil. 
The Act also reduced the British Gas Corporation's role as a 
monopsonist within the North Sea gas market (and privatised 
its oil interests in the form of Enterprise Oil), whilst at 
the same time instructing it to sell its interest in the 
Wych Farm onshore oil field. 
The revenue from North Sea oil has largely been used to 
bolster the government's macroeconomic policies. As a 
result, the government has supervised a rapid rise in 
production, as Figure 1. 4 indicates. Little consideration 
has been given to alternative strategies and the 
government's privatisation policies have left North Sea oil 
developments largely in the hands of the private sector. 
The centralisation of control in the United Kingdom oil 
sector 
The main consequence of the 
policies in the oil sector 
Conservative government's 
has been the increased 
centralisation of resources amongst the international oil 
companies. Although, as we have 
international oil companies had risen 
production of the United Kingdom's 
already noted, the 
to prominence in the 
energy resources, the 
opportunities presented by North Sea developments encouraged 
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the creation of a new category of oil company: the 
"Independents" (companies solely involved in oil and gas 
exploration), particularly with regard to the exploration of 
areas considered marginal by multinationals. The lack of 
government regulation however has left these minnows 
increasingly vulnerable to multinational predators. 
During the 1960s and early 1970s it was the multinationals 
that had set the pace in North Sea developments. But 
following the OPEC price rises in 1973, other forms of 
capital began to take an interest in the potential of the 
North Sea oil market, which represented a growth sector 
offering high profit dividends, at a time when the wider 
economy was experiencing stagflation. Broadly speaking two 
types of new investor were brought into the North Sea in the 
period from 1973 to 1985. Firstly, there were the large 
conglomerates with interests outside the oil industry, which 
were attracted by the short term investment potential of the 
North Sea. As such these entities have characteristically 
taken up small blocks of shares in individual fields, whilst 
allowing established oil companies to hold the principal 
operating position. This type of relationship suits both 
parties: for a small capital stake, the non-oil concern has 
widened its investment portfolio, whilst the oil company has 
an alternative source of revenue and reduced its investment 
in what remains a risk-laden operating environment 
(especially compared to its traditional areas of operation). 
A prime example of this type of operation is B. P. 's Bruce 
Field, discovered in 1974, whose shareholders presently 
include Associated Newspapers ( 6 per cent) and Kleinwort 
Benson (1.2 per cent). 
The second wave of entrants to the North Sea sphere of 
operations were those that are now collectively referred to 
as the "Independent" oil sector. This group was particularly 
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active after the second price shock of 1979, when an 
increasing number of formerly "marginal" oil fields were 
declared profitable. As well as Britoil and Enterprise Oil, 
the Conservative government's privatised flagships of the 
oil sector, there was the emergence of new enterprises (e.g. 
Sun Oil), boosted to a certain extent by the government's 
attempts to encourage small business through its licensing 
policy. But of more significance to these companies was the 
favourable oil market environment of the early 1980s: 
"All of us had a very significant advantage, not only 
in being awarded acreage at a time when some of that 
acreage was prospective and therefore we were able to 
make discoveries which sustained us, but we had the 
fair wind of a following oil price ... and were able to 
get the support of shareholders and the city, allowing 
our shares to remain high and allowing us to use equity 
financing in large part." 
(BRINDEX evidence to Select Committee on Energy, 1988) 
Up until November 1985, with reasonably high oil prices, 
several of these companies were able to establish themselves 
as oil operators in their own right, through the discovery 
of unexpectedly profitable fields, often in areas previously 
discarded by the multinationals. But the drastic price 
reductions from this point onwards, combined with the end of 
the first phase of oil activity in the North SeaM, 
encouraged a period of restructuring amongst the major oil 
companies. The independents with their highly prized assets, 
became victims of their own success. Undermined by their 
plummeting share values on the stock exchange, they 
MThe middle years of the 1980s marked the peak in U.K. 
oil production. From this point onwards it was generally 
recognised that the majority of larger and most profitable 
fields had been discovered. In the future, development 
attempts would centre around smaller and more marginal 
fields, and be more than ever dependent upon the price of 
oil on the world markets. In this situation the position of 
the Independents was likely to be increasingly undermined. 
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presented the ideal opportunity for a takeover wave, which 
would not only allow the multinationals to re-establish 
their hegemony in the North Sea, but also enable them to 
rationalise their own North Sea interests and reappraise 
their global strategies. Subsequently the number of 
independents has declined by half to 31 since its peak in 
1982. In 1988, the year of greatest takeover activity, the 
number declined from 40 to 31. Apart from the most notorious 
takeover of Britoil by B.P, Tricentrol and Acre Oil have 
recently been absorbed by larger concerns. The position of 
other independents is far from secure, e.g. Elf Aquitaine, 
the French oil giant presently has a 25 per cent stake in 
Enterprise Oil. 
The decline of the independents and the increasing 
concentration of oil acreage in the hands of the 
international companies in the North Sea has important 
consequences for the status of the North Sea as a 
hydrocarbon province. The independents, by their very 
nature, were committed to a certain level of North Sea 
development, and the evidence of the early 1980s s that 
their presence helped to maintain exploration effort during 
a period when most of the most profitable and easily 
exploitable fields had been discovered and developed. 
Despite this, the international oil companies have now 
regained their initial dominant position in the North Sea, 
and as such the sector has been fully reintegrated into the 
global oil economy. Future investment decisions are 
increasingly balanced against individual corporations' 
holdings in other parts of the world. Under these 
circumstances the North Sea, as a mature resource region, 
will increasingly be regarded as peripheral to the 
mainstream of the oil industry. 
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Government reaction to this recent activity has been 
relatively muted, in any 
which 
case it is hoist by its own free 
market petard, precludes intervention. This 
Conservative government also seems unconcerned in practice 
about encouraging competition 1n markets, despite its 
earlier rhetoric. Britoil was allowed to be swallowed up by 
B.P. despite the government's "special share" in the 
cornpany. 27 With the subsequent job losses at Britoil {970 at 
Aberdeen and Glasgow)n the government's position has been 
to highlight the net job gain as a result of B.P. 's other 
North Sea activities in Scotland, although these jobs are in 
field development (Bruce) or construction projects 
(modifications to the Grangernouth chemical and Kinneil gas 
plants), traditionally marginal and short term activities. 
The attitude of the present government has reflected that of 
its predecessors in not corning to terms with the long term 
strategic significance of North Sea oil. Naivety during the 
1960s was replaced by hesitancy in the 1970s. This situation 
allowed experienced multinational oil entities to dominate 
the political economy of North Sea oil. In the 1980s this 
trend has been positively accentuated by a government, 
hidebound in its belief in market forces. Its privatisation 
policies have encouraged the centralisation of control, and 
fostered an increasingly oligopolistic North Sea oil market, 
rather than creating a 
following section examines 
competitive environment. 
the implications of 
The 
this 
27The laissez-faire attitude of the Tory government has 
been fueled by persuasive arguments in the media decrying 
the role of the independents (Financial Times, 23-8-88, "The 
case for small players may be hard to prove") and by the 
powerful publicity machines of the multinationals. For 
example, B.P.'s widely circulated journal, Shield (1988: 6-
11) ran an article ''justifying" its takeover of Britoil. 
nselect Committee on Energy (1989) 
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development for the industry that grew up to supply North 
Sea oil. 
1.. 4 The nature of the Offshore supplies Industry in the 
North Sea 
The development of the North Sea's oil and gas resources has 
created a supply market, worth £60 billion up to 1984 
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 1984). The diverse number of 
companies that operate within this market is usually grouped 
together as the "offshore supplies industry". Not only is 
this industry new in British terms, but it is novel on the 
world stage, originating ln the 1930s, when American 
companies first attempted to extract oil offshore in Lake 
Maracaibo (Cook, 1986: 213). Although there will be a 
greater analysis of the structure and development of the 
industry in Chapter 4, a brief outline of the industry's 
development in the United Kingdom is given here. 
From the outset, the role of indigenous supply firms has 
largely been confined to the more peripheral sectors of the 
economy, such as in the final assembly of rigs. 29 Foreign 
companies (such as the United States firm, Brown and Root) 
with experience of operating overseas were able to establish 
hegemony in the key areas of project design and management 
as a result of their early involvement in the North Sea. 30 
Although the percentage of British based firms and loca 1 
employment in the offshore sphere boomed throughout the 
seventies, the key decision making powers lay outside the 
29Hallwood (1988) uses evidence from a study of the 
supply industry in Aberdeen to suggest that the incoming 
American companies actually colluded to deter domestic 
companies from entering this core. 
min fact U.S. supply firms were involved in the first 
exploration for gas off the Dutch coast, during the latter 
part of the 1950s. 
32 
United Kingdom. 
Initially, the offshore supplies market during the 1960s, 
was associated with the development of gas resources in the 
southern North Sea. The capital requirements for such 
developments, in shallow waters were minor in comparison 
with later field development costs for oil exploitation. The 
small size of this early market partially explains the 
unwillingness of either British business or the state, to 
become involved in North Sea operations. 31 As a consequence, 
the earliest developments in oil rig construction were 
largely the preserve of foreign companies. 
American firms 1n particular were able to establish a 
foothold in the North Sea, by using techniques pioneered in 
older offshore regions, such as the Gulf of Mexico and Lake 
Maracaibo. Of the European companies, the French quickly 
established themselves in several key areas: Forex and 
Foramer were successful in the exploration drilling sector; 
UIE became an important jacket and module fabricator; whilst 
ETPM dominated the market for pipelaying and installation. 
Although Norwegian firms were unable to match the success of 
French companies during the early stages, there were several 
notable successes, especially from shipbuilders such as 
Aker, who persevered in the fabrication market despite early 
setbacks. 
31 Although the shipbuilding industry did initially 
participate in the construction of drilling and support 
vessels, substantial losses were made on these early 
ventures, which tended to discourage further activity. There 
was also a lack of financial capital available, resulting 
from the City's unwillingness to invest in the oil sector. 
By 1975 only 20 per cent of finance had come from British 
banks (Hamilton, 1978). 
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The discovery of vast oil resources in the deeper northern 
North Sea, allied to the destabilising effects of the OPEC 
revolution, meant that the North Sea attained a higher 
priority as 
development 
significant 
requirements 
a hydrocarbon province. The implications of this 
for the offshore supplies industry were 
in three aspects. Firstly, the capital 
for the exploitation of oil at such great 
depths were likely to be enormous, compared to previous 
investments. Secondly, the fact that the new resources were 
at a greater depth than for any previous offshore related 
activity, would necessitate a high level of research and 
development work. The third aspect that was of considerable 
importance for the structure of power relations, within the 
industry, was that the firms that had entered the offshore 
market in the early stages would be in the more favourable 
position to profit from this secondary stage of 
developments. 
As we have seen, British companies were only able to obtain 
a 25 per cent share in the burgeoning offshore supplies 
market up until the formation of the Offshore Supplies 
Office in 1974. The lack of British market share of the 
United Kingdom offshore sector (32 per cent up to 1974) was 
compounded by an inability to break into other offshore 
markets, as a result of the protectionist policies of 
foreign governments, most notably Holland and Norway. 
Although British companies have improved their share in the 
overall market (to 84 per cent by 1988) their late entry has 
left them at a strategic disadvantage within the industry. 
This has serious implications for the industry's long term 
survival, which is likely to hinge on the ability to export 
after the North Sea boom dissipates. 
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1.5 The impact of oil operations at the regional level 
The peripheral role of British activity in the North Sea has 
important consequences for the existing pattern of 
capitalist social relations at the regional and local 
levels. Not only have regional issues been neglected by 
successive governments, whether Conservative or Labourn, 
but academics have also been reluctant to develop studies of 
oil and regional impact. 
Ironically those areas that were most affected by incoming 
oil developments had long been regarded as "underdeveloped" 
rural locations (Scottish Highlands) or "decaying" "Old 
Industrial Regions" 33 (the north east of England and the 
Greater Glasgow region of Scotland). These "problem" regions 
had come to be regarded as endemic within the national 
framework, largely because they had not reacted to policy 
stimulants imposed from above by central governments of 
various political persuasions. 
The attention that has been focussed upon oil and regional 
development has been heavily biassed towards Scottish 
issues. For most of the 1970s the debate focussed upon the 
impact of oil with regard to the devolution issue (e.g. 
32The one instance of state regional policy in the 
offshore fabrication industry occurred in the mid 1970s 
(Cook and Surrey, 1982: 28), when the Labour government 
purchased two sites in Scotland, at Portavidie and 
Hunterston, in attempt to take advantage of the concrete rig 
market. Unfortunately the vast majority of platforms built 
after this point were steel, rather than concrete, resulting 
in the sites being made redundant and the loss of £23.5 
million in government expenditure. 
33This term has been taken from Hudson's (1988, 1989a) 
usage, and refers to those areas that spawned the earliest 
developments in industrial capitalism. 
35 
MacKay and Mackay, 1975). Later as the prospects for 
devolution diminished, attention focussed upon the 
vulnerability of Scottish industry to oil price shocks (see 
Salmon and Walker, 1986}. 
At a more local level, research has concentrated upon two 
strands. Firstly, the analysis of the social and economic 
impact of oil on existing urban areas. Aberdeen, as a major 
new growth pole has attracted the most attention in this 
respect {House, 1980; Harris et al, 1986; Hallwood, 1988). 
Alternatively, Moore (1980) demonstrates how the interests 
of the local community in Peterhead are ultimately 
subservient to those of the British state and the major 
corporations where the development of oil resources is 
concerned. 
Secondly there has been some emphasis upon the issue of oil 
impact in rural areas of Northern Scotland (Cairns and 
Rogers, 1981). A valuable contribution in this sphere has 
been made by Shapiro ( 1980, 1981, 1985a, 1985b) who has 
placed the impact of incoming 
context of existing forms 
organisation. 
oil 
of 
operations within the 
social and economic 
However, there has been scant attention paid to the impact 
of North Sea related developments upon regions (or 
localities) with long industrial histories and often 
decaying economic and social infrastructure. Even those 
studies of the Scottish impact have been guilty of this. 
This is the aim of the present study, which limits itself to 
the study of labour organisation, within the context of 
inward oil investments in the North East of England. Thus it 
confines itself to events within the workplace and their 
consequences for the structuring of the industrial labour 
market in the region. 
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To do this necessitates the formulation of an alternative 
framework for the study of incoming industry. Unlike many 
forms of incoming industry at the regional level (e.g. 
electronics in South Wales~) oil fabrication activities in 
North East England do not represent a break from other 
forms of economic activity. Rather, the nature of work, and 
patterns of labour organisation in the industry are markedly 
similar to those in the region's more traditional heavy 
engineering and shipbuilding industries. In this sense, the 
new activity is not alien to the regional environment, but 
complementary, representing the continuation of an existing 
process. It is with this in mind that Chapter 2 expounds a 
theory of labour organisation appropriate for an 
understanding of changes brought by oil developments in the 
North East. 
~Morgan and Sayer (1984, 1988) note for example how the 
electronics industry in South Wales has served to refashion 
local labour markets by introducing new working practices 
and using non-traditional forms of labour. 
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Table 1.1 
Summary of the chanqes in the concentration 
of the international oil industry 1953-72 
1953 1972 
Seven Largest Others Seven Largest Others 
(Percent) (Percent) 
Concession Areas 64 36 24 76 
Proven Reserves 92 8 67 33 
Production 87 13 71 29 
Refining Capacity 73 27 49 51 
Tanker Capacity 29 71 19 81 
Product Marketing 72 28 54 46 
[Source: Jacoby {1974)) 
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Table 1.2 
Chanqes in revenue regimes between multinational companies 
and selected producer countries, 1948 and 1972 
country/ 
Company 
Saudi Arabia/ 
Aramco 
IraqfAIOC 
Kuwait/ 
Kuwait Oil Co 
Algeria 
Venezuela 
1948 
Royalty Income Tax 
4 shillings Exempt 
gold per 
ton 
4 shillings Exempt 
gold per except for 
long ton modest tax 
commutation 
payments 
3.25 rupees Exempt, 
per long except for 
ton commutation 
payment of 
4 ann as per 
ton 
No special legislation 
Production 
tax of 
16.66 per 
cent of 
calculated 
price based 
on u.s. 
Gulf Coast 
Minimum of 
50 per 
cent of 
net 
income 
1972 
Royalty Income Tax 
12.5 per 
cent of 
posted 
price 
12.5 per 
cent of 
posted 
price 
12.5 per 
cent of 
posted 
price 
12.5 per 
cent of 
posted 
price 
16.66 per 
cent of 
agreed 
commercial 
value 
based on 
Texas 
posted 
55 per 
cent of 
net 
profits 
55 per 
cent of 
net 
profits 
55 per 
cent of 
net 
profits 
55 per 
cent of 
profits 
60 per 
cent of 
net 
income 
prices prices 
(Source: Jacoby, N.H. (1974)] 
Year 
1950 
1955 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1985 
1989 
39 
Table 1.3 
The share in energy consumption bv major fuels 
1950-89 (m.t.c.e.) 
Coal Petroleum Nat.Gas Nuclear Hydro 
Elec. 
202.6 22.2 - - 0.9 
215.2 34.5 - - 1.0 
198.6 68.1 0.1 0.9 1.7 
187.5 106.2 1.3 6.1 2.2 
156.9 150.0 17.9 9.5 2.3 
120.0 136.5 55.4 10.9 2.0 
120.8 121.4 71.1 13.4 2.0 
105.3 115.0 82.3 22.1 2.1 
108.1 118.2 80.5 33.4* -
(Source: The Digest of U.K. Energy Statistics, various] 
* After 1985 figures for nuclear and hydro-electricity 
combined under category "Primary Electricity". 
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Table 1.4 
U.K. Licensing Rounds 
Round Year Number offered Number taken 
(blocks) (blocks) 
1st 1964 960 348 
2nd 1965 1102 127 
3rd 1970 157 106 
4th 1971 - 2 436 282 
5th 1976 - 7 71 44 
6th 1978 - 9 46 42 
7th 1980 - 1 specified area 90 
of northern 
North Sea, 80 
elsewhere 
8th 1982 - 3 184 70 
9th 1984 - 5 195 80 
lOth 1986 - 7 127 51 
11th 1988 - 9 212 115 
12th 1990 - 1 120 Awards Pending 
[Source Department of Energy "Brown Books", various) 
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Table 1.5 
Levels of production from major fields in the 
British Sector of the North Sea since 1976 (000 tonnes) 
Field 
Year Brent Forties Ninian Piper Thistle 
1976 0.1 8.6 - 0.1 -
1977 1.3 20.1 - 8.6 -
1978 3.8 24.5 0.04 12.2 2.6 
1979 8.8 24.5 7.7 13.2 3.9 
1980 6.8 24.6 11.4 10.4 5.3 
1981 11.1 22.8 14.3 9.8 5.5 
1982 15.2 22.2 15.0 9.8 6.0 
1983 18.7 21.7 13.7 9.6 5.1 
1984 20.0 20.3 11.6 8.9 4.2 
1985 20.0 18.4 10.9 9.0 3.7 
1986 19.5 16.5 9.7 8.4 3.0 
1987 17.7 15.9 7.5 8.0 2.7 
1988 16.1 14.2 7.0 3.2 2.5 
1989 9.5 10.2 6.2 0.0 1.4 
[Source: Department of Energy "Brown Books", various) 
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Table 1.6 
The North Sea Oil Balance of Payments Impact (£m) 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1981 
Value of oil sales 58 645 2226 2805 5861 8893 
Net Import of goods -341 -536 -531 -185 -171 -144 
for Nth Sea sector 
Net Import of -481 -640 -701 -545 -447 -461 
services for Nth 
Sea sector 
Interest, profit & -23 -24 -550 -666 -1368 -2233 
dividend payments 
of Nth Sea sector 
Total NSO current -787 -555 449 1409 3695 6055 
account impact 
Overseas Invstmnt 946 1142 1508 833 694 732 
NET B.O.P IMPACT 159 587 1952 2242 4389 6787 
OF NTH SEA SECTOR 
(Statistical Trends, various) 
Figure 1.1 The Changing Nature of 
World Oil Supply: 1973 - 1989 
Oil Production (000/barrels/day) 
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Figure 1.3 U.K. Oil Production 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SYSTEMS 
UNDER CAPITALIST ACCUMULATION 
"Every society is a moment in the historical process and 
can be grasped only as part of that process. Capitalism, 
a social form, when it exists in time, space, population, 
and history, weaves a web of myriad threads; the 
conditions of its existence form a complex network each 
of which presupposes many others ... And it is only in 
this sense, as a fabric woven over centuries, that we may 
say that capitalism "produced" the present capitalist 
mode of production. This is a far cry from a ready-made 
formula which enables us to "deduce" from a given state 
of technology a given mode of social organisation." 
(Braverman, 1974: 21-22} 
The aim of this chapter is to develop a theory on the 
restructuring of employment systems appropriate for an 
analysis of labour market change in the North East, within the 
confines of the present study. In doing this, it firstly 
examines some of the ways in which academics have explained 
divisions of labour within society. Until recently there was 
a recognisable dichotomy between those whose explanations 
located industrial organisation, market structure and the 
hierarchical nature of job forms at the core of their 
analysis; and those that regarded the evolution of the labour 
process within the work place as central to their 
explanations. This dichotomy reflected the artificial nature 
of the disciplinary boundaries from which these two 
perspectives were drawn (emanating from within the confines of 
economic and sociological theory respectively). However, as 
the complexity of employment structures has become more 
apparent, a more sophisticated approach to the subject has 
evolved (Rubery, 1989}. 
This integrated approach is drawn upon later in the chapter to 
construct a framework from which to understand the nature of 
the employment impact of North Sea oil upon the North East of 
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England. This is achieved by arguing that change within any 
sector of the labour market can only be understood through 
recourse to the historically specific nature of the labour 
process in that sector. Thus the employment impact of the 
offshore oil industry upon the North East cannot be understood 
without reference to the historical development of the labour 
processes in the North East of England, and specifically, 
those processes which evolved in the structural engineering 
and shipbuilding sectors. But although labour processes are 
viewed as central to an understanding of present patterns of 
labour organisation, they do not work alone in constructing an 
employment system. Instead the labour process, in a given 
situation, is conditioned by and interacts with specific 
labour market conditions. As such, labour processes are 
regionally and functionally specific, within the confines of 
capitalist historical development. 
2.1 Divisions of labour and theoretical developments 
The 1970s saw an awakening of interest into the nature of 
labour organisation and its implications for divisions within 
society. This reflected an increasing degree of awareness, 
during the 1960s, of continuing schisms within society, 
despite the broadly based consensus on social welfare issues, 
in the post war period, in OECD countries. 
One consequence of this renewed awareness was the extent to 
which researchers, in the social sciences, began to reflect 
upon the paucity of existing theories in explaining the role 
of the labour market in perpetuating divisions within society. 
The recognition of this vacuum in academic thought led to a 
proliferation of attempts at explanation from which, generally 
speaking, two basic strands emerged: labour market 
segmentation theories, and theories of the labour process. 
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2.2 Theories of Labour Market Segmentation 
Theories of labour market segmentation stem from the early 
1970s and arose due to the unsatisfactory nature of 
neoclassical labour market theory to explain the continued 
disparity in wages and conditions of different segments of the 
labour market. Although there were various forms to emerge 
(e.g. Bluestone, 1970; Gordon, Edwards and Reich, 1975) the 
most celebrated work remains that of Doeringer and Piore 
(1971) recognising that labour markets were structured 
according to the nature of specific industrial contexts. In 
this sense, they recognised three basic types: 
i) Enterprise markets (essentially internal labour markets) 
where the allocation of labour takes place within the 
boundaries of the individual enterprise, and is characterised 
by a well defined occupational hierarchy and high level of 
demarcation. They suggested that this pattern was typical of 
most manufacturing industries. 
ii) Craft markets, whereby the labour structure was primarily 
influenced by occupational and geographical jurisdiction. "The 
major problems of internal allocation are preparing 
apprentices and trainees to be journeymen and of moving groups 
of workers of roughly equal skill and rank among jobs of short 
duration." (1971:4) This type of market typifies many 
construction industries. 
iii) Competitive markets, where the features of the internal 
labour market are absent, the best example of this being the 
market for migrant labour. 
Doeringer and Piore saw three factors behind the development 
of ILMs: 
a) Skill specificity, employers recognising the need to 
develop a work force with enterprise specific skills; 
b) The tendency for "on the job" training rather than through 
educational institutions; 
c) The development of workplace customs. "Custom at the 
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workplace is an unwritten set of rules based upon past 
practice or precedent." (1971:23) For them, customs 
represented "the outgrowth of employment stability within 
internal labour markets". This stability was to the mutual 
benefit of employers and employees. 
This diversity of labour market forms between industries 
coexists with segmented labour markets within industries into 
primary and secondary sectors. As Loveridge and Mok (1979: 
65,66) note: 
"The primary sector contains the better paying, steady, 
and preferred jobs in the society. Those employed in this 
sector possess job security and opportunities for 
advancement, high wages, good working conditions, 
employment stability, equity and due process in the 
administration of work rules. Work in the primary sector 
is associated with an established position in the 
economy. Workers here tend to identify with institutions; 
the company for which they work; their union, their 
occupation. One who has lost a primary sector job is 
unemployed in the involuntary, Keynesian sense ..... The 
existence of a secondary sector is of crucial importance 
for the maintenance of the marginal jobs. Secondary 
sector jobs tend to be self-terminating, or are basically 
unattractive, and provide little incentive for workers to 
stick with them." 
These early theories of labour market segmentation failed to 
provide adequate explanations for the labour market divisions 
that they had identified. In this sense, the principle value 
of this approach was in asking crucial questions rather than 
in providing the answers (Villa, 1986). At the root of this 
problem was the failure to break the umbilical cord of 
neoclassicism. As Doeringer and Piore themselves acknowledged, 
internal labour market forces: 
" ... do not work alone. Rather they work in combination 
with those forces recognised in neoclassical theory. An 
understanding of the origins of internal labour markets 
can only be approached through the study of the canons of 
conventional theory." (1971: 27-28) 
The recognition of serious deficiencies in early segmentation 
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theories sparked off a second generation of studies that 
attempted to explain the nature of labour market disparities. 
On the one hand, segmented market structures were explained as 
a response to different levels of uncertainty in product 
markets (Berger and Piore, 1980). Alternatively Wilkinson et 
al (1981) accounted for different labour market structures in 
terms of a "dynamic non-equilibrium framework" ( 1981) in which 
institutional operations (forms of labour market regulation) 
and the balance of power according to the nature of productive 
structures were accorded important roles. 
At the same time, this second strand sought to locate 
empirical evidence from various industrial contexts within the 
framework of dualism. As Bluestone and Stevenson (1981: 45) 
noted at the time: 
" a full understanding of segmentation and dualism in 
the labour market requires further exploration of 
industry transformation on a case by case analysis." 
This required the identification of primary and secondary 
industries, from which occupations within industries could 
then be defined according to their ascriptive qualities within 
the dual labour market. But herein remained the nature of the 
analytical problem facing segmentation theories. This second 
generation of segmentation theories made important inroads 
into the analysis of labour market change both within specific 
industrial contexts (see for example Villa, 1986) and at the 
global level (Gordon et al, 1982) by recognising the 
importance of extra economic factors and a more dynamic 
historical approach. However the approach breaks down 
eventually for its a priori assumptions of dualism within the 
labour market. Constrained within this analytical dualism, 
labour market events are ultimately explained in terms of 
their relationship towards the primary and secondary segments 
of the labour market. Thus industries, and occupations within 
industries, are defined on this basis. Reich (1984), for 
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example, using statistics based upon industrial structure, sex 
structure, and race, classified industries within a core-
periphery framework. Thus the core included: primary metals; 
machinery manufacture; transportation equipment; instrument 
and related goods; tobacco manufactures; paper and allied 
products; chemicals; petroleum and coal products; and rubber 
and plastic goods. Meanwhile the periphery consisted of: 
lumber and wood products; furniture and fixtures; stone, clay 
and glass products; fabricated metal products; miscellaneous 
manufacturing; food and kindred products; textile mill 
products; apparel goods; printing, publishing and allied 
industries; leather goods; not specified manufacturing. 
Despite their importance in questioning conventional 
neoclassical theories, dualist approaches are problematic for 
two related reasons: firstly they ignore the historical 
dynamism of capitalism, and as a result, do not take account 
of the changing importance of specific industries over time; 
secondly, they presuppose the duality of economies. The 
flexibility debate has reminded us of the ability of capital 
to restructure economies over time, so that today's industrial 
growth sectors will be tomorrow's decaying, marginal 
industries. Thus in the western capitalist economies, the 
motors of growth in the nineteenth century were first the 
railway boom, and later the expansion in metal shipbuilding. 
In the twentieth century the automobile and, more recently, 
the electronics industries have been central to the process of 
capital accumulation. 
The problems with segmentation theories stem from the fact 
that they have been utilised in areas of study for which they 
were never intended. Originally used as a framework for the 
analysis of employment disparities in the United States during 
the 1960s (particularly with regard to racial inequalities 
within cities), they have since been extended to explain a 
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multiplicity of employment circumstances. This has since 
brought the realisation that what is required in investigating 
labour market structures: 
" .. is a conception of the labour market that rejects the 
search for simple universal laws of labour market 
structure and development in favour of an analysis of the 
interplay of the historically conditioned institutional 
structures that generate specific systems of labour 
market regulation. It places a central emphasis on the 
empirical investigation of the nature and sources of 
change rather than the development of complex deductive 
models based upon highly simplified assumptions about the 
determinants of human behaviour." 
(Gallie, 1988: 18) 
With regard to the development of a suitable framework for the 
analysis of British labour market structures, the Cambridge 
school has had the most influence. The concept of a 
"productive system", first advocated by Wilkinson (1983: 413) 1 
involves a more holistic, and infinitely more satisfactory 
approach to the study of labour markets. His approach 
incorporates institutionalism within a historical materialist 
perspective: 
"Economic relationships are shaped by institutional 
forces and cannot be separated from them. The "free" 
market and "free" trade are not "natural" states of the 
world; they are created by human agencies and guided by 
legislation and institutional rules." 
(1983: 417) 
Wilkinson focusses upon the "forces of production", i.e. 
labour power, the means of production, the relations of 
production, the structure of ownership and the social and 
political framework within which the above forces operate. It 
is the interrelationship of these factors that determine the 
nature of the labour market. 
1This has been further elaborated in a more recent work 
(Tarling and Wilkinson, 1987) to explain how the influence of 
the productive system impinges upon a firm's costs and 
subsequently its success in controlling the market within 
which it operates. 
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The importance of this work is in its identification of the 
relationship between labour and capital, employers and 
workers, as central to an understanding of how productive 
systems operate. Wilkinson notes that whilst labour and 
capital derive mutual benefit from the process of production, 
the needs of capital are less immediate for its subsistence. 
This is a recognition of the inherent inequality of the power 
relationship between the two parties in the labour market that 
breaks with the neoclassical view. Despite this, labour can 
enjoy relative power in the labour market dependent upon other 
influences, such as the nature of institutional forces and the 
regulation system in operation. At the same time, differences 
in the supply of labour available to the labour market will 
obviously affect the balance of power. 
Productive systems will differ through time according to the 
dynamics of the relationship between the productive forces. He 
argues that his framework can be used at all levels: the 
family, productive units, the firm, industrial districts, 
industries, regions, economies, and at the global level. 
Alternatively, Rubery (1989) has developed the concept of an 
"employment system" as a framework for analysing labour market 
change. She breaks down the forces controlling the system into 
four components: the system of labour market regulation, the 
industrial system, the labour market system and the system of 
social reproduction. Unlike Wilkinson she is less ambitious in 
her claims, and uses her approach to explain trends within the 
labour market in Britain during the 1980s. 
These more sophisticated approaches have done much to throw 
off the cloak of dualism, and incorporate social forces into 
their analyses, without quite "grasping the nettle" in their 
explanations of employment dynamics. Although the Marxist view 
of social relations of production is explicitly taken on 
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board, the exploration of the historical foundations of social 
systems is at best partial. Thus Wilkinson (1983} states that 
the forces in production are not pre-existing, but rather are 
produced and reproduced in the course of capitalist 
development, without recognising the importance of the 
valorisation process2 • Despite this, such work does hint at 
the struggle over the variable factor, labour power, between 
employers and employees in the labour process (Tarling and 
Wilkinson, 1987). Similarly Michon (1987), whose approach 
follows Piore in the central role given to uncertainty in 
structuring labour markets, acknowledges that divisions of 
labour are dependent upon the demands and needs of the 
production process. 
The implication is therefore, that what happens in the 
organisation of production remain central to the structuring 
of employment systems, despite the diverse range of industrial 
structures and existing labour market conditions in which 
firms have to operate. But to understand these different forms 
of organisation it is necessary to explore inside the "black 
box of production" (Nichols, 1986: 34), to examine the nature 
of the labour process, which is considered to be central to an 
examination of employment structure, under specific 
conditions. It is to this subject that we now turn. 
2.3 The debate on the Labour Process 
Labour Process theories stress the centrality of events within 
the work place to the development of capitalist societies. 
This type of approach had largely been consigned to the 
periphery of academic discussion since Marx 1 s time, until 
Braverman 1 s great work, "Labour and Monopoly Capital" ( 197 4) . 
2Valorisation being the means by which capital derives 
surplus value (profit) through the exploitation of labour. 
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Braverman's work was undertaken because he realised the need 
to update Marx's theory on the labour process with the 
development of capitalism in the twentieth century. As he 
notes (1974: 9): 
"Marx completed this work (Capital] in the mid 1860s. 
During the past century this very same dynamic has been 
far more powerful than the manifestations of it which 
Marx witnessed in his own lifetime and upon which he 
based his critical analysis of capitalist production. Yet 
the extraordinary fact is that Marxists have added little 
to his body of work in this respect. Neither the changes 
in productive processes throughout this century of 
capitalism and monopoly capitalism, nor the changes in 
the occupational and industrial structure of the working 
population have been subjected to any comprehensive 
Marxist analysis since Marx's death .... there is simply no 
continuing body of work in the Marxist tradition dealing 
with the capitalist mode of production in the manner in 
which Marx treated it in the first volume of "Capital"." 
Braverman blamed this neglect firstly upon the apparent 
"thoroughness and prescience" of Marx's critique of capitalist 
production, and secondly, concern over modes of distribution 
rather than production. Additionally, Marxists had become 
obsessed with the advance of technology and science to the 
extent that prevailing modes of production and the subsequent 
organisation of labour were seen as inevitable. 
Braverman correctly recognised the need for a fresh approach 
to the study of the world of work, which did not consider the 
present labour organisation under capitalism as external or 
inevitable. This involved the reappraisal of the relationship 
between technology and social trends. Initially this required 
the recognition that modes of production under capitalism do 
not arise through changing technologies, but are moulded over 
time by capital through the mechanism of new technology. In 
this sense, Braverman is merely reiterating Marx's own 
analysis: 
"Within the historical 
capital ism, according to 
and analytical 
Marx's analysis, 
limits of 
technology, 
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instead of simply producing social relations, is produced 
by the social relation represented by capital." 
(1974: 20) 
If one studies "Capital" closely, it becomes obvious that, in 
Marx's view, the development of a particular form of work 
organisation under capitalism is the product of socially 
driven forces rather than technological ones. 
The industrial capitalist and the factory system were only 
possible as the result of the creation of the category of 
"free labour", as opposed to the serf or slave. In Britain 
this category largely arose from the expropriation of the 
agricultural population from the sixteenth century to the 
nineteenth century ("Capital": 671-701) and the large-scale 
in-migration of dispossessed Irish peasants during the course 
of the nineteenth century. Only as a result of the advent of 
free labour was there the potential for the exploitation of 
labour power by the capitalist and the creation of the 
capitalist mode of production. These large movements of 
population from rural to urban areas created a surplus 
unskilled labour force (the reserve army of labour), with 
which the industrial capitalist could organise new forms of 
production and undermine the positions of craft workers 
engaged in pre-capitalist forms. 
Applying Marx's definition of the working class, as those with 
no means save the sale of their own labour power, Braverman 
suggests that today this would include most of the population 
(1974: 26). As such he treats the working class as a 
homogenous mass, with a commonality of interest. 
The key phenomenon associated with the evolution of the 
working class in its twentieth century form has been the 
development of monopoly capitalism. The mechanism behind this 
process according to Braverman is scientific management 
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(Taylorism) , whose principle rationale is the separation of 
the acts of doing and planning. This is seen as the principle 
weapon used by capital in the class struggle. 
The development of Taylorism is viewed as the driving force 
behind the deskilling and subsequent subordination of labour 
in the production process. Taylor ism represented a second 
phase of management development under capitalism. The first 
phase was characterised by a new wage relation and the need to 
extract surplus value. To do this, the capitalist increasingly 
recognises that a measure of control over the production 
process is required. The manifestation of this is the 
transition from cottage industry to the factory. Only in doing 
this would the capitalist achieve control over methods and 
hours of work and extract a greater return from labour. 
"Control without centralization of labor was, if not 
impossible, certainly very difficult, and so the 
precondition for management was the gathering of workers 
under one roof." 
(1974: 65) 
However this first phase represented only a form of relative 
control. Although production was now centralised, the control 
of the production process was still in the hands of the 
worker, which limited the ability of the capitalist to extract 
the maximum surplus value. Only through absolute control over 
the production process by the capitalist could this be 
achieved. This search for control was encapsulated in the 
Scientific Management ethos. Principally associated with the 
work of F.W. Taylor in the late nineteenth century, Braverman 
perceives Scientific Management as an attempt to increase the 
productivity of labour through a more technical analysis of 
the production process by management. For Taylor this would 
only be achieved by management wrestling control of the 
production process from labour. 
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Consistent with his historical approach, Braverman points out 
that experiments with different forms of work organisation are 
not novel to capitalist development, and neither was Taylor 
the first to indulge in the theoretical aspects. However he 
claims that scientific management represented the first 
attempt by the manager to design work tasks rather than the 
worker. This is essentially a phenomenon unique to capitalism, 
a fundamental break from the past. 
"The use of experimental methods in the study of work did 
not begin with Taylor; in fact, the use of such methods 
by the craftsman is part of the very practice of the 
craft. But the study of work by or on behalf of those who 
manage it rather than those who perform it seems to have 
come to the fore only with the capitalist epoch; indeed 
very little basis could have existed for it before." 
(1974: 88) 
It has been noted that management attempted to gain control 
over the labour process through the centralisation of 
production into factories during the early phase of 
capitalism. However under Taylorism, management took on new 
dimensions. Taylor believed that managers should now dictate 
the very nature of the work task to the worker. Only with this 
total control could management extract the maximum return from 
the worker. 
Taylor's concern over control stemmed from his recognition, 
that there existed an underlying conflict between manager and 
worker. The worker is paid up to a certain level for work 
done, above which he receives no more (even with piece rates). 
It is therefore against his interests to produce over a 
certain level. Conversely the manager attempts to extract the 
maximum return possible from labour power. This situation is 
responsible for the basic underlying conflict between the two 
parties, and necessitates management control over labour. 
Braverman notes (1974: 100): 
"So long as they [the workers) control the labour process 
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itself, they will thwart efforts to realize to the full 
the potential inherent in their labor power." 
In Braverman's view, the twentieth century has seen an ever 
widening gap between the conception and operation of economic 
activity. This process was the result of management's desire 
to wrest control over production away from the worker. This 
control was a prerequisite to expanding surplus value. For him 
Taylorism was the key mechanism, resulting in the deskilling 
of labour. 
As capitalism has become more complex, through the 
consolidation and concentration of capital under competition 
(Baran and Sweezy, 1966), the systems by which capital 
controls labour have become more sophisticated. The 
development of Monopoly Capitalism and its manifestation, the 
modern corporation, have seen a corresponding growth in the 
layers of business organisation. 3 
The importance of the development of Monopoly Capitalism for 
the development of the labour process is seen in functional 
terms, as firstly, that point when capital ceases to be 
personalised and secondly, where ownership and control 
functions become separated. 
"The corporation as a form severs the direct link between 
capital and its individual owner, and monopoly capitalism 
builds upon this form. Huge aggregates of capital may be 
assembled that far transcend the sum of the wealth of 
those immediately associated with the enterprise. Since 
both capital and professional management - at its top 
levels - are drawn, by and large, from the same class, 
it may be said that the two sides of the capitalist, 
3Braverman dates the development of Monopoly Capitalism 
to the late nineteenth century, associated with the growth of 
the first trusts and cartels. For him, monopoly capitalism and 
scientific management are bound up in the same process of 
capital accumulation. Monopoly capitalism arises out of the 
driving force of accumulation, with management reorganising 
the labour force through the means of scientific management. 
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owner and manager, formerly united in one person, now 
become aspects of the class. It is true that ownership of 
capital and the management of enterprises are never 
totally divorced from each other in the individuals of 
the class, since both remain concentrated in a social 
grouping of extremely limited size: therefore, as a rule, 
top managers are not capital-less individuals, nor are 
owners of capital necessarily inactive in management. But 
in each enterprise the direct and personal unity between 
the two is ruptured. Capital has now transcended its 
limited and limiting personal form and has entered into 
an institutional form." 
(1974: 258) 
The growth of Monopoly Capitalism results in the development 
of a managerial process that is analogous to that of the 
labour process. Hence just as the traditional craftsman is 
displaced by a new division of labour, then the small firm 
owner-manager is replaced by a complex of management 
divisions: manufacturing, marketing, finance, sales, 
advertising, personnel, public relations, etc. In this way, 
management, has itself become a product, the product being the 
control of the production process for the extraction of 
surplus value. 
A side effect of the managerial labour process is the creation 
of what Braverman terms "the middle layers of employment". 4 
Here Braverman is identifying individuals who simultaneously 
have roles as "manager" and "worker" in the labour process: 
" ... there is a range of intermediate categories, sharing 
the characteristics of worker on the one side and manager 
on the other in varying degrees." 
(1974: 405) 
The status of these groups differs to that of those below them 
in the labour process because of their ability to control the 
4Wright's (1978) definition of this group as occupying 
"contradictory class locations" is more useful than 
Braverman's. This suggest the possibility for shifting 
allegiances in the labour process. 
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fortunes of those under their command, and the extent to which 
they benefit from capital through a share (however small) in 
the spoils. They are also guaranteed a degree of independence, 
contingent upon their ability to "hire" and "fire" others. 
From the point of view of their superiors at the top of, and 
in control of, the labour process this group has two key 
functions: firstly as the recruiting ground for top managerial 
positions, and secondly as a buffer zone of support against a 
"hostile or indifferent mass" (1974: 407). 
This brings us to the apex of the pyramid under monopoly 
capitalism; the corporate 
either born with the wealth 
to ascend to these exalted 
executives, the elite, who are 
to buy into the class, or are able 
heights through demonstrating in 
their actions the attributes required by capital. Braverman 
describes the attributes required to be a member of this class 
as follows: 
"To belong to the capitalist class by virtue of ownership 
of capital, one must simply possess adequate wealth; that 
is the only requirement for membership in that sense. To 
belong to the capitalist class in its aspect as the 
direct organizer and manager of a capitalist enterprise 
is another matter. Here, a process of selection goes on 
having to do with such qualities as aggressiveness and 
ruthlessness, organizational proficiency and drive, 
technical insight and especially marketing talent." 
{1974: 258) 
2.3.1 Shortcomings in Braverman's work and reactions to it 
Braverman's work represented the most significant contemporary 
attempt to reformulate Marx's original thesis. However the 
value of Braverman's work is not necessarily to be found in 
his conclusions, but rather in the style of his approach and 
his view of the labour process as central to the organisation 
of society under capitalism. By focusing upon the 
contradictory nature of the relationship between capital and 
labour in the evolution of the production process, Braverman 
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has constructed the theoretical template which researchers 
into the nature of labour organisation should expand upon. 
Nevertheless, having accepted the importance of Braverman's 
contribution, it is necessary to be critical of his theory in 
analysing the variety of circumstances that exist across 
different sectoral and geographical boundaries. The acid test 
for a theory is the extent to which it can be applied to 
explain empirical events. It is in this respect that Braverman 
has been found wanting, and it is likely that his long-
standing contribution to the nature of labour organisation 
will have been in reopening the debate, and providing a 
framework for analysis. 5 
Braverman's basic failing was in his unilinear view of the 
labour process in the century since Marx wrote "Capital". This 
was partially the result of Braverman following Marx's 
analysis too closely in his own approach {Nichols, 1986: 35). 
In Marx's thesis, industrial capitalism was in its infancy and 
the factory system was viewed as the epitome of the labour 
process. Capitalism was later to acquire a more sophisticated 
character and develop along a series of divergent paths. 
But even in its early stages, 
differed across functional 
the capitalist labour process 
and 
imposition of the factory system 
spatial boundaries. The 
{identified by Marx) was 
never a universal phenomenon in early industrial capitalism 
(Elbaum et al, 1979). Marx's model of manufacturing industry, 
centred upon the textile industry within the United Kingdom, 
neglecting the development of the labour process in other 
50n this subject, Littler notes (1982: 26): 
"Braverman's major contribution was to smash through the 
academic barriers and offer the potential for the birth 
of a new, integrated approach to the study and history of 
work." 
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industries such as engineering and shipbuilding, that were 
arguably equally as representative of contemporary capitalist 
structures. 6 In such industries, the labour process was 
characterised more by the continuation of forms of craft 
control, rather than by deskilling. 
Braverman's analysis rests upon the existence of a craft based 
society that is transformed into an homogenous deskilled mass 
under Taylor ism. 7 Various writers have exposed this craft 
myth; instead the working population in the nineteenth century 
was predominantly composed of an unskilled mass surrounding a 
small core of craftsmen. 
At the same time, Braverman ignores the diversity of labour 
market circumstances that existed prior to industrialisation; 
Elbaum (1989) makes this point in contrasting the importance 
of apprenticeship to the development of employment regimes in 
Great Britain and the United States. The survival of 
apprenticeship as an important institution within the British 
capitalist system reflects the durability of pre-industrial 
craft training practices, whereas in the United States the 
6Even within textiles, Lazonick has shown that the labour 
process was not driven by the continuous triumph of capitalism 
in deskilling and disfranchising labour of control. Rather: 
" .. there was a continual process of conflict, compromise 
and even cooperation between capitalists and workers over 
the form and content of the components of technical 
change-mechanisation, divisions of labour and 
intensification of labour." 
(1979: 257) 
7Braverman also deserves criticism for stressing the 
merits of craftsmanship (1974: 131-138) without recourse to 
the social conditions which surrounded it. For example, Landes 
(1969: 43) has noted that even in the medieval period the 
notion of an independent craftsman was a false one. More often 
than not, he was in a dependent relationship with the merchant 
for whom he produced. 
65 
lack of a strong craft tradition and the more fluid nature of 
nineteenth century society precluded such practices. 
Another problem with Braverman stems from his perception of 
control. For him, management requires absolute control over 
workplace relations, Taylor ism is the mechanism for this 
process. This necessity emerges from the nature of the 
inherent conflict between labour and capital. But as Friedman 
(1977) has shown this conflict is not always so immediate. In 
any case, Burawoy (1979, 1985) reminds us that management is 
often capable of "obscuring" the nature of this conflict by 
encouraging competition amongst the work force. This suggests, 
as Elger points out, that scientific management and deskilling 
have never been more than options, from a range of choices, 
available to capital to secure surplus value from the labour 
force 1982:52): 
"It lS necessary to advance beyond the spurious 
concreteness of the generic impulse towards deskilling 
which governs Braverman's account towards a historically 
located theorization of the transformation of the 
capitalist labour process within which deskilling may be 
adequately located as a tendency." 
In the wake of Braverman, other works have highlighted the 
existence of alternative forms of worker control utilised by 
management in the labour process. Friedman (1977) argues that 
capitalists tend to employ two approaches in practice: Direct 
Control and Responsible Autonomy. Whilst the former is a 
synonym for Taylorism, the latter is available to management 
when faced with worker resistance. Decisions over which 
strategy to deploy are contingent upon the strength of worker 
resistance and the product market structure facing 
capitalists. Thus in certain circumstances, short term surplus 
can be foregone and immediate control relaxed (1978: 77-85). 
Alternatively, Edwards (1979) suggests that there are usually 
three types of managerial control system in operation: simple 
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control, broadly speaking supervision of workers by foremen 
within small plants; technical control, of which Fordism is 
considered to be an early form; and bureaucratic control, 
which is centred upon procedures within large organisations. 8 
Other studies such as Brecher's (1979) recognise that 
deskilling has only ever been a partial tendency within the 
labour process. Crucially, he makes the link between the 
development of mass markets and the possibility for 
introducing mass production techniques. Hence, only with the 
rapid growth in demand for televisions in the United States, 
during the 1950s and 1960s, was it possible to introduce an 
extensive subdivision of labour into this sector of the 
electrical products industry. But, even with the development 
of mass markets, a certain skilled element is still required 
in the production process, particularly in what Brecher (1979: 
208) describes as the "heavy current" part of the industry. 
In a similar vein, More (1982: 121) notes that the nature of 
the product market in engineering has forestalled the process 
of deskilling: 
"In the engineering industry, for instance, the bulk of 
the work before the First World War involved one-off or 
small-batch production, and even after the war only 
sections of the industry, such as motor vehicle 
manufacture went over to mass production. In small-batch 
production the variety of the work makes it less 
susceptible to routinization and deskilling." 
At the international level, Wood (1982} stresses that 
scientific management has never been universally accepted as 
a strategy by management, especially in the United Kingdom. In 
cases where it has been established, for example in Nazi 
Germany and pre-war Japan, it has tended to be part of wider 
8This form of control is analogous to the workings of the 
internal labour market. 
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national movements and ideologies, as such it is difficult to 
point to a common model. 
A further common criticism of Braverman is for his neglect of 
the ability of labour to counteract the strategies of 
management within the context of capitalist development. One 
of the more significant criticisms of Braverman's neglect of 
worker resistance in the labour process comes from Friedman 
(1977). He notes that Braverman: 
" while recognising that current technical and 
organisational methods of production are not inevitable 
to any future system, wrongly treats them as inevitable 
within the capitalist system. In doing so he misses the 
possibility of changes within the capitalist mode of 
production in response to worker resistance." 
(1977: 30) 
In developing a framework for worker resistance, he points to 
three basic characteristics: firstly, it exists in a variety 
of forms; secondly, the level of resistance varies between 
different groups of workers; and finally, in certain 
circumstances, successful worker resistance is in the long 
term detrimental to the needs of labour. 
He suggests that labour resistance can be divided into 
"individualistic" and "collective" forms. The former centres 
around the physical impossibility faced by the capitalist in 
controlling, in entirety, the individual's contribution to the 
production process. Collective resistance is an extension of 
the form taken by individual resistance, but its success is 
reliant upon the maintenance of solidarity. 
Friedman argues that the strength of worker resistance is 
likely to be higher, the larger the work force within an 
individual plant in situations where: 
" .. workers live in a homogenous community centred around 
a particular form of work such as mining or docking." 
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{1977: 53) 
With his analysis of worker resistance, Friedman partially 
compensates for Braverman's neglect of the supply side in his 
analysis of the labour process. The view of worker 
participation in the labour process advocated by Friedman was 
extended in an important work by Rubery { 19 7 8) • Here she 
recognises that the formation of trade unions may create 
divisions of labour to the same extent that managerial control 
systems do. Thus, whilst there is a likelihood that at certain 
points, in time and space, the interests of such groups are 
likely to coincide, one should also recognise the 
inevitability of areas of conflict developing between groups, 
the outcome of events within the labour process {see for 
example Zeitlin, 1985). 
This brings us to another failing of Braverman's work, which 
is remarkable for its lack of class analysis. 9 He assumes that 
the shared experience of Taylorism gives the working class a 
common identity. Thus his acceptance of the working class as 
a "class in itself" leaves vital questions unanswered about 
levels of class consciousness, and the roles and positions of 
the various interest groups that are engaged in the labour 
process. This suggests the need for a more dynamic view of 
class relations, where a conflict can be superceded by an 
alliance of interest, for as Sadler notes {1985: 39): 
"·· the very nature of class lies in the working of the 
system itself, not in some set of attributes analysed in 
a particular circumstance." 
Penn { 1982) also notes the importance of social exclusion 
strategies by certain groups to protect their skills and 
position in the labour process against other workers. But 
9Stark {1980) provides an 
Braverman's neglect of this issue. 
important critique of 
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crucially, the success of such strategies is contingent upon 
the nature of the labour market in which they are engaged. 
This leads him to suggest that: 
"The real significance of skill within the manual working 
class cannot be grasped from aggregate data; we must 
examine the local labour markets and local industrial 
relations structures where most of the battles over skill 
are fought. There is clearly a need for more research 
into such areas, but if it is to be adequate, it must 
examine the real bases of skill in the workplace." 
(1982: 108) 
The above discussion suggests that Braverman's vision of 
deskilling as the central characteristic of the labour process 
in the twentieth century lS at odds with the empirical 
evidence. Instead the requirements of capital in production 
may involve simultaneously both deskilling and upgrading 
processes. Indeed this is the impression reached by many 
studies into the restructuring of work during the 1980s (see 
for example Jones and Rose, 1986). 
But, at the same time, many of Braverman's detractors have 
become overconcerned with dispelling his deskilling thesis, 
and consequently have themselves become embroiled in a debate 
about managerial control of the labour process in the 
narrowest sense (see Littler, 1990 for a review of these 
developments). This, to a certain extent, deflects attention 
away from Braverman's true purpose which was to expose the 
workings of capital, and the removal of control from the 
worker in a wider sense. Given this insight, debates 
concerning worker control over the immediate sphere of 
production are to a certain extent redundant, for they fly in 
the face of the complex global system which capitalism has 
become in the past 100 years. Thus arguments concerning the 
extent to which workers are undergoing deskilling processes, 
at the level of the individual factory or plant, pale into 
insignificance in the light of an increasingly global capital 
accumulation system. This is a system in which "meaningful 
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decisions" (Armstrong, 1988: 147) concerning the production 
process are gradually being removed from the individual worker 
(and in fact from the immediate geographical point of 
production) and concentrated within the hands of a corporate 
elite. 
2.4 constructing a framework for the analysis of employment 
change 
To reiterate earlier remarks, Braverman's principle legacy 
lies in the style of his approach, reminding us that 
contemporary patterns of labour organisation are the result of 
historically constructed social processes. 10 At the same time 
the most frequently cited criticism of Braverman is for his 
single track view of the evolution of work. It is therefore 
surprising that during the 1980s the major theoretical 
developments concerned with the organisation of work have also 
been found wanting in this respect. 
Responding to a period of increasing labour market chaos, and 
growing unemployment in most advanced industrial countries 
from the mid 1970s onwards, the dominant theme espoused by 
theorists during the 1980s was that a major reorganisation of 
work was underway, representing the decline of Fordism (mass 
production) and the growth of newer more flexible forms of 
production (Piore and Sabel, 1984). Braverman's deskilling 
thesis has been supplanted by an alternative hypothesis, the 
10Signif icantly this point has long since been conceded by 
researchers working in the labour market segmentation 
tradition: 
"In this book we argue that one cannot understand current 
divisions within the working class without tracing the 
character and effects of labour market segmentation ... We 
develop this argument through an analysis of the 
historical dynamics of institutional change in American 
labor-management structures and u.s. labor markets." 
(Gordonetal1982) 
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central theme of which is that periods of crisis within 
capitalism bring about a restructuring of production relations 
and the emergence of new forms of labour organisation (Gordon 
et al, 1982). Thus during the present period of restructuring 
(made necessary largely by the saturation of mass consumer 
markets) the extensive sub-division and deskilling of the 
workforce under Fordism is being replaced by a new division of 
labour into a "core" of multi-skilled craftsmen, surrounded by 
a periphery of semi-skilled, unskilled and underemployed 
individuals (Atkinson, 1984). 
There is an extensive and well developed literature devoted to 
the critique of flexibility in its various guises (e.g. 
Pollert, 1988a; Amin, 1989; Elger, 1989; Rubery, 1989) and its 
claims to account for contemporary changes in the organisation 
of work. However what is of interest to us here is the tacit 
acceptance (by both advocates of flexible specialisation and 
many of those in the labour process school tradition) of 
fordism as the benchmark by which to study the transformation 
of work during the 1980s. Thus arguments about whether the 
present restructuring of work represents post-fordism or neo-
fordism implies an acceptance of a recent past where the 
organisation of work was intrinsically determined by a mass 
production ethos. This is despite evidence that important 
sectors of production exhibited systems of labour 
organisation, especially in the British case, that were never 
governed by the logic of fordism (see for example the studies 
of the construction and shipbuilding industries by Moore, 1981 
and Lorenz, 1983 respectively). 
Certainly a fordist description was never appropriate for the 
forms of labour organisation that were associated with the 
development of industrial capitalism in the coastal areas of 
North East England, prior to the development of North Sea oil. 
Bearing this in mind, it is inappropriate to consider changes 
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in the nature of labour organisation within the region, as a 
result of the arrival of oil-related developments, in terms of 
either a fordist - flexibility perspective or a deskilling 
thesis. 
2.5 The employment system as a framework for the historical 
evolution of work 
What the above discussion suggests is the need to go beyond a 
single basic model to explain changes in the organisation of 
work (Thompson, 1990: 98). In particular it is necessary to 
reject the temptation to reduce what are often highly diverse 
organisational structures to variants of a theme. As Pollert 
notes in her critique of the "Flexible Firm" model: 
"The overstretching of the model to explain the evidence 
makes it appear more of a conceptual strait-jacket than 
an analytical tool." 
( 1988b: 45) 
Instead what is required is a less deterministic and rigid 
framework for analysis, that is capable of explaining the 
multiplicity .of employment circumstances that arise under 
capitalist production. Rubery's concept of an employment 
system, referred to earlier, is a useful starting point in 
this process. In essence she recognises the extent to which 
the restructuring of employment has (1989: 155): 
" .. to be considered within the context of a specific 
labour market and the economic and social systems of 
organisation that underpin the operation of that market." 
Although Rubery introduces the term, "employment system", as 
a means by which to examine changes in the labour market at 
the national level, it is an equally appropriate instrument 
for charting the restructuring of employment at other scales 
of analysis. 
Here, we adopt the term in a narrower spatial perspective, but 
over a longer timescale, to chart the historical evolution of 
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work associated with a specific form of industrial development 
within a particular region. An employment system in this sense 
refers to the development and sustenance of a form of labour 
organisation, linked to and indeed structured by the demands 
of a particular branch of production within a given locality. 
In this case we use the concept to represent a form of labour 
organisation that developed in the North East of England in 
the period from 1850 to the present day. It was an employment 
system that originally developed to serve the industries of 
shipbuilding and structural engineering, but was then adopted 
and restructured by the incoming oil industry. 
Significantly the analysis is restricted to an examination of 
the organisation of labour in production, and not upon the 
labour market at the macro level. We are concerned with a 
particular segment of the labour market that was associated 
with shipbuilding and engineering and its reproduction over 
time. As such, the major departure from Rubery's framework is 
in the central role given to specific processes of capital 
accumulation and their associated forms of work organisation 
(manifested in the labour process) in restructuring the 
employment system. 
However this is not a general labour process on Braverman's 
terms, governed by one immutable law of development, but 
rather the labour process of a specific industrial and social 
context. From this perspective the labour process is subject 
to two important influences: firstly, the industrial structure 
and product market circumstances within which it takes place; 
and secondly, the prevailing set of social relationships that 
exist at the level of the local labour market. We argue that 
it is only within this type of framework that one can begin to 
fully comprehend differences in the organisation of work 
across geographical boundaries and industrial sectors. 
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The recognition that the labour process is contingent upon 
prevailing external social relationships forces us to take a 
wider view of what constitutes this same labour process, i.e. 
not merely as the physical organisation of work at the point 
of production, but also as the process of recruitment (or put 
another way the nature of internal labour market development) 
by which employers reproduce their supply of labour. 
With this more expansive view of what constitutes a labour 
process, we will proceed to explain the development of North 
Sea oil related employment within the context of past forms of 
work organisation in the North East of England. However, prior 
to this it is necessary to elaborate upon our understanding of 
the concept of a labour process, in terms of its relationship 
to the wider process of capital accumulation and the key 
influences upon it; namely the local labour market 
circumstances and specific product market conditions. 
2.5.1 Contemporary accumulation and the labour process 
There is little doubt that the nature of capital accumulation 
has altered radically since Marx's time. In particular, the 
nature and scope of capital is itself less personal. The mid 
Victorian factory owner has been supplanted by the large 
corporate enterprise as the central unit of analysis in most 
industries, through the process of competition, and embodied 
in the increasing concentration and centralisation of capital: 
"In all advanced capitalist economies there now exists a 
sector of huge corporations whose top managers exercise 
considerable discretion over their policies. We now live 
in the era of Monopoly Capitalism." 
Friedman (1977: 23) 
In the 1980s these processes accelerated to the extent that 
the world economy has become increasingly dominated by large 
transnational organisations, often with their own vast global 
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linkage networks. 11 Accompanying this internationalisation of 
capital, there has been a restructuring of employment systems 
to the extent that divisions of labour are increasingly 
located at the global rather than the national level: 
"Thus a characteristic of corporate decision-making and 
corporate strategy in late capitalism is the 
"rationalisation" of labour and work at home and the 
transfer of industry to areas abroad where labour is 
cheaper and can be "super-exploited", with consequences 
for wage rates, accidents, working conditions, and most 
significantly, profits". 
(Littler and Salaman, 1984: 40) 
Even in those industries where divisions of labour have not 
assumed a global, or for that matter a dispersed geographical, 
form but remain fully integrated within individual sites, such 
as shipbuilding in the United Kingdom, the indirect effects of 
the internationalisation of capital are still felt. Capital 
investment strategies, increasingly the preserve of financial 
rather than industrial institutions, are taken at the global 
level and face a galaxy of competing avenues for profit 
accumulation. Thus in this advanced stage of capitalism, not 
only is there intense competition between individual 
corporations, but also between different economic sectors, 
which by their very nature offer varied returns on investment. 
But although the capitalist system is becoming increasingly 
global in character, the wealth of literature from the post-
Braverman debate continues to stress the diversity of forms of 
labour organisation in production. The development of Monopoly 
Capitalism has been characterised not by one dominant labour 
process, nor by a series of stages identified by dominant 
modes of production and labour organisation (Piore and Sabel, 
11The most recent trend in this centralisation process has 
been the collaboration of former rivals in joint production 
ventures, epitomised by the Rover-Honda deal and more recently 
by the agreement between Chrysler and Toyota (Wood, 1988). 
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1984; Gordon et al, 1982). Instead the nature of capital 
accumulation has been uneven across the parameters of 
industry, time and space. Labour processes have developed to 
accommodate the specifics of individual spheres of capital 
accumulation. 
The survival and extension of capitalist accumulation in the 
past 100 years has been dependent upon its inherent 
flexibility. The diverse forms of capitalist development 
across geographical boundaries lie as testimony to its 
ability, as a mode of production, to assimilate with existing 
social and cultural structures. At the same time, whilst the 
need to extract a surplus remains paramount, the need to 
extract an immediate surplus varies according to the degree of 
monopoly enjoyed by a firm within a specific industrial 
context. Thus whilst capital still requires ultimate control 
over production to ensure continued accumulation, forms and 
levels of control over labour within the production process 
will vary along a relatively wide spectrum. 
A further characteristic of the capital accumulation process 
is its inherently dynamic nature. Today individual 
corporations experience an ongoing restructuring process, in 
response to competition, recycling capital for the highest 
returns on investment. This in return results in new systems 
of production and employment often at new locations. The forms 
of labour organisation that emerge in these circumstances will 
represent the interplay of existing local labour market forces 
(themselves the result of previous labour processes), with the 
nature of product market conditions and industrial structure 
in that particular sector. This is not to negate the role of 
the labour process as central to the accumulation of capital, 
but rather to argue for an understanding of the labour process 
within the boundaries of individual spheres of capitalist 
accumulation. 
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2.5.2 Existing local labour market conditions 
In structuring an employment system, the labour process, at 
any one point in time, does not take place within a vacuum, 
but is influenced by the pattern of existing social relations, 
represented by prevailing local labour market conditions . 12 
There are two principle means by which this influence is felt. 
Firstly it determines the balance of power between labour and 
capital in the labour process. Power relations are inherently 
unequal in the labour market; ultimately labour is forced to 
supply its labour power via the wage contract to ensure its 
own reproduction, as Adam Smith noted: 
"It is difficult not to foresee which of the two parties 
must, upon all ordinary occasions, have the advantage in 
the dispute, and force the other into compliance with 
their terms. The masters being fewer in number can 
combine much more easily .... In all disputes the masters 
can hold out much longer ... In the long run the workmen 
may be as necessary to his master is to him, but the 
necessity is not so immediate." 
(1845 (1776):66 quoted in Loveridge and Mok, 1979:32) 
However having accepted this basic point, it is necessary to 
recognise that groups within the labour market can enjoy 
periodic, strategic advantages over capital, often through the 
result of changes in supply conditions (e.g. alterations in 
demographic trends or in levels of training). Additionally, 
upsurges in demand resulting from booms in the product market 
can further serve to tighten labour markets, giving groups in 
the labour market power to improve their position through and 
within the labour process. These fluctuating power relations 
characterised many labour markets prior to the First World 
War, notably in engineering and shipbuilding. 
A second means of influence is the way 1n which changes in 
labour market structure can affect the position of supply side 
12These conditions are themselves the result of previous 
and ongoing labour processes. 
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groups in the labour process. Thus in the nineteenth century, 
the influx of large numbers of unskilled cheap Irish labour, 
onto the British labour market, served to undermine the 
position of existing work forces in the labour process, across 
a wide range of industries. 
A further way that the nature of existing social relations can 
also impart an influence on the nature of an employment system 
is through the regulatory framework within which the social 
relations of production take place. In Britain, employment 
relations in many industrie~ (especially those that developed 
in the nineteenth century) have traditionally been governed by 
a "voluntarist" system (Deakin, 1985) of agreements between 
management and strong unions. In the past 150 years the state 
has played a relatively passive role in labour regulation, 
although there has been significant post war legislation, 
largely in favour of the employee. 13 
2.5.3 The nature of the product market and industrial 
organisation 
Product markets act as enabling frameworks, providing a range 
of possibilities within which the labour process can take 
place. The nature of the product market, in terms of scale of 
production, degree of standardisation of the commodity 
produced and stability of market demand will all impinge upon 
the labour process and subsequent stratification of the labour 
market (Piore, 1980). 
In industries characterised by mass markets (e.g. large parts 
of car manufacturing and food production) employers have been 
13This situation has changed in the 1980s; the Thatcher 
government has pursued a legislative and political offensive 
against the unions (Towers, 1989), which are seen as 
institutions that hinder the development of free market 
forces. 
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able to instigate mass production {fordist) regimes, 
accompanied by the introduction of assembly lines, the 
increased use of machinery, and the subdivision and deskilling 
of labour. 14 But other industries, notably those producing 
large capital goods, do not operate within mass market systems 
and are confronted by a different production rationale. The 
product market for these industries is typically characterised 
by a situation in which fluctuations are endemic, rather than 
sporadic, an integral feature. The shipbuilding industry is 
the most classic example, where demand, whilst on the one 
hand, being dependent upon trends in the market for passenger 
and cargo transportation, is, on the other, fundamentally 
associated with the age of existing vessels {capital stock) 
and their replacement needs {Lorenz, 1983). Similarly 
construction industries are faced with highly irregular 
patterns of demand. The underlying reason for the nature of 
these product markets is the factor of large, single unit 
production, rather than small-scale mass production. This in 
turn has important implications for the nature of the labour 
process. 15 
The nature of industrial organisation within product markets 
will also impinge upon the development of an employment 
system. The extent to which a market is dominated by several 
large firms, or composed of a multitude of small firms in 
dynamic competition, determines whether firms can forego 
immediate profit for stable employment relations {Friedman, 
1977). At the same time, the role of large business 
14This is not to dispute recent evidence that suggests the 
introduction of more flexible regimes and the erosion of 
fordism. 
15Moore (1981} illustrates this point from his analysis of 
the U.K. construction industry, noting how employers casualise 
the bulk of the work force to cope with uncertainty in the 
product market. 
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conglomerates and their investment policies, that straddle a 
diverse range of product markets, are increasingly important 
in explaining employment change at the level of the individual 
plant. 
2.6 conclusion 
This chapter set out to develop a framework with which to 
analyse the impact of North Sea oil upon employment in the 
North East of England. Initially this involved an examination 
of the ways in which employment structures have been analysed 
in the past. This led us to suggest that there is no universal 
model with which to analyse patterns of labour organisation. 
Instead labour market dynamics are best encapsulated in the 
notion of an "employment system". Whilst this system is 
structured by a range of mechanisms, at the level of the 
production process the labour process rema1ns central to an 
explanation, being the the key mechanism by which labour is 
reproduced. 
But labour processes take place within and are conditioned by 
pre-existing structures; the prevalent employment conditions 
within which firms have to operate. These are manifested in 
the form of local labour market conditions and systems of 
employment regulation. Additionally the evolution of an 
employment system is conditioned by the nature of the product 
market and industrial organisation in that sector of the 
economy within which the firm operates. 
This provides the framework for analysis in the following 
chapters. In particular, we will demonstrate how the arrival 
of the oil industry in the North East was confronted with an 
employment system, that was characterised by a highly skilled 
male dominated work force with strong union traditions, and a 
division of labour based around craft demarcation. This 
employment system was itself the product of a labour process 
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based upon heavy engineering industries, and in particular 
shipbuilding. It is to this process that we turn in the next 
chapter to provide the context for the advent of oil 
developments. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE BACKGROUND TO OFFSHORE FABRICATION IN THE NORTH EAST: 
THE EMERGENCE OF AN EMPLOYMENT SYSTEM 
The impact of oil-related development on the North East of 
England can only be fully comprehended through an 
understanding of the existing social and economic 
relationships in the region. Within the North East, the 
offshore fabrication industry did not represent a break from 
past economic activity, but was, in many ways, an extension 
of previous forms. More specifically it represented the 
continuation of a long-standing tradition of large-scale 
structural engineering and shipbuilding projects, stemming 
from the early industrial period. This chapter traces the 
evolution of this tradition, which represented the 
development of a particular type of production regime' and 
system of employment organisation. 
3.1 Employment structure prior to North Sea oil developments 
In Chapter 1 the North East was referred to as an "old 
industrial region". During 
twentieth centuries it was a 
phase of accumulation on a 
the nineteenth and early 
core region for a particular 
global scale; a period of 
industrial capitalism that was centred upon the development 
of heavy industry through the exploitation of indigenous 
coal and iron resources. As the twentieth century has 
advanced and new sectors of accumulation have been opened up 
for exploitation by capital, the North East has become 
increasingly peripheral to economic development, both 
1The use of the term "regime" here is not intended to 
reflect a particular phase of global capitalist accumulation as 
envisaged by the French regulationists (e.g. Aglietta, 1976; 
Lipietz, 1986), but rather as a particular type of production in 
response to the requirements of a specific industrial context. 
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nationally and internationally. Underlying this decline has 
been the failure of locally based capital to reinvest within 
the region, expressing instead a preference for investment 
in newer growth regions such as the South East of England 
and in export markets (Carney et al, 1977). 
Consequently the North East exhibited an industrial 
structure centred upon "old" and decaying industries, that 
was still apparent at the time of the 1971 census of 
employment (see Table 3.1). 
primary industries continued 
The 
to 
percentage 
be double 
employed in 
that of the 
national average, whilst in manufacturing, the region 
remained heavily reliant upon the traditional industries 
such as mechanical engineering and shipbuilding (which 
combined, accounted for 25 per cent of all manufacturing 
employment) and had not received as high a share of the 
twentieth century's growth industries. 2 The major area of 
expansion in manufacturing in the twentieth century has been 
chemicals, predominantly based upon Teesside. Elsewhere 
there has been some development of light engineering, 
stimulated by government regional policy in the post 1945 
era, located at trading estates such as Team Valley on 
Tynes ide. 
This concentration 
exacerbated by the 
within manufacturing was further 
fact that almost 40 per cent of 
mechanical engineering employment was in the "Industrial 
Plant and Steelwork" division. In reality this division 
represented an offshoot of the region's involvement with 
iron and steel, associated with the fabrication of steelwork 
for the construction industry. This sector of engineering is 
2For example its share of motor vehicle production was only 
3 per cent of total manufacturing employment, compared to the 
national average of 10 per cent. 
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striking in its resemblance to the functioning of the 
shipbuilding industry; manufacturing capital goods in single 
unit product markets employing similar types of production 
technique, and requiring an almost identical composition of 
labour. In short, these two industries combined constituted 
a particular form of industrial and employment experience 
and drew upon a particular form of craft labour market 
within the region. This experience was confined 
geographically to three industrial coastal districts at the 
mouths of the rivers Tees, Tyne and Wear, and inland at 
Darlington and was distinct from the mining culture of the 
Durham coalfield. 
This employment tradition was also heavily, male dominated 
(women made up less than 10 per cent of the work force in 
the shipbuilding and mechanical engineering industries, 
compared to a national figure of 29 per cent for 
manufacturing as a whole) . Women were largely excluded from 
the local labour market, being predominantly confined to 
domestic and other forms of service activity, or unpaid work 
in the home. Associated with this employment system, there 
developed a particular form of labour market regulation, 
that was characterised by a strong craft presence and 
embodied in the preservation of rigid demarcation lines. It 
is to the historical evolution of this employment system 
that we now turn our attention. 
3.2 Industrial structure and product market development 
within the employment system 1850-1939 
The origins of this employment system were rooted in a phase 
of industrial capitalism that followed the exploitation of 
the resources of the Northern coalfield. In the mercantilist 
period, the existence of easily accessible supplies of coal 
in the North East, and its growing importance as a fuel in 
most parts of Europe, allied to an expansion of 
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international trading links, facilitated an important if 
limited growth in shipbuilding: 
"The reason for the shipbuilding boom was simple. With 
the emasculation of the forests, coal was being 
increasingly employed as the great natural fuel of the 
country and much of the coal was to be found in the 
north. By the end of the seventeenth century great 
fleets of coal-carrying ships were sailing from the 
Tyne for ports as far away as Danzig or the Channel 
Islands. But Newcastle's chief markets were London and 
East Anglia, or abroad, Northern France, North West 
Germany and the Low Countries." 
(Dougan, 1968:20) 
Although the construction of colliers remained the dominant 
form of shipbuilding activity at this time, the American War 
of Independence and the Napoleonic Wars brought with them 
some diversification into military vessels. 
Whilst the development of the coal trade with London led to 
the emergence of a sizeable shipbuilding industry in the 
region, it was the transition to industrial capitalism 
embodied in the expansion of the iron, and later steel, 
industries that were key to the massive expansion of both 
shipbuilding and engineering. 
3.2.1 Shipbuilding 
In shipbuilding the substitution of steel for wood, during 
the middle years of the nineteenth century, resulted in a 
dramatic expansion in the scale of operations, both in terms 
of capital and manpower requirements, as McClelland and Reid 
note (1985: 153): 
"While there had been some very large wooden yards, 
especially on the Thames, the average size of the firms 
scattered around the country's coasts and rivers was 
nearer to twenty men with very little fixed capital. In 
marked contrast even the earliest iron shipbuilding 
yards employed from 500 to 1000 men and had capital of 
from £5000 to £25000, whilst by the late nineteenth-
century shipyards were among the largest industrial 
enterprises in the country with twenty employing over 
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2000 men each." 
This development had implications for the continued growth 
of the wider capitalist economy. In the early part of the 
nineteenth century, the rapid expansion of the railway 
network had acted as the principle motor of growth, with its 
demand soaking up the burgeoning supplies of products 
emanating from the coal, iron and steel, and engineering 
industries (as we shall see later). With the saturation and 
subsequent demise of this market (at least in the domestic 
context) by the early 1880s, the expansion of the 
shipbuilding industry presented an alternative vehicle as 
the focus for accumulation within this sector of British 
industry. 3 
Accompanying this change in the scale of operations, was a 
shift in the spatial structure of the industry at both the 
national and international levels. Within Great Britain the 
dominant role of the Thames and the Mersey (largely achieved 
through their links with international trading operations) 
was gradually displaced by the growth of shipbuilding 
operations on the Clyde and the North Eastern rivers, 
facilitated by their proximity to important suppliers of raw 
materials. 
At the global level, the previously dominant North American 
industry (founded upon abundant quantities of timber in the 
vast hinterland) was undermined by the combination of a 
switch to iron ships and the debilitating effects of the 
Civil War. It was in these circumstances that the North East 
shipbuilding industry was able to achieve prominence on a 
world as well as a national scale. As Pollard and Robertson 
3This fact is illustrated clearly by Lorenz (1984: 100) who 
estimates that shipyards were consuming 30 per cent of all steel 
production between 1910 and 1912. 
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(1979:48) note: 
"This competitive advantage of British shipyards 
originated in the period 1860-1880 when no other major 
country, save perhaps America, whose resources were 
occupied elsewhere, had the iron, steel and engineering 
capacity to build modern steamers on a large scale. The 
advantage continued to 1914 largely because of three 
factors: access to a large market, full use of fixed 
capital, and external economies; cheap supplies of raw 
materials and components; and the skill and experience 
of management and men." 
By 1889, Britain was producing 80 per cent of the world's 
ships, out of which the North East was producing almost one 
half (Dougan, 1968: 62). 
Within the North East itself, the development of iron and 
steel shipbuilding became increasingly clustered in those 
areas that were closely linked both organisationally and 
geographically to the developing "coal combines" (Carney et 
al, 1977). From the construction of the first iron ship, 
"The Star" at south Shields in 1839, shipbuilding in the 
North East became increasingly synonymous with the Tyne, the 
Wear, and to a lesser extent the Tees. 
In the period from 1870 to 1939 the British shipbuilding 
industry underwent a tremendous process of growth and 
decline that reflected the country's wider role in the 
development of the global political economy. The period from 
1870 to 1900 was the one of most pronounced growth in 
shipbuilding in the U.K. and more especially the North East 
(see Table 3.2). This growth was a consequence of the huge 
expansion of trade, occasioned by British capital's 
expanding horizons overseas. In the period 1880 to 1914 
British shipping companies accounted for approximately 35 
per cent of the world fleet, providing shipbuilders with a 
sizeable and relatively stable domestic market (Lorenz and 
Wilkinson, 1983: 110). This enabled British shipbuilders to 
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specialise in production to a greater extent than their 
rivals, bringing a substantial competitive advantage and 
subsequent domination of the overall world market. 
Despite this competitive advantage, the British share of the 
world market was already in decline in the period from 1892 
to 1914, as is illustrated by Figure 3. 1, as a result of 
protectionist measures pursued abroad, although the downturn 
in commercial demand was compensated for by a growth in the 
number of contracts for naval vessels. 
Within these longer term trends, the industry was 
characterised by short term fluctuations (see Figure 3. 2) , 
the explanation for which lies in the nature of the product 
market. 
Ships have never been produced for mass consumption markets 
in the same sense that, for example, cars have been in the 
twentieth century. A separate transaction is completed in 
the marketplace for each good produced, rather than multiple 
purchasing. There is no regular pattern of demand, the only 
continuous process is the marketing effort required to bring 
a steady flow of orders to a company's yards. Herein 1 ies 
the fundamental uncertainty and dynamism with which firms 
are faced. 
contracts, 
combination 
Production is centred around single unit based 
the requirements of which are flexibility in the 
of inputs. 4 This favours labour intensive 
regimes, rather than large investments in fixed capital 
40ne qualification to be made here is that certain companies 
produced whole series of ships, of a standard design, as McCord 
notes: 
" in the 18 years after 1893 Doxfords of Sunderland built 
178 of a more or less standardized turret-deck cargo ship". 
However this does not constitute a form of mass production. Ships 
were still constructed one at a time in a single berth, 
representing at the most a primitive form of batch production. 
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equipment that is likely to remain idle for long periods. 
The majority of North Eastern firms became specialists in 
the highly competitive market for cargo vessels (this in 
turn stemmed from the earlier tradition of producing coal 
tramps) . These vessels did not require a great deal of 
sophistication in their construction, and thus there was no 
great technical restriction to entry. As a result, market 
fluctuations tended to be the norm rather than the 
exception. Firms that entered the industry were often of a 
highly ephemeral nature. The transient nature of the cargo 
division was reflected in the large number of single vessel 
firms that the industry witnessed in the period up to 1930. 
The situation was compounded by the correspondingly high 
levels of competition amongst shipping companies. This 
precluded attempts to stabilise the product market through 
vertical integration. The cargo shipping industry continued 
to be characterised by a large number of individual ship 
owners up to the 1930s. 
Consequently 
continued to 
producers, a 
depression of 
remark: 
this sector of the shipbuilding industry 
be constituted by many non-integrated 
situation that persisted through to the 
the 1930s, causing Lorenz (1984: 20) to 
"The majority of shipbuilding firms in Britain remained 
independent and comparatively small in scale. 
Frequently under family ownership or control, there was 
a tendency to jealously guard independence of action. 
This .. was to prove a major obstacle to restructuring 
industry, the need for which became increasingly in the 
1930s." 
If this pertained at a 
accentuated when applied 
national 
to the 
level, then 
North East, 
it 
with 
was 
its 
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reputation for cargo vessels. The Wear alone still had 14 
independent yards in this specialist field up to 1914 
(Pollard and Robertson, 1979: 63). Thus in 1920 the region's 
shipbuilding industry was still fragmented; 35 separate 
firms producing an average merchant tonnage of 22,000 {Todd, 
1983: 58) . 5 
Apart from these smaller producers, several large integrated 
companies were established to supply the more sophisticated 
markets for naval vessels and passenger liners. 
Military related contracts had been a key source of work 
since the eighteenth century, but increases in the scale and 
sophistication of activities from the nineteenth century 
onwards favoured the development of large-scale integrated 
shipbuilding complexes. Indeed the state actually encouraged 
the concentration of naval shipbuilding in the larger 
private yards through its "Admiralty List" (Pollard and 
Robertson, 1979: 211}. The strategic nature of the naval 
market also accounted for the state's willingness to spread 
its contracts evenly to the appointed yards during harsh 
market circumstances. A final factor important to the naval 
segment of the product market was the priority placed by the 
client on quality rather than cost. This tended to enhance 
capital investment and new technologies. 
Within the North East, the construction of naval vessels was 
restricted to the Tyne and associated with several large 
producers (in 1910 these were swan Hunter, Wigham 
Richardson, Palmers, Armstrong Whitworth, Barclay Curle and 
Beardsmore, and Northumberland Shipbuilding Co.). These 
5The corresponding figures in Northern Ireland, for example, 
with its specialisation in large passenger liners were 4 firms 
with an average annual output of over 40,000 tons. 
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companies benefited from being at the centre of complex 
industrial linkage systems, a typical example being 
Armstrong's (with its links with the armaments industry). 
The North East did not become a major centre for the 
construction of passenger liners (Belfast and the Clyde 
became associated with this sector of the market); the 
Furness shipyard at Hartlepool being the most notable 
producer. Here a degree of market stability was established 
through its links with its sister company, the large 
shipping concern, the Furness Line. 
The diversity and fragmentation of the industry that had 
been its strength in the period prior to 1914 was to prove 
its "achilles' heel" under the very different market 
conditions that prevailed after 1918. At first there 
appeared to be little change in the market environment 
facing firms; in 1920 the peak output in the North East of 
948,000 gross tons was reached, 16.5 per cent of the world 
output (Dougan, 1968: 137). But unfortunately the surge of 
naval related orders during and immediately following the 
Great War had given rise to a false sense of security, 
encapsulated in the extravagant and ill-fated capital 
expenditure plans of Palmer's. 
Palmer's experience was typical of many North Eastern 
companies; Dougan suggests that 14 firms closed between 1918 
and 1931 (1968: 148). In the 1930s the recession deepened; 
at its height in 1933 82.5 per cent of the shipbuilding and 
shiprepair workforce was unemployed (Cousins and Brown, 
1970: 315) and a production low point of 37,000 tons was 
recorded (Dougan, 1968: 166). 
Behind the depression in shipbuilding were several key 
market trends. The most obvious of these was a decline in 
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demand in the world market as a whole during the 1920s, that 
was not to pick up until 1938 (Parkinson, 1979: 80-84}. At 
the same time the British share of this market fell from 58 
per cent in 1913 (on the eve of the Great War) to 34 per 
cent in 1938 (Pollard and Robertson, 1979: 45; Lorenz, 1984: 
245). Whilst part of this decline in market share was due to 
the protectionist policies pursued by her competitors, 
British firms had also lost former markets as a result of 
the switch towards military production during the war. 
Britain's share of the world export market continued to 
decline during the 1930s although the full effects of this 
were masked by the upturn in the home market in 1934 and 
rearmament in the latter years of the decade. 
Although all sectors of the market were adversely affected 
by the recession, it was those areas on which the North East 
most depended that were hit the hardest. The peace dividend 
brought by disarmament resulted in empty order books for the 
region's naval contractors. Between 1920 and 1928 only one 
warship, the H.M.S. Nelson, was constructed (by Armstrong's) 
within the region (Dougan, 168: 146). At the same time the 
market for cargo vessels, in which the majority of North 
Eastern firms specialised, disintegrated. The Depression 
affected shipbuilding in the North East more than any other 
region, reflected in the lowering of the North East's share 
of U.K. production from 50 per cent in 1913 to a low of 28 
per cent in 1933 before rearmament for the Second World War 
stimulated a recovery (Cousins and Brown, 1970: 315). 
In the light of the recession it is surprising how little 
restructuring of the industry occurred within the North East 
during the inter war years. This was despite the efforts of 
the National Shipbuilders Security Ltd, a body established 
in 1929, to reduce capacity in the industry through the 
compulsory purchase and resale for non-shipbuilding purposes 
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of redundant yards. Its secondary purpose was to foster a 
rationalisation of remaining production facilities into 
larger units. This organisation was the brainchild of the 
shipbuilding companies themselves with the support of the 
Bank of England, and although it succeeded in reducing the 
capacity of the industry from 3.9 million tons in 1930 to 
2. 5 million in 1939 (Lorenz, 1984: 126), the latter figure 
was still over double the output of the most productive year 
in the 1930s. Apart from Palmer's yard at Jarrow, a further 
12 yards were closed in the region through the scheme. With 
regard to its second aim the N.S.S. was even less 
successful, corning into conflict with owners, who jealously 
guarded their independence. Despite its efforts the industry 
remained highly fragmented, 47 firms remained at the 
national level in 1938 compared to 60 in 1930 (Table 3.3). 
Within the North East, although the number of firms (in 
merchant shipbuilding) was reduced from 35 in 1920 to only 
14 in 1937 (Todd, 1983: 58) this was mostly achieved through 
closure rather than amalgamation or takeover. 
The severity of the 1930s recession forced a change in 
attitude towards the issue of government involvement in 
industry. Within shipbuilding however the role of government 
remained largely confined to the military sphere. The one 
exception was its "scrap and build" programme, which was 
introduced in 1935, in an attempt to stimulate the 
shipbuilding market through the activities of the shipping 
companies. The aim was to induce shipping companies to scrap 
older stock and place orders for newer vessels with domestic 
shipbuilders with the aid of a government subsidy. 
Unfortunately by the time the act took effect the world 
market was in the recovery phase, hence shipowners were 
unwilling to scrap in conditions where freight rates were 
rising (Hogwood, 1979: 37). 
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3.2.2 Engineering 
The engineering industry in the North East emerged from 
three overlapping waves of capitalist development during the 
eighty year period from 1840 to 1920. The first of these was 
the railway boom, followed by the massive expansion in 
shipbuilding that accompanied the changeover to iron and 
steel; and finally the development of the market for 
industrial plant and steel goods, whose most rapid period of 
expansion was in the first quarter of the twentieth century. 
The close chronological proximity of these developments 
often allowed companies to participate in all three markets 
simultaneously. There was also a spatial dimension to the 
development of engineering; for whilst in the early years 
(first half of the nineteenth century) a diverse range of 
workshops operated throughout the region supplying local 
markets, by the latter years of the nineteenth century 
localities were becoming specialised in different areas of 
engineering, associated with the emergent local combines and 
supplying global markets. In particular the Tyne and the 
Wear specialised in the more intricate and technically 
demanding markets of marine and railway engineering, whilst 
Teesside engineering became almost a by-product of the huge 
steel combines, churning out low value-added structural 
products. 
North Eastern companies were involved in the railway boom 
from the outset; Whessoe of Darlington made the castings for 
stephenson's original "Locomotion" and built the "Derwent" 
in 1845 ("The History of Whessoe", 1955). The Tees Engine 
Works was established in 1845 as a supplier of equipment to 
the Stockton and Darlington Railway Company. Another 
important company was established in 1859 at Thornaby by 
Thomas Head and Joseph Wrightson specialising in the 
production of iron window sashes and railway castings. 
As the nineteenth century wore on the early workshops, 
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employing a small number of skilled artisans, 
supplanted by much larger organisations and 
sophisticated methods of production. 
were 
more 
By the 1870s the railway market was increasingly dominated 
by the rail companies themselves with huge manufacture and 
repair plants being established at Crewe, Derby, Doncaster, 
Swindon and Wolverton in particular, all employing between 
2,000 and 6,000 men each by 1880 {Saul, 1968: 187). Within 
the region railway activity became concentrated on the Tyne 
in the private engine works of Hawthorn Brothers and 
Stephenson's. But with the increasing monopolisation of the 
domestic market by the rail companies, these remaining 
private companies were forced either into export markets (in 
particular India) or alternative sectors of engineering. 
A second wave of engineering activity accompanied the growth 
of shipbuilding 1n the region. The sector of marine 
engineering developed from the expertise accumulated during 
the railway boom and was largely restricted to the areas 
with the highest concentration of shipbuilding activity, 
namely the Tyne and the Wear. The more successful marine 
engineers were usually those who developed close 
affiliations with their principle clients. This often led to 
amalgamations of engineering and shipbuilding capitals in 
powerful combines e.g. the formation of Hawthorn Leslie from 
the marine engineering firm of Hawthorn and Andrew Leslie's 
shipbuilding concern in 1886 (McCord, 1979: 131). But 
perhaps the epitome of integrated engineering and 
shipbuilding capital was Armstrong's. Originally rising to 
prominence through the manufacture of armaments for the 
Crimean War by William Armstrong, the company diversified 
into gunboat production after the merger with Mitchell's in 
1882. With the takeover of a major arms rival, Whitworth's, 
in 1897 the Armstrong company became a powerful economic 
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unit, employing 2 6, 000 men on the Tyne prior to the Great 
War. The basis of Armstrong's success however was a 
substantial degree of patronage from the Royal Navy, and the 
careful cultivation of personal links. It was not unusual 
for retired naval officers to become recruited onto the 
Armstrong board. 
The third wave, that of structural engineering, is the most 
important for our purposes here6 
created by a technical advance, i.e. 
representing a market 
the development of the 
Thomas Gilchrist basic steel making process on Teesside in 
1879 (Almond et al, 1979). This effectively ushered in the 
era of cheap steel and 
construction of bridges and 
was a timely event for 
encouraged its uptake in the 
buildings. At the same time it 
the continuation of capital 
accumulation in Teesside' s growing steel and engineering 
combines. The levelling off of construction in the region's 
shipbuilding industry at the turn of the century, 
with increasing foreign competition, had led 
coupled 
to the 
rationalisation of the steel industry into three major 
firms; Bolckow Vaughan, Dorman Long and South Durham Iron 
and Steel (Hudson and Sadler, 1985: 7). But there was also a 
movement downstream into the expanding market for 
constructional steel products, Dorman Long in particular 
establishing its own Bridge and Construction Works on 
Teesside to counter foreign competition in its traditional 
areas. Similarly Bolckow Vaughan acquired the Birmingham 
firm Redpath Brown, which was the largest structural 
engineering firm in Great Britain during the 1920s. 
Alternatively some smaller companies, formerly involved in 
iron and steel production retained their independence by 
6It also represented a trend within British engineering as a 
whole away from the mass markets such as textile machinery and 
railway products into less standardised and more sophisticated 
products (Zeitlin, 1983: 25-54). 
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switching into the new market, exemplified by the cargo 
Fleet Iron Works. 
For existing engineering companies, the growth of the 
structural sector offered an escape route from the saturated 
railway sector. As the railway boom dissipated many of the 
smaller foundries and workshops suffered in the Great 
Depression of the 1870s. Whessoe's salvation was in the 
growing market for the steel erection of gas holding 
equipment. The company had been on the verge of closure in 
the 1890s, when an injection of outside capital allied to 
the new market opportunities associated with gas transformed 
Whessoe from a small foundry supplying the Darlington 
region, into an enterprise with a substantial export market 
("The History of Whessoe", 1955). By the 1920s the company 
had diversified into process plant for the oil and chemical 
industries, and in the process, establishing itself as a 
main supplier to the Anglo-American Oil Company (the British 
subsidiary of Standard Oil) , the fledgling Shell Trading 
Company (from 1897 onwards) and I.C.I. 
One of the earliest construction companies, Teesside Bridge 
was also close to bankruptcy during this period, through a 
lack of trade and the stigma attached to it as the main 
contractor for the doomed Tay Bridge project. Survival was 
achieved by the restructuring of the company's shareholding 
capital bringing Christopher Furness in as Chairman of the 
board in 1892. 
Head Wrightson also became involved in urban construction 
projects, diversifying out of the declining rail market. A 
significant development in 1877 was the establishment of the 
Cleveland Bridge company by former employees of the Skerne 
Ironworks; a company that was to become one of the world's 
major bridge builders. 
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The movement into the structural market heralded a change in 
focus for the firms on Teesside, markets were no longer 
localised, but nationally and later globally oriented. In 
the last two decades of the nineteenth century structural 
projects were undertaken as part of a large programme of 
civic works that characterised late Victorian capitalism: 
bridges, stations, hotels and piers all mushroomed as part 
of the changing human landscape. An alternative market, 
particularly with regard to bridge and railway construction, 
corresponded with the age of high British imperialism in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, e.g. between 
1900 and 1940 Cleveland Bridge built 15 bridges in total, 7 
of which were overseas in Africa or South America (Company 
Archives). This represented the beginnings of an outflow of 
capital from the region, that was to lead to its long term 
demise as an industrial heartland. Its indirect effects were 
also substantial, absorbing part of the output of the area's 
iron and steel industry at a time when it was suffering from 
increased foreign competition in its traditional markets. 
A second feature of this new market was its dynamic nature; 
even during a boom period the size and magnitude of 
contracts remained highly irregular. This point is well 
illustrated by the profit figures for the Teesside Bridge 
Engineering Company in the 1920s (see Table 3.3) when 
compared to the company's more stable foundry business. 
Like shipbuilding, structural engineering does not face a 
standardised mass market in the sense that textiles and 
automobile manufacturing do; as such the features of the 
production regime are radically different, usually more 
labour intensive and requiring higher levels of skill. 
A third feature of the market was the high levels of risk 
and initial outlay of capital required for individual 
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contracts. As a result it was common for firms to make huge 
losses through the uncertainties inherent in large-scale 
project work; Dorman Long made a significant deficit on its 
celebrated Sydney Harbour Bridge project, completed in 1927. 
The First World War affected the region's engineering 
sectors in the same manner that it had the shipbuilding 
industry. Production was diverted away from civil works 
towards the war effort, predominantly armament production 
and whilst this provided regular profits, it also 
represented lost export markets and discouraged urgently 
needed capital restructuring programmes. 
During the inter war years, the structural side fared better 
than most other sectors of engineering. The region's marine 
engineering companies suffered most through their dependence 
upon shipbuilding operations. As an industry it was all but 
extinguished on the Tees (North, 1975: 66) whilst in the 
Tyne and Wear heartland areas, cutbacks and rationalisation 
mirrored the shipbuilding experience. 
For some structural companies it was a relatively prosperous 
time, Cleveland Bridge for example exhibited an average 
ordinary profit dividend of 8.1 per cent between 1920 and 
1938 (Gourvish, 1979: 154) . This was partly due to the 
growth of new markets, especially in the production of 
industrial plant. At the same time this reflected the 
continued expansion of export markets within the formal 
empire where the effects of the worldwide depression were 
less noticeable. 7 The acceleration towards the Second World 
War and the advent of a rearmament programme by the 
7In fact the most 
engineering firms was the 
industrial disputes, most 
1926. 
severe problem for many structural 
shortage of materials resulting from 
notably after the General Strike in 
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government served to forestall doubts about the industry's 
competitiveness until the 1960s. 
The outcome of this period of relative prosperity was an 
industrial structure little changed from that of 1918, 
characterised by a large number of medium sized companies 
operating in a diverse range of product markets. The major 
development was the takeover of Teesside Bridge by Dorman 
Long in 1930, although even here the former retained its own 
board and management structure. 
The absence of radical restructuring within the shipbuilding 
and structural engineering industries of the North East, 
despite the ravages of recession, can be attributed, in 
part, to the nature of the employment regime that grew up to 
serve these industries. As we shall demonstrate later in the 
chapter, labour organisation remained predominantly craft 
based throughout the twentieth century, reflecting the 
emergence of a strong union movement. The Boilermakers, for 
example, operated virtually a closed shop in all the black 
trades throughout the North East coastal region, and had 
done so since the turn of the century (Clarke, 1987). Whilst 
the Depression years had undermined union organisation with 
many skilled workers leaving the industry and often the 
region altogether, the employers were still unwilling to 
challenge the unions over the fundamental questions 
concerning aspects of labour organisation and control in 
production. But at the same time, the structure of capital 
itself had become obsolete by the standards of the late 
1930s. Before turning to the development of the employment 
structure in the North East, we examine this issue in brief. 
3. 3 The development of the capital structure in the North 
East to 1939 
The capital structure of British industry in 1939 was 
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comparatively backward in comparison with the other dominant 
industrial nations of the world. Whereas by the 1930s 
Germany, the United States and Japan had developed large 
corporate entities that dominated important sectors of the 
national economy, British industry continued to be dominated 
by a preponderance of small and medium sized firms.~ This 
tendency has been apportioned to the "continued familial 
framework of many British industries" (Littler, 1983: 185). 
Although the concentration of capital was a feature of 
British capitalist development in the period prior to the 
Second World War, there was never a radical restructuring of 
industrial ownership away from its early personalised form 
(Chandler and Daems, 1979) . 9 Where mergers and takeovers did 
occur in the period from 1850 to 1939, individual units 
within loose conglomerates continued to function as before 
with a large degree of autonomy and often a significant 
degree of control was exercised by the original owners. Thus 
it could be argued that British industry was lagging behind 
its competitors in the development of monopoly capitalism. 
Where this applied to Britain in very general terms, it is 
crucial in explaining the malaise of the North East's 
coastal districts. Amalgamations had occurred within 
shipbuilding and engineering in the period from 1880 to 1930 
and there was even a strong element of horizontal 
integration, 10 but capital remained concentrated within the 
hands of the major combines and never completely transcended 
8For accounts of these developments see Homburg, Lazonick 
and Okayama in Littler and Gospel (eds). 
9There were exceptions to this rule, notably I.C.I. and 
Unilever in the fast expanding chemicals industry. 
10For example, the combine controlled by Sir Christopher 
Furness and William Gray encompassed a diverse range of companies 
including Gray's Shipyard, South Durham Iron and Steel and 
Teesside Bridge. 
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its highly personalised form (see for example Benwell C.D.P, 
1978) . 11 In particular, there was no substantial movement 
towards the formation of public limited companies and wider 
share ownership. Thus the North East's capital structure 
remained immature in the 1930s and as a result was unable to 
generate the financial capital required for large-scale 
restructuring, characteristic of its giant competitors 
overseas. Although a certain degree of rationalisation and 
restructuring occurred within shipbuilding during the 1930s, 
the organisation of capital remained somewhat parochial and 
outdated in relation to other sectors of the economy 
(notably the emerging chemical industry) . There were several 
factors behind this backwardness in organisational 
development. Firstly the upturn in demand occasioned by the 
the acceleration towards the First World War from 1910 
onwards. Undoubtedly this stimulus rescued many of the 
region's firms from bankruptcy and slowed demands for both 
technological and organisational restructuring. Secondly, 
and more significantly for the structural engineering sector 
than for shipbuilding, the empire constituted a stable 
market for products at a time when traditional areas of 
development (such as South America) were increasingly 
threatened by 
empire provided 
dynamic world 
companies. 12 
foreign competition. Thus the 
a partial shelter, from the 
market, for the North East's 
umbrella of 
increasingly 
engineering 
11 For example the shares of the Teesside Bridge Company were 
owned entirely by the Peat family after the First World War, 
whilst the board at Dorman Long continued to be dominated by 
members of the Dorman and Long families as late as 1926. 
12The prime example of this came in 1929 when Dorman Long 
acquired the Edinburgh based engineering firm of Redpath Brown, 
as part of its merger with Bolckow Vaughan. Notably there was no 
attempt to incorporate Redpath Brown within Dorman's own 
structural division. Instead the former continued to operate as a 
separate entity in its traditional markets (predominantly the 
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A further factor behind the stagnation of British capital, 
it has been suggested, was the pervasiveness of Victorian 
liberal ideology which precluded government involvement in 
industry in the interests of the national economy (Dickson 
and Judge, 1986). Again the contrasts with Germany and Japan 
are striking (ibid, 1986: 5): 
"In Germany and Japan, for instance, the state and 
industrial capital combined resources not only to 
protect and subsidise domestic industry but also to 
foster close links between the banks and heavy 
industry; to provide and manage a basic infrastructure; 
to encourage cartels; and to mobilise strong national 
ideologies." 
Although the devastating consequences of the 1930s for many 
British industries were eventually to alter these attitudes 
bringing an acceptance of forms of government intervention 
in the traditional industries, there was never a 
wholehearted ideological conversion. The attitude of many 
British managers 
mentality, rather 
the state to 
continued to reflect a laissez-faire 
than a willingness to use the apparatus of 
construct a more efficient industrial 
infrastructure. Underlying this was a refusal to accept 
contemporary economic realities and a desire to return to a 
"Golden Age" of liberal capitalism. Such thoughts were 
encapsulated in an address made by Sir Ellis Hunter, 
Chairman of Dorman Long, to shareholders at an Annual 
General Meeting in 1948 when speaking out against 
nationalisation plans in the steel industry: 
"It is a melancholy thought that political obsessions 
have caused the future of the iron and steel industry 
to become a political issue. The Directors of Dorman 
Long are unanimously opposed to nationalisation and are 
determined to support to the full the efforts of the 
British Iron and Steel Federation in its resistance to 
supply of fabricated steel for industrial and commercial plant) . 
In fact there was virtually no restructuring within the 
structural engineering division until the nationalisation of the 
steel industry in 1967. 
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the Bill ....... This is a serious matter. All who are 
anxious to see our country restored to full economic 
health and her traditional place in world affairs must 
hope that this Bill will never be put into effect." 
Thus the North East's capitalists had failed to comprehend 
changes within the structure of the global economy, allied 
to Britain's declining (but still significant) imperial 
position. Against this background, the continuing immaturity 
of the capitalist framework within the North East resulted 
in the failure to make the transition to a more 
interventionist form of industrial economy, essential to 
overcome the declining rate of profit (Jessop, 1983: 279). 
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3.4 The development of the employment system in the coastal 
districts 1850-1939 
Not only do shipbuilding and structural 
industries share similar characteristics in 
engineering 
their product 
markets and industrial structure, but to a large extent the 
systems of labour organisation in the two industries 
developed through a common process. The result was an 
employment system along the North East coast, where 
production was dominated by a craft division of labour, and 
recruitment depended heavily upon an externalised labour 
market. 
The link between product markets and employment structure 
is, of course, intentional. The emphasis of this chapter so 
far has been upon the nature of product market development 
and industrial structure, the implication being that these 
are central to understanding the nature of an employment 
system. Having established the role of these components as 
providing a dynamic environment, it is necessary to re-
emphasise that these forces operate in conjunction with the 
very same employment features that they impinge upon. It is 
with this central tenet in mind that we examine the 
development of the employment system along the North East 
coast. 
3.4.1 The forging of a craft identity: labour process 
development, local labour market structure and craft 
regulation 
The origins of the employment system along the North East 
coast extend further back than some of the markets it 
served, having its precursors in the guild system of the 
medieval period, whereby the rules of apprenticeship and 
"tramping" were first laid down. By the eighteenth century a 
system of "friendly benefit societies" existed that were in 
many ways the forerunners of trade unions (Hobsbawm, 1984). 
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This was reflected in their aims and conditions, principally 
to insure workers against injury and ill health, and to 
protect the "journeyman's" position within the labour 
market. This latter issue was also the single most important 
feature of the early trade union movement, along the North 
East coast, which was predominantly skill based. The key 
strategies pursued to serve this end were the control of 
apprentice numbers and strict job demarcation rules. 
This early craft labour force constituted a relatively minor 
segment of the region's labour market prior to 
industrialisation. In 1851 agriculture was still the largest 
employer in the North East, although mining had become 
firmly established as the principal occupation in the 
coalfield areas. 13 Shipbuilding was still a small scale 
activity at the regional level, employing less than 5, 000 
men in predominantly small firms (see Table 3.5), although 
it was becoming increasingly important to local economies; 
in particular there were over 1, 000 shipwrights in 
Sunderland. Engineering remained a fledgling industry (with 
only 3,000 engine makers or boilermakers) confined to 
localised pockets and predominantly based upon small 
workshops, manufacturing and repairing engines and rolling 
stock for the railway expansion of the 1840s. Within sixty 
years this situation had been transformed and the North East 
had become one of the world's core industrial regions with 
44,670 directly employed in shipbuilding and 58,277 employed 
in "General Engineering and Machine Making'' (1911 Census). 
The growth of this employment system was all the more 
significant for its degree of concentration within 
particular coastal districts, employing 50 per cent or more 
13There were 38,801 miners in Durham and Northumberland 
according to the 1851 Census. 
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of the male insured population (e.g. Jarrow, Hartlepool, 
Hebburn and Wallsend) . Even in areas with traditionally more 
diverse local labour markets, such as Newcastle and 
Stockton, shipbuilding and engineering employment had begun 
to account for a sizeable proportion of the labour force 
(with 24 per cent and 33 per cent respectively) . 
Accompanying this growth in employment was a huge population 
explosion partially accounted for by demographic changes, 
but there was also a net in-migration of 150, 000 between 
1851 and 1911, primarily from Ireland and Scotland. The 
latter was a particularly important source of skilled labour 
often at the instigation of aspiring entrepreneurs: 
"Another difficulty was the scarcity of local labour 
and he [Andrew Leslie] was forced to import skilled men 
from his own town, a movement that gave Hebburn the 
name of "Little Aberdeen". 
(Dougan, 1968: 45) 
On Teesside there was also a movement of both workers and 
companies from the iron industry into the heavy engineering 
and shipbuilding sectors. 
Aside from the growing importance of these sectors to the 
regional labour market, industrialisation brought with it 
radical changes in the organisation of work, through the 
labour process, and in the nature of the labour market 
itself. 
Labour process development and new divisions of labour 
The overriding characteristics of the labour processes that 
developed in both industries up to the 1930s were: firstly 
the extent to which they remained labour intensive and under 
craft control; and secondly the reconstruction of the labour 
force into a multiplicity of newly skilled categories. The 
latter was particularly true of shipbuilding, which during 
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the nineteenth century was transformed from a wood-based 
industry dominated by a single trade; shipwrights, into a 
complex division of labour working with steel (Dougan, 1968; 
Harrison, 1986; Pollard and Robertson, 1979). 
As shipbuilding became a more sophisticated industry, the 
production process became more complex; the changeover to 
iron led to the incorporation and transformation of trades 
from the iron and engineering industries. The iron workers 
that entered shipbuilding became subdivided into platers, 
angle-iron smiths, caulkers, riveters, holders-up and their 
assistants. Similarly the original engineering workers were 
transformed into fitters, turners and drillers. Additionally 
trades were brought in that had no previous associations 
with any sectors of engineering, such as plumbers, brass 
moulders, coppersmiths and other specialised outfitting 
trades. The creation of new job categories tended often to 
overlap traditionally defined trade boundaries. This was the 
cause of intense sectional conflict and juxtapositioning 
amongst the various unions during the latter years of the 
nineteenth century, particularly between the plating 
sections of the Boilermakers' union and the Shipwrights. The 
outcome of the majority of these disputes tended to favour 
the Boilermakers, whose strength in numbers often proved 
decisive. 
As the scope of engineering 
century industry based upon 
versatile artisans engaged 
widened, the mid-nineteenth 
small workshops, employing 
in aspects of general 
engineering, was transformed into a number of diverse and 
often unrelated sectors. For the structural sector, with its 
emphasis on larger scale, single unit product markets, this 
meant a new division of labour into flexible specialists 
working in iron and later steel. This also involved the 
geographical division of the labour process between the 
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fabrication shops and the construction sites. In the shops, 
the same basic trades held sway as in the shipbuilding 
industry, but obviously without the conflict associated with 
the displacement of the shipwrights. The growth in steel 
construction also led to the development of new trades on 
construction sites, such as steel erectors and riggers (this 
led to the formation of the Constructional Engineering 
Union) who tended to coexist uneasily with the traditional 
building trades. 
This new division of labour was further accentuated by forms 
of subdivision within craft categories. This involved 
methods of team working, whereby skilled workers would 
preside over groups of semi-skilled assistants and labourers 
or trade assistants. This reflected an extension of the gang 
system, whereby the "piecemaster" acted as an intermediary 
between capitalist and worker. As the system evolved in the 
twentieth century, the piecemaster was replaced by the 
foreman, who became the overseer of both skilled and 
unskilled workers. But the position of foreman was not 
synonymous with coercion in the Taylorist sense. Although 
the foreman retained his supervisory function, he was a 
skilled worker himself, rather than a lower rung of 
management (Melling, 1983: 59), and his position represented 
the apex of a craft hierarchy. The ambiguous role of the 
foreman is one of the more obvious examples of the failure 
of the labour process in British shipbuilding and forms of 
engineering to make the transition to a Taylorist or Fordist 
production regime. 
Another feature of the labour process in the North East was 
the extent to which it remained craft-based and labour 
intensive. There was little attempt to substitute capital 
for labour and utilise the new technology for control of the 
labour process in either the shipbuilding or structural 
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engineering industries. This is in direct contrast with the 
mainstream of British engineering which was undergoing a 
significant, albeit not completely successful, deskilling 
process. 14 
The explanation for this again lies with the combination of 
product market structure and the early development of a 
strong craft unionism that managers were confronted with in 
the North East. In shipbuilding, Pollard and Robertson 
(1979) have suggested that this situation was largely due to 
the fluctuations in the product market, which deterred 
investment in fixed capital, that could be idle for long 
periods. Additionally Lorenz (1984) points out that the one-
off nature of production does not allow the substitution of 
capital for labour. His argument is supported by evidence 
from the United States, where capital substitution (in the 
face of greater manpower shortages than in the United 
Kingdom) occurred in the less skilled and more peripheral 
areas of production. 
In the North East, it was only the larger yards such as Swan 
Hunter and Wigham Richardson that were to make large 
investments in this type of additional capital (the main 
instruments being electrical haulage cranes and covered 
berths). 
Whilst mechanisation was introduced in the nineteenth 
century (in all yards) in the form of machine tools, it was 
as an aid to the worker rather than as a means of achieving 
14The most notable example in the North East was Armstrong's 
factory at Elswick, operating in the mass production of shells 
for the armaments industry and more able to develop a capital 
intensive Taylorist method of labour organisation (Zeitlin, 1983: 
28) . This type of organisational ethos became associated with 
engineering in areas such as the North West and the Midlands 
(Holbrook Jones, 1981). 
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control over labour in the production process: 
"Shipyard machine tools, then, evolved from rather 
simple beginnings as adopted from boilershop practice 
to an increasingly specialized and heavy class of 
machine tools designed to manipulate large and 
extremely heavy steel sections. While these machine 
tools were specialized to the methods of shipbuilding, 
they were by no means single purpose tools, designed 
for the mass production of identical components. This 
point cannot be stressed enough." 
(Lorenz, 1984: 31) 
The introduction of machinery into structural engineering 
was similarly constrained by the diverse range of projects 
that firms became involved with. Although there was a 
standard method of shaping iron and steel, undertaken by the 
basic trades in the fabrication shops, the diversity in 
output precluded the introduction of heavy machinery for the 
purpose of series or assembly line production. 
There were exceptions to the general situation. Whessoe, 
specialising in the construction of relatively uniform 
process plant for the chemical and energy industries, 
pioneered the development of shop built modules during the 
First World War. But even here, although worker control of 
production was diluted, it was not usurped by management. 
During the 1920s, after the introduction of American capital 
and ideas the company attempted to introduce a new 
production system, loosely based around Fordism, and centred 
upon the new welding techniques. Although the new techniques 
were largely accepted, they did not alter the existing 
relations of production and tended to be incorporated within 
traditional demarcation boundaries. 
Production remained labour intensive, and capital investment 
in the form of new technology was minimal. This is 
illustrated by the failure of semi-skilled categories to 
displace skilled workers in the labour process, unlike in 
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other manufacturing areas dominated by industries such as 
clothing and electrical engineering (Anderson, 1982}. Whilst 
on the one hand this reflected the uncertain and cyclical 
nature of the product market and the fragmented capital 
structure of the industry, it also indicated the strength of 
craft unionism within this realm of engineering. 
At the same time the evidence suggests that the maintenance 
of worker autonomy was in the employers' own interests. Not 
only was the emphasis placed upon skilled workers to 
supervise the gangs working under them, but the system was 
also useful in maintaining profit levels for the employer. 
It was standard for an engineer or shipwright to work as a 
contractor on a piece rate, whilst hiring labour from the 
lower echelons himself on time rates. Thus during a trade 
slump, reductions in wages were usually passed onto the 
lower echelons by the piecemaster, whilst in a boom period 
the latter received any additional revenue accruing from a 
contract. Clearly this type of activity further enhanced the 
divisions within the labour force, creating an intermediary 
layer of prosperous workers between the capitalist and the 
lower layers of the working class. 
Local labour market development 
Whilst there were significant divisions between the working 
class in the production process, the dynamic character of 
the product market impinged upon all individuals, 
independent of skill. Thus the position of craftsmen within 
the employment system was fundamentally undermined by the 
severe fluctuations in product markets. To counteract this 
situation, companies continued to organise their demand for 
labour not through an internal labour market, but through 
the casualisation of the bulk of the workforce. The 
prevalence of this system of labour market regulation was in 
contrary to the general trend in other sectors of the 
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British economy, where more stable forms of employment, less 
susceptible to trade fluctuations, were increasingly 
becoming the norm (Southall, 1988: 254). Its preservation 
was dependent upon the high number of yards through which 
this mobile workforce could circulate. This was borne out by 
the situation that existed in shipbuilding areas abroad, 
characterised by a single large employer and a lack of 
alternative opportunities. Under such circumstances workers 
were often guaranteed security of employment in return for 
flexibility in the labour process (Lorenz and Wilkinson, 
1983: 114). In contrast few of the North East's manual 
labour force were in what by today's standards we would call 
permanent employment. 15 
In practice there were differences 1n status between 
individuals based upon employment longevity, which in turn 
was a reward for loyalty to individual firms. For some, 
loyalty to a particular company was rewarded with greater 
employment security, whilst others would move between 
companies "chasing" money. Mess describes how this labour 
market system operated in his survey of Tyneside during the 
inter-war period (1928: 52): 
"Employment in the shipbuilding and ship-repairing 
industries consists for most men of a series of jobs, 
which may last anything from a few hours to a few 
months. Usually men are engaged by the day. The methods 
of engagement at shipyards are roughly as follows. In 
each shipyard there are recognised places, where men of 
the different occupations assemble; these are known as 
"markets," the "drillers' market," the "riveters 
market," and so on. The foremen go there twice a day, 
at 7. 30 a.m. and 1 p.m., to engage such men as they 
15 In structural engineering, employment stability varied to a 
greater extent. In the fabrication shops the majority of 
craftsmen tended to be longer-serving and there is evidence to 
suggest the semblance of an internal labour market. But sitework 
was probably more casual than many sectors of shipbuilding. 
Indeed the constructional engineering trades were subject to 
similar labour market conditions as the building trades. 
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require. In most crafts there 
who are taken on before others 
Usually the list of royals 
order ... 
are "royals," i.e. men 
when work is available. 
is kept in a definite 
Many men follow a particular firm, and often a 
particular department of a firm; that is to say, that 
they work for that firm when there is work to do, but 
they do not normally expect or try to get work 
elsewhere if their firm is slack. Other men move about 
the river a great deal. In the main the men of the 
former class are the "royals"; they get the pick of the 
work, and they probably do the bulk of the work; they 
are the men to whom heads of firms refer to as "our 
men," and they have often long records of service. In 
the main the men of the second class get the extra work 
of yards at their busy times; their livelihood is more 
precarious, and they tend to be inferior men." 
Up until the 1920s, despite short term fluctuations, the 
overall growth conditions of the economy within the North 
East ensured a relatively high continuity of work and living 
standards for skilled workers and their assistants. This was 
reflected in the high wage levels, earned by craftsmen 
especially, relative to other sectors, as Table 3.6 
illustrates. The large number of firms operating within the 
region ensured a steady supply of work for the labour force. 
As such, this employment continuity was achieved not through 
a single firm dominating and stabilising its product market, 
but through the diverse range of production stages within 
which the totality of firms in an individual district were 
located at any one moment in time. This allowed the plethora 
of trades that comprised the local labour markets of the 
region to move with their respective skills from yard to 
yard as the production process dictated. 
In this sense a craft identity was forged not through a 
shared experience 
individual firms 
of regular and stable employment within 
but rather through a high level of 
consciousness based upon a local labour market identity. 
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The development of craft regulation 
At the same time there did not develop a wider class 
consciousness, a factor that was borne out by the often 
sectional nature of industrial relations conflicts. 
Certainly during the last two decades of the nineteenth 
century the majority of disputes were concerned with the 
protection of craft positions within the labour market 
rather than class conscious movements for radical social 
reform. This trend became the hallmark of craft unionism in 
the North East, in contrast to the newer engineering areas 
that developed in the twentieth century, which were often 
more concerned with the greater political issue of piece 
rates (Croucher, 1977} . 16 It is also noticeable that the 
more radical "New Unionism" never gained a strong foothold 
in the North East, indeed a large percentage of the 
workforce within the North East could be defined within 
Hobsbawrn's labour aristocracy {1964: 272-315}. This largely 
reflects the union background and social divisions within 
the regional labour force in the North East that were 
highlighted earlier. 
Despite the priveleged position enjoyed by craftsmen within 
this employment system it would be misleading to suggest 
that industrial capitalists accepted craft unionism and its 
precepts from the outset. The technological advances of the 
industrial revolution offered the opportunity for the 
reorganisation of production, involving the erosion of craft 
autonomy in pursuit of greater surplus value. In this sense 
the establishment of a strong union tradition along the 
16Th is is not to suggest that craft unionism was apolitical; 
the sponsorship of the early Labour party refutes this. But the 
attempt to gain political representation reflected the desire to 
improve the work environment through legislative change after 
setbacks to union development from several disputes with 
employers, notably after the Engineering Lockout of 1898 (Hinton, 
1982}. " 
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North East coast was initially the result of a series of 
struggles with employers over the recognition of worker 
representation. Ironically the landmark in this struggle was 
the successfully fought movement for a Nine Hour Week by 
engineers in 1871, whose inspiration was not the nationally 
based ASE, but a local coalition of skilled and unskilled 
workers, the majority of whom were not unionised (Allen et 
al, 1971: 101). From this point until the 1898 engineering 
lockout, unions were able to make steady progress in 
establishing themselves (the Boilermakers had 80 per cent 
coverage in their areas of control by the end of the 
century). 
By the beginning of the twentieth century the craft unions 
were strongly organised both at the local and national 
levels. From this point onwards, conflict between employers 
and unions tended to be confined to a terrain of compromise. 
Whilst to a large extent unions were able to preserve worker 
autonomy in the labour process, managers were able to 
instigate piecemeal changes when circumstances favoured 
them. The outcome of these bilateral struggles tended to 
hinge upon the balance of power in the labour market. 
Employers were more able to impose their will during 
recessions, but trade unions could make substantial inroads 
under boom conditions, e.g. the unions agreed to the 
Edinburgh Agreement during the recession in shipbuilding in 
1907. This gave employers the right to use 
apprentice labour at their discretion. In 
overtime and 
1909, with 
unemployment amongst the Boilermakers reaching 21 per cent 
nationally, a procedures' agreement was established that 
allowed employers to implement changes in production at the 
local level without union consent. Such agreements were 
unpopular with "rank and file unionists" and were rescinded 
by the Boilermakers' executive when economic conditions 
improved in 1912. Similarly the ASE were forced to allow the 
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employers to implement crucial manning changes after the 
1897-8 Lockout. This led to the the replacement of the 
executive by a more radical central committee, committed to 
defending craft principles in 1912. 
Although there was substantial conflict between employers 
and unions, the North East was not witness to the battles 
over deskilling and job content that occurred in other 
industrial regions. 17 No wonder therefore that the North 
East coast was lauded for its exemplary labour relations in 
a contemporary report: 
"On the whole, we formed the opinion that unrest 
arising from delay in settlement of disputes is less 
evident in the North East area than it seems to be in 
other districts.. . The employees collectively do not 
advance any demands that are extravagant or incapable 
of being met by friendly cooperation between Employer 
and Employee." 
(1917 Commission of Inquiry, Cmd. 8662; quoted in 
Eldridge, 1968: 156) 
This also explains the absence of growing state involvement 
in employment regulation, which was apparent in other areas 
of the country in the first quarter of the twentieth 
century. IS The North East coast (excluding the mining 
districts) appeared to represent the prototype of a self-
17Instead the majority of conflicts between employers and 
workers tended to be over wage rates, which fluctuated severely 
with the trade cycle, especially in shipbuilding. 
1RThe old liberalist views of the labour market were in 
retreat during this period. The growth of a more radical unionism 
appeared to threaten the very fabric of British capitalism, 
particularly in the period from the end of the Great War up until 
the General Strike in 1926. Against this background a new 
hegemony was emerging (Hall, 1984: Jessop, 1983), most obviously 
represented by the social reform programme of Lloyd George, which 
proved to be the precursor of welfare capitalism. This involved 
accepting the validity of unionism and embracing the more 
moderate labour leaders (Wrigley, 1982). 
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regulating employment system. 
The consequences of The Depression for employment relations 
The onset of a depression in shipbuilding and to a lesser 
extent structural engineering in the inter-war years was to 
have a significant impact upon all aspects of the employment 
system. The customary fluctuations ln the shipbuilding 
market were supplanted by a period of severe secular decline 
from the 1920s, and the North East for the first time 
registered unemployment figures consistently higher than the 
national average. Declining orders in the shipbuilding and 
engineering industries shifted the balance of power in the 
labour market towards the employers, who initially were able 
to impose wage reductions on the labour force. Worker 
acceptance of pay cuts in the period from 1920 to 1922 
reflected the belief amongst many union leaders that the 
doubling of wage rates during the war had contributed to the 
decline in competitiveness of British shipbuilders. Further 
cuts in wages accompanied the downward spiral into recession 
and the employers were to remain in the ascendancy until the 
late 1930s. 
Although structural engineering companies fared better than 
the North East's shipbuilders during this period, their 
policies were often directed at expansion overseas, and in 
particular at the establishment of subsidiary operations. 
Whilst such activities usually secured existing jobs, they 
ran contrary to the needs of the increasing numbers of 
unemployed people in the region. There was implicit 
recognition of this sharp conflict of interest between 
domestic capital and the regional labour force by Sir Arthur 
Dorman, the Chairman of Dorman Long, in his annual 
{1928) to shareholders, when commenting on the 
Harbour Bridge Contract: 
report 
Sydney 
"In our part, we have had to depart from the policy we 
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had in view when we decided to establish branches in 
these countries. Our object then was to provide or 
increase already existing outlets for our production of 
finished materials. As local production has increased, 
we have had to modify this policy, and in an increasing 
degree we have had to recognise that these markets have 
become valuable for purposes of investment, rather than 
as a means of absorbing a portion of the output of this 
country. On the whole, we cannot but congratulate 
ourselves that we were early enough in this field to 
take advantage of altering conditions and to adopt our 
policy in the best way possible in the interests of our 
shareholders. Unfortunately, every ton of steel 
manufactured overseas means to all intents and purposes 
the loss of a ton to British works." 
Despite this, 
craftsmen, in 
the 
work, 
position 
in the 
of structural 
region, during 
engineering 
this period 
remained relatively strong, and they were not subject to the 
same scale of wage erosion as their counterparts in 
shipbuilding. (This reflected the relative growth of the 
sector during the inter war years.) They emerged from the 
Depression with their labour market position unscathed, and 
significantly, a comparison of wage rates, at the time of 
rearmament reveals that these workers continued to be 
amongst the best paid in the country (Table 3.7). 
The decimation of employment during the 1930s weakened the 
bargaining power of unions in the labour market, 
particularly in shipbuilding, where wage levels declined in 
relation to other trades (compare Table 3.6 with Table 3.7). 
But significantly there was no great change in the 
organisation of labour in production. This was despite 
considerable technical changes, especially the introduction 
of welding and prefabrication. 
By the early 1930s it was obvious that welding would 
gradually replace riveting in the fabrication of structural 
steel. With this in mind, the SEF established a committee to 
investigate the implications of the introduction of welding 
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on the labour process. Their principal recommendation was 
that a new class of skilled worker, the shipwelder be 
recruited and trained from the existing workforce, but not 
necessarily from the ranks of the displaced workers. This 
involved a five year apprenticeship in all aspects of 
construction. Behind these changes it was hoped that the 
role of the platers would also be undermined, restricting 
them to skilled work only, allowing platers' helpers to 
replace them in the task of plate straightening. By 
undermining the key role of platers and others within the 
production process it was hoped to erode the "gang system. 
The unions were against these changes, which were viewed not 
only as a means with which to undermine the existing craft 
arrangements, but also to reduce wage levels. A united front 
presented by the CSEU forestalled the changes by fighting 
the employers on a yard by yard, shop by shop basis 
(Mortimer, 1982: 231). As a result the majority of welding 
work passed into the hands of the Boilermakers. 19 
Once again the experience of labour organisation in the 
North East was at odds with other, newer forms of industry, 
notably food processing and chemicals, where watered down 
forms of scientific management were being introduced in the 
form of the Bedaux system (Littler, 1982: 139-43). The 
failure of the North East's companies to restructure the 
labour process in a similar fashion not only reflected the 
unwillingness of management to challenge craft unionism even 
19The advent of welding did cause sectional conflict within 
the unions however, notably between the drilling section of the 
Shipwrights and the plating section of the Boilermakers on the 
structural side. There was also conflict between Boilermakers and 
metal working shipwrights over prefabrication. This involved the 
removal of part of the production process to the fabrication 
sheds, where the plater operated a closed shop, and was to be a 
bone of contention through to the 1960s (Lorenz, 1983). 
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during the advantageous labour market environment provided 
by the depression years, but also the absence of sufficient 
capital (Lee, 1982: 154). Thus the shipbuilding and 
structural engineering industries entered the Second World 
War with capital structures and methods of labour 
organisation little changed from those in place at the start 
of the First World War. 
3.5 The erosion of an employment system, 1939-1970 
The Second World War and its immediate aftermath was a 
period of great activity for the region's shipbuilding and 
engineering industries. The increased demands of a wartime 
economy followed by the peace time reconstruction programme 
provided a huge market of diverse products for capital goods 
industries. In many ways this boom period only served to 
paper over cracks in the region's industries that had first 
surfaced in the inter war years. The situation in the North 
East was symptomatic of British industry as a whole. The old 
problems of fragmentation, technical inefficiency and 
archaic production systems were still present. Added to this 
manufacturing industry faced greater competitiveness in both 
the world and home markets, both from traditional rivals and 
new producers. Against this background the post war boom 
encouraged a mood of complacency in the existing industrial 
order, and to a large extent the lessons of the 1930s were 
forgotten (Armstrong et al, 1984: 96-104), whilst victory in 
the war dispelled doubts about the existing political 
economy (Price, 1986: 214). 
3.5.1 Shipbuilding 
The demands of post war reconstruction brought full order 
books to the North East's shipyards and relative prosperity 
throughout the 1950s. Under such circumstances, little 
thought was given to the issues of restructuring and 
modernisation, whilst the government was unwilling to 
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sponsor this type of programme in an industry that was 
superficially healthy {Hegwood, 1979: 40). But beneath these 
surface trends the industry was being substantially 
undermined, particularly with regard to export markets. Up 
until 1960 its share of the world market declined, but it 
continued to dominate the home market. It was only when 
British shipping companies began to desert domestic 
shipbuilders during the 1960s, that profits fell and the 
underlying structural problems of the domestic industry 
become fully apparent. 
The doubts about the industry were occasioned not only by a 
fall in market share, but also due to the low rises in 
productivity (less than 1 per cent between 1951 and 1961 
compared to 3. 5 per cent in manufacturing industry as a 
whole) . 20 
The quantity and structure of the world market altered 
dramatically between 1950 and 1970; whilst production 
increased from 3.25 million to 21 million gross tons. The 
increase in demand was accompanied by a growing share for 
standardised tanker output, compared to a decline in 
specialist cargo vessels. Under these circumstances, the 
North East's yards continued to place emphasis upon 
diversity in production. As a result the tanker market was 
increasingly dominated by countries such as Germany, Japan 
and sweden. During the 1930s, sweden in particular had 
developed the production of tankers, built to a standardised 
design. This enabled the development of series or batch 
production, based upon assembly lines with considerable cost 
reductions. The failure of North Eastern firms (and British 
firms in general) to capitalise on the new market after the 
war was surprising given the destruction of the 
Wsee Hegwood (ibid: 46). 
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infrastructure of many of their overseas competitors. 
Paradoxically however, countries such as France, Germany and 
Japan were forced to build facilities from scratch, 
incorporating new production techniques such as 
prefabrication and welding. In contrast technical 
improvements in North Eastern yards were undertaken by 
modifying existing facilities, that were ill-suited to the 
demands of the new tanker age. 
The absence of productivity gains was partly the consequence 
of the industry in the North East's inability to adopt new 
construction techniques in anything more than a piecemeal 
fashion. But the situation also reflected deteriorating 
labour relations and the entrenched position of the unions 
on the subject of demarcation. Even with the introduction of 
the new welding techniques from the early 1930s, production 
continued to be dominated by a craft division of labour, 
which remained a counterbalance against the unstable nature 
of employment. 
With the decline in orders in the early 1960s, the extent of 
the crisis facing shipbuilding became apparent. Amongst the 
more notable casualties were Gray's shipyard at Hartlepool, 
closing in 1962 and the Wearside firm of Short Brothers in 
1964. The remainder of the shipyards were only rescued 
through government intervention, firstly through the 
shipbuilding credit scheme in 1964 and secondly through the 
restructuring engendered by the Geddes Report ( 19 6 6) . The 
former represented a short term palliative in the form of an 
interest free loan to shipowners. Whilst it did serve to 
stimulate commercial demand, it did not cure the industry's 
long term problems. But the Geddes Report was much more 
significant in this respect. 
The report recommended the amalgamation of firms and the 
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concentration of production into regional groupings. These 
regional combines would specialise and become expert in 
particular types of vessel. It advocated two centres for the 
North East coast; one amalgamating the Tyneside firms with 
the two remaining Tees yards, Furness' and Smith's Dock, and 
a second based on the Wear. In the event, the Tyne and Tees 
block amalgamated into Swan Hunter, but continued to produce 
a diverse range of vessels (e.g. warships at the Walker 
Neptune yard and oil tankers at the Furness yards on the 
Tees), whilst the two firms on the Wear; Austin and 
Pickersgill, and Sunderland Shipbuilders preserved their 
independence (Todd, 1983: 61-2) 21 • 
3.5.2 structural Engineering 
The period from 1945 to 1960 was one of almost unprecedented 
boom for the sector, benefiting from increased demand in 
various segments of the market: firstly from new investment 
in local steel production, notably the construction of two 
new steel works at Hartlepool and Lackenby; secondly from 
the government's power station construction 
thirdly from a major refinery construction 
bridge and civil construction markets 
profitable throughout this period. 
programme, and 
programme. The 
also remained 
Construction contracts were often shared out amongst the 
large number of firms on Teesside. In certain cases this 
meant the alliance of companies for the purposes of specific 
projects, in 1938 a company called Bellman Hangers was 
formed to build hangers for the Ministry of Defence on a 
contract basis. Amongst those firms participating were the 
Teesside based Cleveland Bridge, Head Wrightson and Teesside 
Bridge. In the post war period Cleveland Bridge and Dorman 
21 The closure of one of these groupings and the difficulties 
facing several others eventually led to nationalisation in 1977. 
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Long regularly collaborated on bridge projects, notable 
examples being the Auckland Harbour Bridge contract in 1954 
and the Forth Road Bridge in 1958. At other times there was 
covert collusion amongst firms over individual contracts. 
This was a reaction to a period of intense competition and 
price cutting during the 1920s. From the late 1930s onwards 
it was common for there to be an exchange of information 
between contractors over tenders to ensure that the eventual 
price quoted was not below a certain minimum level. In this 
sense the contractors would decide between themselves, 
beforehand, who would undertake which parts of the 
contract. 22 This system prevailed into the 1960s despite the 
1951 Restrictive Trade Practices Act. An example is provided 
by Tighe (1979: 128) of his experience at Teesside Bridge: 
"I remember a contract for some repetitive work in 
which six companies appeared on the file as having 
received the enquiry to quote for the business, but one 
glance was enough to convey the message that four of 
them were not really fitted for it and could not be 
seriously interested, and thus there was but one real 
competitor. A very keen estimate was prepared with a 5% 
profit margin, but it so happened that I met a Director 
of the opposing company and there was a conversation. 
In the event we added 20 per cent to our bid to give a 
reasonable margin and a decent profit on at least one 
job and only quoted for half the work. Our competitor 
quoted for the other half, at a price remarkably close 
to ours. The customer was quite happy, he had two 
sources of supply which was safer than one, he got the 
job on time and there were no complaints. Half a loaf 
at a better price, than the whole at a potential loss." 
Such informal channels of communication were the norm in 
structural engineering, but were the closest the sector came 
to amalgamation. Although companies liaised frequently on 
contracts and over industrial relations procedures, existing 
structures were rarely called into question. Instead, this 
22This informal apportioning of market share between 
producers was commonplace throughout British industry (Armstrong 
et al, 1984: 101} . 
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egalitarian approach to the distribution of major contracts, 
during boom conditions, perpetuated the anachronistic 
structure of the industry. 
At the start of the 1960s this boom was dissipating, the 
steel reconstruction programme was drawing to a close, 
whilst work on refinery and power plant was increasingly of 
a small scale nature. In addition, technical advances in the 
use of reinforced concrete had given it a competitive 
advantage over steel in construction. This allowed the large 
civil constructors such as McAlpine to undertake more of the 
work themselves without subcontracting to steel specialists. 
Apart from these changes in the product market, companies 
were increasingly constrained by the age of existing plant 
and a lack of capital to modernise facilities. Teesside 
Bridge's yard dated back to the nineteenth century with 
extra bays added as the company moved into newer markets. At 
the same time, 
traditionally 
the structural engineering sector was still 
the poor relation of the steel industry. 
Profits from Dorman Long's structural division were usually 
invested in the expansion of iron and steel producing 
facilities. 
3.6 Employment change in the post-war era 
The importance of the employment system (associated with 
shipbuilding and structural engineering) to the regional 
labour market was substantially diminished by the events of 
the 1930s, although as we noted at the beginning of the 
chapter, it continued to represent a considerable segment of 
the labour market up to the 1970s. Additionally, the post 
war era witnessed considerable diversity in the fortunes of 
the local economies of Tyne and Wear, and Teesside. Teesside 
experienced boom conditions stimulated by the growth of the 
chemicals industry, which attracted engineering and former 
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shipbuilding trades (Beynon et al, 1986b), whilst the area 
comprising Tyneside and Wearside came to be regarded as a 
problem area and was the recipient of regional aid from 
central government. This had the effect of diluting the 
labour market away from the dominance of shipbuilding by 
bringing new forms of industry into the area.n 
These changes also reflected the contradictory aims of 
government regional policy and its effects. For whilst 
governments explicitly sought to diversify the labour market 
of Tyneside away from shipbuilding and heavy engineering, 
Teesside was allowed to remain a dominated labour market in 
the interests of the chemicals and steel industries (Beynon 
et al, 1985). 
In contrast to the inter-war years, the balance of power in 
the labour market was tipped ln favour of the workforce 
during the post war period. Two factors were important in 
explaining this reverse. Firstly, the ravages of the 1930s 
had produced a new consensus amongst governing circles, 
centred upon Keynesian economic principles and a commitment 
to full employment (Crouch, 1982). In addition the 
overwhelming weight of employment legislation was directed 
at protecting and securing the position of the worker in the 
labour market. Secondly, within the North East itself, the 
outflow of workers from the shipbuilding and engineering 
industries into other industries and away from the region 
itself since the 1930s had produced considerable skill 
shortages by the 1950s, resulting in a more stable working 
environment for those remaining and creating what the 
contemporary Labour politician, Tony Crosland, was to refer 
23These new forms often drew from sections of the labour 
market not previously associated with industrial development in 
the area, e.g. Findus Foods employing predominantly unskilled, 
part-time female workers. 
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to as a "seller's market for labour" (quoted in Coates, 
1990: 20}. 
These altered power relations within the labour market 
constrained management attempts to restructure the labour 
process in both shipbuilding and engineering. 
Although the production process had been transformed in 
shipbuilding during the late 19 3 Os (the old practice of 
shaping individual plates and joining them piece by piece at 
the berth was replaced by a three dimensional construction 
indoors followed by the transfer to the berth for welding} 
the ascendancy of skilled labour was not challenged. In 
time, the new tasks of welding and burning became 
established as skilled trades in their own right. 24 
Consequently, as Lorenz notes, skilled workers continued to 
account for almost 70 per cent of the workforce as late as 
1968 ( 1983: 169} . 
Similarly in structural engineering, the organisation of 
labour 
still 
in production had 
revolving around 
changed little 
the requirements 
in sixty years, 
of individual 
contracts and involving a dichotomy between short term 
contract work on site and a more stable type of employment 
in the fabrication shops {though the latter was contingent 
upon the continuity of orders) . Craftsmen retained their 
hegemony here, despite the introduction of limited forms of 
new technology during the early 1960s (in the shape of semi-
automatic welding machines in the 'shops and mobile cranes 
which speeded up the erection process on site). 
Mrndeed the welders adopted all the traditional baggage of 
sectionalism in protecting their labour market status, i.e. 
strict apprenticeship and demarcation controls (McGoldrick, 1983: 
2 02) . 
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In particular employers attempts to overcome skill 
shortages, through raising the ratio of apprentices to 
craftsmen and the upgrading of semi-skilled workers during 
the 1950s, were largely thwarted by unions, still nervous of 
demarcation boundaries, although there were examples of 
union acceptance under certain conditions, providing they 
were consulted (Eldridge, 1968; Lee, 1979: 36). But notably, 
productivity in shipbuilding only increased by one per cent 
in the period 1951-61 prompting Hagwood to remark that: 
"··· production control in the industry was primitive, 
work-study non existent and personnel management old 
fashioned, and there was too little contact with other 
industries whose techniques might benefit the yards. On 
labour relations there would be little hope of an end 
to demarcation troubles unless the workers were given 
security of employment, and the unions some kind of 
financial inducement to cooperate." 
(1979: 46) 
By the middle of the 1960s there had been something of a 
seachange in the attitudes of both employers and workers to 
labour relations, occasioned by the beginining of a rapid 
decline in shipbuilding fortunes, which coincided with a 
downturn in the structural engineering market. Management 
had begun to accept that more flexible working practices 
would only be acceded to if employees were guaranteed 
greater employment stability. In shipbuilding the Geddes 
Report helped in this respect by encouraging the 
amalgamation into larger organisational units, whereby a 
more stable employment regime was made possible. 25 At the 
same time there was a growing acceptance amongst unions that 
some form of restructuring was required, if traditional 
forms of employment were to survive in any form in the 
region. In particular this was reflected in a more relaxed 
25There was no similar trend in structural engineering, 
although the nationalisation of the steel industry in 1968 was to 
lead to the reorganisation of the structural division of Dorman 
Long. 
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attitude towards job control and demarcation, particularly 
amongst the basic trades, aided by the amalgamation of 
Boilermakers, Blacksmiths and Shipwrights in 1962 and the 
relative security of existing crafts within the labour 
process by this time. As McGoldrick (1983: 213) notes: 
"The "problem" of demarcation had diminished in 
importance by 1969. In fact this was due to reduction 
of friction fostered by the ASB amalgamations, but it 
was also related to the settled nature of the 
organisation of the division of labour after the 
initial negotiation of prefabrication and sub-assembly 
methods of work." 
In fact what was steadily emerging in this employment system 
by the end of the 1960s was a transformation of the social 
relations that had underpinned it in the 
years. With the increasing globalisation 
capitalist economy in the post war period, 
parochial conflicts between employers and 
preceding 100 
of the wider 
the traditional 
employees were 
gradually being supplanted by concern over the region's 
status and survival in the wider world economic system. This 
trend was accentuated by the arrival of North Sea oil 
activity, which served to highlight the region's peripheral 
position in the new global economy. Although, as we shall 
see in subsequent chapters, there have continued to be old 
style disputes between local managements and workforces, 
these have tended to be subsumed, especially during the 
1980s, by a new set of relationships, which marked the 
incorporation of this employment system into a global 
economic framework. In this sense, the stances of both 
management and workforces have been radically altered in the 
past twenty years, to the extent that in certain instances, 
the two parties have acted in common purpose, thus defining 
a regional interest that overrides traditional class 
boundaries. 
131 
3.7 concluding comments 
This chapter has shown how the North East developed into one 
of the world's economic core regions through a particular 
sphere of industrial accumulation. Its subsequent demise 
during the twentieth century has been explained by its 
failure to attract a substantial portion of the new growth 
industries. Up until the early 1960s the regional economy 
(outside the coalfield areas) continued to be dominated 
traditional industries, centred upon the production of 
capital goods for characteristically dynamic markets. In 
essence here was a sector of industrial accumulation that 
never made the transition to a regime of stable mass 
production and the accompanying restructuring of the labour 
process with its consequences for the local labour market. 
Under these circumstances an employment system common to 
shipbuilding and structural engineering developed, that was 
dominated by a form of craft regulation. This represented 
the incorporation of pre-industrial forms of work 
organisation into an capitalist industrial setting, but also 
reflected the unwillingness of managers to introduce more 
modern methods of labour organisation, based around capital 
intensive production methods against a background of market 
uncertainty. In this sense, capital did not seek to dominate 
labour through subservience in the la-bour process, but 
rather through a strategy of casualisation in the local 
labour market. Thus many areas 
developed large segments within 
of the North East coast 
the local labour market 
where casualisation and insecurity were endemic features of 
the employment experience. 
It was against this background that oil was discovered in 
the North Sea, opening up a new market for the North East's 
beleaguered industries, but at the same time bringing about 
a transformation in the social relations underpinning the 
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employment system. 
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Table 3.1 
Employment Structure in the Northern Region, 1971 
Numbers ern:Qloyed (%) 
Sector 
Male Female All 
Primary 77,628 4,904 82,532 (7) 
Manufacturing 340,833 120,279 461,162 (38) 
Construction 79,120 4,145 83,265 (7) 
Services 272,575 306,746 579,321 (48) 
Total 770,206 436,074 1,206,280 
(Source: NOMIS database) 
Year 
1870 
1871 
1872 
1873 
1874 
1875 
1876 
1877 
1878 
1879 
1880 
1881 
1882 
1883 
1884 
1885 
1886 
1887 
1888 
1889 
1890 
1891 
1892 
1893 
1894 
1895 
1896 
1897 
1898 
1899 
1900 
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Table 3.2 
Shipbuilding output in the North East 1870-1900 
(gross tons) 
Newcastle sunderland North East Coast 
86,000 70,084 ---
77,628 81,903 ---
83,672 134,825 ---
87,913 99,371 ---
110,000 99,371 ---
98,000 79,904 ---
--- 55,041 ---
87,968 87,587 ---
126,307 112,602 ---
139,843 87,432 ---
149,082 108,626 ---
177,165 130,862 ---
208,406 183,350 ---
216,573 212,313 ---
124,221 99,597 ---
106,447 61,761 ---
82,760 56,699 ---
104,296 84,254 ---
213,203 142,508 ---
281,710 217,383 ---
235,062 194,307 ---
185,367 188,715 ---
181,508 186,440 570,296 
144,261 118,317 431,405 
190,601 168,257 544,768 
161,476 125,266 497,564 
200,746 215,956 611,727 
169,585 174,496 498,594 
238,551 268,754 763,825 
249,038 242,611 766,282 
265,142 244,371 794,300 
{Source: Lloyds List) 
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Table 3.3 
Industrial concentration in British Mercantile Shipping 
Percentage gross tonnage 
Year To:Q 2 TO:Q 5 TO:Q 10 No. Firms No. Yards 
1920 19.1 34.4 45.5 109 126 
1930 25.8 40.4 46.4 60 80 
1938 24.5 46.4 65.8 47 54 
[Source: Lorenz, E. (1984: 125)] 
136 
Table 3.4 
Tees Side Bridge and Engineering Works Profits (OOOs) 
1920-29 
Year Engineering Foundry 
1920 - 8 22 
1921 14 13 
1922 17 9 
1923 - 2 21 
1924 7 3 
1925 6 10 
1926 -11 23 
1927 1 11 
1928 18 8 
1929 8 3 
(Source: Tighe, 1980: 54) 
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Table 3.5 
Size of Shipbuilding Works in 1851 (Northern counties) 
No. Men Employed Shipbuilders 
1-9 10 
10-19 13 
20-29 7 
30-39 6 
40-49 4 
50-74 10 
75-99 2 
100-149 2 
150-199 5 
200-249 1 
(Source: Dougan, 1968: 237) 
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Table 3.6 
A Comparison of Wage Rates in Shipbuilding 
against Other Selected Industries, 1914 
Industry/Occupation Rate per week 
Shipbuilding: 
Shipwrights 41 7 
Shipjoiners 40 5 
Labourers 23 0 
Engineering: 
Fitters and turners 38 11 
Labourers 22 10 
Printing: 
Compositors 35 8 
Building: 
Carpenters and joiners 39 11 
Labourers 27 0 
(s. d.) 
N.B. Figures are for the United Kingdom average, calculated 
from district rates. 
[Source: British Labour Statistics, Historical Abstract, 
1886-1968) 
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Table 3.7 
Waqe Rates of Structural Engineerinq Trades on Teesside 
and Darlington compared to Other Selected Workers 1938-9 
Industry/Occupation Weekly Wage Rates ( s. ) 
Structural Eng. (Teesside) 
Platers 91 
Burners 83 
Rivetters 104 
Shipbuilding 
Shipwrights 68 
Mechanical Eng. 
Fitt/Tune 67 
Printing 
Compositors 74 
N.B. Figures for Teesside represent average of seven major 
companies: Dorman Long, Ashmore Benson Pease, Head 
Wrightson, Whessoe, Cleveland Bridge, Tees-Side Bridge, 
cargo Fleet Iron co. other figures are for U.K. average. 
(Source: BSC Archives, British Labour Statistics, ibid] 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE ROLE OF THE NORTH EAST IN OFFSHORE OPERATIONS 
Having established the historical background to the arrival 
of North Sea oil operations in the North East, this chapter 
begins to examine the impact of oil development upon the 
region. Initially North Sea oil was regarded as a much 
needed fillip for the region, bringing a new market for its 
industries at a time when its traditional markets were 
experiencing substantial decline and competition from 
overseas. This was represented by full order books and 
rising wage levels for firms and workers engaged in aspects 
of oil activity, particularly in the halcyon days of the 
middle 1970s. On Teesside especially, this was a boom 
period; the area received 21 per cent of all oil-related 
investment, in the U.K, in industrial plant prior to 1976 
(M.S.C. report, 1974). Not only was the engineering 
workforce fully employed in the construction of facilities 
for the upstream sector of the oil market, but there were 
also other important construction projects taking place 
simultaneously, most notably the building of the Phillips 
and Shell oil refineries. 
But at the same time, the region has not received any long 
term strategic benefits from oil operations in the past 
twenty years. The region is increasingly peripheral to the 
main areas of decision making, both within the United 
Kingdom and at the global level (Austrin and Beynon, 1980), 
a position is likely to worsen during the 1990s with the 
advent of greater European economic integration. 
The following three chapters consider the actual nature of 
the oil impact and what the effects of this have been for 
the restructuring of employment within the region. As a 
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first stage in this process, the following chapter examines 
the structure of the oil supplies market in the British 
sector of the North Sea and the role of North Eastern firms 
within that market. In doing so we will be elaborating upon 
certain themes arising in Chapter One. 
4.1 The nature of the oil supplies market in the North Sea 
The significance of the offshore market in the North Sea 
stretches far beyond the limits of the oil industry. For it 
would be no exaggeration to describe the offshore oil and 
gas industry as the biggest area of economic growth, 1n the 
United Kingdom, since the 1960s. This 1s true whether 
measured in terms of manpower, or capital investment. At its 
peak, during the middle years of the 1970s, it directly 
employed approximately 100,000 individuals (Hamilton, 1978: 
132), whilst expenditure on capital equipment between 1974 
and 1978 consistently accounted for over 40 per cent of all 
manufacturing investment and 7 per cent of all United 
Kingdom investment (Department of Energy "Brown Books"). 
But aside from these quantifiable aspects of the offshore 
supplies market, it is characterised by certain generic 
features, which are essential to explaining the structure of 
the industry itself. The first and probably most important 
of these is its dynamic nat_ure. The upstream segment of the 
oil industry is probably the sector of the industry most 
directly affected by changes in the price of oil. Thus in 
the twenty year period between 1970 and 1990 the supplies 
industry suffered fluctuating fortunes, roughly 
corresponding to price movements in the oil market. 
A second distinguishing feature of the supplies market is in 
the degree of importance it holds for firms engaging in 
aspects of offshore activity. Another feature of market 
diversity is in the extent to which the activities of supply 
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companies can be defined as offshore-specific rather than 
locationally-specific. As we shall illustrate later this has 
important consequences for the strategic position of firms. 
The market is further characterised by the nature of 
demand, which is based around single unit contracts with 
specific requirements. This is especially the case for 
exploration and development contracts, whilst the market for 
offshore support services tends to be more recurrent in 
nature. 
4.1.1 The fluctuating fortunes of the offshore supplies 
industry 
Given the prevailing political economy in the United 
Kingdom, the fortunes of the indigenous offshore supplies 
industry have been hostage to the price of crude oil on the 
world's spot markets in the past twenty years. During the 
early 1970s, the development of the Forties Field and other 
subsequent finds, coupled with the price rises emanating 
from the OPEC revolution, produced boom conditions in the 
market for offshore supplies. 
Despite this, in the intervening period, the oil market has 
been characterised by severe fluctuations. In particular it 
has been subjecteo to four major price shocks: the initial 
dramatic price rises associated with the OPEC revolution; 
further increases in price in the period 1979-80, stimulated 
by renewed political uncertainty in the Middle East 
following the Iranian Revolution; the fall in oil prices in 
1986, a consequence of the collapse of OPEC control and the 
Iran-Iraq war; and the most recent upsurge in prices 
following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. In between shocks, 
the oil price displays a tendency towards a slow, but 
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significant movement in the reverse direction.' 
The implications of changes 1n the price of oil, as 
suggested earlier, are borne directly by the oil supplies 
industry (McLin, 1988). The middle years of the 1970s 
represented a boom time for the industry in the United 
Kingdom. In addition, a large number of British companies 
became involved in North Sea operations for the first time. 
With the decline in the real price of oil (Figure 4 .1) in 
the period up to 1979, 
the viability of North 
and the subsequent reassessment of 
Sea oil, the supplies industry 
experienced a downturn and many firms left the industry, as 
expenditure was reduced and the exploration effort became 
less intense. 
A further surge in oil prices 
to dramatically increased 
in the period of 1979-80 led 
expenditure on North Sea 
developments during the first half of the 1980s. Whilst part 
of this undoubtedly reflected the spiralling costs of 
development resulting from a high rate of inflation, a 
substantial proportion highlighted the increased perception, 
on the part of the multinational oil companies, of the North 
1This pattern in price movement demonstrates two 
fundamental features of the oil market since 1970. Firstly, 
the full capitalisation of the oil industry (described by 
Bina, 1985), inherent in the development of the spot market, 
has transformed oil into just another commodity to be traded 
on the world's commodity markets. As such, the price of oil 
is subjected to the endemic fluctuations that typify 
commodity markets. But paradoxically, oil cannot be regarded 
as just another commodity. As we stressed at the beginning 
of Chapter One, it is central to the functioning of the 
global capitalist economy and its market circumstances are 
therefore unique. Thus, political upheavals, in areas close 
to major oil production regions, are likely to bring extreme 
reactions in crude oil markets; reactions that reflect the 
unique importance of oil to capitalist development. 
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Sea as a stable political environment, relative to other 
producing areas. 
Despite this, the fact remains that, in the long term, the 
North Sea is a marginal oil province; average costs for 
field development are far in excess of the equivalent for 
Middle Eastern oil. At the same time, its resources pale 
into insignificance when compared against the vast riches of 
the Arabian Peninsula. Hence, when the oil price plummeted 
from November 1985 onwards (from approximately $30 per 
barrel to under $10 at one point), capital expenditure was 
reduced dramatically and many supply firms were forced to 
close or leave the industry. 
Apart from these general trends, the effect of price 
fluctuations on the supply market has tended to be uneven 
across upstream activities. In the North Sea, and in other 
offshore areas, the operating costs are far lower in 
proportion to the initial field development costs. As a 
result, a fall in price does not necessarily lead to a 
corresponding reduction in the level of production. This is 
reflected in the relatively stable nature of operating 
costs, compared to those for exploration and development as 
Figure 4.2 illustrates. As a result, those firms engaged in 
maintenance and service activity in the North Sea are less 
prone to market fluctuations. 
Conversely exploration and field development costs are 
particularly sensitive to oil price movements; expenditure 
in these areas having a strong positive relationship with 
the market price. This was vividly illustrated during the 
oil market downturn in 1986. For exploration drilling rig 
operators the situation was particularly severe. Many had 
been attracted to the North Sea during the 1970s by the high 
rates of hire, in what was described as a "sellers' market" 
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(Select Committee on Energy, 1987). By 1986 however, rates 
were at levels 20 per cent of those in 1981, with only 22 
rigs out of 66 active (ibid, 162). 
But new field development projects represent the area of 
offshore activity most susceptible to price fluctuations. 
This is indicative of the large proportion of total capital 
expenditure accounted for by this sector (Table 4.1). Hence 
following the falling price levels of the mid 1980s, the 
situation with regard to field developments was described as 
follows: 
"No entirely new oil development had occurred between 
May 1986 and March 1987 and only three developments had 
taken place earlier in 1986." 
(ibid, xiii) 
Within field development contracts, the bulk of the 
expenditure is usually upon the fabrication of offshore 
structures. Consequently this sector bears the brunt of oil 
market dynamics. This situation is compounded by the fact 
that the major fabrication firms have often specialised in 
offshore work (though this varies between firms as we shall 
see later) , in contrast to the manufacturers of process 
plant, for whom oil operations represents one segment of 
their product market: 
"The effect of the drop in oil prices on the 
fabrication and manufacturing industries has been very 
uneven. The major fabrication yards, set up to produce 
modules and other structures for offshore platforms 
have naturally been hardest hit because their 
opportunities for diversification are most limited. 
There has been a substantial number of closures, and it 
is difficult to see how further closures will be 
avoided ... 
Manufacturing industry is less hard hit. As an example, 
while a major manufacturer of equipment has seen its 
throughput for the worldwide oil and gas industry 
reduced by almost 60 per cent over the past three 
years, this has been offset with considerable success 
by increased activity in the combined heat and power 
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{C.H.P.) market." 
(ibid 1 2 4 8) 
4.1.2 Varying degrees of dependence upon offshore operations 
Following on from the last point, the varying degree of 
involvement of companies in the offshore market is another 
important feature of the oil supply sector. The evidence 
suggests that for the majority of companies, the North Sea 
offers only a small proportion of their total product 
market. A study commissioned by Shell noted that 62 per cent 
of firms in the supplies industry derived less than half 
their business from the offshore market (E.I.U, 1984). This 
point is further emphasised by the fact that 48 per cent of 
companies depended upon the market for only one quarter of 
total demand for their products. Meanwhile only 25 per cent 
of companies claimed that their North Sea activities 
accounted for over half of their business. Paramount, 
amongst this group are the major offshore fabricators, for 
whom the dependence is almost complete. A large proportion 
of these companies were established solely for the purpose 
of exploiting the offshore market. 
The downturn in the oil price in 1986 provided pertinent 
evidence of the reliance of these companies on the offshore 
market with several companies being forced to close or 
mothball their yards. In particular the Scottish yards of 
Howard Doris (Kishorn), Kestrel Marine (Dundee) and 
Motherwell Bridge (Edinburgh) and I.T.M's2 Teesdale site 
(Peppin, 1990) were closed in the immediate aftermath of 
this fall in price. Howard Doris also sold their Hadrian 
yard on the Tyne to Press in 1987 having failed to establish 
themselves in the fabrication industry. Additionally, during 
the period 1987-8 the remainder of the offshore fabrication 
2International Transport Management of Middlesbrough. 
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industry was running at only 3 5 per cent capacity (M. c. A. 
circular). The dependence of the fabrication sector on the 
North Sea was matched only by that of the drilling 
companies. 
4.1.3 The nature and longevity of offshore contracts 
The offshore market is characterised by a series of 
individual contracts, for which the demand requirements are 
almost always unique, corresponding to the idiosyncratic 
nature of each oil field. At one end of this spectrum are 
the giant oil fields; Brent, Forties, Piper, or Ekofisk in 
the Norwegian sector. These usually entail huge investment 
projects and a complex linkage network of suppliers. The 
Forties project, installed during the period 1974-5, the 
forerunner of this type of development, involved almost 
every major contractor in the British North Sea (Table 4.2). 
In addition, its exploitation required further rounds of 
investment, beyond the initial production stage, most 
notably the installation of an unmanned steel platform and a 
pipeline linking it to the main Forties field development, 
installed in 1984. In contrast, the less grandiose field 
developments require smaller levels of investment more 
analogous to gas requirements. This can often be achieved 
through the conversion of existing offshore vessels, such as 
Charlton Leslie's last contract for Amerada Hess's Rob Roy 
field. Even where specialist equipment needs to be built, 
this is usually small-scale, in the case of the SWOPS 
(single well oil production system) vessel constructed by 
Harland and Wolff for B.P's Cyrus field. 3 
3The wide range of fields under development in the 
North Sea is indicated by the costs of two recent projects; 
Marathon Oil's North Brae development (installed in 1987) 
cost £1,373 million to develop, whilst the equivalent figure 
for Mobil's Ness field has been estimated at £60 million 
(Leitch, 1987: 387). 
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The majority of the larger scale contracts were completed by 
the early 1980s, the implication being that the most 
profitable fields had been discovered and were in operation. 
The B.P. Miller construction contract, estimated development 
costs for which were £1.16 billion (Leitch, 1989: 385), 
starting in 1990 was heralded as the last of the "old style" 
contracts. The conventional wisdom (EIU, 1984; NEDO, 1985; 
Segal Quince Wicksteed et al, 1986) suggested that future 
developments would involve the exploitation of smaller and 
more marginal fields (dependent to a larger extent on the 
oil price) than previous discoveries. The fall in the oil 
price tended to reinforce these views, and although it was 
noted that the size of the market was likely to exceed past 
investment, 4 there were important changes in the nature of 
demand, as a Financial Times article (23.8.88) noted: 
"Any oil company faced with the prospect of developing 
a billion barrel field, with oil prices at $30 a barrel 
and a strong dollar, would not worry excessively about 
minor details, such as cost over-run of a hundred 
million pounds. 
But if looking at less than lOOm barrels, with oil at 
$15 a barrel and a weak dollar, every bit hurts. 
This is the sort of regime that many oil companies now 
find themselves operating under, and it has provoked a 
much more self-conscious approach toward the science, 
or art, of project management . 
. . . This is a problem that the oil industry lS now 
coming to grips with and many projects under way, or at 
the planning stage, have in effect tried to collapse 
the stages so that the final project comes out faster." 
In particular, emphasis would 
research and development input, 
move towards a greater 
and in terms of capital 
equipment towards smaller and more integrated structures. 
This was likely to involve fewer suppliers than previously, 
4An estimated £60 billion at 1982 
£30 million in previous developments 
report (1984). 
prices compared to 
according to an EIU 
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encouraging greater competition and rationalisation within 
the supplies sector. Such structural changes to the market 
favoured the larger and more integrated companies, such as 
McDermott's, Highland Fabricators and Press, over the 
smaller, more specialised firms, such as Davy and Whessoe. 5 
In addition the smaller size of offshore projects reduced 
the length of contracts. Allied to improved methods of 
production and labour organisation, the oil companies were 
able to make considerable savings through the reduction of 
the time lag between the award of a contract and the 
installation date. There were also important consequences 
for employment as we shall see later. 
4.2 The structure of the offshore supplies industry 
The chaotic and unstable nature of the offshore supplies 
market explains the oil companies' pursuance of a strategy 
of vertical disintegration; preferring to maintain 
independent suppliers, rather than absorbing upstream 
activities (Williamson, 1975; Vatne, 1986). This is in 
contrast to the downstream sectors of the oil industry, 
which were characterised at an early stage by integration. 
The offshore supplies industry can therefore be described in 
general terms (although we challenge this assumption with 
regard to the North East region in Chapter 5) as a loose 
5A key development in this sense has been the advent of 
the EPIC production system. This stands for engineer, 
procure, instal and commission, and effectively represents a 
trend amongst oil companies to award whole projects to 
fabrication companies on a turnkey basis. Often this has 
involved the collaboration of companies in joint ventures, 
e.g. Shell awarded its recent £100 million Sole Pit gas 
development to a combination of the U.S. project management 
firm Brown & Root and Wimpey Highland Fabricators. 
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network of primarily small firms, 6 supplying an inner ring 
of larger contractors, centred upon the oil companies. 
Through this form of industrial organisation, the oil 
companies are able to reduce costs upstream and maintain 
profits downstream in an unstable oil market. Thus price 
reductions in the oil market are offset by encouraging 
fierce competition amongst suppliers. 
This position is complicated however by the North Sea 
industry's position at the boundary of a range of diverse 
activities, many unrelated except for their interest in 
exploiting the oil market. Thus although the major oil 
companies have become ascendant in the North Sea, their 
control over any one supplier is itself contingent upon the 
supplier's dependence on the oil market for orders, a 
dependency that tends to increase towards the core of this 
network. 
At the same time, multinational oil companies have developed 
special relationships with certain American supply companies 
that dominate the core offshore supply activities of design 
work, project management, and research and development. The 
contemporary importance of American supply companies is 
explained by the early growth of the oil industry within the 
United States. The initial size and diversity of the 
American market encouraged individuals with experience in 
the oil industry to start their own companies supplying the 
major oil companies (Vatne, 1986: 187). Non-American oil 
companies such as B.P. and Shell were also forced to use 
American suppliers, later on, due to the lack of indigenous 
suppliers. Moreover foreign supply companies were precluded 
6A survey by the EIU (1984) found that 68 per cent of 
firms employed less than 50 workers, whilst only 16 per cent 
of companies employed more than 100. 
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from becoming involved in the oi 1 industry in the Gulf of 
Mexico as a result of the Jones Act (Arnold, 197 8: 212) 
which prohibits non-American vessels from working in that 
area. 
Consequently close linkage networks were forged between the 
major oil companies and American oil supply firms, which 
were transplanted into the North Sea sphere. The desire to 
use long-standing and trusted suppliers was a major reason 
behind the lack of early local involvement in North Sea 
oil. 7 The evidence since has suggested growing levels of 
involvement of domestic firms in all areas of activity, 
although the success with which a local capability has been 
transmitted into a viable export sector has reflected the 
contrasting levels of government involvement in Norway and 
Britain respectively.~ 
Whilst government policy (see Chapter 1) has been 
instrumental in persuading oil companies to use more native 
suppliers, foreign supply firms continue to dominate the 
core areas of the industry. 9 These trends are illustrated by 
7This also applied to the Norwegian sector, with 
domestic firms only capturing 28 per cent of the market in 
1975 (Berrefjord, 0. and Heum, P. 1983: "Olje-Politikk. 
Oljepolitikken og Leverenseporsmaelet" Tiden, Oslo) as well 
as the much quoted example of the United Kingdom (see 
Chapter 1). 
RThe lack of government involvement in the offshore 
supplies industry was consistent with a long-standing 
tradition in British political economy. As Chapter 3 
illustrated, British capitalists, even in the post war era, 
remained vehemently opposed to any forms of government 
intervention in industry. This was in direct contrast to 
other countries' industrial traditions, particularly in this 
case, France and Norway (Cook and surrey, 1983). 
9In particular British firms have been unable to 
establish themselves in the strategically important drilling 
sector. Drilling rig firms' importance within the industry 
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reference to B. P. 's earliest and latest North Sea field 
development projects. For its first North Sea venture in 
1965, that of the West Sole gas field, the initial 
exploration drilling contracts were awarded to the American 
firms: Santa Fe, SEDCO, Rowan Drilling, Transocean and 
Reading and Bates. The jacket design, fabrication and 
installation were undertaken by the Dutch firms Heerema and 
IHC Gusto. In comparison, for the development of the B. P. 
Miller field 25 years later Santa Fe was again the main 
drilling contractor, whilst British based companies; 
Highland Fabricators, Press Offshore, Redpath Offshore and 
SLP; had replaced their Dutch counterparts in the 
fabrication activities. Notably however the topside design 
was undertaken by the American firm of Humphreys and 
Glasgow, whilst Heerema had maintained its role as the 
installation contractor. 
In practice, foreign companies have been able to circumvent 
government legislation aimed at improving the strategic role 
of British firms by using "indigenisation" strategies. The 
most obvious means is through the establishment of British 
subsidiaries, which are then recognised as domestic 
establishments. 10 Typical examples are McDermott's 
fabrication yard at Ardersier and the project management 
firm of Brown and Root. Another method has been through the 
formation of joint ventures with British companies, typified 
by the formation of Laing Bechtel and Worley santa Fe 
(Noroil, 1986). Although there is some technical gain for 
British industry through such activities, the long term 
is second only to the oil companies themselves, largely due 
to their position as a client for equipment suppliers 
(Jenkin, 1981: 14). 
10This definitional flaw in government legislation, 
itself serves to question successive government's commitment 
to establish a viable long term British supplies industry. 
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strategic benefits for domestic firms remain bleak. Many 
joint ventures are one-off affairs, marriages of 
convenience, an appropriate example being the formation of 
the Miller Engineering Consortium for the engineering and 
design of the jacket for the Miller platform; this involved 
the collusion of Brown and Root, Vickers and John Brown. 
There have been exceptions to this general rule, notably in 
the case of North East England, the firm of Press Offshore, 
which has benefited from the support of its huge parent 
organisation, AMEC construction. But even here, although it 
is expanding its reputation as a hook-up operator and 
supplier of technical staff offshore, the main focus of its 
operation remains its fabrication division. Whilst Press now 
operates, to a limited extent in export markets outside the 
North Sea, it will have difficulty establishing itself in 
the core oil supply areas currently dominated by the giant 
U.S. and Dutch contractors at the global level. At the same 
time non-American supply firms face difficulties in 
penetrating "the good old boys club in Houston" without the 
positive discrimination of their domestic governments 
(H.O.C. Energy Committee, First Report, 1988-89: 19). 
For a host of reasons therefore British firms have largely 
been excluded from the more specialised core areas of oil 
activity, such as 
installation and 
project design and management, 
exploration drilling. Thus, 
offshore 
although 
British firms have recovered ground in most sectors of the 
market, to the extent that they are now obtaining the lion's 
share of contracts, they have been unable to corner the 
market in these offshore specific areas. British companies 
now dominate location-specific activity, a fact that limits 
the benefits accruing from the North Sea experience to the 
immediate requirements of the North Sea province. 
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As a result of this strategic disadvantage, British firms 
are unlikely to share in the rapidly expanding offshore 
markets of the Far East, Australasia and Latin America. 11 
Instead the fortunes of British firms are tied to North Sea 
developments as Cameron (1986: 27) notes: 
"Although the UK industry probably ranks second or 
third among the world suppliers of offshore goods and 
services by oil companies, it has so far failed to 
become a large-scale exporter. This is indicative of 
the extent to which UK firms have been successful 
largely in the "locationally-determined" elements in 
the offshore supply industry, but not in the area of 
high technology exports." 
Nowhere is this situation more prevalent than in the 
fabrication division of the supplies industry, for whilst it 
is the archetypal example of a location-specific industry, 
it is also by far the highest beneficiary of capital 
investment within the upstream segment of the oil industry, 
as Table 4.3 illustrates. It is also the principal area of 
activity for the North East's offshore companies. 
4. 3 Operating at the margins: the fabrication industry in 
the North sea 
The fabrication division's position within the offshore 
industry is somewhat anomalous, for whilst it is the 
beneficiary of the largest sums of expenditure from the oil 
companies, it is also (as we noted earlier) the most 
vulnerable to oil price fluctuations. 
Not only are fabrication companies in a dependent 
relationship with the oil companies, regarding contracts, 
but also, the development programme itself is controlled by 
11This is an especially galling point, considering the 
extent to which the North Sea has been "a veritable proving 
ground for advanced technologies" (Delacour, 1988: 474) that 
are likely to be used elsewhere. 
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the oil companies in tandem with overseas project management 
teams. Under these circumstances, the role of British 
companies has largely been confined to that of final 
assembly. 
The nature of the relationship between fabricating firms and 
the oil companies is usefully illustrated through reference 
to Transaction Cost Theory (Williamson, 1975, 1985). This 
suggests that industrial structure is determined by the 
nature of the transactual relationship between the various 
parties. 12 In the case of the oil fabrication market this 
relationship is characterised by a continuous transaction 
process, reflecting the nature of demand for single unit 
rather than mass products. The realities of this situation 
are that each product requires a fresh round of capital 
investment, in contrast to mass production or even batch 
production industries, where once the initial fixed capital 
has been employed in restructuring the production process, 
forms of series production can take place. In this sense, 
mass production industries face a decreasing marginal cost 
curve, which tends to encourage vertical integration. 
In contrast, the offshore fabrication market precludes mass 
production and is characterised by a more even cost 
distribution. Cost reductions are therefore achieved by 
encouraging vertical disintegration, maintaining a list of 
approved contractors in competition for each individual 
project. In practice this requires a complex and often 
12Care should be taken over the use of Transactions' 
Cost Theory. Like other theories emanating from the 
neoclassical school it neglects the centrality of power 
relations to the organisation of production, and assumes 
decisions are made on the basis of efficiency under 
competitive market conditions (see Littler, 1990 for a 
useful critique). Nevertheless it provides a useful insight 
into organisational structures. 
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politically contentious tendering procedure (e.g. the recent 
Occidental contract for the Piper Alpha replacement) . 
In addition, fabrication contracts usually operate under 
what Vatne describes as a "trilateral governance system" 
(1987: 182). This refers to the tendency amongst oil 
companies to appoint a specialist project management firm to 
oversee production and rationalise costs wherever possible 
once production is under way. 
Through this strategy, the fabricating companies and their 
subcontractors are marginalised from downstream oil 
operations. Their role is confined to contractors on site, 
in the civil construction sense. 13 Although the entire 
assembly process, of modules or jackets, takes place at a 
yard leased by the principle fabricator, production is in 
effect directed 
addition, the oil 
capital required 
by project management specialists. In 
company owns all the major inputs of 
in construction, buying directly from 
it is steel tubing (typically from suppliers, whether 
British Steel 14 or Nippon Steel) or advanced electronic 
systems (from Ferranti). Fabrication companies operate with 
the bare minimum of fixed capital assets, a fact that 
reiterates the transient nature of offshore work. This is an 
important point to bear in m-ind when understanding the power 
13In fact the status of an offshore yard is more akin to 
that of a construction site, than a traditional engineering 
fabrication shop. The principal difference in offshore work 
is that completed structures are towed out to the North Sea, 
rather than built for that site. 
~ British Steel's North Sea contracts have been spread 
comparatively evenly throughout its various U.K. plants, 
reflecting the diversity of demand occasioned by the oil 
market. A specific company, Progress Chasers Ltd, based in 
Middlesbrough, was established in 197 3 to coordinate the 
supply of steel to the offshore industry. 
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relations not just between the oil companies and their 
contractors, but also the direct nature of the dependency of 
the local workforce on the power of the oil companies. This 
was borne out by the speedy resolution of a local dispute at 
Charlton Leslie's South Shields yard during a contract for 
Amerada Hess, described by Brian (a pipefitter in his 
fifties): 
"Here we have been on strike and we had genuine cause. 
I still say that! And we've just been knuckled down by 
them [Amerada Hess) saying "Right we're going to tow 
that [rig) away.·" Let's face it, you don't want it 
towed away, because the money is good for a start. 
You'll never get money in the area like this again." 
From this premise, locational factors undoubtedly account 
for the high level of British activity in this sector. This 
is borne out by Figure 4. 3 which shows the clustering of 
fabrication sites in the northern and eastern areas of the 
British Isles. Whilst the areas involved have benefited from 
the extra employment and income generated, the fact that 
many have been located at the site of redundant shipyards 
has only served to reinforce the historical trend in these 
areas towards peripheralisation from the main centres of 
decision making within the United Kingdom and abroad. 
In practice, offshore fabrication can be subdivided into two 
key functions: jacket fabrication, and module construction. 
Whilst the former activity (in common with most other oil 
supply sectors) has become concentrated within Scotland, and 
more specifically at greenfield sites in remote areas of the 
Scottish Highlands, the North East of England has become an 
important area for module construction. There are three 
factors behind this dichotomy. Firstly deep water sites are 
the preferred location for jacket fabrication, excluding 
most of the Tees and Tyne yards, and favouring the estuarine 
areas of North East Scotland. Secondly, module fabrication 
requires a more sophisticated set of skills and more complex 
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input of materials than jacket construction. The North East, 
with its highly skilled engineering workforce, network of 
engineering shops, and background in module fabrication for 
other industries is therefore an ideal location. 15 
4.4 The role of the North East within the offshore industry 
The relationship between the North East and oil operations 
in the past twenty years has been radically different from 
the oil impact in other areas. For whilst, as the preceding 
section has shown, British firms have largely remained in a 
subservient relationship to established foreign oil 
companies and their inner circle of suppliers, and London 
(itself a corporate outlier of the global oil industry) has 
remained the key decision-making centre for oil operations 
in Europe, the role of other areas affected has noticeably 
changed within the global division of labour. Thus Aberdeen, 
for example, whilst not the capital of the European oil 
industry that many of its more partisan adherents have 
claimed, has nevertheless benefited from the influx of new 
higher managerial functions and the establishment of several 
leading local companies. This has transformed the status of 
the city into: 
"·. a northern urban outlier of southern based growth -
a "sun-belt" city in the "frost belt", where the new 
scientific, high technology, capital intensive industry 
of t.he North Sea has stimulated economic growth and 
social change." 
(Bonney, 1986: 190) 
Similarly the incorporation of remote rural areas of 
Scotland into the global oil economy transformed the social 
relations underpinning many local labour markets (Parsler 
15The corollary to this is that the lower degree of 
sophistication involved in jacket fabrication, largely a 
metal bashing activity, has allowed the establishment of 
offshore construction sites in rural areas of Scotland, 
devoid of a tradition of strong labour organisation. 
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and Shapiro, 1980). 
In the North East, whilst the impact of oil has been 
substantial in terms of employment gains 16 (although it 
might be argued that oil has merely preserved existing jobs) 
and income generated, a transformation of the employment 
structure and underlying social relations is less 
discernible. Thus in many ways the oil impact represented 
part of a historical continuum, rather than a break from 
past activity, although this point should not be 
exaggerated. 
For whilst the type of work provided by oil development has 
been characterised by its similarity (in terms of job 
content) to existing and previous forms within the region, 
the particular context of oil impact on the North East is an 
important point to stress at this juncture. North Sea oil 
represented one of the few avenues of employment growth 
during the 1970s and early 1980s, against a background of 
terminal decline in the region's shipbuilding and 
engineering industries. But these events at the regional 
level need to be interpreted as the outward manifestations 
of underlying processes of global capitalist restructuring. 
Thus, whilst many companies went to the wall with their 
employees (particularly in shipbuilding) during the 
recession (both within the North East and U.K as a whole), 
for many others (usually larger and more internationally-
16Unfortunately, u~iike Scotland, there are few figures 
available on the employment impact of North Sea oil in the 
North East. A consultancy report released towards the end of 
the second boom in offshore-related work estimated that 
12,600 jobs in the region were completely dependent upon the 
sector. It is likely however that this figure was 
considerably higher during the 1970s, when an estimated 
8, 000 people were employed in the mechanical engineering 
sector on Teesside alone, at the height of the first 
offshore boom. 
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oriented) it represented another round of capital 
restructuring, directed at disinvestment at home and 
expansion overseas (Beynon and Wainwright, 1979; Beynon, 
1987) . Conversely, and somewhat ironically, new forms of 
oil-related employment in the region were linked to a period 
of global restructuring within the oil industry. 
From this perspective, it could be claimed that to a certain 
extent, the North East has exchanged peripheries within 
different spheres of capital accumulation. The principal 
motive for oil capital to invest in the North East (apart 
from the obvious locational advantages) has been the 
availability of a made to order, highly skilled, craft based 
employment system. 
4.4.1 The magnitude of oil impact 
The 1970s were years of deepening recession throughout the 
United Kingdom in many areas of industry. Whilst the same 
applied to the North East, the development of oil activities 
provided a short term stimulant, and the deterioration of 
the manufacturing base was markedly less than in other 
regions of the United Kingdom as a consequence {Townsend, 
1983: 38). In particular, declining employment trends were 
arrested in those industries associated with the employment 
system in the coastal districts (Figure 4 .-4). Although the 
region's shipbuilding and marine engineering complexes never 
fully embraced the offshore market, they did participate in 
marginal activities such as rig repair (notably Swan 
Hunter), which filled in the gaps between their mainstream 
contracts. The impact upon the mechanical engineering sector 
was more pronounced. In the years of greatest oil 
development, between 1972 and 1976, there was a net growth 
within the industry of over 6,000 jobs. 
But the biggest short term impact was felt outside the 
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indigenous engineering industry, within the construction 
sector where over 12,000 jobs were created between 1971 and 
1976. 
This boost to the construction sector was centred upon the 
growth of Teesside as an oil and petrochemicals complex. 
During the middle years of the 1970s the area attracted over 
20 per cent of the total national investment in industrial 
plant construction. Of particular importance was the 
decision by Phillips to construct a refinery to service its 
Ekofisk field in the North Sea at Seal Sands, near 
Hartlepool. In addition Shell had commissioned a refinery at 
an earlier date, at Teesport, (1964) that was in operation 
by the early 1970s. Further construction work was occasioned 
by the decision to build a new B.S.C. plant at Redcar, and 
the restructuring of the chemicals industry on Teesside, 
associated with the existing I.C.I. plant at Wilton, but 
also with new production units built by Grace, Monsanto and 
Rohm and Haas (both of these at Seal Sands) . 
But the 
resulted 
scenario. 
and wage 
ephemeral nature 
in a short term 
The construction 
levels, but also 
of the construction industry 
and destabilising employment 
boom brought rising employment 
skill shortages and industrial 
relations' conflict. The impact of these circumstances upon 
the local labour market are analysed more fully in Chapter 
5, but at this stage it is worth noting that by 1978 the 
jobs boom was over and the region's construction sector was 
experiencing severe disinvestment and increasing levels of 
unemployment. In April of that year for example, Phillips 
shelved its plans for a £280 million expansion at Seal 
Sands, that would have provided an estimated four years of 
work for the existing site workforce, blaming poor labour 
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relations and inefficient subcontractors. 17 It was a bitter 
irony for the area that these alleged failings were 
themselves the result of overinvestment 1n the recent 
past. 18 As a consequence, the long term employment impact of 
refinery development on Teesside was restricted to 750 
maintenance and production jobs at the Phillips and Shell 
plants. 
In other parts of the region the gains from oil development 
were not as great as the early euphoria had suggested. Many 
of the intended developments did not materialise. On 
Wears ide for example, the attempt by the marine engineering 
sector to enter the rig fabrication market; in the form of a 
consortium between George Clark N.E.M. (owned by Richardson 
Westgarth) and the Hertfordshire based firm of International 
Management Contractors; was shelved at the planning stage. 
Another long established marine engineering firm, Hawthorn 
Leslie, which facing a decline in its traditional market had 
paid off 120 workers in the first half of 1972 ("The Journal 
of Commerce", 4.12.1972), was also unable to break into the 
offshore market. Generally speaking there were few 
successful attempts by the region's machinery manufacturing 
specialists to enter the offshore supply industry. A notable 
17 In fact a more plausible explanation for the 
cancellation of Phillips' plans was the chronic overcapacity 
in the United Kingdom refinery market, the consequence of 
rising oil prices and a subsequent decline in demand for 
refinery products. 
18 As we have suggested the huge levels of investment 
directed at Teesside by the oil and chemicals industry in 
the period from 1964 to 1976 were to have a profound effect 
upon the local economy. The higher wage rates offered by 
these activities attracted labour from existing industries, 
undermining the position of many of Teesside's long-standing 
companies. The underwriting of this construction boom by 
central government as part of its regional development 
strategy was doubly ironic (Beynon et al, 1986; H.M.S.O, 
1963) . 
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exception was the firm of Clarke Chapman (later absorbed 
within NEI), which was able to carve a niche for itself in 
the new offshore market having received a contract to 
produce heavy duty mooring windlasses 
submersible drilling rig "Ocean Endeavour" 
29.10.1974). 
for the semi-
("The Journal", 
In fact the oil boom of the 1970s was to herald a false dawn 
for the region's economy. To a certain extent, the very 
mention of oil development conjured up visions of increased 
wealth within the North East, that were not easily dispelled 
by harsh realities. 
The impression, derived from the high levels of oil-related 
activity, reported by the media during the 1970s, was that 
the North East was about to become a major player in the 
international oil industry. Entry into the offshore market 
was stimulated by false perceptions, amongst the region's 
various newspapers, concerning the North East's role in oil 
affairs. "North can be new Texas" (Evening Chronicle, 
31.3. 1972) was a recurrent theme expounded by the local 
media. Striking a similar note, following the announcement 
that William Press was to establish an offshore yard at 
Howden on the Tyne, the Newcastle Journal suggested that 
(18.4.1972): 
" The location, the faci 1 i ties and the men with the 
right skills added up to just what was needed. When 
work begins in August, 300 men will be required. But 
the rig gear makers are confident that this figure will 
quickly grow to 1500. 
It is to be hoped this scheme will be just one part of 
a healthy trend, with the river that prospered and 
declined with the fortunes of the North East coal trade 
being helped by the new fuel discoveries." 
A second related feature of the response to the arrival of 
oil activity was the identification of the North East as the 
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region within the U.K. most suited to the needs of the oil 
companies. This was a marketing effort that cut across class 
barriers within the region, most notably illustrated by the 
comments of Dan Edwards, then Tyne district secretary of the 
CSEU, also remarking on the new Press yard (The Journal, 
18.4.72): 
"This is great news. It is just the kind of new 
industry we need on the river. Although there is fairly 
full employment in shipbuilding at the moment, we can 
still provide the kind of skilled labour this company 
will need. 
This uncritical acceptance, and indeed acclaim, of the new 
North Sea developments overlooked the new relations of oil 
dependency that were being introduced to the region. In 
particular this applied to attempts by local authorities 
within the region to establish supply bases to rival those 
of Aberdeen and Great Yarmouth. There have been various 
attempts at this in the past twenty years. During the early 
1970s the North East Development Council constantly 
pressurised the government to set up a regional offshore 
office. Oil development was seen as crucial to the revival 
of the North East's economy. An N.E.D.C. report (1972) 
suggested that Tyneside and Wearside could become important 
centres within the North Sea oil services network, whilst 
smaller towns such as Blyth and Seaham would serve important 
roles as supply vessel bases. In reality it has been 
difficult to challenge the hegemony of established service 
centres. The principal successes in the area of offshore 
supply have been for individual field develop projects, e.g. 
Blyth was the location for the support base for Hamilton 
Brothers development of the Esmonde field, 130 miles off the 
Northumberland coast from 1984 onwards. 
In the 1980s a new phase of local policy development in 
vogue with Thatcherite planning principles and linked to the 
166 
development corporation philosophy has been the attempts on 
both Tyneside and Teesside to establish "offshore technology 
parks". On the Tyne the manifestation of this has been the 
Newcastle Offshore Technology Base (established in 1988) at 
the former Walker naval yard, whilst its equivalent on the 
Tees has been the Tees Offshore Base (set up in 1987 at the 
site of the former Smith's Dock shipyard at South Bank) . 
Both of these initiatives are aimed at increasing the level 
of the region's technological development in North Sea 
developments, implicitly recognising the peripheral role of 
the North East in past activity. Whilst it remains too early 
to assess the success of these new developments, the early 
portents are not encouraging. Although some 3 50 jobs had 
been "created" at the Tees Offshore Base by 1989, it was 
significant that almost half of the firms involved had 
relocated from other areas of the United Kingdom to be 
closer to the North Sea, whilst three of the firms had 
actually transferred from other areas on Teesside. 
It is also significant that those enterprises, developing 
new technologies are often reliant upon outside capital. 
Notably, the Tees Offshore Base's flagship company, Northern 
Ocean Services, attempting to break into the market for 
subsea oi 1 and gas technology, has had to surrender its 
independence in return for a large capital investment 19 from 
the Cable and Wireless group. 
4.4.2 The development of the offshore fabrication industry 
in the North East 
Thus, the efforts of local authorities to widen the scope of 
the region's offshore involvement, in a non-interventionist 
domestic political environment, have largely proved 
19 An estimated £7.5 million according to a recent 
Financial Times estimate {21.3.89). 
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ineffectual. The oil impact has largely been limited to 
traditional activities and employment structures. This is 
borne out by Table 4.4, which illustrates the breakdown of 
offshore activity into sectors from a survey in the mid 
1980s. 
By far the most 
fabrication of 
became involved 
important area in this respect has been the 
equipment for rnodules.w Companies that 
in this type of work were either incoming 
firms, taking advantage of the large number of heavy 
engineering trades, or local firms, whose main activity had 
already been in aspects of steel fabrication and process 
plant construction. For this latter group, oil development 
was a lifeline at a time when their more conventional 
product markets were suffering saturation, stagnation or 
decline following the end of the post-war boom. 
The North East's earliest experience with fabricating 
offshore structures predates the development of North Sea 
oil and gas. In 1952 Cleveland Bridge was commissioned to 
build a drilling rig for the National Coal Board for 
exploration beneath the Firth of Forth (Company archives). 
By the same token, certain of the region's engineering 
companies had long-standing relationships with the 
multinational oil companies for the supply of oil and gas 
equipment. Whessoe, as we noted in Chapter 3, had been a 
supplier to the industry since the early decades of the 
century, whilst for other companies such as Ashmore, Benson, 
Pease and Head Wrightson, involvement in the oil sector 
arrived with the post war refinery construction programme 
20In 1975 for example an estimated 6, 700 were working 
upon rig fabrication contracts in the region, both directly 
and in a subcontracting role (The Guardian, 17.7.75). This 
compares with a figure of approximately 7,000 at the end of 
the second oil boom in 1985 (Segal et al: 1985: 69). 
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(Peppin, 1990). 
Despite this early history of involvement in offshore 
related work, the region's firms seemed to share in British 
industry's general diffidence towards North Sea oil 
developments during the 1960s. Shipbuilding companies across 
the region were preoccupied with retaining their share of 
traditional markets and the reorganisation engendered by the 
Geddes Report. on Teesside, the structural engineering 
sector remained aloof from offshore developments until the 
early 1970s, apart from an unsuccessful attempt by a 
consortium of companies under the auspices of North Sea 
Marine Engineering (including Cleveland Bridge and Redpath 
Dorman Long) located at Redcar, to enter the market for the 
construction of offshore drilling rigs. 
As a result of the reluctance of the more established firms 
to engage in offshore fabrication, the early oil-related 
developments in the region tended to be either from smaller 
local companies or incoming firms, and often of a transient 
nature. The first of these was Wilson Walton (Smith, 1978: 
8), a Middlesbrough company that established a site at 
Normanby, on the Tees in 1965, and was initially involved in 
piecemeal repair work for gas installations off the 
Yorkshire and East Anglia coast. But in 1971 it received a 
contract to build modules for the Shell Leman gas field 
project. Overnight the status of the company and the area 
was transformed in terms of oil developments, as one 
observer noted in retrospect: 
"Wilson Walton were only a small outfit, sending people 
down to Great Yarmouth to work on the gas lines. At 
that time, they were only a single shop employing maybe 
10 or 15 men. Then suddenly they turned into an oil rig 
company and were building a shell, paying £100 when the 
going rate in this area was £50." 
But the most significant development for the future of 
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offshore fabrication on Teesside was the decision taken by 
Laing's to locate their huge contract to build the jacket 
for the Forties Field at Graythorp, near Hartlepool. Not 
only did Laing's employ 2, 2 00 men at the peak of their 
offshore activities in 1975, but various local companies 
became involved in this project in a subcontracting role. In 
particular, the engineering firms of Foster Wheeler, George 
Robinson and John Brown were important in supplying Laing's, 
operating within the limits of existing plant capacity. At 
the same time a large number of firms and workers were being 
absorbed by downstream oil development projects taking place 
on the Tees. In particular the Phillips and Shell refinery 
construction contracts were to have a huge impact upon the 
locality in terms of employment and industrial relations. 
On Tyneside the growth of oil developments was less 
spectacular, starting in 1972, when William Press 
established a fabrication facility, at Wallsend on the site 
of a former shiprepair yard, purchased from the Port of Tyne 
Authority. 
As the market for offshore construction work continued to 
expand during the 1970s, several firms attracted contracts, 
directly from the oil companies, in their own right, and 
thus entered the league of major fabrica~ers~ On Tyneside: 
the locally based firm of Charlton Leslie (which had 
formerly been a supplier of pipework and pressure vessels on 
a subcontract basis to the oil companies) established a yard 
at Davy Bank, near Wallsend. Similarly Whessoe converted a 
yard at Dock Point, on the south bank of the Tees at 
Middlesbrough (that had previously been used for the 
completion of Polaris Submarine hull sections in the 1950s) 
at the cost of £1 million. Redpath Dorman Long, the 
structural arm of British Steel, established a yard at 
Linthorpe, whilst Cleveland Bridge built an offshore site at 
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Port Clarence on the north bank of the river. 
With the large amount of work available, firms tended to 
specialise in different areas of offshore activity: Redpath 
developed expertise in accommodation modules, Whessoe in 
power generation equipment, and Charlton Leslie in 
compression vessels. These forms of specialisation ensured 
the continuation of two important linkages with past forms 
of activity. Firstly they discouraged rationalisation within 
the region's engineering industry and ensured the 
continuation of the cooperative approach to tendering 
identified in Chapter 3. 21 Secondly the specialisms of 
individual firms were often related to their traditional 
forms of activity, particularly in the case of Charlton 
Leslie and Whessoe. 
As a result of the large average size of fields under 
development (and the accompanying scale of the structures 
required) during the first wave of North Sea oil 
exploitation, the market for the region's fabrication firms 
remained buoyant during the period from 1972 to 1978. In 
particular the discovery and subsequent rapid development of 
the Murchison, Ninian and Thistle fields provided the 
continuity for the North East's structural engineering firms 
to establish themselves w.ithin particular segments of the 
fabrication market. 
From 1978 to 1982 there was a significant downturn in the 
number of fabrication contracts awarded to North Eastern 
companies. Whilst this reflected a hiatus in North Sea 
activity following the huge expenditure round several years 
earlier, there was also a feeling abroad that the region was 
21 The role of the Module Constructors Association, 
formed in 1974 was important in this context. 
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being punished for its poor industrial relations' record. In 
particular Laing's yard at Graythorp, which had developed a 
notorious reputation for wildcat disputes, was effectively 
closed following the float out of the jacket for the Thistle 
field in 1976.n Wilson Walton also withdrew from the 
offshore market following the completion of a contract for 
B.N.O.C.'s Beatrice field at the end of 1979. 
In retrospect, this period represented a lull in orders 
rather than a depression. Of the two firms that left the 
offshore industry, Wilson Walton were facing acute financial 
problems, whilst Laing's demise reflected chronic 
overcapacity in the fabrication of jackets, 23 rather than 
the malaise of the offshore market as a whole. Although 
workers were laid off in all firms, many of which were 
reduced to their baseline employment levels, the majority of 
companies had orders in the pipeline.M 
22 Labour relations problems were not limited to 
incoming firms such as Laing's. Other long-standing 
companies in the region, with a tradition of relatively 
harmonious industrial relations, were blighted by sporadic 
outbreaks of strike action. A typical example was reported 
in Refinery News (7.7.76) from Whessoe's offshore yard, 
where 450 workers walked out over a claim for increases in 
wage rates. These surface pressures on the labour market 
were the manifestations of changing currents within the 
regional emp_loyment system-, most clear-ly expl:'essed on 
Teesside but present throughout the region as Chapter 5 
elucidates. 
23 Ironically, this situation had been brought about by 
an ill-considered government policy initiative to encourage 
firms into offshore work. The result was a rapid lnflux of 
construction firms into jacket fabrication (Table 4.5) and 
subsequently saturation of this particular market. 
MA good example of this again comes from Whessoe, which 
reduced its workforce from over 500, to 67 blue collar and 
38 white collar, following the completion of 3 drilling 
modules for Conoco's Murchison contract in August 1979, and 
despite the company's impending order for the British Gas 
Corporation's Rough field redevelopment. Similarly Charlton 
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Despite these impending orders, the period from 1976 to 1979 
did represent one of reappra is a 1 of oi 1 company strategy 
towards the North Sea as a sector for accumulation. In the 
period immediately prior to 1979 the British sector of the 
North Sea had become less attractive as a focus for longer 
term development. A fall in the real price of oil coincided 
with a period when the majority of larger and more 
profitable fields were thought to have been discovered and 
undergoing development. Simultaneously, the growing 
involvement of the state oil entity, BNOC, in North Sea oil 
developments, despite its initial collaboration with the 
private sector, represented a potential threat to the 
hegemony of the international oil companies in the North 
Sea. 
But in the short period 1979/80 the perception of the North 
Sea as a long term sector for accumulation received a timely 
boost; the result of a further upsurge 1n the world oil 
price from 1979 onwards and growing political instability in 
the Middle East, coupled with the election of a radical 
Conservative government committed to the dissolution of 
BNOC. The government also relaxed the taxation regime in the 
North Sea during the early 1980s to encourage the 
development of previously marginal fields. Consequently some 
form of new oil development was inevitable, alth-ou-gh the 
extent and timing of future contracts (often critical to the 
survival of individual firms) remained at the whim of the 
international oil industry, particularly with the 
dismantling of B.N.O.C. 
Leslie were on the verge of laying off 250 workers, almost 
half the workforce, prior to obtaining a £20 million order 
for British Gas's Morecambe Bay field in October 1982. 
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4.4.3 From Boom to bust: the fabrication industry in the 
1980s 
The oil market developments of the 1980s took place against 
a fast changing wider economic environment. The slow growth 
scenario of the 1970s was replaced by the no-growth 
realities of recession in the period from 1979-83. At the 
national level, the early 1980s were witness to the worst 
depression in fifty years for British industry. There is not 
the space here to fully examine the nature of this decline, 
which is comprehensively documented elsewhere (Massey and 
Meegan, 1982; Townsend, 1983). It is sufficient to note that 
between 1979 and 1983 over 2 million jobs were lost 
nationwide, 1.5 million of which were in manufacturing 
industry. Whilst this devastation gave way to slow growth 
within the national economy as a whole during the latter 
part of the decade, the mechanical engineering industry 
entered a period of protracted decline. Between 1978 and 
1988, the sector shed 385,549 jobs; representing almost 43 
per cent of total employment.~ 
Within the North East, the process of overall decline in 
mechanical engineering was complicated by the arrival of 
North Sea oil. For those companies supplying markets in the 
non-oil sector, the experience of contraction and closure 
was consistent with -the major part of British manufacturing 
industry. For the structural engineering sector, the trough 
of the early 1980s represented the culmination of a long 
period of decline in traditional markets. The experience of 
the stockton based firm of Head Wrightson was typical. The 
contraction of its role as a supplier of materials to the 
coal and steel industries coincided witho its takeover by 
the Davy Corporation in the 1970s, rationalisation and 
restructuring during the early 1980s, the sale of its assets 
~EITB Statutory Returns. 
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to a fledgling offshore company (I.T.M.) in 1984, and 
eventual closure in 1986 (Peppin, 1990: Chapter 9). 
With the long term decline of traditional markets, the 
fabrication industry became increasingly dependent upon the 
offshore oil sector. In this way, the industry in the North 
East was hitched to an oil rollercoaster during the 1980s. 
As a consequence, the fortunes of the large fabricating 
companies in these latter regions, during the 1980s, 
reflected the cyclical behaviour of the oil market, rather 
than the performance of the wider economy. 
At the beginning of the 1980s, despite the withdrawal of 
Laing from the offshore market and the closure of Wilson 
Walton, there remained five major fabricating yards with 
proven capability in offshore construction: Charlton Leslie 
and William Press on the Tyne; with Cleveland Offshore, 
Redpath Offshore and Whessoe on the Tees. Whilst these 
companies, to a varying extent, continued to serve their 
more traditional markets, their survival as major employers 
within the North East had become largely dependent upon 
their ability to obtain contracts from North Sea related 
activity. It was somewhat ironic therefore that it was 
British Gas's decision to develop the Morecambe Bay gas 
fi~ld (at a cost of £1.3 billion) from 1982 onwards that 
secured the future of several of the region's existing 
yards. 
It was not until the end of 1983 that greatly increased 
levels of expenditure on oil related projects led to a 
period of renewed prosperity for the North East's 
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fabricators. 26 Of particular importance were the contracts 
emanating from the development of Marathon Oil's Brae field 
and Shell's decision to develop the Eider and Tern fields in 
December 1985. These latter developments brought £87 million 
in orders for the four remaining Teesside yards and largely 
secured 2,680 existing jobs (Sadler, 1986: 3). This upsurge 
in activity encouraged other companies to enter the offshore 
sphere. Howard Doris, already established in Scotland, 
leased yards on the Tyne (from Wallsend Slipway and 
Engineers) and in East Anglia in expectation of contracts 
emanating from the southern sector of the North Sea. Another 
development at Hartlepool was the setting up of M. M. Oil 
with Dutch backing from the huge project management 
specialists Heerema. But the most significant development 
was the establishment of Davy Offshore, the marriage of a 
breakaway management group from Press with Davy 
Corporation's delayed decision to move into the offshore 
market. 
Davy's immediate future in the offshore market was secured 
when the company was awarded a substantial portion of the 
Marathon Brae contract,n whilst M.M. Oil was awarded 
26This also coincided with a period when the major oil 
companies were attempting to project an imag~ of the Nerth 
Sea as a long term market for industrial goods. Shell U.K., 
for example, commissioned a report by the E.I.U. suggesting 
that the future size of the offshore supplies market was 
likely to be double that of previous total expenditure. In 
the North East, the company's promotional activities even 
extended to the sponsoring of a conference at Middlesbrough 
(14/15th October 1985) entitled "The Offshore Challenge for 
the North East (the £100 billion market on the doorstep)". 
Behind these activities, the strategy was clearly to 
encourage greater competition in the offshore market through 
the entry of firms, that had previously been either 
disinterested or had disengaged from the oil market during 
the 1970s. 
nThis involved over 7,000 tonnes of module work. 
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contracts from the Dutch sector, the result of its 1 inks 
with Heerema. 
Significantly, this upsurge in confidence in the future of 
North Sea oil brought an increased amount of capital 
expenditure in facilities at the fabrication yards. During 
the 1970s the fabrication companies had largely treated the 
offshore market as a subsidiary sector to their main 
operations. The oil supplies market, as we have suggested 
previously, was regarded as a short term palliative to 
compensate for inactivity in traditional markets. As such 
the levels of investment committed to offshore projects by 
the fabrication companies tended to be relatively minor. 28 
The total collapse of other markets had radically altered 
this situation by the early 1980s. With the advent of a 
second phase of development, North Sea oil itself had become 
the principle market for structural engineering employment 
within the North East. The heightened importance of the 
offshore market was clearly illustrated by an unprecedented 
wave of capital investment in the upgrading of facilities ln 
fabrication yards throughout the U.K. (Table 4.6) 
But the character of those companies involved in offshore 
fabrication had also changed during the course of oil 
operations and the industr:y in the North East was -subject to 
ncleveland Offshore's yard at Port Clarence, for 
example, has been described as an 11 open site 11 when it first 
opened in 1975. Indeed it was not even intended for complex 
offshore work, but as a loading out facility for Cleveland 
Bridge's Thames Barrier contract. Similarly, RDL's initial 
movement into the offshore sector was considered to be a 
transient operation: 
11 lt was a temporary site to start with. As far as RDL 
were concerned it [oil fabrication) was a third rate 
activity. The company was still concentrating on power 
plant, and whatever, and there we were trying to build 
modules. 11 
(quoted in Sadler: 1986: 7) 
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the same processes of capital centralisation that have 
characterised much of the United Kingdom economy since the 
1960s (Massey, 1984; Cowling, 1986). As a result of a 
succession of acquisitions and takeovers, decisions 
concerning the continued involvement of the North East in 
oil operations have largely been removed from the reg ion. 
Charlton Leslie, for example, which had been controlled by a 
Hexham based family for 100 years was bought by B.T.R, the 
huge industrial conglomerate, based ln London, in 1972. 
Similarly the merger between William Press and the 
Fairclough group of companies in 1982 resulted in the 
formation of AMEC Construction with its headquarters in 
London. 
Behind this trend was the desire on the part of 
multinational capital to partake in the benefits to be 
derived from the North Sea oil boom during a period when 
other markets were contracting. For the fabrication firms, 
the loss of independence was offset by access to greater 
levels of finance. This was to be particularly important 
during the middle of the 1980s when the second oil boom 
neccesitated high levels of capital investment. At the same 
time, the response of parent companies during slump 
conditions has also been critical. It is certain that 
severa~ ~ards would have c~osed without this backing during 
the early 1980s. The takeover of Redpath Dorman Long and 
Cleveland Bridge by Trafalgar House in 1982 ensured the 
survival of these companies' respective offshore facilities 
on the Tees, as well as R.D.L.'s jacket fabrication site at 
Methil in Fife. By the same token, corporate backing was 
increasingly viewed as essential to attract the confidence 
of the oil companies. With the large round of investment 
initiated in the middle 1980s on field development projects 
that were increasingly marginal compared to previous 
developments, the oil majors became increasingly concerned 
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with reducing risk factors, 
deliveries from suppliers. 
which required guaranteed 
The changes in the nature of ownership in offshore related 
firms were to lead to a radically altered decision making 
framework. For offshore investment strategies became 
increasingly balanced against other avenues of accumulation, 
often outside structural engineering altogether. This was 
borne out by the different responses of companies to the 
slump in the oil supplies market, following the fall in oil 
prices in 1986. The subsequent cancellation or postponement 
of a large number of field developments was to lead to a 
major process of restructuring within the offshore 
fabrication industry. 
To a certain extent the immediate term survival of firms in 
the offshore industry depended upon their contract status at 
the moment of the oil price collapse. Thus those actively 
tendering for contracts were in the worst possible 
situation. Howard Doris's recently opened yard on the Tyne 
was forced to close, the most obvious early casualty of the 
slump in the supply market. I.T.M. was another firm caught 
without an order on their books. Although both these 
companies withdrew from offshore operations, their 
fabrication facilities were partially absorbed by remaining 
companies, anxious to extend existing plant capacity whilst 
prices for oil plant were at their nadir; Davy took over 
I.T.M.'s Normanby yard, whilst Press's purchase of the 
Howard Doris yard greatly enhanced its capacity and was an 
important factor in its successful joint bid (with 
McDermott's) for the second phase of the Morecambe Bay gas 
field contract commencing in 1987. Elsewhere in the region 
other companies had been fortunate in recently securing 
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major contracts that ensured their short term survival.~ In 
this sense the greatest immediate effects of oil price 
disintegration were felt in the Scottish yards. 
Nevertheless the continuing depressed state of the oil 
supplies market for the remainder of the 1980s (see Table 
4.7) was to lead to further major restructuring and 
concentration within the North East's fabrication industry 
as companies reassessed their commitment to oil operations 
in the longer term. This was both a reflection of the 
changing nature of the offshore supplies market (described 
earlier) , and the strategic corporate interests of the 
parent companies involved. For despite the fact that with 
the recovery in the oil price after 1987, an upturn was 
confidently forecasted during the 1990s, it would be 
preceded by another period of inactivity. Clearly this 
required a certain amount of capital remaining dormant in 
temporarily inactive offshore yards. This factor was to be 
crucial in the decisions made by Whessoe and to a lesser 
extent B.T.R. to close their respective offshore yards in 
1989 (a detailed account of these events is given in Chapter 
6). In contrast, Davy's persistence in the search for 
contracts around the same time resulted in them obtaining 
the Amethyst contract, employing 800 men at its peak. 
Thus by the close of the 1980s there were four firms still 
active in the region with the capacity and expertise to 
fabricate modules for the offshore industry. Of these, Press 
appeared to be in the strongest position, a fact reflected 
in the size of its turnover. For the financial year 1988-89 
DFor example, Charlton Leslie secured a 14 month 
conversion contract from Amerada Hess in August 1987 (worth 
approximately £30 million), following the completion of work 
for Marathon Oil which forestalled its owner, B.T.R's 
decision to withdraw from the offshore market until 1989. 
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it was the tenth highest ranking company based in the North 
East, in terms of this criterion (Table 4.8). Its situation 
was further enhanced with the withdrawal of Charlton Leslie 
from offshore operations in 1989, allowing Press to lease 
the latter's Wallsend yard and also making it the only major 
offshore employer on the Tyne. The strength of Press's 
situation was reflected in its obtaining the lion's share of 
contract work in 1989 and 1990. In particular, Press's 
market position was enhanced when Occidental awarded it the 
entire topside fabrication contract for the £580 million 
redevelopment of Piper Alpha, and a follow up contract for 
the £350 million Saltire field development. With its 
extensive facilities and the substantial backing of the AMEC 
group, Press is able to achieve a considerable amount of 
work continuity. 
The remaining firms are to varying degrees hostage to the 
fluctuations of the oil market. Redpath's offshore order 
book has been supplemented during recessions in the oil 
market by other forms of construction work from its parent 
company Trafalgar House, whilst Davy Offshore is almost 
totally reliant upon offshore orders for its survival. 
T.H.C's (formerly M.M Oil) operations are contingent upon 
the requirements of its Dutch parent company, receiving 
sporadic contracts without offering any form of employment 
continuity. 
The current situation facing the fabrication division in the 
region, and indeed the British supplies industry as a whole, 
is highly ironic in the light of a forecasted upturn in the 
offshore supplies market during the 1990s. With the closure 
of various yards, the British industry no longer has the 
capacity to meet this upsurge in demand. The next decade is 
likely to witness a reversal in the trend, since the middle 
1970s, for British companies to receive an increasing share 
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of orders emanating from the North Sea. As a recent issue of 
the F.T. North Sea Letter has noted (30.1.91: 2): 
"A perceived shortage of capacity in the U.K. means 
operators are increasingly looking abroad for 
fabrication capability. Chevron is finishing bid 
documents for fabrication of its 15,000 tonne Alba 
Northern eight-legged steel jacket. The bid list is 
expected to include an overseas element. Contract award 
for the 18' ooot integrated deck' expected to go to 
Grootint in Holland because of the shortage of yard 
capacity in the U.K, is "imminent". Bids for the 
1,600t, 124-bed accommodation module and helideck close 
in late February. The bid list here is expected to be 
BAM, Consafe, Heerema, Leirvik, Redpath amd SLP." 
As if to confirm this trend a more up to date article in The 
Independent noted (25.3.91: 14): 
"Early this month Shell U.K. awarded two offshore 
platform fabrication contracts, marking a small but 
noteworthy watershed in the current U.K. North Sea oil 
and gas scene. Both were for the Nelson oilfield - one 
of the largest recent British North Sea finds - which 
Shell is developing with partners Enterprise Oil and 
Esso. One contract, worth about £31m, went to the 
leading Norwegian company Aker for the platform 
drilling equipment module and derrick. The other, worth 
about £22m, also went to Norway, this time to the 
offshore accommodation specialist Leirvik Sveis for the 
living quarters and helicopter deck. 
Although not outstanding otherwise, these awards made 
their mark as the first construction contracts of this 
size won by Norwegian industry for a U.K. North Sea 
project in about a decade. They followed a string of 
contracts awarded to Contimintal European yards for 
U.K. offshore projects in recent months, and further 
underlined the pressure on capacity in U.K. yards from 
the current activity boom." 
4.5 Concluding comments 
We have shown in this chapter how the North East's interest 
in North Sea oil developments originated during the 1970s, 
partly through the government's "Full and Fair 
Opportunities" legislation, but primarily through the oil 
companies' strategy to persuade firms into the sector to 
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stimulate competition.~ The initial contracts awarded to 
the North East's structural engineering sector during the 
middle years of the 1970s need to be reassessed in this 
context. In this sense the offshore fabrication sector in 
the North East was the creation of the international oil 
companies themselves. 
Subsequently 
characterised 
the 
by 
offshore supplies 
vertical disintegration 
industry 
with the 
became 
North 
East's fabrication firms 6ccupying peripheral positions in 
relation to field development decisions. 
Having established this offshore capability (both within the 
North East and the U.K. as a whole) the oil industry has 
attempted to maintain, and even increase, competition by 
encouraging new firms into the industry. 31 This has been 
particularly important in minimising costs for smaller and 
more marginal field developments during the 1980s. 32 Whilst 
mDuring the 1960s and early 1970s the lack of British 
involvement in the North Sea was not merely a problem for 
the British government, but alsti for the international oil 
companies. For under these circumstances, they became 
dependent upon a small number of (primarily Dutch) 
engineering contractors with experience in offshore work. In 
particular the firms of De Groot and IHC Gusto monopolised 
the early fabrication contracts. 
31 The establishment of Davy Offshore on the Tees was a 
result of positive noises emanating from the Chairman of 
Shell, Bob Reid, concerning the future potential of the 
offshore market ( 11 £100 billion market on the doorstep"). 
Significantly, the influential EIU report (1984) which had 
first suggested the likelihood of an extensive second phase 
of oil-related developments was also commissioned by Shell. 
32 In fact, this policy led to a spate of under-bidding 
by fabricators during the latter part of the 1980s. In 
December 1987 for example, Davy agreed to convert a drilling 
rig to a fixed production platform for Shell's Emerald field 
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the oil companies can manipulate their suppliers during boom 
periods, their abilities are severely constrained by slumps 
in the oil market, when their range of suppliers is 
curtailed often by the disinvestment strategies of the 
latter's parent organisations. In this sense, oil companies 
are ultimately faced with a trade off in the North Sea, 
between maintaining competition amongst their suppliers (by 
releasing a regular number of contracts to encourage firms 
to remain in the offshore market) and only developing those 
fields that are profitable in the highly fluctuating oil 
market environment. 
With the unprecedented slump in the offshore supplies 
market, following the fall in oil prices during 1986, the 
oil companies have found it increasingly difficult to foster 
a competitive environment through a vertical disintegration 
strategy. To a certain extent, the "chickens have come home 
to roost" for the oil companies, the decision by various 
parent companies to close their offshore operations, 
particularly in the module fabrication sector has 
accentuated a trend towards a rationalisation of production. 
On the other hand, with the changing nature of topside 
technology and the movement towards more integrated 
structures, these trends 
industry might well be 
within the 
compatible 
offshore 
w-ith 
fabrication 
eil company 
interests. In this sense, a lower cost operating environment 
is more likely to be achieved through the integration of 
upstream operations within larger production complexes (and 
the increased use of EPIC management strategies) than the 
earlier strategy of encouraging competition through 
disintegration. 
at a fixed cost of £120 million, a decision that was to 
result in an overall loss of £127 million and place the 
entire corporation at risk. 
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We also identified the role of the North East of England 
within this framework, which has been primarily in the 
fabrication of equipment for oil and gas rigs, and 
especially in the fabrication of modules. The oil companies 
found within the region a ready-made employment system, 
tailored to the manufacture of industrial plant for basic 
process industries and suited to the vagaries of single unit 
production. Not only did the structural engineering sector 
fully embrace the new opportunities, but with the decline of 
traditional markets, the oil sector gradually became the 
main focus of activity for structural engineering in the 
North East. In this way, a new oi 1-related dependency was 
subtly forged. 
This dependency is all the more pronounced for the fact that 
the region's engineering companies have been unable to enter 
into the core activities of the offshore supplies market, 
remaining firmly entrenched in peripheral "location-
specific" fabrication activity. This applies equally at the 
national level, and it is significant that, although British 
owned firms have obtained traditional style contract work 
from the recent round of orders, the newer subsea 
developments are still being awarded primarily to overseas 
based firms. 
During the 1980s the offshore industry was subject to boom-
bust conditions with severe fluctuations in the oil market 
replacing the growth environment of the 1970s. The market 
crash of 1985-6 led to a rationalisation of the industry 
with a withdrawal of many of the smaller and less committed 
companies, unable or unwilling to fall back upon non-oil 
related work. Thus firms have become increasingly dependent 
upon the vagaries of the offshore market, and largely 
hostage to the fluctuating oil price. 
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This situation has been accentuated by the general 
centralising tendencies of British industrial capital in the 
past twenty years, to the extent that key strategic 
decision-making has largely been removed from the North 
East's indigenous engineering industry. 
In the following two chapters, the consequences of these 
processes for the organisation of employment within the 
North East are examined. In particular it will be noted that 
the dynamic nature of the oil marke~ has compelled companies 
to maintain fluid strategies, with regard to their labour 
requirements. But set against this, labour organisation 
varies from company to company, reflecting the diversity of 
corporate circumstances and power relationships that 
companies are embroiled within. 
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Table 4.1 
The Extent of Offshore supplies contracts in the U.K. 
Value of orders placed (£m) 
Year Exploration Development Maintenance/support 
1976 301 1507 - -
1977 375 1556 - -
1978 261 1709 - -
1979 241 2012 506 
1980 379 2374 699 
1981 550 2759 1004 
1982 875 2911 1309 
1983 993 2822 1495 
1984 1395 3054 1773 
1985 1450 2801 2248 
1986 1042 2365 2144 
1987 816 2008 2104 
1988 1129 2104 2061 
1989 1166 2640 2312 
[Source: Department of Energy Brown and Blue Books] 
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Table 4.2 
Initial capital Requirements for the Forties Project 
- 4 steel production platforms to stand in depths of up 
to 128 metres of water (Jacket Fabricators = Highland 
Fabricators and Laing Offshore; Topsides = Cleveland 
Offshore, De Groot, Foster Wheeler, Humphreys and 
Glasgow, Press, Redpath Dorman Long) 
- A submarine pipeline 32 inches in diameter from the 
field 169 kilometres to Cruden Bay. 
- A buried landline 36 inches in diameter from Cruden Bay 
209 kilometres to Grangemouth. 
- An oil stabilisation and gas processing plant at the 
Kerse of Kinneil, adjacent to the B.P. refinery at 
Grangemouth. 
-A tank farm at Dalmeny with capacity to store 3.6 
million barrels of oil. 
- Another landline 30 inches in diameter from the Kerse 
of Kinneil 19 kilometres to Dalmeny. 
- A new tanker loading terminal at Hound Point in the 
Firth of Forth. 
A pipeline 48 inches in diameter from Dalmeny 5 
kilometres to Hound Point. 
- An office and control centre at Dyce, near Aberdeen, 
with a communications system linked via Brimmond Hill 
to the Forties Field 
(Source: B.P. company document) 
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Table 4.3 
Expenditure on Fabrication Projects Compared to 
Total Development Costs on North Sea Oil and Gas Projects 
1981-90 
Expenditure (Em) 
Year Total Fabrication 
1981 2759 1544 
1982 2911 1737 
1983 2826 1793 
1984 3052 1903 
1985 2800 1799 
1986 2391 1622 
1987 2008 1126 
1988 2172 996 
1989 2799 1426 
1990 3520 2109 
[Source: Brown Books) 
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Table 4.4 
Offshore Turnover in the North East 1985 
Number of Firms 1985 Turnover £ooom 
Exploration 2 505 
Development 
Design Eng 3 750 
Large Fabricators 8 220,300 
Fabricators 10 19,036 
Plant & Equipment 9 7,930 
Install. & Hook-up 2 9,200 
Other 4 1,790 
TOTAL 36 259,006 
Operations 
Maintenance 6 8,993 
Transport Services 2 6,505 
Subsea Services - -
Personnel Services 1 -
TOTAL 9 19,998 
OVERALL TOTAL 47 279,509 
[Source Segal & Wicksteed et al, 1986: 69] 
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Table 4.5 
U.K. Based Companies Competing for Oil/Gas 
Platform contracts 4.4.74 
Firm 
AN DOC 
Richard Costain 
owner 
Balfour Beaty/Dutch 
Consortium 
Costa in 
Location 
Burnt island 
Hunters ton 
Howard Doris John Howard/C.G. Doris Loch Kishorn 
Highland 
Fabricators 
Laing 
McAlpine/ 
Sea Tank 
McDermott 
Lewis Offshore 
R.D.L. 
Sea Tank 
Constructors 
Taywood Selhurst 
Weldit 
Engineering 
Notes 
Brown and Root/Wimpey 
Laing/EPTM 
McAlpinejSea Tank 
Oceanic Contractors 
Fred Olsen 
Redpath Dorman Long/ 
Microperi/Saipem 
Cementation/ 
Royal Netherlands 
Harbour Works 
Taylor Woodrow; 
Selhursttion 
Weldit 
Nigg Bay 
Graythorp 
Ardyne Point 
Ardersier 
Glumag Bay 
Methil 
Rudhe Mor, 
Loch Fyne 
Drumbuie 
Jarrow/ 
Barrow 
a) Oceanic Contractors is itself a subsidiary of the New 
Orleans based corporation J. Ray McDermott 
b) Cementation is part of Trafalgar House 
c) Weldit were attempting to develop the old Palmer's 
shipyard. 
(Source: Construction News: 4.4.74] 
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Table 4.6 
Investment in the Upgrading of Yard Facilities 
During the mid 1980s by U.K. based Fabrication Firms 
Company Yard Location 
Charlton Wallsend 
Leslie 
Highland Nigg Bay 
Fabricators 
Howard Kishorn 
Doris 
Kestrel Dundee 
Marine 
Lewis 
Offshore 
McDermott 
Press 
Offshore 
Redpath 
Offshore 
Glumag Bay 
Ardersier 
Wall send 
Middlesbrough 
Nature of Upgrading Cost 
- New load out quay £1m 
for modules of up 
to 7,500 tonnes 
- Construction of £8m 
new assembly halls 
for all weather 
fabrication 
- Conversion of £0.5m 
machining shop to 
new assembly hall 
- Enlargening of n.a 
facilities to create 
2 separate 
construction areas 
- Installation of n.a 
computer aided 
draughting system 
- Increase in load-out n.a 
quay capacity and 
extension of 
fabrication hall 
- Purchase of 1,200 n.a 
tonne rolling 
machine 
- Extensive upgrading £25m 
of all aspects of 
yard 
- Conversion of £2.5m 
Hadrian Shipyard to 
accommodate offshore 
structures up to 
10,000 tonnes 
- Upgrading of 3 n.a 
module assembly 
halls 
192 
Table 4.6 
Investment in the Upgrading of Yard Facilities 
during the mid 1980s by U.K. based Fabrication Firms 
(continued) 
Company Yard Location Nature of Upgrading Cost 
T.H.C. Hartlepool - Developing new 16 £9m 
Fabricators acre site to 
accommodate 
structures up to 
10,000 tonnes 
Whessoe Middlesbrough - Enlargening yard £2.5m 
capacity to build 
modules up to 
9,000 tonnes 
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Table 4.7 
Capacity in Offshore Fabrication Yards, June 1988 
Company Capacity (%) 
Charlton Leslie 0 (C & M) 
(Wallsend Yard) 
Davy Offshore 75 
Hi - Fab 100 
Lewis Offshore 0 (C & M) 
McDermott 100 
Press Offshore 50 
Redpath 60 
THC Fabricators 80 
VIE 0 (C & M) 
Whessoe Offshore 0 (C & M) 
c & M = care and maintenance 
[Source Various Management Interviews] 
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Table 4.8 
Turnover for Selected North Eastern Companies, 1988-89 
Company Rank Turnover 
Northern Engineering Industries 1 £804m 
Proctor and Gamble 2 £630m 
Press Offshore 10 £111m 
Whessoe Heavy Engineering 13 £99.6m 
Darchem Engineering 16 £86m 
Swan Hunter 17 £81m 
Charlton Leslie Engineering 30 £53m 
Cleveland Bridge 41 £45m 
[Source: The Journal: 22.2.89] 
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Figure 4.3 
The Location of U.K. Fabricators, 1986 
[Taken from Sadler, 1986: 34) 
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CHAPTER 5 
INTEGRATION AND ACCOMMODATION: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 
OIL INDUSTRY AND THE EMPLOYMENT SYSTEM IN THE NORTH EAST1 
"When I first started work in the early 1970s, there 
were 40 jobs per month there were that many 
available. You could go from one job to another. Chuck 
one in the morning, start another in the afternoon. 
Then, if you were unemployed for any particular length 
of time it was because you didn't want a job. Now, it's 
different." 
"When I think about the rundown of the shipbuilding and 
ship repair yards I often wonder what the situation 
would have been if the offshore work hadn't been here. 
It would have been hell." 
"If it hadn't been for the rig yards, you would have 
seen the end of engineering by now. We would all be 
looking for some other line of work." 
These comments, expressed by workers at offshore fabrication 
yards in the North East during the late 1980s, in many ways 
encapsulate the role of North Sea oil developments, within 
the context of labour market change in the North East of 
England. For most of the 1970s oil-related employment 
represented one of the better paying of many alternatives 
for individuals in the region's labour market. But, with the 
decimation of the traditional engineering and shipbuilding 
industries during the recession of the 1980s, offshore work 
increasingly became the only form of employment open to 
workers trained in the field of structural engineering. As a 
result, the oil industry has become an increasingly 
important agent in structuring employment change within the 
North East, both in its pattern of labour recruitment and in 
1The material used in Chapters 5 and 6 is primarily 
drawn from interviews, undertaken with the management, 
workforce and union officials from the offshore fabrication 
industry in the North East of England and Scotland. A brief 
methodology of this research is given as an appendix. 
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the organisation of work in production. It is these 
developments and their inter-relationship with wider 
employment trends that are the focus of this chapter. 
5.1 The post war employment system 
As Chapter 3 demonstrated, prior to the arrival of oil-
related activities, the coastal districts in the North East 
were the focus of an employment system, supplying the labour 
requirements of the shipbuilding and structural engineering 
industries. Its principal characteristics were a highly 
skilled, craft-based and unionised workforce, a large degree 
of casualisation to compensate for irregular demand in the 
product market, and a strongly developed local labour market 
identity. 
The post war period witnessed a degree of implicit change 
within this system. The reduction in the number of shipyards 
and engineering works within the region, facilitated the 
gradual decline of the externalised local labour market, as 
a mechanism for labour allocation, on all three of the North 
East's industrial rivers. It was becoming increasingly more 
difficult for the multiplicity of trades to rotate between 
different workplaces, 1n tandem with the needs of the 
production cycle. By the same token, employers were 
increasingly aware that the pool of skilled labour available 
to them within the region was shrinking. Since the 1930s, 
the combination of outward migration from the region, allied 
to the influx of new manufacturing and service industries 
(especially on Tyneside) had served to undermine the 
traditional sources of labour in the coastal districts. 
Attempts to overcome labour shortages through increasing 
apprentice numbers and the upgrading of semi-skilled workers 
had only resulted in numerous localised industrial disputes 
during the 1950s. 
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With the shift in the attitudes of both employers and 
workers during the 1960s, in response to declining markets, 
the nature of employment relations began to change; greater 
employment stability was guaranteed by firms in return for a 
more relaxed attitude amongst the unions regarding working 
practices. 
These changes, however, represented no more than the 
accomodation of the local employment system to altered 
economic circumstances, rather than a more fundamental shift 
in the nature of labour organisation. Firms did not 
construct sophisticated internal labour market structures, 
but rather internalised elements of the existing external 
labour market. As such there was no marked development of a 
vertical division of labour based upon job ladders and 
clearly defined career paths, but rather the incorporation 
of the more traditional, horizontal demarcations between 
crafts, with the continuing dichotomy between skilled and 
unskilled workers. Similarly there was no change in the 
nature of the labour process, which continued to be 
characterised by informal systems of control, rather any 
movement towards "bureaucratic control" (Edwards, 1979; 
Clawson, 1980). Supervision continued to be personal and 
direct, corresponding to "responsible autonomy" (Friedman, 
1977). 
The absence of these internal forms of labour organisation 
was also a reflection of the extent to which an individual's 
work experience remained outside the firm and rooted within 
a craft identity. Robertson's observations about 
shipbuilding on the Clyde, in the immediate post war period, 
remained equally pertinent as a description of the 
employment system along the North East coast's industrial 
districts in the late 1960s: 
"Shipbuilding is therefore a tradesman's industry. The 
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community of purpose and homogeneity of status of a 
mass production factory are lacking." 
(1954: 9-10) 
Although the apprenticeship system had been formalised (with 
the creation of the various Industry Training Boards2 in 
1963) and reduced to a four year training period, the 
practice of releasing newly qualified craftsmen onto the 
local labour market endured and this, in turn, encouraged 
the persistence of a "journeyman" mentality within the 
labour force. Thus although a large proportion of the latter 
would immediately find work in the company that had trained 
them, substantial numbers opted to choose the alternative of 
"chasing money" elsewhere. During the early 1970s this 
continued to be an option both inside and outside the North 
East. The gradual rundown in employment numbers within the 
region had encouraged an increasing number of skilled 
workers to travel away from the region in search of work. 
Many were absorbed, as site labour, in the numerous oil 
refinery and terminal developments that underpinned the post 
war boom throughout Western Europe. In this sense it became 
something of a grotesque irony that the outflow of capital 
from the region in the first half of the twentieth century 
should be succeeded by the export of its skilled labour in 
the second half. But there continued to be substantial 
opportunities for employment at home, not just from the 
larger shipbuilding and engineering employers, but also from 
2These boards were established to ensure a more stable 
training environment within British industry, through a levy 
system. In the case of the Engineering Industry Training 
Board, all firms with over 40 employees were required by 
mandate to pay the organisation 1.7 per cent of their total 
pay roll, receiving back 1 per cent if they trained to 
E.I.T.B. standards. This system however is in the process of 
being disbanded as part of the Conservative government's 
drive towards free enterprise based forms of training (see 
Ashton, Green and Hoskins (1989) for an historical account 
of these developments). 
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a multitude of small supply firms, that formed an extensive 
subcontracting network. 
5.2 The introduction of the oil industry to the employment 
system in the coastal districts during the 1970s 
5.2.1 The labour market situation and developments in labour 
relations during the 1970s 
The arrival of North Sea oil in the late 1960s brought a new 
source of demand for the labour skills of the North East, 
that was initially in direct competition for labour with 
established industries. For, despite the long term malaise 
of the traditional industries in the coastal districts, the 
advent of oil operations happened to coincide with a period 
of brief economic revival. 
On the Tyne an upturn in the world shipbuilding market 
produced a situation of full employment amongst the various 
trades, although this dissipated as a result of subsequent 
OPEC events. Meanwhile, Teesside was in the throes of the 
construction boom described in the previous chapter. 
The ensuing tight labour market conditions encouraged 
companies into intense competition to attract labour, which 
in turn led to a spiralling of wage rates. This inevitably 
resulted in a situation of wage inflation, in which the 
higher wages associated with oil activities tended to pull 
labour away from long established local firms. Of particular 
concern were the poaching activities of Laing's, the civil 
construction firm that established an offshore yard at 
Graythorp, near Hartlepool in 1972 specifically for the B.P. 
Forties contract, offering vastly inflated wage rates: 
"Laing's, in order to attract labour that perhaps had a 
lot of service with other companies offered enhanced 
rates of pay, and as a result there was a mass exodus 
from large engineering companies in this district. I'm 
certain that a lot of them closed as a direct result of 
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that happening. They were starved of labour, not only 
my members, but engineers, superintendents and works 
managers opted for the El Dorado. The place I worked in 
the seventies couldn't tender for the traditional work 
they had done for thirty to forty years, because they 
did not have the skilled labour. A lot of people went 
to the wall: Whessoe in Stockton, the Britannia Works 
and all those others." 3 
(Tony Finn, Regional Organiser, GMBATU] 
Laing's was aided and abetted in its activities by B.P, 
through the offering of bonus payments, which served to 
destabilise the local labour market and industrial relations 
environment on Teesside as Lee, the present EETPU shop 
steward at Redpath's Port Clarence yard remembers: 
"The actual pay-off payments were paid by the oil 
companies. After that the [local] companies, such as 
Cleveland Bridge, got their heads together and said 
"this has got to stop - we can't afford to pay what 
Laing's are paying". They had the backing of union 
officials, who did not want big lump sum payouts 
(redundancy payments). That put a stop to it." 
The industrial relations' problems associated with bonus 
payments at Laing's Graythorp yard in the mid 1970s soon 
spread to other more reputable companies. Ian, a foreman 
with Cleveland Bridge at the time, describes a particular 
situation at the company's Port Clarence yard: 
"In 1977/8 we did some salination plants, which 
involved load-outs. They (the work force) wanted load-
out money for it. What had happened was that Laing had 
paid thousands of pounds to get a specific oil rig onto 
a barge at a specific date in 1974 (Forties project]. 
They paid two shifts for every shift worked, and a 
promise of so many thousands if they got it out. It was 
for the Forties Field. That happened and everybody made 
a lot of money, which is unusual in this field 
3This situation was especially galling in the light of 
recent restructuring by certain engineering companies, 
stimulated by the I.R.C., to improve the competitiveness of 
British industry. 
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(engineering construction). You normally make just a 
living. Quite a few of those people came here and 
wanted payments, "lumpers" for putting the desalination 
plants on the barges for Dubai." 
The difficulties encountered within the fabrication yards 
were exacerbated on Teesside by other construction work. 
Tony Finn describes the situation: 
"At the time we had 42 per cent of total U.K 
(construction) investment centred in a 12 mile radius: 
the Redcar complex, Seal Sands and the Monsanto 
complex, then we had all the module construction yards, 
Laing's and Wilson Walton." 
The sheer weight of development meant that a large number of 
"travelling men" were brought into the area to offset local 
labour shortages. This served to fuel the already 
inflammatory industrial relations scene: 
"There was an awful lot of discontent at the time. 
We had 15,000 travelling men in the district, the 
scousers and that. They don't care what they do when 
they are working away from home. They walked off on 
Fridays just to let you know what they thought of you. 
There were major skill shortages - nobody was prepared 
to hold back on their investment, British Steel wanted 
their Redcar complex, the oil companies wanted their 
rigs, etc. So they had to bring a lot of people in from 
outside the area. Teesside lived with a scar on its 
character after that." 
With the balance of power firmly in the hands of the work 
force, stoppages became commonplace. Much of the credit for 
the disturbances was given to the incoming workers, by both 
managers as well as unions: 
"This area got a bad reputation when Redcar was being 
built. They brought a lot of men in to build the site 
who were just there to cream the situation. It was 
virtually warfare between managers and workforce." 
(Comments made by local management in Sadler (1986: 5)] 
But Bob Wright, personnel manager at Whessoe from 1976 to 
1989, and supervisor prior to that, suggested that the high 
wages on offer were another contributory factor: 
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"In this area the men used to strike on Wednesday's. 
Clubs were open all day in Stockton then, and they 
didn't have anything else to spend their money on. 
North Sea oil was just starting to happen and they were 
paid a lot of money. Instead of going for bigger and 
better cars, houses and holidays, a lot of them just 
got a bigger and bigger wad in the back pocket. Getting 
some free time was the best way of spending money. The 
way of getting free time was to cause a problem. They 
used to come in the next day (Thursday] and there was 
no problem. But that day it was blood and guts. They 
would deliberately set a situation up." 
Although the Tyne was not subjected to the intensity of 
industrial conflict experienced on the Tees, similar 
conditions prevailed as Brian, a pipefitter with forty years 
of experience in offshore and shipbuilding yards, noted: 
"In past years, we would have been out of the gate for 
the slightest things. At one time, Monday was your 
favourite day - "half-day Monday". Everyone knew it was 
Monday on the drink." 
Bob Wright suggests that such unrest was down to a few 
ringleaders, whom he described as "barrack room lawyer type 
of people, who shout you down." In doing so, like many 
representatives of management, he is adhering to a unitary 
view of industrial relations (Palmer, 1983: 10-12) which 
fails to recognise the potential for conflict in work 
situations. Indeed other evidence, from the employees' 
perspective, puts such events in a different light, 
highlighting in this instance the adverse working conditions 
that workers were subjected to. Boom conditions and labour 
shortages, allied to firms' requirements to meet stringent 
deadlines set by clients, meant that the labour force was 
under intense pressure in terms of hours being worked and 
the pace of production. As Arthur Garth, branch secretary of 
the EETPU on Teesside notes: 
"In those days people were working seven days a week, 
52 weeks of the year and it did have its own problems. 
At the first excuse, that was it. It wasn't just 
individuals taking time off, but the whole yard. A nice 
sunny day, say Derby Day, and that would be it. They 
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would have some reason for it, a reason to give. 
the lads would admit that. If you think about 
rather than taking half a day off as an individual 
then being under the microscope from then on, it 
better if the whole yard went out." 
Even 
it, 
and 
was 
This type of worker mentality seems to have been the result 
of the particular pressures and attitudes fostered by the 
demands of site contract work in the engineering 
construction industry, rather then a general upsurge in 
industrial unrest throughout the industrial districts during 
the 1970s (ibid): 
"You wouldn't see it within establishments such as 
British Steel and I.C.I. or even in engineering shops 
such as Cleveland Bridge. But the fellow, that does the 
major construction on a contracting job is a different 
animal altogether. 
Laing's was where it all started, it set the scene for 
some of the other yards. Before they even started the 
job, strikes were taking place, arguing over completion 
rates and early finish jobs." 
In fact the most significant underlying explanation for much 
of the industrial conflict, that centred around the 
fabrication yards during this period, lies in the unstable 
nature of the industry itself. The level of employment 
discontinuity is such that workers will strike for the best 
pay deal during a tight labour market situation to 
compensate for the inevitable periods of unemployment that 
usually follow. A recurrent theme of conversations with 
workers in the industry is that: 
"Peaks and troughs are always a 
construction industry. When there is 
get as much money as you can for it."4 
problem in 
work around 
the 
you 
The strategies employed by both management and workforce 
4This situation is similar to the longstanding 
tradition that used to exist within shipbuilding in the 
region, where workers would make increased pay claims at 
times when their skills were in greatest demand with 
employers (Cameron, 1964). 
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tend to reflect the dynamic tendencies of the product 
market. This is another point neglected by personnel 
managers, when they erroneously blame "ringleaders" for 
worker disturbances. As Beynon has noted (1973: 187): 
"Yet recourse to the idea of a "ringleader", a "trouble 
maker", focuses attention away from the examination of 
the position of the shop floor leader within the 
factory and in particular the nature of his 
relationship with his members. To understand the shop 
steward is to understand this relationship." 
Workers' and indeed, employers' representatives are usually 
selected for the demands of each particular situation. 
During the 1970s, the need to extract the maximum benefit 
from an advantageous labour market situation produced a more 
belligerent type of unionism in the offshore yards. 
5.2.2 Regulating the offshore industry in the aftermath of 
the oil boom 
Although by 1978 the boom was largely dissipating and the 
labour market had become more stable, irreparable damage had 
been done to the region's employment infrastructure and 
industrial relations reputation, particularly on Teesside. 
David Clarke, industrial relations officer at Charlton 
Leslie, provides a typical anecdote: 
"In the mid 1970s on Teesside, the situation was 
particularly bad. There is a story going around that 
the guy who is General Manager of Phillips Petroleum in 
this country has a map in his London office with a big 
red ring around Teesside. It is indelibly printed on 
his mind that Teesside was hell in the mid seventies. 
Now whether we ever get into that situation again, I 
don't know. I think we are better prepared for it this 
time. In the meantime we have got agreements in that 
are thorough, and have better communications for 
disputes than the free-for-all we had then." 
The problems associated with the offshore developments in 
the 1970s had revealed serious defects in the system of 
labour regulation. Being a relatively new industry, offshore 
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fabrication tended to fall between stools, drawing labour 
from a variety of different industrial traditions and 
encompassing a wide range of 
the large majority of trades 
the Bridlington Agreement 
regulatory arrangements. Whilst 
belonged to the CSEU, for which 
(1939) was supposed to be the 
structure for arbitration over spheres of work, the latter 
had long since become redundant 1n the resolution of 
disputes. 5 The post war period had witnessed a trend back 
towards district and plant level bargaining, resulting in 
the growing influence of shop stewards (Marsh and Coker, 
1963; Clegg, 1979). Despite the amalgamation of the numerous 
trades throughout the region into three principle craft 
unions and two general unions by the mid 1970s, 6 the 
practice of having a representative of each trade on the 
Joint Shop Stewards Works Committee continued to be an 
important feature of collective bargaining arrangements. 
Thus as Stan Jackson, the present union convener at Redpath 
Offshore's Port Clarence yard remembers: 
"In the seventies we used to have 30 odd stewards and 
now we've got 7. There used to be 10 Boilermaker 
5The industrial relations landscape was dominated by 
informal plant and district level practices which tended to 
override, national or federal agreements. 
~he largest engineering and shipbuilding union in the 
North East lS the General, Municipal, Boilermakers and 
Allied Trades Union. During the mid 1970s the GMB accounted 
for approximately 125,000 men, 30,000 of which were involved 
in various forms of structural steelwork. In the offshore 
industry this group included burners, chippers, platers, 
template makers and welders. A close second was the EETPU ( 
with 80,000 members in the region, mostly in the electrical 
and pipefitting trades. The third major craft union was the 
AUEW (Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers), which 
represented the amalgamation of the main engineering 
construction union the C.E.U. with the old A.S.E. in 1970. 
This union embraced the mechanical fitters, erectors and 
riggers. Labourers and other general workers were divided 
between the G.M. U. (which merged with the Boilermakers in 
1978 to form the aforementioned GMBATU) and the Transport 
and General Workers Union. 
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stewards alone, and every steward had a deputy that was 
practically full time". 
This was perceived as a major problem for union officials, 
at the district level, as well as management, as Tony Finn 
recalls: 
The 
"At one time we used to go to a meeting, and there 
would be 26 shop stewards. You couldn't get a 
consensus. But now we have 2 shop stewards at Davy 
Offshore and those men have looked after 1,000 workers 
at the peak." 
high levels of representation led to numerous 
demarcation disputes, not so much between the skilled 
categories, but over the status of work outside of the core 
stages of production. A typical example comes from a dispute 
on the Tees in 1975, between the C.E.U and the Boilermakers 
over the control of metal preparation work, i.e. the 
assembly and positioning of components prior to fabrication. 
In the shipyards, this type of work had been traditionally 
associated with semi-skilled riggers, who were affiliated to 
the Boilermakers Union. But within engineering construction 
this role was filled by the erector, a skilled category in 
its own right, and a mainstay of the C.E.U. The fact that 
this dispute was eventually decided in favour of the latter, 
reflects the support of the A.E.U.W and the structural 
engineering heritage of the area. 7 But disputes did not 
always take such a course. On another Cleveland Bridge site 
upstream, there was a dispute over the manning of cranes 
between the C. E. U. who had traditionally done the work on 
site and the T&G crane drivers from the general construction 
industry. The CEU saw this as a defence of their trade 
against unskilled labour and appealed to the Boilermakers as 
7By the same token, it is significant that for the 
offshore yards of Charlton Leslie and Press on the Tyne, 
where shipbuilding traditions have left such a dominant 
legacy, riggers undertake the majority of metal preparation 
work. 
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a fellow skilled union for support. This was not 
forthcoming; crane driving was not considered to constitute 
a proper trade. As a result, the company sacked striking CEU 
men, thus allowing the T&G to gain the upper hand in this 
line of work. 
The rationale behind these latter disputes was distinct from 
some of those described earlier, representing the teething 
problems of a new industry, rather than the expression of 
worker power in the labour market. But the common 
denominator for both forms of dispute was the breakdown in 
existing regulatory arrangements between employer and union 
organisations within the offshore industry. It was this 
situation that the National Joint Council for the 
Engineering Construction Industry was established to redress 
on lOth September 1981. Its principle concerns were to 
establish a procedures' system, to limit the incidence of 
wildcat strikes and to control wages issues: 8 
"As a result of what happened in Teesside in the 
seventies, a large investment now comes under the 
N.J.C. They decide whether it is going to be a 
nominated project, and the procedures required. 
Projects are all so different, from the construction of 
a petrochemical complex to the relining of a blast 
furnace. The refinements have to be gone into in fine 
detail. The client come to the first meeting and tells 
us [the unions] what he wants. We agree with the client 
what the money should be and the N.J .c. authorises 
that. Then we go into the procedures. 
The blast furnace [at B.S.C. Redcar] was a nightmare as 
regards procedures. Wherever a problem arose, the field 
officer [a trade union official] and a representative 
from the employers had to go there and look at the 
conditions, then agree that a "condition" existed - in 
your pyjamas; the lads used to get you out of bed at 
midnight. We would agree that a "condition" existed 
that warranted new monies, etc that had been 
unforeseen. Then we would return to the client and he 
8Though notably it did not include activities on rigs 
in the North Sea, where unions remained largely excluded. 
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would agree to the changes, providing they had been 
authorised by the N.J.C." 
[Tony Finn] 
Thus, whilst the new agreement had its drawbacks it was 
supported by both management and unions, who considered it 
preferable to have an organised forum for debate, rather 
than the more spontaneous situations in the 1970s, where 
11 people would have just downed tools". 
Spiralling wage rates, and the use of bonus payments had 
been the primary source of discomfort for fabrication firms 
during the boom years. In an attempt to eliminate a 
recurrence of this situation, the employers agreed to a 
series of assurances over conditions. These included: a 
guarantee of at least 39 hours employment per week for each 
individual and a minimum contract of at least six weeks, 
with a limit of 8 hours per week on overtime (although this 
tended to vary between firms); up to 25 days of annual paid 
holiday, dependent upon length of service; and severance pay 
for up to a maximum of 103 weeks worked. 9 
But this agreement was flying in the face of labour market 
realities. An unstable and disorganised employment 
environment was further undermined by the sheer weight of 
recession in the period from 1978 to 1981. This situation, 
allied to an incoming Conservative government intent upon an 
assault on union power in the labour market, was to 
transform the balance of power, away from the individual 
worker, away 
employer. 
from organised unionism and towards the 
9A similar severance agreement had already 
introduced into the shipbuilding industry in 1979. 
been 
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5.2.3 The organisation of labour in production 
Thus the industrial relations' conflicts of the 1970s were 
linked to specific labour market conditions, rather than a 
concern over the organisation of labour in production. In 
fact, the production requirements for the fabrication of 
offshore modules were notable for their similarities to 
shipbuilding, a result of the irregular pattern of demand in 
the product market that prevented the development of forms 
of mass 
fledgling 
production. 10 
activity was 
labour organisation at 
Under these 
able to utilise 
the point of 
circumstances the 
existing forms of 
production. As a 
consequence, disputes over demarcation, which were regular 
features of the local industrial relations environment in 
the past, have been uncommon in the history of offshore 
operations. Those that have occurred were usually over some 
minor infringement along rigidly defined craft boundaries, 
and need to be viewed in the context of the chaotic labour 
market situation described above, rather than as the defence 
of craft positions. 11 
10In addition, the unwillingness of firms to commit 
large amounts of capital to offshore fabrication activity 
provided a constraint upon any attempt by management to 
transform the labour process through technical changes ln 
production. 
11This is not to deny the existence of some forms of 
craft erosion. Since the 19 60s the roles of some of the 
traditional shipyard trades in production were being 
implicitly undermined, resulting from a tacit agreement 
between management and unions concerning overmanning. This 
was usually achieved through increased flexibility in the 
roles of core trades. The advent of offshore work, for 
example, saw the virtual disappearance of the chipper; a 
welder's mate whose chief task had been to clean up a weld 
after cooling. In the offshore yards, welders were 
increasingly encouraged to do their own cleaning and 
scaling. On Teesside such small-scale transformations 
presented few problems, although on Tyneside, the legacy of 
shipbuilding brought a greater degree of worker resistance. 
This was illustrated in a remark made to the local press by 
Bob Glass, chairman on the CSEU as recently as 1986 
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Reflecting the similarities with previous forms of work 
organisation, the production of offshore modules has been 
centred upon a series of clearly defined stages, requiring a 
changing composition of labour. The first of these is the 
metal preparatory stage ("prepping"), involving burners, 
platers and template makers in the shaping, bending and 
planing 
employed 
of materials prior to assembly. Welders are 
ln significant numbers, alongside these 
then 
other 
trades, in the fabrication of the shell or basic framework 
of the module. 12 In doing so they recel ve support from 
trades specialised in the servicing and maintenance of the 
ongoing structure, such as erectors, riggers and 
scaffolders. The peak employment level for a contract is 
usually reached during this stage. This is followed by the 
shotblasting and painting stage, probably the least 
significant stage ln terms of manpower recruitment, but 
crucial in terms of quality control as one manager at Press 
following a walkout 
precipitated by the 
to undertake work 
locality: 
at Howard Doris's yard on the Tyne, 
firm's attempt to bring in pipefitters 
traditionally done by platers in the 
"This is something which could 
The management is new to the 
have a lot to learn." 
have been avoided .... 
area and it seems they 
(Evening Chronicle, 17.6.86: 3) 
But levels of worker resistance should not be overstated. 
The mechanisms used for this process, natural wastage and 
the reduction of apprentice numbers, ensured that there were 
no significant outbreaks of sectional conflict, although 
evidence of underlying bitterness has been evident in the 
research. The implications of this on-going process with 
regard to the 1980s are discussed later in the chapter. 
12These trades experience the greatest fluctuations in 
employment levels, fluctuating within the course of a 
contract as much as between contracts. The nature of their 
work, whether welding, plating or burning is such that they 
can be called in for small "touch-up" and repair jobs after 
the main fabrication stages. 
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noted: 
"Blasting and painting are important in this business, 
you've got to get that right. That can cause you a lot 
of problems. I think people tend to look towards the 
blasting and painting as unimportant, but it is very 
important from an engineering point of view. If they 
don't get it right there is trouble. If the painting is 
not right, then there is a lot of stripping back to be 
done, which can cost a few weeks." 
After the completion of the structural stages, a contract 
enters the pipef i tting stage, although in practice there 
tends to be a great deal of overlap between these stages. 
In particular versatile welders are often capable of welding 
pipes as well as structural steelwork. Platers and 
pipefitters lack such diversity, possessing highly 
specialised skills. 
In the final stages of a contract, the outfitting trades are 
brought in to install electrical, mechanical and other more 
sophisticated equipment. Most firms use a mixture of direct 
and subcontract labour for such work, the ratio being 
indicative of the degree of sophistication involved. 
Charlton Leslie were exceptional in having their own 
electrics division, whilst other firms such as Press and 
Redpath have used sister companies from within their own 
parent organisations. 
The similarities with traditional forms of work in the 
region fostered a conservative attitude amongst employers 
towards technical change. Working practices were not altered 
radically for the specificities of offshore activity during 
the early 1970s. 13 The changes in production that did take 
13But management attitudes were also influenced by the 
uncertainties surrounding the future of offshore work. In 
this sense, firms were particularly unwilling to undertake 
massive capital investment in new production systems. 
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place need to be viewed in the context of much longer term 
trends within existing industries, as we suggested earlier 
(see footnote 6). The predominant change to the organisation 
of labour in production came within the semi-skilled and 
unskilled segments of the work force. Offshore related 
companies had inherited an overmanned system of unskilled 
support labour from shipbuilding and engineering traditions. 
In this system, every tradesman not only had a semi-skilled 
assistant such as a chipper or gouger, but also a mate to do 
menial tasks. This system was abolished almost immediately, 
with craftsmen increasingly forced to undertake the work 
themselves, as John, a welder who had served on Davy's Shell 
\ 
Amethyst project in 1989 remembers: 
"When I first started each tradesman had a mate. This 
industry was just taking off then so you had more mates 
than elsewhere. Gradually however the tradesmen have 
taken over the mate's side of the job. You do a lot 
more "humping" and "pulling". But that took off fairly 
quickly. When I was here in 1975 you did about the same 
as you do now." 
Under these circumstances, the role of the unskilled within 
production was transferred from the specific to a more 
general plane, involving greater functional flexibility. 
Thus trade assistants operated between trades, "as and when 
required". 
Thus the early changes to the nature of work led not to any 
form of technical restructuring, but rather an 
intensification of work within existing craft boundaries, 
through the reduction in the number of service trades. 
Undoubtedly the most significant transformation of the 
employment environment, as a result of oil developments, 
came, not in the nature of the labour process itself, but in 
the changing composition of the labour force. As a reaction 
to the uncertain, short term nature of oil developments in 
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the North Sea during the 1970s, fabrication companies began 
to rely more heavily upon a casualised workforce and the 
extensive use of subcontracting firms. Both these trends 
represented a significant reversal in the post war pattern 
towards a more stable working environment within firms. 
The greater use of subcontractors reflected the lower level 
of expertise within offshore fabrication companies compared 
to shipbuilding. For whilst, shipbuilding firms were largely 
able to undertake the entire production of a vessel from the 
basic fabrication stages to the outfitting stages using 
their own contract labour, fabrication firms have used 
subcontracting firms to a greater extent. 14 Thus, the actual 
construction effort, although taking place on one site is 
more vertically disintegrated between firms. 
Fabrication firms only employ their own direct labour in the 
structural phases of each contract. Other activities are 
subcontracted out to a varying extent: 
"Effectively the people we employ, the portion of the 
offshore work that we do with our own 
resident/permanent labour force is the steelwork 
structure, the frame of the module. That's all we do, 
all the other supplementary requirements to complete 
the module are done by subcontractors. Some of the 
subcontracting is done by companies that are part of 
Trafalgar House, e.g the electrics are done by Redpath 
Engineering Services." 
[Lou Casson, Personnel Manager, Redpath Offshore] 
It is difficult to estimate the quantitative employment 
impact of subcontracting activity, or its change over time, 
14This is also a response to greater market uncertainty. 
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given the confines of the present study. 15 Generally 
speaking, employment levels within these subcontracting 
firms probably fluctuate in line with the firm's role in the 
offshore production cycle. But at the same time, 
subcontractors' involvement in the offshore market has 
tended to vary wildly, both between individual firms and 
over time. An attempt to discern these patterns was 
attempted in 1988, when a survey of the 20 principle local 
subcontractors used by the major fabricators was undertaken. 
The 17 that responded, employed 3119 in the middle of 1988, 
although significantly, 13 of these firms declared that on 
average, offshore work accounted for less than 25 per cent 
of their overall market. Unfortunately firms were unable (or 
unwilling) to state what proportion of their workforce was 
employed in the offshore sector at any one point in time, or 
15The conventional wisdom when describing the 
relationship between offshore fabricators and their 
suppliers is to think in terms of a network of primarily 
small firms based upon an inner ring of contractors, within 
which, the oil companies are the "bullseye" of the "darts-
board" and also project managers in each case (E.I.U, 1983). 
This is far too simplistic a description of a complex set of 
arrangements, which probably vary in proportion with the 
very different nature of each individual contract. The 
"small firms" myth is exploded by subcontracting firms such 
as Darchem, which regularly employs more people than the 
largest fabricator, Press (over 2,000 nati-onally in 1988), 
and is engaged in a diverse number of fabricating operations 
(ranging from insulation to pipe fabrication), rather than 
having a specialised product or service. Broadly speaking 
three types of subcontractor have been recognisable during 
this research: firms, for whom offshore activity is the 
principal market, with employees based at the construction 
site, supplying an on-going service, an example being 
Barrier of Wallsend (whose headquarters are located 
adjacently to Press) ; secondly, firms, for whom offshore 
work is not the principal market, although it forms an 
important part of their overall portfolio, supplying 
materials manufactured at their own site; and finally highly 
specialised firms that are called on to the construction 
site for a particular production stage, such as electrical 
wiring or insulation. 
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to supply figures relating to individual contracts. These 
figures were not available from the offshore fabricators, 
who only keep records relating to their own direct employees 
and agency staff. 
However, it should be obvious from this discussion that a 
sizeable proportion of the labour process within offshore 
fabrication is undertaken outside the remit of the principle 
fabricator, although as we have already noted such estimates 
for the industry as a whole disguise considerable variations 
between firms in their use of subcontract labour. This is a 
theme taken up in Chapter 6. 
A point touched upon in the previous paragraph was the use 
of subcontract labour by the fabricating company itself. 
Although not great in terms of employment numbers, it is 
significant in terms of a growing trend, both within the 
offshore industry and the labour market as a whole. The 
source of this type of labour is usually a specialised 
engineering employment agency, typically supplying highly 
skilled project managers, engineers and draughtsmen, i.e 
white collar staff. This was a development inextricably 
linked with the arrival of offshore work. Traditionally such 
categories of employment represented the only permanent 
members of the workforce in shipbuilding and engineering 
within the North East. As we suggested in Chapter Three, the 
marketing effort used to be the only continuous process 
within a shipbuilding or structural engineering prod':J.ction 
system, and these employees were critical for that effort. 
Recruited from the local labour market, these people 
represented a small professional elite, with employment 
guarantees and access to job ladders within firms. 
But with the arrival of offshore work, 
these people chose the option of 
growing numbers of 
leaving permanent 
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employment and chasing the oil money in the same manner as 
their blue collar counterparts. Undoubtedly part of the spur 
for this had been the decline in the opportunities provided 
by the shipbuilding industry within the region, although the 
offshore related firms were of course themselves developing 
a more transient employment environment. Not only did these 
people work in the locally based oil developments, but in 
all types of contract work throughout the U. K and abroad. 
The specialised employment agency developed to reflect this 
new tendency. 16 Thus the break down of the locally oriented 
employment system was complete, the geographical link 
between work and home had been fractured within all segments 
of the labour market. 
5.3 The restructuring of the employment system: on the 
market in the 1980s 
The marginalisation 
enhanced the short 
strategies 
term financial 
of companies 
prospects for 
probably 
workers 
during the buoyant labour market conditions of the 1970s. As 
we saw earlier, increasing numbers of men left stable 
employers to chase money in the oil industry, the "El 
Dorado" of black gold. A typical example was Ralph; who 
served his time as a caulker burner on the Tyne: 
"When I was shipbuilding here [McNulty Marine) , 10. 00, 
in the morning I got a pass out and I went across the 
road to Fox's where I heard there was a better job 
going and I was off to Holland at 4.30 the same day." 
By the end of the decade however this ephemeral working 
environment was disintegrating; labour market conditions 
16A typical example is the firm, Bordax, based at 
Glenrothes in Fife (and established in 1971 with the 
specific intention of benefitting from these changes in 
employment patterns), which supplies, not only highly 
skilled personnel such as Planning Engineers, Quantity 
surveyors and Welding Inspectors, but also skilled tradesmen 
to companies facing local labour shortages. 
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were altering radically throughout the region, as the end of 
the North Sea oil boom coincided with recession in the wider 
economy. With the continuing rise in the numbers unemployed, 
(Figure 5.1) those who had decided to follow the tune played 
by the oil piper found themselves having to wait 
increasingly longer and search increasingly further for 
work. This situation was encapsulated in the experience of 
Allen, a pipefitter with a history of working for a whole 
plethora of employers in engineering and construction site 
work (including Charlton Leslie, I.C.I, Monsanto, Taylor 
Woodrow and Wimpey) . 
Up until 1982 he had been unemployed on numerous occasions, 
but only for six weeks at the most. But after finishing a 
job at the St Fergus oil terminal, he spent 16 months out of 
work. Naturally it had a big impact upon him: 
"I've been off before four weeks, six 
never 16 months like that. I must admit, 
worst time I've ever had in my life." 
weeks - but 
that was the 
He talked with great feeling about the transition in status 
from being "on the dole" to "on social" experienced by many 
of the long term unemployed: 
"It's not too bad on the dole because I had money to 
start with obviously. After I got paid off it was great 
for a few months. Once the dole runs out, you've got to 
start going to these social people; they look down upon 
you as if it's your fault, everything is your fault. 
You've got to go and beg and scrape. I just don't like 
doing it, but you've got to haven't you?" 
When he did eventually find work, typically enough it was 
outside the North East, and indeed when interviewed at 
Charlton Leslie's South Shields yard, he was working in his 
first home-based job for 10 years. 
But the dole queues were also composed of those who had 
stayed put during the oil years, in companies whose fortunes 
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had declined as their traditional markets had dried up. For, 
whilst the temporary migration of skilled labour from the 
North East had been a steadily increasing phenomenon 1n the 
post war period, the dislocations to local industry in the 
late 1970s and 1980s transformed the scale of this process, 
and decimated the employment base of the prevailing system 
(see for example Table 5.1). From being an option pursued by 
the more adventurous within the local labour market, it 
became an absolute necessity for many of those who wished to 
preserve their own living standards, whilst remaining in the 
occupations they had been trained for. 
With the majority of offshore firms within the North East 
also reduced to their baseline employment levels (see for 
example Chapter 4, Footnote 21) individuals were forced to 
look for work outside the sector. Inevitably, for many this 
usually meant a spell of inactivity on the region's dole 
queues. At first there were scraps of work around for those 
with good social networks, typically short term contract 
work of up to 5 weeks on site, or in the smaller fabrication 
shops that remained, though wage rates were much reduced in 
this kind of activity. However as the recession deepened, 
even this option was removed for the majority of workers. 
New job opportunities for skilled craftsmen within the 
region were virtually zero, until the upturn in offshore 
work from the middle of 1982 onwards. Under these 
circumstances, those laid off were faced with several less 
than appetising alternatives: remaining "on the dole" at 
home, in the hope that an upturn in activity would not be 
too prolonged; "getting on their bikes" and travelling away 
from the region (and often abroad) for work; or leaving the 
industry altogether. 
An individual who has been through all three experiences at 
one time or another is Peter, a plater who served his 
apprenticeship at a 
between 1976 and 1980. 
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firm called W.T.C. at Billingham, 
After being made redundant, due to 
company cutbacks in July of 1981, he spent 9 months "on the 
dole". It was this ordeal that encouraged him to leave the 
trade, and undertake a range of jobs: insurance sales, 
setting up snooker tables, driving jobs; all for low wages. 
These jobs often took him away from the North East for 
weeks, and then (as time drew on and the likelihood of 
employment at home receded) months at a time. 
During one of these periods away he returned to plating work 
on a range of contract jobs: in module yards abroad, and 
"down south" on construction work during "bad times". 1986 
was a particularly "bad time" when he was unemployed for a 
total of 9 months, after which he returned to the region to 
work, belatedly, in 1987 for Whessoe, and following the 
closure there for Redpath, on the B.P. Gyda contract until 
December 1989. During the 1980s, he estimates that only 
three years have been spent working in the North East. 
As the 1980s progressed, increasing numbers 
experienced this kind of employment perspective. 
Unfortunately it ls difficult to accurately assess the 
of men 
growing number of workers who left the various trades for 
other WQrk, because official statistics were not designed to 
represent this type of labour migration. The best estimates 
have tended to come from the trade unions themselves. The 
EETPU, for example, lost half of its membership between 1979 
and 1989, being reduced to 40,000 in the North East region 
(an area from York to Berwick). But notably, the vast 
majority of those lost were in the semi-skilled categories, 
such as in the assembly of components. For the large numbers 
of electricians, plumbers and pipefitters, who make up the 
skilled sections of the union, the 1980s proved to be less 
cataclysmic, reflecting the fact that these skills are 
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highly transferable not just between different industrial 
sectors, but also within the informal economy, typically in 
the form of domestic, maintenance and repair work. 
In contrast the old Boilermakers' union, (A. S. B. ) whose 
trades were highly reliant upon the pattern of work in 
shipbuilding and structural engineering, was decimated by 
the economic downturn. Of those workers remaining in the 
basic trades (especially on Tyneside where the tradition of 
shipbuilding is stronger) many are still tied to whatever 
work is available in the local district as Arty (a caulker 
project) burner on Charlton Leslie's Amerada Hess 
illustrates: 
"The repercussions of finishing here are different 
between the trades; because joiners, electricians, 
fitters, plumbers and pipefitters finish here and there 
are jobs for them outside of this industry. Now the 
only place boilermakers can go is on the river and when 
that finishes you rot. You're dependent basically upon 
what comes to the river (whether shipbuilding, ship 
repair or offshore work)." 
Although for structural steel workers there has often been 
the option of working on the rigs or in nuclear related 
work, these forms of employment are regarded by many as last 
resort options, due to the safety hazards involved. In fact 
many of those interviewed during this research claimed that 
they wouldn't consider this type of work, although attitudes 
are likely to change according to the length of time spent 
on the dole, as Geordie (a pipefitter with Charlton Leslie): 
"I wouldn't say a lot of them wouldn't work on the 
rigs. A lot of them would prefer not to. I can say here 
and now that I wouldn't go offshore because I'm in a 
job. Three months on the dole, phone me up for an 
offshore job and I'll be away." 
The Piper Alpha incident 
threshold further back 
Charlton Leslie) says: 
has probably pushed 
again as Ralph (a 
the average 
burner with 
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"A lot of lads are actually starting to think two or 
three times before going out there. The majority of 
people sitting in the house don't realise the dangers 
involved in actually working out there. It's a 
dangerous business, you walk out the front door and 
step towards the oil rig knowing that it'll easily blow 
if anything happens." 
"Piper was the catalyst for bringing a lot of smaller 
incidents out into the light. It's (oil) a dangerous 
industry and the worst environment of all is offshore." 
But it is not just the safety aspects of rig work that are 
of concern to the workforce, the refusal by the oil 
companies to acknowledge unions, and subsequently the 
former's ability to cut wage rates at the drop of a hat has 
been a constant source of rancour with many workers. 
Initially, during the "hook-up", offshore work wage rates 
for working in the North Sea are higher than anywhere else, 
but when rigs move into the production phase ("first oil" or 
"first gas") there ceases to be any union recognition and 
rates are negotiated individually. As a consequence, rates 
drop drastically as Table 5.2 illustrates, adding up in some 
cases to wage reductions of almost £100 per week. As Bob 
Eadie, Offshore Organiser of the EETPU, notes: 
"After the hook-ups, it's the law of the jungle, and 
you'll be paid what the oil companies want to. 1117 
17 The situation was manipulated even further by the oil 
companies following the slump in oil prices in 1986 as Bob 
Eadie explains: 
"When the oil price dropped in 1986 there was a 
terrible situation, because you'd start off on £5.90 an 
hour, for example. You'd be working the contract, maybe 
for Press Offshore (services division) and the oil 
company would re-bid it. Then a new company, say P.o.c. 
would arrive and say, "Well, the contract has been re-
bid and we've won the job, but the bad news is, we've 
had to re-bid it at £5.50 an hour, so you can work for 
us at £5.50 or you are redundant - and the guys didn't 
have another job, so they had to accept it." 
This situation would often be repeated with a third, or even 
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Nor does offshore rig work provide the same type of 
opportunites that it did in the 1970s. 1K 
In effect, for those remaining within their chosen trades, 
the labour market during the 1980s had become increasingly 
segmented into those who chose to travel for work and those 
who preferred to wait and hope 1 as Lou Dobson (Personnel 
Manager at Charlton Leslie) explains: 
"I think that since the offshore industry has been 
going in the North East 1 the labour force has become 
divided into two groups. The one group 1 who won't go 
offshore for family commitments or whatever, and have 
long periods of unemployment mixed with periods of 
highly paid work. Then you have the other group, who 
will go offshore, down to Fawley, do anything to keep 
themselves working - and they are usually the younger 
ones." 
fourth contracting company. 
By 1989 however the situation was showing signs of 
improvement. With a great deal of other engineering 
construction work available, especially for the electrical 
trades (e.g. the Channel Tunnel project, Canary Wharf, in 
London's Dock lands and the St Fergus oi 1 terminal 
construction) the balance of power in the labour market had 
shifted slightly in favour of the workforce. Workers were 
successful in obtaining a post construction agreement of 
£6.36 and there was a concerted lobbying campaign for union 
representation, given publicity by the Piper Alpha tragedy 
and manifested in the formation of the Offshore Industry 
Liaison committee. 
tt!Improvements in module technology have reduced the 
number of man hours required in the hook-up stage, as Bob 
Eadie of the EETPU explains: 
"In the early days, if you want to get a historical 
perspective, you could make a very good living moving 
from one hook-up to the next. There were men constantly 
moving from one hook-up to the next, enjoying in 
relative terms, good wages and conditions. But now, at 
present (16.6.89), everything can be done in modules, 
and that means, for people who used to work constantly 
on hook-ups, they can now look forward to getting maybe 
8 or 9 weeks work out of a hook-up." 
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But this itself is too simplistic a view of the employment 
situation. Though, for many people a migratory existence 
with no ties fitted their own personal aspirations and 
philosophy, 19 the majority of travel! ing men did so through 
necessity rather than choice. Nor was it a simple monetary 
choice. Examples abound of individuals who have taken work 
rather than remain on the dole, even though there was little 
monetary gain. The longer the period of unemployment, the 
greater the frustration and the lower the acceptable wage. 
Indeed for many, the decision to work away from the region 
often resulted in a financial loss as this anecdote from 
Geordie illustrates: 
"There was a bad run in the area [Tyneside] a couple of 
years ago when there was just nothing about. I had 4 
months off around about Christmas and I was out of my 
head. I took a job in Holland which was really 
financial suicide for me because I'd be better off on 
19Indeed there are many advantages in a migratory 
lifestyle, particularly for younger men, as Tony Finn notes: 
"The younger element of highly skilled people don't 
think twice about "upping and off", because their 
philosophy is "it's 2 years work, £800 per week." You 
can go home every other weekend for a long weekend. You 
can get the wife down there every weekend if you want. 
In the mean time you are earning twice or three times 
the amount you can earn here [the North). So you can 
earn 6 or 7 years earnings in 2 years, and start 
looking around ... " 
By the same token, the work by its very nature is unstable 
and unemployment remains an occupational hazard. Ralph's 
maximum period of unemployment was 6 months in 1982. If he 
hadn't been prepared to travel, this would have been much 
longer: 
"If you're prepared to sit and wait, a job does comes 
along (like this) but who knows where the next one is 
coming from - this one's nearly finished now. It's a 
case of sitting and waiting or packing your bag. It's 
hard to work running into two years. Nine times out of 
ten you finish before that so you don't qualify for 
redundancy payments. That's what's accepted. Everyone 
knows the score." 
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the dole. It was a ridiculous situation to be in. But I 
took it anyway just to get out of the house." 
Inactivity and the danger of drifting into the ranks of the 
long term unemployed lS a constant threat for offshore 
workers. Thus for those remaining at home, the situation is 
rarely clear cut. A long period of unemployment would weaken 
a man's resolve to "sit it out" on the labour market. In 
practice it is only the oldest sections of the work force 
that are unwilling to travel abroad or work on the rigs. 20 
Although a second oil boom was experienced in the middle 
years of the 1980s, the continuing decline in 
opportunities within the former shipbuilding and 
districts, throughout the region, during the 
employment 
engineering 
decade has 
reinforced this situation. It was this changing employment 
environment that redundant shipyard workers were forced to 
confront, a fact brought home by the comments of Les, a 
redundant shipyard worker following the closure of Smith's 
Dock on Teesside in 1987 with the loss of 1,400 jobs: 
"I think when I was first unemployed, I was living in 
the past. Years ago, you could just go down to British 
Steel, knock on the window, and say "Any vacancy?" 
They'd say yes or no. If they'd got any vacancies, you 
wThough for many older workers, a well developed 
personal contact network affords them some protection from 
the dole queues. Arty for example, picks up piecemeal work 
from the various ship repair yards still operating on the 
Tyne. Faced with the dole queue after 15 months with 
Charlton Leslie, he didn't envisage any problem in finding a 
job. He thought the Tyne Ship Repair company was a good bet. 
Because of the nature of their work, they have a small core 
workforce, supplemented by casual labour. The pay is good 
and it is possible to get 8 weeks work followed by 2 weeks 
off, then maybe pick up some more work. He thinks that many 
older workers are glad of the respite: 
"The older hands, men in their 40s and 50s don't really 
mind that because it's a hard, dirty, grafting 
industry. You can earn a few "bob" - keep hold of it -
get a few day's rest and go back again." 
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could start on Monday. But that's not really the 
situation now. They're losing jobs all the time. We're 
losing industry all the time, so the whole situation's 
changed, and the sooner I face up to it, which I'm 
starting to do now, the better it' 11 be all round. I 
don't know whether it'll help me with that outlook to 
get a job, but that's the situation. Times have 
changed, and they've changed so radically that you must 
adapt. If you don't adapt, you're just going to get 
left in the dark." 
(Withington, 1989: 55) 
In 1988, the closure of North East Shipbuilders, the last 
major shipyard on the Wear, also brought this salient point 
home to the people of Sunderland: 
"Mr Downes, 46 is one of 2,400 shipyard workers losing 
their jobs with the closure of North East Shipbuilders. 
After 21 years as a welder in the same yard, he should 
come away with £15,000: enough, he says to last him two 
years on the dole. 
He faces two options. He can stay in Sunderland and 
retrain or he can leave his family behind and work away 
during the week. 
The maps were out on the Downes's lounge floor the day 
after the NESL closure was announced, when Vickers ran 
a television announcement for skilled workers for its 
yard in Barrow-in-Furness, cumbria." 
(Financial Times: 20.12.88: 9) 
Evidence from a survey of those interviewed for this 
research provides us with a resounding picture of this 
increasing trend towards labour mobility. Of 80 blue collar 
interviewees (interviewed whilst in employment in offshore 
firms on the Tyne and the Tees) it was discovered that 52 
( 65 per cent) had worked away from the North East at some 
point in their lives. In addition there had been almost a 50 
per cent increase in those working away from the region 
during the 1980s. 
These figures are supported by union records that show an 
increasing number of branch members travelling away from the 
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region in search of employment, as Tommy Brennan (Regional 
Organiser of the GMB on Tyneside and) notes: 
"Our travelling membership is amazing, especially since 
the demise of shipbuilding. The members who stay 
nowadays, do travel for work, when local oil-related 
work is not available. They travel to Sellafield, 
Vickers (Barrow), Cammell Laird, etc. So, when I say we 
have a working membership, they are not working in the 
North East." 
Out of 15,000 Boilermakers registered in the Tyne and Wear 
district in 1989, Tommy estimated that approximately 7,000 
were probably working outside the area. 21 Many were working 
abroad in Germany, Holland and the Middle East: 
"Some of our members were actually repairing tanks 
during the Iran-Iraq war." 
Although on Teesside, the proportion of Boilermakers working 
away was far lower, due to the availability of work with 
British Steel, I.C.I. and Rolls Royce, as well as the 
remaining offshore yards, it was still a significant number: 
1,500 out of 7,000. 
Geordie's attitude summarises the philosophy of this growing 
number of contract workers: 
"We just take it in our stride. You'll find that 99 per 
cent of people employed here on this site are contract 
in the respect that they just come and go. But there 
are a few here, with it being such_a big job, that have 
been absorbed from other companies closing like North 
East Shipbuilders. They've probably been there since 
day one and they don't know anything but that. Now 
redundancy to them would be a different situation than 
to me. I would just say to myself, "straight down the 
dole, get the kit bag out and away", no hassle, it's 
the trade I'm in. I wouldn't have as much as I've got 
if it wasn't for contracting, and being prepared to go 
to the other side of the world at the drop of a hat. 
That's my outlook. You' 11 probably find the average 
21 Th is was after the culmination of Charlton Leslie's 
Amerada Hess contract, for which an extra 1200 union members 
were employed locally. 
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contracting man is 1 ike that - very easy going, very 
laid back." 22 
What pertains for the skilled worker does not hold for the 
increasing number of unskilled workers that constitute the 
local labour market, largely the result of the decline in 
apprentice numbers as a consequence of recession. Without a 
craft base to distinguish them from the "reserve army of 
labour" these workers are able to exert little influence in 
the employment system, either ln terms of job security or 
through a favourable power balance ln the labour market. 
They are also unable to benefit from labour shortages 
elsewhere, in the same sense as their skilled counterparts 
for the former reason. In the casualised offshore 
environment, unemployment has therefore become an 
unavoidable occupational hazard for the majority of 
unskilled workers. This applies even to those individuals, 
who through a long period of time in offshore-related 
employment have acquired low order semi-skills, such as 
crane driving. A good example was Bernie, an occasional 
employee of Redpath Offshore. 
After leaving school ln 
he learnt most of his 
1971 without formal qualifications, 
skills on a succession of building 
sites throughout the North East. He hasn't been abroad, for 
as he says there isn't much scope for non-trades overseas. 
22The closure of NESL at Sunderland offered a comparison 
of the traditional work experience in the North East with 
the new form of work brought by oil developments, as a quote 
from Tommy Brennan illustrates: 
"The difficulty and difference between oil-related and 
shipbuilding is that shipbuilders work at home within a 
community, and are far less likely to want to pack 
their bags and work elsewhere compared to oil-related 
workers. So there is a conditioning process to 
undergo." 
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When he was interviewed (9.12.88) he had been with the 
company for 9 months, before which he was unemployed for 
over one year. On average he expects to be unemployed for 6 
months out of every 30. Redpath alone have employed him on 8 
separate occasions since 1975. In between times he has done 
various stints on building sites. His employment experience 
in offshore work tends to range between six months and two 
years. He was laid off in July 1989. 
Although there are opportunities for unskilled workers to 
find well paid work within engineering construction outside 
the region, their catchment area is limited to the United 
Kingdom. In a sense, their greatest strength is also their 
greatest weakness: the lack of a specialised skill and the 
accompanying willingness to take various forms of work. 
This point was brought home by the example of Kevin, a semi-
skilled trade assistant who had just started in offshore 
work with Redpath when interviewed {29.6.89) after a six 
month spell "on the dole". He has experienced a particularly 
colourful employment history. 
After leaving school at 16, he trained for clerical work in 
Middlesbrough for 1 year. Following this, he spent another 
year as a trainee manager at a newsagent's, before spending 
five years in a warehouse. Having left the warehouse, he did 
some casual work as an engineer's mate. The common 
denominator for this variety of jobs was extremely low 
wages. He determined to switch away from white collar to 
blue collar work for the better wages and working 
conditions. 
Kevin compared the job at Redpath to warehousing work, 
fetching and carrying for other people. He was expecting 
anything up to six months work during the period in which he 
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was interviewed. He was particularly pleased with the rate 
of pay, £5 per hour, immeasurably more than anything he is 
used to. The other bonus is that he expected to pick up "on 
the job" skills. 
This is the route for many of the unskilled away from 
employment insecurity, although as Bernie's example 
illustrates the chances of attaining a similar status within 
the labour market as a craftsmen are virtually zero under 
existing employment conditions. This difference in status 
levels is graphically illustrated in the treatment of 
migrant workers during buoyant labour market conditions. 
Colin, a labourer with Whessoe prior to its closure in 1989, 
had found himself out of work in the North East in the 
period 1983-5 and travelled down to London to take advantage 
of the construction boom during the summer season. The 
recurring problem was that: 
" ... there was plenty of work but the accomodation was 
too expensive." 
The contrast with the value placed upon craftsmen during 
periods of skills shortage is striking. Craft unions on 
Teesside are increasingly inundated with requests from 
companies working on construction projects in the South East 
offering high wages and guaranteed accomodation in bed and 
breakfast establishments, or even in purpose built dormitory 
settlements23 : 
"We get regular calls from all parts of the country -
Fawley [petrochemicals] my counterpart there said 
they wanted as many platers and welders as they could 
get. He sent me about 500 application forms. The highly 
skilled guy has got no problem at all, provided he's 
prepared to travel. I've got boilermakers on £800 per 
week on the tunnel." 
[Tony Finn, GMBATU] 
23In the case of the Channel Tunnel project. 
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Not only are skilled workers increasingly prized outside the 
region, but also within it. Companies such as Davy and 
Redpath are concerned enough now about long term labour 
recruitment to notify unions in advance of a layoff. In this 
way, they can keep in touch with certain indi victuals, and 
perhaps even keep them in the area. Another growing practice 
is for local firms to collaborate over local labour market 
issues. On Teesside for example, Davy will contact Redpath 
and T. H. C. to recommend men who are finishing a contract 
with the company. 
By the end of the 1980s, continuing and even accelerating 
skill shortages were widening the traditional gulf between 
the skilled and unskilled within the North East's employment 
system. But to understand the nature of these skill 
shortages and 
necessary to 
through the 
the accentuated divisions of labour, it is 
exam1ne the restructuring of the supply side, 
labour strategies of fabrication companies 
during the 1980s. 
5.4 The role of fabrication firms in the changing employment 
system 
Within the shrinking employment system of the 1980s, the 
offshore fabrication firms increasingly came to represent 
the last vestiges of structural engineering activity in the 
North East. From a skilled worker's point of view, these 
became almost the only source of regular (albeit unstable) 
demand for their skills remaining in the North East. But at 
the same time, these firms have become increasingly 
important (as a result of the decline 1n other forms of 
engineering activity) in an active sense, in structuring the 
local labour market during the 1980s, both through changes 
made in working practices and in their recruitment policies. 
These two aspects are intertwined, particularly with regard 
to the reproduction of the supply side of the labour market 
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through firms' activity, most clearly manifested in the 
changes to the training regime during the past decade. It is 
these two processes and their on-going repercussions that we 
focus upon in the remainder of the chapter. 
5.4.1 Changes in working practices during the 1980s 
The 1980s have become associated with wide ranging changes 
in the organisation of labour in production. The combination 
of a right wing government, committed to the destruction of 
union power in the labour market, and high levels of 
unemployment presented managements with the opportunity to 
transform the very basis of productive relations. But whilst 
both management and the state have enforced the new 
employment legislation, to undermine union strength within 
particular industries, this has not been a trend throughout 
the entire economy (Macinnes, 1987:92-135; Rubery, 1986). 
Indeed in sectors of industry with strong collective 
bargaining systems (at both the national and local levels), 
particularly ln heavy engineering and shipbuilding, 
employers have often been unwilling to supplant existing 
arrangements, preferring to introduce changes on a "softly-
softly" basis through (nominal) discussions with union 
representatives. As Rubery notes (1986: 108): 
"Available evidence suggests that collective bargaining 
institutions may not in fact have posed a major problem 
for management in the 1980s; in many cases they have 
been used directly to bring about changes in working 
practices that management has sought in response to the 
recession. Most of the changes in working practices 
have probably intensified the pace of work and might 
have been more actively resisted in earlier periods." 
This type of inter-relationship between management strategy 
and the state of the economy is particularly important to 
bear in mind when considering the development of working 
practices in the offshore fabrication industry during the 
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1980s. This problem was graphically illustrated at Redpath 
Offshore's Port Clarence yard in 1984, when the company was 
able to impose a more flexible agreement on the workforce, 
involving complete interchangeability and mobility between 
the trades against a background of recession and 
redundancies in the local area. 
Indeed as a result of this latter point, unions have been 
more conciliatory towards changes in working practices. 
Although the AEUW and the EETPU are often pilloried as the 
unions who have done most to collaborate with employers and 
hence undermine collective solidarity in the labour 
movement, the role of the GMBATU in the offshore industry 
contains interesting parallels. With the knowledge that core 
areas of Boilermaker activity, such as plating and welding 
are unlikely to be eroded under the prevailing product 
market conditions, the GMBATU has taken a relatively 
conciliatory stance over flexibility issues. 24 In this the 
Mindeed the union has long since discarded demarcation 
as a strategy for the protection of its interests, as Les, a 
plater with twenty five years experience of working on the 
Tees notes: 
"They're pushing it [demarcation) because progress has 
to be maintained. The GMB used to carry platers, 
chippers, burners, welders, gougers, all sorts. Now if 
they can condense them into two trades [welder and 
platers) without any animosity so much the better." 
"I don't think they'd be bothered if everyone was just 
a Boilermaker, as long as they don't lose their 
membership. They realise it's in their interest as well 
as everyone else's to thin the spectrum." 
Les even 
attempting 
every year. 
suggested half-seriously that the union were 
to do the latter by "knocking off" one trade 
In fact, a new strategy aimed at maintaining and increasing 
the size of the membership, rather than adhering strictly to 
the defence of craft positions has been emerging. The 
subsequent acceptance by unions of changes in working 
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union has been aided by the fact that management's principal 
aims regarding flexibility do not correspond to a 
willingness to transform the role of the worker through 
functional flexibility (Atkinson, 1984; 1985), but rather 
have reflected the need to reduce costs, through the 
intensification of production within existing structures 
(Massey and Meegan, 1982: 18). 
On the other hand, the nature of this type of work is so 
highly skilled and specialised that management are not, and 
in fact have never been interested in complete flexibility 
as Tommy Brennan suggests, drawing from his own experiences 
as a Boilermaker during the 1960s, when he was required to 
be flexible in his work: 
"I went to the job with the burning gear, I cut up 
everything, I made it, fabricated it, and put it back 
together again. I did the rivetting as well. Yes! There 
was flexibility then. But, to talk of flexibility, is 
bloody nonsense in most cases; a welder, for example, 
he's got miles and miles of welding to do, so from 
07.30 to 4.30, he's head down, and he is welding. Who 
the hell wants him to do something else. The particular 
trades have sufficient work full time. But, when 
flexibility was required, there was flexibility - there 
were negotiated and signed agreements for complete 
flexibility, but the demand never arose. The 
flexibility issue is a myth." 
At the same time, flexibility issues need to be considered 
within the product market context of offshore fabrication. 
Production, as we have continually stressed, has never been 
practices had caused consternation amongst certain sections 
of the workforce, particularly in the peripheral trades, who 
have not only found that their traditional roles within 
production are being undermined, but also that their levels 
of representation within the union framework and, as a 
consequence, in workplace bargaining discussions have been 
reduced. For example, at Charlton Leslie's South Shields 
yard platers and burners were represented by the same union 
official. 
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geared towards a mass production ethos and therefore 
arguments about the transition from fordism to post-fordism 
are irrelevant. Whilst management has continued to strive 
for more efficient ways of producing modules, particularly 
given the intense competition that has characterised the 
offshore market, the nature of demand has remained 
fundamentally the same; contracts are cent.red upon single 
unit production. 
Nevertheless the 1980s have seen significant changes in the 
type of structure produced by the fabrication sector. As a 
result of improved technologies and the exploitation of more 
marginal fields, there has been a movement during the 1980s 
away from the stereotypical fixed production platform 
towards smaller and more sophisticated structures for the 
extraction of oil and gas, ranging from floating production 
vessels to subsea manifold systems. This trend has reduced 
the number of contracts available to fabricators and as such 
intensified competition. In the module market, for example, 
there has been an increasing propensity for fully integrated 
deck structures to be awarded to companies on a single 
contract basis, compared to the established practice of 
assigning specialist firms to complete different segments of 
the contract. 25 
However these developments do not entail technological 
change at the fabrication stage. Most of the 
input occurs upstream of the assembly yards, 
technology 
where the 
25Th is has benefited Press in particular, which has 
maintained a diverse capability in the fabrication market, 
whilst expanding its experience in hook-up and installation 
work, in contrast to firms which have specialised in 
particular types of module construction. This has been 
reflected in the company's increasing domination of the 
topsides market 1 e.g. 45 per cent in 1988, rising to over 50 
per cent by 1990. 
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actual composition of a module has changed radically since 
Cleveland Offshore started to produce ''little boxes" for the 
drilling company Loffland. In the contemporary, 
sophisticated modules: 
"The technology that's inside them, electrically wise 
and computer wise is unbelievable. But as far as it 
goes for us it is still just a matter of picking it up 
and dropping it in." 
[Lee, shop steward, EETPU, Port Clarence] 
Thus in comparison, the nature of fabrication work has not 
altered radically since the advent of oil operations, 
as Bob Wright at Whessoe confirms: 
"We still put things together in the same old 
antiquated ways. There are opportunities to change. But 
the biggest problem in our industry has been getting 
rid of the overmanning and blurring the edges of 
demarcation. I don't say sweeping it away completely, 
because you really want your skilled man to spend most 
of his time at his best skill, whatever that is. It's 
flexibility round the edges and doing away with bits 
and pieces." 
In this sense new technology and flexibility, during the 
1980s, have not been used to implement new production 
systems and transform the existing divisions of labour, but 
rather to reduce costs, in an increasingly competitive 
environment. 
Indeed, the most significant technological improvements in 
the past twenty years have been made not on the shopfloor 
but in the area of office automation, although conspicuously 
not in the drawing room.M Shopfloor improvements have been 
26Here, the nature of the product market once again 
limits the usefulness of computer aided techniques, as Ian a 
draughtsmen with Redpath Offshore noted: 
"The increased use of computer technology has been not 
so much on the drawing side, but rather the 
documentation side. The drawing side is still done, 
purely on the drawing board. If there are one-off 
projects all the time, it's not really cost effective 
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confined to the upgrading of specific tools rather than the 
introduction of new production systems. A prime example has 
been the introduction of the computer welding machine. In 
addition Mig welding sets are being introduced more and more 
and inner shield welding systems have been introduced since 
1984. The important point about these forms of welding are 
that they are continuous process instruments, whereas 
conventional welding techniques required constant cha~ging 
of "sticks" as Davy explains: 
"The only reason inner shield and mig are being 
introduced and they rave about them is because they 
represent a continuous process and the operator does 
not stop. Every time you use a stick you stop for 3 
seconds or whatever to change the stick." 
A further advantage with mig welding is that it requires 
less cleaning up afterwards, again beneficial to management. 
Another technological change has been the new computer 
burning machine. Previously to "burn" a piece of metal 
required two stages of "cutting" and "prepping". The 
computerised machine will do both at the same time [Davy): 
"Anything that will get us working longer in our given 
eight hours they [the company] will invest money in." 
By the same token [Lee): 
"Anything that takes men off the job for three days, 
where they can sit down and go through the theory and 
working practices of another trade is unprofitable for 
them, so they are reluctant to do it. They let you pick 
up the skills as you go along with the job." 
Thus technology has been used without exception to speed up 
and increase the efficiency of the production process rather 
than to benefit, or even displace, the worker. Similarly 
to use [C.A.D.). If you've got a lot off, then it 
becomes more effective to do it on a computer." 
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increases ln flexibility are geared to intensifying the work 
effort, through encouraging interchangeability between 
trades.n Welders for example are allowed to burn, although 
they do not spend much time doing so, because it is against 
the employers' interests; the existing work force within the 
region remains craft based. The welder can now do his own 
piecemeal burning rather than having to stop work and call a 
specialist burner over but lacks the sophisticated level of 
skill to replace the burner. A similar situation 
characterises the relationship between welders and platers, 
as Mark, formerly a plater with Whessoe notes: 
"A welder can put a nut and bolt down, but he can't do 
the intricate part of our trade [plating], same as I 
might be able to burn a rod down, but I can't do it as 
well as a welder. So it gets to the point where it is 
absolutely pointless for the manager to have me doing 
anything other than the trade I'm skilled in". 
Underlying this erosion of craft boundaries is the ever 
constant need for companies to remain competitive in a 
dynamic market environment, a point borne out by a 
conversation with Ken, a plater with forty years' experience 
including a spell 1n the Norwegian sector, but who had spent 
the last 13 years at Redpath's Port Clarence yard: 
"When I first started here it was every man to his 
trade. . . . . Now we are allowed to do burning and also 
welding up to 4 inches. It had to come because of the 
competition with the Norwegian yards. If we didn't have 
27It is important at this juncture to reiterate that the 
gradual erosion of craft boundaries has been an on-going 
process since the 1960s. The major development in the 
offshore yards during the 1980s has been the speeding up of 
this process, with management taking advantage of favourable 
labour market conditions to push through agreements on 
flexibility that would have taken longer during the 
employment boom of the mid 1970s. For example, Redpath 
Offshore's management was able to negotiate a new agreement 
with the unions in 1984, against a background of recession, 
which guaranteed complete flexibility, interchangeability 
and mobility between trades, although this has never been 
put into practice to its full extent. 
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the flexibility we were waiting 
hours." 
costing money and 
But flexibility continues to be around the edges, especially 
when companies are not prepared to retrain the existing 
workforce, 
Although 
given the short term economic environment. 
further erosion of craft boundaries seems 
inevitable, some form of craft division of labour is likely 
to persist within fabrication work. The high level of 
training needed to acquire the skills of each trade for the 
more sophisticated work will ensure that some divisions 
remain.u The likelihood is that in time there will be just 
fabricators and welders (a situation that already exists in 
some Scottish yards). The fabricators will be the platers 
who can also undertake pipework. 
significantly, changes to the apprenticeship scheme are 
moving in the direction of multi-skilling. Accompanying the 
gradual shift away from the old style "on the job training" 
methods to a more formalised training environment outside 
the work place has been the extension of an individual's 
2KThis is not necessarily the case with all types of 
fabrication work. Traditional bridge and construction 
fabrication work which does not require the high levels of 
quality and complexity of offshore module work is probably 
more prone to the introduction of multi-skilling. But the 
standards required for offshore work require extremely high 
standards of craftsmanship which in turn limits the ability 
to achieve complete interchangeability between jobs, as 
stan, a planning engineer, who originally started work as an 
apprentice with Ashmore Benson and Pease in 1943 notes: 
"Basically the philosophy of build has remained the 
same with traditional work. With modules, the 
philosophy has altered slightly. If you are building a 
bridge, you build it differently to a module. The 
structural sequence has stayed the same, but the 
structures have become more complex." 
"In an industry like this one (offshore), where the 
quality of the structure is paramount, I don't think 
you can interchange too much." 
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range of skills, a point noted by Arty, a burner on Charlton 
Leslie's Amerada Hess contract: 
"When I did my time (late 1940s in the shipyards), on 
my card I was a caulker burner and I'd do nothing else 
except caulk and burn. Today you've got a bloke who, on 
his card, is a Boilermaker-caulker/burner; but he'll 
also do a bit of welding, a bit of plating, etc. If the 
money's on the job he'll do it. We still do our jobs, 
but we're flexible." 
Andrew, a 21 year old 
apprenticeship with Redpath, 
plater one year out of his 
epitomises this newly flexible 
generation of craftsmen now coming through the system. His 
first year was spent entirely at the company's training 
school at Darlington doing "a bit of everything - plating, 
welding, template making, etc." In the second year, 
apprentices are divided into the basic and outfitting 
trades. He did the former which involved plating and welding 
in roughly equal parts, but no electrical work or 'fitting. 
During his third and fourth years he gradually did more 
plating and: 
II 
.. the welding that you have to, to hold the job 
together. II 
With the decimation of the craft apprenticeship scheme 
within the North East, in tandem with the decline in 
engineering29 , in the past twenty five years, those 
individuals like Andrew, that are able to secure a skills 
based qualification, are likely to become a privileged group 
within the employment system. This illustrates how firms' 
recruitment strategies, in response to their wider economic 
circumstances, are active in reconstituting the supply side 
29 In an interview with Arthur Dalton, Regional Training 
Officer of the E.I.T.B. (31.7.89) it was discovered that the 
number of North Eastern apprentices on the Board's books had 
fallen from 30,000 during the late 1960s to a low of 8,500 
in 1987. 
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of the labour market. It is this issue that we consider 
next. 
5.4.2 Recruitment strategies and the reconstitution of the 
supply side under offshore fabrication 
As the earlier part of this chapter demonstrated, offshore 
firms' manpower strategies during the 1970s were singularly 
characterised by an absence of any semblance of forward 
planning. In a tight labour market situation, the problems 
of labour supply were, more often than not, solved by 
outbidding rival companies, through higher wage rates, and 
poaching from existing firms. Recruitment was therefore 
something of a "fire-fighting" operation. 
As the 
largely 
early boom dissipated 
disappeared with the 
and labour 
growth of 
supply problems 
high levels of 
unemployment during the early 1980s, it was significant that 
firms continued to put a low level of emphasis upon labour 
recruitment strategies. Indeed there was a high level of 
continuity with past practices, which relied upon informal 
social networks, operating at two levels: firstly with new 
recruits, family networks continued to be the usual route 
into the industry; and secondly, intra-industry networks 
were relied upon for the uptake of existing labour on new 
contracts. For most of the 1980s these informal channels of 
recruitment served the needs of the fabrication firms in the 
North East. 
The practice of using family networks to recruit new labour 
is one that is as old as craft-based industry itself. This 
is a tradition that persists strongly to the present day. At 
its narrowest definition it expresses the tendency for sons 
to follow fathers into the same trade. Prior to the 1960s, 
in the ship yards and engineering shops throughout the North 
East, it had been virtually impossible to secure an 
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apprenticeship unless your father was himself a craftsmen 
with a particular firm. Though this practice had become less 
institutionalised through time, the majority of 
apprenticeships taken up today are usually the result of 
existing family ties within firms. At Press, for example 
apprentices are still only given to boys with a relative 
working for the firm. 
Even blue collar workers employed from outside these family 
networks are always recruited from a highly localised area: 
Charlton Leslie and Press drew upon a catchment area 
extending from the Wear to Blyth Valley. For Redpath 
Offshore, the catchment area has traditionally been even 
smaller confined to the north bank of the Tees; only two of 
the workforce (including white collar) at Port Clarence are 
from outside the Stockton area. 
The ability to exist without more formalised recruitment 
systems in the past reflected the availability of labour 
locally, and the strength of the informal social network. 
Similarly, throughout the 1980s, offshore firms discovered 
that it was unnecessary to use the conventional channels of 
newspaper advertising columns and employment agencies to 
recruit labour. Once an offshore contract had been announced 
in the local media, firms became engulfed with enquiries. 
Lou Dobson, personnel manager at Charlton Leslie until the 
recent closure provides us with a typical anecdote: 
"When Amerada Hess was announced we had 10,000 written 
applications in the first three weeks .... a huge mound 
of c.v.'s. I can't ever remember advertising for blue-
collar labour." 
A similar pattern emerges from other accounts: 
"Any suggestion (of work) in the press and then you're 
inundated. You don't have to recruit at all." 
[Mike Smith (Training Manager, Press Offshore}) 
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Whessoe used to rely heavily upon two sources for the 
recruitment of labour: the informal social networks that 
surrounded their longer term employees and the list of 
former employees 
(usually running 
on their books from previous contracts 
into thousands) . 30 At the announcement in 
the press of a major contract, the company receives "a flood 
of telephone enquiries". On each new labour intake, only 
10 - 15 per cent represent "new blood". 
Redpath also continue to keep over 3000 c.v.s on record, 
mostly of former employees, but unless they require a very 
large number of men (probably over 1000) they rely on the 
social networks of their foremen and other key workers. In 
short, information is adequately circulated "by word of 
mouth". Les, a plater formerly with Whessoe, was taken on by 
Redpath (on January 8th 1989 on a six week contract) on the 
recommendation of a friend of his, an existing employee of 
the company: 
"I didn't know there were actually jobs going here. I 
knew there were jobs in the area in either these sites 
or the small shops. I didn't expect to be out of work 
very long at that moment in time. I had four weeks off 
over the Christmas period when there wasn't much on 
anyway. Then one of my mates who works here told me 
they were looking for people and luckily I walked 
straight in here." 
He thinks that he was lucky with his timing, being laid off 
after the worst of the recession in the area: 
"I was lucky because it's been depression for quite a 
few years, and then all of a sudden there is a change 
and there seems to be a build up. I get paid off when 
the build up comes along." 
Thus the system used is a highly informal one, with firms 
being reliant upon individual contact, usually amongst 
msimilarly, Davy Offshore have 7,000 blue collar c.v.'s 
on their records. 
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certain key workers, what Mess would have identified as 
"Royals", for access to these networks. Such networks exist 
for individuals at all levels, even extending into 
management, as David Clarke's recent success in obtaining 
employment illustrates: 
"In this game, it's contacts. We all know each other, 
even though it's a fair size industry, because we all 
move around. The guy I'm going to work for, I first met 
on my third day as an industrial relations officer. I 
was working for Monk, he was the Project Relations 
Officer, that was 11 years ago. Two years ago, I nearly 
went to M.W. Kellogg because he was leaving them to go 
back to Costain and leaving them with a vacancy at 
Saltend, southend. I was in for that, but I didn't take 
it. I'd just come back to Charlton Leslie. So, we all 
know or know of each other. Initially, when I was made 
redundant, I flagged up that I was available and 
Wimpey's made me an offer, initially at Sellafield. 
However I preferred Costain. There were other companies 
interested, but it comes down to a skills' shortage -
in all areas. So companies are always on the lookout." 
What pertains for management is doubly the case for manual 
workers, further down the scale of job security. For 
offshore workers, an extensive network of personal contacts; 
an established place upon the grapevine; is essential for 
regular employment. 31 In practice, names, addresses and 
31 In fact, offshore fabrication (and indeed the 
engineering construction industry generally) is insular 
almost to its own detr-iment. This point was brought home by 
the experience of Michael, a trainee engineer, who had been 
unemployed for three months between March and June 1989, 
having completed an HND at Sunderland Polytechnic, before he 
was given a position at Redpath Offshore. He was slightly 
critical of engineering companies for not advertising 
positions outside the "inner circle": 
"I was looking about, in the newspapers, for offshore 
work, and there's nothing there. This is the first job 
I wrote off for speculatively, and I ended up at the 
interview and came straight in. So I don't know whether 
these firms are crying out for engineers. They don't 
seem to let the outside world know that they are 
looking for them. It was only because I wrote in that I 
found out there was a desperate shortage." 
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phone numbers are readily exchanged at the culmination of 
each individual contract, widening the network, extending 
the arena of job opportunity. 
Thus firms' recruitment policies have been more 
distinguished by what they don't do, in contrast to the norm 
elsewhere, rather than what they do in any active sense. The 
continuation of the apprenticeship scheme has been the only 
area where formal recuitment procedures are pursued, 
although even here the level of recruitment has been much 
reduced from past activity in the region (see footnote 29). 
such reduced levels of training are beginning to have an 
important effect upon the constitution of the supply side of 
the labour market, not just within the offshore fabrication 
sector but within British engineering industry as a whole. 
As such it is worthy of special consideration here. 
The high cost of training skilled labour against the 
background of a severely fluctuating product market within 
offshore fabrication has been the major factor behind these 
reductions in apprentice numbers. At the same time, 
recession in other more conventional markets within 
mechanical engineering and shipbuilding has led to a 
reduction in the number of craftsmen trained in other 
sectors~ The skills base of the engineering labour market as 
a whole has therefore been shrinking rapidly during the 
1980s. At the national level, within the industrial plant 
and steelwork sector (which encompasses offshore fabrication 
activity) the number of skilled trainees fell from 1189 in 
1978/79 to just 292 by 1985/6. This represented a decline 1n 
those receiving training of over 75 per cent, compared to a 
reduction in the total number of skilled employees of just 
over 40 per cent (see Figure 5.2). Thus levels of training 
were falling more rapidly than corresponding levels of 
employment, reflecting the old addage that training costs 
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face the most severe cut backs during recession. 
If it was possible then, this situation was compounded in 
the North East, where offshore-related firms, with an 
extremely low proportion of trainees, were replacing more 
stable forms of employment as the mainstays of the craft-
based employment system. Of the six major firms operating in 
the offshore sector in mid 1988, only three ran 
apprenticeship schemes (Davy, Press and Redpath) with a 
total of 57 craft and technical apprenticeships out of a 
total workforce of 2840, a mere 2 per cent of the workforce. 
Contrast this figure to the heady days of shipbuilding 
within the North East during the 1960s when trainees would 
have accounted for almost 10 per cent of the workforce. At 
the same time even those more reputable firms such as 
Redpath that do provide training, only do so in those areas 
where it is impossible to acquire the skills elsewhere in 
the local labour market, 1. e. in the structural trades. 
Offshore companies can still poach labour directly from 
larger organisations, mechanical fitters for example are 
directly recruited from B.S. C. and I. C. I. Notably Redpath 
have only trained 2 fitters in 14 years. 
By the late 1980s, the consequences of 
just beginning to be felt by offshore 
this process were 
firms. Demographic 
factors were beginning to put the skills shortage situation 
into perspective as Lou Casson at Redpath noted: 
"British industry is presently existing thanks to a 
work force largely trained between 1950 and 1970. Since 
that period there has been a steep absolute decline in 
the number of men to receive trade training." 
He said that he himself was constantly trying to persuade 
his superiors at Redpath, and in the Trafalgar House group 
generally, to increase the number of apprentices. 
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In fact the offshore fabrication industry has come in for 
special critic ism from governmental training agencies for 
its attitude towards apprentice training. Although the three 
aforementioned firms do their own "fair share" of training, 
the majority of other firms have been reliant upon the 
higher wages on offer in oil-related work to draw employees 
away from larger established firms such as B.S.C and I.C.I. 
in the first instance, or as we have seen, later as a result 
of the 1980s recession have been able to pick and choose 
from a growing number of unemployed on the external labour 
market. In effect individual companies were able to use the 
over supply of skills in local labour markets to satisfy 
their manpower requirements when contracts had been awarded. 
In doing so firms were utilising a communal segment of the 
local labour market. Thus, on Teesside, as Davy, a shop 
steward at Redpath acknowledges there is a shifting labour 
force that moves between companies: 
"In this area it is basically the same men who do most 
of the work. It might be a different yard. There is a 
nucleus of workers in each yard, and the rest go from 
yard to yard, wherever the work is. Getting paid off is 
an occupational hazard." 
Similarly with reference to Tyneside, Lou Dobson of Charlton 
Leslie notes: 
"If they are not working for us they are working for 
Press. If they can't do onshore they go offshore 
doing hook-ups, at Blandford or somewhere like that. We 
are fishing in the same labour pond, Scott's fish in 
the same electrical pool, we fish in the same 
structural pool as Press." 
The problem for offshore companies is that the pool 1s now 
evaporating. The decline in training levels, the exodus of 
skilled workers from the North East to work on construction 
sites elsewhere, and the further exodus of workers from the 
engineering and shipbuilding industries altogether are 
likely to present companies with labour supply problems in 
the 1990s. In addition the reduction in the number of firms 
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operating in the industry has further reduced the potential 
labour supply. Between 1978 and 1987 the industrial plant 
and steelwork sector within the region was reduced from 
around 100 to 63 establishments. 
A secondary, but for future labour market structure, no less 
important change to the training regime within mechanical 
engineering as a whole has been (as hinted earlier) a 
qualitative shift in the type of training provided for craft 
apprentices. All major companies, training under the 
auspices of the E.I.T.B, now engage in a formalised four 
year apprenticeship scheme. Changes to this regime in the 
past five years signify the shift away from a single craft 
to a multi-skilled based training environment.n In addition 
the long established companies such as B.S.C and I.C.I. that 
saw many of their newly trained craftsmen absorbed by the 
oil boom of the 1970s have increasingly structured their 
training schemes to their own firm-specific requirements. 
This has had the effect of limiting an individual's 
marketability within structural engineering, given the high 
standards required in offshore work. Tony Finn describes 
this development: 
"There are a lot of companies now training for their 
own needs, not for the needs of others. If you are a 
32Initially the training scheme was referred to as the 
"Module System'', reflecting the fact that trainees undertake 
two modules in a first year training programme. For example 
an apprentice welder would undertake two units: one in basic 
welding techniques supplemented by a subsidiary unit in the 
other aspects of basic structural work such as burning and 
plating. This was replaced by the "Module Segment System", 
under which greater emphasis was placed upon the 
supplementary skills during the first year. The most recent 
change to the "Segment System" represents a further shift 
towards multi-skilling: the first year now consists of six 
segments; broadly based packages of equal content; so that 
structural trainees will now learn something about 
electrical and mechanical installaion skills. 
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boilermaker in I.C.I and British Steel, they can train 
you and channel you into being an expert in coke oven 
and blast furnace technology, so that you know that 
piece of equipment inside out. It's going to be there 
for as long as you've got steelmaking on Teesside, so 
that you're guaranteed a job for life. But you are very 
vulnerable to an open market. Even though you are a 
fitter or an electrician, or a boilermaker, you've been 
trained for the needs of that business. I.C.I and 
British Steel, because of the lessons from the past are 
training for their own needs ... 33 Of course, when we 
say this to them, they say, " Nonsense, our workers 
could get a job anywhere." But that's not the case. 
They've got this new mechanical-electrical-fabricating 
concept; that you go on and do a complete job. In other 
words, you could be mainly be mechanically biassed, but 
picked up a bit of training on electrical work or 
welding. That's alright in a steelmaking environment, 
when you are maintenance on that type of work, which 
only requires utility welding and burning. But when you 
33There is a widely held belief amongst trade unionists 
and personnel managers connected with the offshore industry 
that the competition over skilled labour between these two 
large employers and the module yards on Teesside has been 
responsible for fabrication contracts going elsewhere. This 
was particularly thought to be the case when the topside 
component of the Piper Alpha replacement project were 
awarded in its entirety to Press Offshore, as one prominent 
local unionist remarked: 
"When Laing was here, I.C.I. couldn't go ahead with the 
construction of a refinery because of the skills 
shortages. They were losing all the "tippies" to the 
highest bidder. Rates fluctuated from week to week to 
secure workers. I.C.I. said they would never allow that 
situation to return. Now, we happen to know that I.C.I. 
and British Steel have a very powerful political 
influence. I am very suspicious, because we did attend 
a meeting with I.C.I. to launch a new safety campaign. 
Their construction manager said, "We can't afford these 
module constructors to be picking up all our skilled 
labour." If Davy Offshore secured the Occidental order, 
it would have been a disaster for I.C.I.'s future 
capital project work. 
I. C. I. suffered immensely as a result of the 1970s. 
They don't want travelling men if they can avoid it. 
They see that pool of skilled labour as labour they 
have trained, and they don't want to see it going to 
what they think are fly-by-nights." 
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get to the up-market stuff, the module yards, and 
you've served your time at British Steel and they say 
what job have you applied for? They've advertised in 
the gazette for platers, welders, template makers and 
electricians - and I'm your man sir, I can do it all. 
They don't know, haven't a clue." 
The high standards required by the module yards have also 
been a barrier to entry for many former shipyard workers; an 
example of this situation was provided recently when a 
number of recently redundant platers from NESL applied for 
positions on Charlton Leslie's Amerada Hess contract at 
South Shields, but as David Clarke remembers: 
"We put quite a number of them through through the 
trade tests, and many couldn't do them, either the work 
or read the drawings. 1134 
He notes that this is largely a fault of the older 
apprenticeship schemes and said that younger more recent 
apprentices are usually more capable: 
"So what you have then are two types of platers: 
jobbing platers and fabrication platers. Jobbing 
platers will work solely on the fabricated product, 
whereas fabricators will work in the shop fabricating 
the sections themselves - the younger ones can do that 
but there aren't enough of them." 
Thus by the close of the 1980s the problem of skill 
~The standards required in the construction of offshore 
platforms necessitate the testing of each individual 
craftsman for every project undertaken. As such just 
surviving within a trade at the high standards required by 
the offshore industry is difficult in itself. Companies are 
required by law to test workers up to the maximum of 6gi 
even when a worker has just completed a job satisfactorily. 
Tony Finn explains: 
"There's no other trade or profession I know where 
people have got to be continually tested out for their 
own job. The lads could be welding, and doing a maximum 
job for Arco, everything is "spot on", 100 per cent. 
Then they start another job for Esso, and they have to 
be tested again. It's a legal requirement." 
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shortages was once again on the agenda for offshore 
fabrication firms within the region: a problem likely to be 
accentuated with the acceleration of existing trends. In 
fact the cumulative effect of recession and stagnation; the 
removal of a large part of the manufacturing base and with 
it a significant chunk of industrial employment; throughout 
the 1980s was to change the nature of labour market power 
relationships in those industries that were experiencing an 
upturn in activity by the close of the decade. The 
structural engineering industry and more 
offshore fabrication was one such example.~ 
particularly 
5.5 Concluding remarks on the nature of the labour process, 
power relationships in the labour market and the reshaping 
of the employment system in the North East 
The portends of this development, when considered against 
the other processes at work within the labour market during 
the 1980s in the context of oil-related development are for 
an increasingly polarised employment system within the North 
East's coastal districts during the 1990s and into the next 
century. 
In essence, the labour process in offshore fabrication 
during the past two decades has not been characterised by a 
~Indeed industrial disputes involving workers on 
offshore rigs and in London's Dock lands development 
represented the crystallisation of this worker power. Tony 
Finn describes the success with which erectors were able to 
achieve their goals in the Docklands during the summer of 
1989: 
"In London the' ve bumped the rates up. The National 
Agreement [Blue Book] for engineering construction has 
fallen into disrepute as a result of London. The lads 
screwed them at the right time. They've doubled the 
lodging allowance; it's £85 per week in the Blue Book. 
They've doubled it. The maximum bonus they could earn 
was £1.60, they've put that up to £2.50 per hour." 
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trend towards deskilling, or a movement towards the 
multiskilled craftsmen, as identified in other sectors of 
engineering. Whilst the 
project, accompanied by 
precluded mass production 
capital for labour in 
diverse requirements of 
the unstable product market 
each 
have 
and therefore the substitution of 
the 
requirements of offshore work 
former case, the stringent 
impinge upon the ability of 
employers to introduce forms of the latter. Instead, the 
industry is moving towards flexible specialists in the true 
sense. The eros1on of demarcation lines is occurring within 
stages of the production cycle rather than between them. 
Recent changes 1n the training syllabus reflect this 
process. Whilst this means that certain of the more 
peripheral trades are being undermined, the gradual nature 
of these developments has meant that the effects upon 
individuals are less pronounced. Instead it is future 
generations of school leavers that suffer the consequences. 
These are double-edged: on the one hand the number of job 
opportunities are likely to diminish 1n offshore-related 
work36 ; whilst alternatively the reduced number of 
individuals with a diverse range of skills are likely to be 
highly prized within the labour market and capable of 
holding down more secure and better paying positions than at 
present. 
The greatest effects of changes in working practices have 
come in the unskilled areas of production, with job tasks 
formerly performed by labourers and trade assistants 
increasingly incorporated within craftsmen's roles. In 
36Th is is worth illustrating through the example of 
Redpath Offshore. When the Port Clarence yard opened in 
1975, the company employed 70 chippers/burners and 84 
riggersjerectors at the peak of the first contract. In 
contrast, at the peak of the Gyda contract in 1989 the 
corresponding figures were 2 and 24 respectively. 
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effect, craftsmen and their unions have tacitly accepted an 
intensification of the work process in return for greater 
employment security. For the unskilled portions of the 
labour market (growing as a consequence of declining levels 
of industrial training) this represents shrinking job 
opportunities, accompanied by an absence of bargaining power 
in the labour market.n This group is the one to which the 
term "marginalisation" can most effectively be applied as 
the consequence of North Sea offshore operations. Whilst it 
is true that craft labour has always held the ascendancy 
within the North East's coastal districts, previous 
adherence to demarcation lines protected the position of the 
unskilled in the labour market to a much more fundamental 
degree than the skilled elements. The unskilled position in 
the labour market is therefore the one most at threat from 
new working practices. 
The precise consequences of this for the structuring of the 
employment system remain unclear at this juncture. Wide 
differentials between highly skilled specialists and 
unskilled marginal workers are already apparent, with the 
former achieving a certain power status within the labour 
market. But the extent to which firms' strategies are 
changing to reflect the state of the labour market is still 
open to question. It is with this in mind that we examine 
the activities of three firms and their recent labour 
strategies in the following chapter. Having established 
this, we then draw together the revised conclusions on the 
changing nature of employment under offshore fabrication. 
nGiven the present nature of union organisation in 
structural engineering and the growing tendency amongst the 
GMB and EETPU towards single union deals. 
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Table 5.1 
Employment change in shipbuilding and offshore construction 
on the Tyne, 1981-7 
Company 
Shipbuilding and repair 
Swan Hunter 
Tyne Ship Repairers 
Clelands 
Clark Kincaid 
Wallsend Slipway 
Engineering 
Tyne Dock Engineering 
Smiths Shiprepair 
Offshore construction 
Charlton Leslie Offshore 
Wm Press Production Systems 
1981 1987 
c.10,000 3,300 
2,500 c.340 
500 - (closed) 
1,400 - (closed) 
250 
c.100 c.100 
1,300 c.200 
c.500 c.800 
c.1000 c.1300 
Note: Wallsend Slipway was sold to Howard Doris Offshore in 
1985, opened briefly for a £12 million contract to supply 
jackets to Conoco employing 650 at its peak, but closed in 
1986. 
[Source: Robinson, 1988: 26) 
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Table 5.2 
Wage rates from selected companies and offshore average 
for skilled workers, June 1989 
Company Ratejhour (£) 
Offshore (prior to 7.70* 
"first oil") 
Offshore (after 
"first oil" 5.90* 
Charlton Leslie 6.00 
(Amerada Hess) 
Press 6.75 
Redpath 6.64 
R.G.C. 5.90 
* Offshore averages supplied from an EETPU survey 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FIRMS AND WORKERS 
IN OFFSHORE FABRICATION 
"Within a year I would think that every yard will be 
healthy until that round of work goes out. Then 
confidence drops and someone else might go to the 
wall. It wouldn't be so bad to go that way, but 
we've gone for different reasons. That's what is so 
galling. We were doing alright. You are up there and 
running, and bang. . . someone hits you from behind 
and your gone." 
[David Clarke, Industrial Relations Manager at Charlton 
Leslie, talking about the closure decision: 4.7.89.] 
The approach adopted in Chapters 4 and 5 was narrowly 
focused to a certain extent, in that an analysis of the 
development of the offshore industry, in the North East, 
was offered largely in isolation from wider economic 
events. This 
has been to 
was intentional; 
explain the 
the focus 
impact of 
of this thesis 
oil and gas 
developments upon employment structures in the region. As 
such, the principal controlling factors on a firm's 
employment strategy have been identified as the nature 
and scope of the product market, and the character of 
existing employment relationships within an area 
(themselves reflecting the nature of earlier forms of 
production linked to traditional markets). But as we 
noted in Chapter 2 this remains a partial analysis of 
employment change. Offshore firms themselves do not 
operate in isolation, but are increasingly part of a 
global accumulation system that transcends both 
geographical boundaries and individual sectors of the 
economy. For the absorption of offshore related firms 
during the 1970s and 1980s (see Chapter 4) within larger 
capitalist institutions has meant that the decision 
making framework, within which individual capitals 
operate, is no longer focussed upon the situation in one 
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particular market or segment of a market', but upon a 
dynamic portfolio of interest. Offshore activity has 
become one small part of a diverse balance sheet, rather 
than a major element. 
In turn, the employment strategies of offshore-related 
firms are not merely contingent upon the state of the oil 
supplies market, but also upon their location within this 
wider sphere of global capital accumulation. In this 
sense the structuring of employment within a firm is 
influenced by the activities of the parent company and 
its perception of the oil market as an arena for capital 
accumulation. 
With this in mind this chapter sets about examining the 
organisation of labour in three of the North East's 
fabrication firms. The central theme to emerge from this 
chapter is that there exists a relationship between a 
firm's position within its own corporate network and its 
ability to construct a stable employment regime. The 
first company studied, Charlton Leslie, was 
peripheral to its parent, B.T.R's normal 
operation. This resulted ln a lack of long 
extremely 
area of 
standing 
financial commitment to offshore work, which in turn 
entailed a marginalisation strategy by the board at 
Charlton Leslie, with respect to its offshore workforce. 
In doing so the company was able to take advantage of a 
favourable local labour market environment. 
Whessoe Offshore's situation was markedly different, 
although the implications for the organisation of labour 
were similar. Its development was set against the context 
of its parent company, Whessoe Engineering's 
disengagement from its traditional manufacturing 
operations during the 1970s and 1980s. Ultimately this 
1For offshore fabrication represents part of a wider 
market for structural engineering products. 
263 
was a process that was to leave the offshore subsidiary 
out on a limb during the latter half of the 1980s. With a 
reduced commitment from its parent company the offshore 
division was increasingly forced to marginalise its 
workforce to cope with the market downturn of the late 
1980s, although some hallmarks of permanent employment 
remained. 
The third company under study 
along this continuum. 
represents a further 
Redpath Offshore has 
within the structural 
movement 
remained 
division 
heavily integrated 
of Trafalgar House and as such has benefitted 
from parcels of onshore work and the redeployment of 
staff within other companies of the group during periods 
of inactivity in the offshore market. As such it has been 
possible to maintain a more stable employment regime and 
more of the features associated with an internal labour 
market. 
6.1 A marriage of short term convenience: B.T.R, Charlton 
Leslie and the offshore industry 
B. T. R. is a London based holding company, whose size of 
operation can be gauged from its turnover of £4 billion 
in 1987. Its principal interests have always been in 
consumer goods markets (for example it owns Dunlop, 
Pretty Polly, Slazenger and Tilcon) although it displays 
no loyalty to any particular sector of the economy, 
buying and selling companies at the global level and 
dedicated to the pursuit of a high rate of return on 
investments. 
In June of 1989 the B.T.R. group management made the 
decision to withdraw from the engineering construction 
sector altogether, resulting in the closure of Charlton 
Leslie Offshore. This development was totally at odds 
with the situation in the offshore supplies market, which 
was undergoing a renaissance after a considerable slump. 
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The situation was all the more galling for Charlton 
Leslie's management and workforce in the light of the 
recently completed Amerada Hess contract, which was 
widely acknowledged to be an outstanding success: 
"We did a first class job on Amerada Hess, everyone 
acknowledged we did a first class job. We burnt over 
2 million man hours in 18 months. That is 
phenomenal. Everyone says you can't do 1 million man 
hours in 1 year; we did 2 million in 18 months! And 
yet, all for nothing. All the publicity that went 
with it, first of its kind etc. It's left a lot of 
people disillusioned, but these things happen. I 
suppose the people at Whessoe felt the same way, 
they'd always done a good job." 
[David Clarke, Industrial Relations Officer, Charlton 
Leslie] 
"That contract went out on the completion date, the 
exact time, everything was perfect. That was an 
exceptional accomplishment, because after the Piper 
Alpha tragedy, there was a hell of a lot more 
operations needed to be done, resulting from 
Department of Energy regulations, blast walls, etc. 
Despite all the extra work it went out on time. 
There were more man hours worked on that contract 
than ever before. The lads worked around the clock, 
12 hour shifts, back to back. That project was a 
tremendous success, in terms of quality, 
workmanship, and achievement. That message did not 
really get across." 
[Tommy Brennan, Regional Organiser, G.M.B.] 
"There is an opportunity to get one jump 
believe the North East is uniquely 
growth. I have been very impressed with 
of work done for Rob Roy and Ivanhoe." 
ahead and I 
placed for 
the quality 
[Sam Laidlaw, Managing Director, Amerada Hess 
The Journal, 17.1.90) 
(U.K. ) in 
Indeed as a result of the success of this contract, 
Charlton Leslie was well placed for the next round of 
orders; the company had been a leading contender to pick 
up work on the Piper Alpha replacement project, together 
with the power generation module for B.P.'s Miller field 
and Amerada Hess's next project; a "floater" for the 
Scott field. 
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But B.T.R's decision had little to do with the state of 
the offshore market, except 1n its relation to other 
sectors of accumulation. Indeed it was specifically about 
the pursuit of profits elsewhere, and the low returns on 
investment that characterise the offshore market, a point 
taken up by· Lou Dobson, Charlton Leslie's Personnel 
Manager: 
"Anybody can make a bigger return than contracting. 
We were making 10 per cent, twice the average and 
still going under." 
A comparison of Charlton Leslie's profitability record 
with that of the other Tyneside firm, Press Offshore, for 
that period suggests quite convincingly that it was 
developments outside the offshore sector that were 
instrumental in B.T.R's thinking. Press made a profit of 
£750,000 from a turnover of £67 million in the financial 
year through to April 1988 and remained in business, 
whilst Charlton Leslie made £7 million from a turnover of 
£77 million and closed: 
"It's galling at the individual level, but that's 
business. It's like the Godfather syndrome. Our 
closure is not connected with the state of a 
particular market. It's a decision taken by the 
parent company, about a market they don't want to be 
in, at whatever level. It just does not generate 
(even when you are doing relatively well) the sort 
of turnover you can get from traditional 
manufacturing." 
[ibid] 
In fact the original decision to buy Charlton Leslie in 
1972, represented a departure from B.T.R.'s normal sphere 
of operations, reflecting an attempt to capitalise on the 
growing market for offshore supplies, at a time when 
other sectors of the economy were experiencing stagnation 
or decline. Continuing prosperity in the offshore market, 
against the background of economic recession elsewhere in 
the economy, enhanced the position of Charlton Leslie 
within B.T.R. In this respect it was the coincidence of 
the consumer boom of the second half of the 1980s with 
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the downturn in oil prices 1n 1986 that undermined the 
company's importance to B.T.R's operations. 
6.1.1 The development of Charlton Leslie Offshore 
Charlton Leslie's original contact with the oil industry 
had been in a subcontracting role, supplying pressure 
vessels and pipework to fabricators from the late 1960s 
onwards. However the scale of the offshore market, and in 
particular 
module for 
the successful tendering for a 
Shell's Leman gas field 1n 197 5, 
compression 
encouraged 
the company to establish its own fabrication facility, on 
a reclaimed site at Davy Bank, near Walker. With the 
completion of similar module work, notably for British 
Gas's Rough field, Britoil's Ninian field and Amoco's 
Indefatigable Compression Complex, the company had 
established itself as a major supplier to the oil 
industry by the end of the decade. 
The takeover by B. T. R and the change 1n the focus of 
company activity led to a drastic restructuring of 
operations at Charlton Leslie. This involved the 
relocation of the company's headquarters from Ashington 
to Davy Bank and the closure of several of the smaller 
specialist workshops. At the same time, the group's 
management structure was streamlined to bring the various 
operations under a single administrative regime, with the 
integration of the offshore division within the company's 
onshore operations. This ensured that the company could 
compete successfully for offshore contracts, but at the 
same time was in a position to survive without one. 
Under the new management structure, the firm retained a 
small core permanent management and administrative staff 
serving the Charlton Leslie group of companies, whilst at 
the same time casualising the remainder of the workforce. 
The new organisational structure effectively allowed the 
company to switch key white collar staff between the 
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different parts of the group according to the levels of 
activity at any one time. 
In 1979 the company strengthened its position in both 
offshore and onshore markets by purchasing one of its own 
supply companies, Campbell Isherwood. The latter had at 
one time been one of the largest marine electrical 
installation companies in the world, but by the late 
1970s was suffering from the general decline in the 
shipbuilding market. A severe rationalisation programme 
resulted in the transformation of Campbell's into a 
small, specialist installation outfit. Not only did this 
complement Charlton Leslie's offshore activities, 2 but 
the new electrical division also diversified into the 
burgeoning market, resulting from the out-of-town 
shopping centre boom of the 1980s. 
Despite the downturn 
Charlton Leslie was 
in the oil market during the 1980s, 
able to obtain a regular flow of 
offshore orders in the period up until 1986, although it 
remained 
modules. 
specialised 
With the 
in the fabrication of 
occasional onshore 
compression 
contract, 3 
particularly for British Nuclear Fuels and the small but 
significant growth in electrical work, Charlton Leslie 
2The acquisition of Campbell and Isherwood, added to 
the comprehensive nature of existing in-house facilities, 
was cited as a distinct, competitive advantage in a 
newspaper profile of the company during the mid 1980s: 
"A major factor in the chances of success for 
Charlton Leslie will be the fact that it can do 90 
per cent of the work on each contract itself, using 
in-house facilities from draughting right through to 
painting, mechanical and electrical fitting out. 
Only insulation tends to be sub-contracted to 
outside firms." 
(The Journal, 22.8.84: 17) 
3Interestingly enough, one of these contracts 
actually involved the construction of a service centre at 
Blyth for Hamilton Brothers' development of the Esmonde 
Field, 130 miles off the Northumberland coast (The 
Journal, 26.4.85: 7). 
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appeared to be an 
that represented 
during the 1980s. 
island of hope 
the North East's 
in the sea 
industrial 
of gloom, 
landscape 
6.1.2 Declining fortunes and a false dawn: the post 1986 
environment 
The cataclysmic fall in the oil price from December 1985 
onwards, although responsible for the withdrawal of many 
companies from offshore operations, did not, at first, 
appear to threaten the survival of Charlton Leslie. 
Having just won the order for the compression module on 
Marathon's Brae "A" development, the company had 
of the initial succeeded in avoiding the worst 
oil market downturn. But with 
effects 
the completion of this 
project and the continued market slump throughout 1987, 
Charlton Leslie found itself with an empty offshore order 
book, forcing it to reduce its workforce to just three 
security guards at one point, compared to the 750 
employed at the peak of the Marathon contract in 1985. 
Although the company's short term future was assured with 
the fourteen month contract to convert a drilling rig 
into a semi-submersible oil production platform for the 
American company, Amerada Hess, the situation had called 
into question Charlton Leslie's role in future B.T.R 
corporate strategy. 
Initially it appeared that the Amerada Hess contract 
might prove to be the saving of Charlton Leslie, for it 
was a significant boost to the company's status within 
the offshore industry, beyond short term financial 
considerations. In the first place, it represented a 
positive move into what was commonly regarded as a new 
market within the fabrication industry. The demand for 
floating production vessels was expected to increase with 
the development of more marginal fields. As Peter Wilson, 
the then Managing Director of Charlton Leslie remarked 
(The Journal, 30.10.1987: 5): 
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11 Having won the contract to convert the first of 
these vessels we will be in a good position to win 
the many follow-on contracts as demand for floating 
platforms increases .. " 
It also marked the diversification of the company away 
from its traditional activity fabricating compression 
modules, at a time when the trend in the market was 
towards integrated deck structures. 
Aside from these aspects, the contract was significant 
for the degree of sophistication and the amount of work 
required. The platform itself was described as "the 
largest floating object ever to enter the Tyne 11 (The 
Journal, ibid) , its sheer size4 requiring Charlton Leslie 
to lease the South Shields yard of McNulty Marine, rather 
than use its own facility at Wallsend. It was also unique 
to the offshore industry in both the scope and the 
intensive nature of the work involved. As Ray, an EETPU 
shop steward noted at the time: 
11 You couldn't get a bigger job than this ..... the 
only way it would be bigger is if the rig was 
bigger. They've used every amount of space possible. 
You're looking at a total system all on one semi-
submersible." 
Apart from the actual physical requirements of the job, 
it was almost exceptional in the demands made of the work 
force by the client. In doing so Amerada Hess was 
exploiting both the depressed situation in the offshore 
industry and the high level of unemployment amongst 
Boilermakers on the Tyne at that time. As a result, the 
company, work force, and in a wider sense local labour 
market were held to ransom by the oil company. 5 The 
4325 feet long, 245 feet wide and weighing 16, 500 
tonnes, compared to Charlton Leslie's usual business of 
fabricating 2,000 tonne modules. 
5This was a situation that highlighted the underlying 
power relations within the political economy of North Sea 
oil. 
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winning of the contract therefore entailed certain 
sacrifices, that went against local industrial relations 
traditions, as we shall see later. 
However 1n spite of the fact that the Amerada Hess 
contract had resulted in a record turnover for Charlton 
Leslie in 1987 (Table 6 .1), it did not alter the 
situation that the offshore sector was not a high profit 
earner even during boom conditions. 
given the lack of familiarity 
This was problematic 
of B.T.R. and its 
shareholders with the industry. 6 Most of their companies 
make an annual return of 20 per cent on investments, 
compared to 7 per cent at Charlton Leslie in an average 
year. 
The problems 1n the offshore market were matched by an 
absence of orders on the onshore side. Taken together the 
decline in structural engineering markets had been 
responsible for a fall in Charlton Leslie's total 
workforce from 3,000 to 800 between 1984 and 1987. 
The intentions of the main board of B.T.R had been 
signalled in its decision to close Charlton Leslie's 
6This is a salient point and is illustrated by the 
actions of the AMEC group, owners of Press Offshore, for 
whom the structural engineering industry is their primary 
area of activity. AMEC are more interested in a high 
volume of work than a high rate of return, as David 
Clarke notes: 
"Press are quite happy to make £5 million out of a 
£100 million project. B.T.R. will be looking to make 
a lot more than that. All AMEC's investors are used 
to their situation. This industry is high risk-low 
return, it always has been and always will be. It's 
very competitive." 
The commitment of AMEC to offshore construction was amply 
illustrated in 1983, when most of Press's main board quit 
the company to establish Davy Offshore. Senior management 
from other parts of the AMEC group were transferred to 
Press within a matter of days, thus enabling the company 
to stabilise its offshore operations. 
271 
onshore fabrication facility at Sunderland in 1988. In-
house fabrication capacity was reduced to the site at 
Davy Bank (although ironically this facility was never 
again used by the company) . 
With the culmination of the Amerada Hess contract the 
offshore division was also closed down, a decision that, 
although surprising to the local management in its 
suddenness was not completely unexpected. Lou Dobson had 
suspected that bad news was on the way, because there had 
been less urgency and supervision from the parent company 
for several weeks beforehand: 
"Everybody was too relaxed. Nobody was asking 
questions like; "Why aren't you doing this?" and 
"where's the money for that?" Everything became very 
gentlemanly all of a sudden. That's not normal. Once 
they stopped asking about the money, we thought 
something was up." 
Nevertheless in the aftermath of the Amerada Hess 
project, there had been reasons for optimism; the 
business development manager, G.B. Collingwood was quoted 
as saying to the local press that: 
"This puts us at the forefront of offshore 
engineering" 
(From an interview with Lou Dobson] 
only to be made redundant himself within two weeks. The 
euphoria created within the firm by the successful 
completion of the Amerada Hess contract had instilled a 
renewed sense of hope that the company's survival would 
be prolonged, strengthened by the knowledge that the 
industry was experiencing an upsurge in offshore work. In 
fact, the company had been in "pole position" to obtain 
part of Occidental's Piper Alpha replacement contract, as 
well as being at an advanced stage of negotiations for 
several onshore contracts. 
Ironically, the first inklings of B.T.R. 's closure 
decision came when Occidental withdrew from negotiations 
with the firm. It is likely that B.T.R. had been planning 
the move 
Charlton 
for some 
Leslie had 
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time, 
been 
although 
kept 
the 
in 
management 
the dark 
at 
over 
developments, only learning of their fate approximately 
two weeks after the end of the contract at South Shields 
in May 1989. This breakdown in communication between 
local management and senior group management is possibly 
the most poignant indicator of the extent to which normal 
everyday productive activity in this situation had been 
peripheralised from real decision making powers. 
6. 2 Labour force structure and the nature of employment 
relations at Charlton Leslie 
The takeover by B.T.R. in 1972 and the 
relocation 
production 
of Charlton 
relations was 
Leslie within the 
also to have 
subsequent 
arena of 
significant 
implications for the structure of employment. From being 
a relatively stable employer, consisting of a network of 
small firms, it became a largescale, albeit fluctuating 
source of demand for labour. This restructuring of the 
employment regime had the effect of removing any 
semblance of an internal labour market structure and 
accompanying occupational hierarchy within the firm and 
replacing it with a system of complete numerical 
flexibility (Atkinson, 1985). 
The pattern of offshore employment however has to be set 
in the context of the company's onshore activities. With 
the closure of the Sunderland onshore fabrication 
facility, the company effectively became a wholly site 
based employer, with only 40 permanent employees 
(administrative and senior management) based at the 
Wallsend headquarters. Although the company maintained a 
large drawing office at Davy Bank, the 100 draughtsmen 
employed were all on short term contracts, supplied by an 
agency on a week-by-week basis. The company's electrical 
installation division also employed 450 contract workers 
at various construction sites throughout the U.K., so 
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that the total number employed in January 1989 was 2030 
out of which only 40 were permanent. 
But in adopting this manpower strategy Charlton Leslie 
was taking advantage of trends within the external labour 
market (Chapter 5: sect ion 5. 2) . In common with other 
fabrication firms, Charlton Leslie was able to capitalise 
on (and indeed later through its recruitment policies was 
instrumental in) the decline of the traditional 
employment system, along the North East coast, by 
poaching labour from traditional sectors through the lure 
of higher wage rates during the 1970s. With the 
subsequent decline in alternative forms of employment, 
and in particular shipbuilding on the Tyne, Charlton 
Leslie found itself in a "buyers" labour market, with 
respect to white collar as well as blue collar labour, by 
the beginning of the 1980s; a situation that allowed it 
to rigorously pursue an "as and when required" strategy 
towards labour recruitment. 
6.2.1 The "as and when required" principle 
A common theme to emerge from discussions with both 
workforce 
yard was 
themselves 
the fact 
and management at 
the extent to 
as being "in the 
that employment 
Charlton Leslie's offshore 
which everyone described 
same boat". This reflected 
within the firm had been 
marginalised to such an extent that a heightened level of 
group consciousness, embodied ln a contractor mentality, 
had built up across the normally antagonistic relations 
between management and labour (an important point that we 
shall return to later). In short, there were no permanent 
employees within . Charlton Leslie's offshore division; 
even the project management team were on short term 
contracts for the Amerada Hess project. 7 
7The Amerada Hess contract, apart from being the last 
offshore project undertaken by Charlton Leslie, was also 
the largest in terms of manpower requirements. At its 
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Recruitment strategy was based to a far greater degree 
than elsewhere in the industry upon the exact demands of 
each project, and within that project upon the 
requirements of each stage. This trend became 
increasingly pronounced throughout the 1980s, the company 
being able to achieve more flexibility as the employment 
opportunities facing individuals deteriorated. Continuing 
high levels of unemployment amongst structural workers on 
the Tyne, and in particular a rising number of long term 
unemployed, gave those firms that were able to offer any 
form of employment a large amount of bargaining power 
over unions. In practice, firms were able to ignore the 
industry level N.J. C. agreement, regarding the minimum 
statutory length of employment and "last- in, firs t-out" 
requirements, which for Charlton Leslie meant complete 
flexibility with regard to the "hiring and firing" of 
labour. 
Undoubtedly the Amerada Hess contract was the absolute 
embodiment of total flexibility in operation within an 
employment situation, largely reflecting the depressed 
state of the local labour market. The employment impact 
of the contract was considered so important for Tyneside, 
that the company were able to exact considerable 
concessions from the loca 1 G. M. B. (over and above those 
already gained during the 1980s) which helped them obtain 
the contract in the first place, most notable of which 
was a "no strike agreement", as Lou Dobson explains: 
"We needed an edge to sell; it was well known 
throughout the industry that Amerada had had labour 
troubles at Hi-Fab, the GMBATU (Boilermakers) had 50 
per cent unemployment on Tyneside and hence willing 
to accept the deal ....... I don't know of any other 
peak in January 1989 the breakdown of the workforce was 
as follows: 
100 white collar; 
- 1250 blue collar; 
90 Subcontractors - 20 insulation, 
- 40 painting, 
- 30 scaffolding. 
275 
company that has a no-strike agreement with the 
Boilermakers." 
The company had also negotiated the removal of severance 
payments with the Boilermakers, and the other two unions, 
the AEUW and the EETPU, a situation that would have been 
unthinkable ten years earlier. 
The contract was also remarkable for the extent to which 
workers were brought on site for specific tasks and then 
laid off again, before being brought back a few weeks 
later. Stan, for example, a rigger in his early twenties, 
had being employed on the contract on three separate 
occasions. He had been laid off for three and two months 
respectively. On the first occasion, he was able to find 
casual work with Wallsend Dry Dock, whereas on the second 
occasion he went offshore for AFC International. 
Despite the transient nature of the working environment 
at Charlton Leslie, there were implicit divisions within 
the workforce. The company usually appointed a "core" 
group of tried and trusted workers at the outset of a 
contract, predominantly as project managers, foremen and 
supervisors: 
"who've worked for us on and off over the years and, 
with their wide experience of the external labour 
market, are able to recommend the right kind of 
worker during the selection process." 
[Lou Dobson) 
A typical example was Frank, a plater in his early 
forties, who up until 1977 had had a stable job in a ship 
repair yard on the Tyne. However that year he left: 
" .. to chase money, this [the offshore industry) was 
the best." 
Since then he has had about 40 jobs in offshore related 
work, a lifestyle that has taken him abroad for work on 
numerous occasions including: to Holland (onshore rig 
construction); W.Germany (petrochemical complex); Egypt 
(power station); and Norway (on the rigs plus seagoing 
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repair work). But he has always returned and found work 
with Charlton Leslie (on six separate occasions} during 
the 1980s. 
Another "tried and trusted employee" was Michael, a 
burner in his mid thirties, who had entered the offshore 
industry after being laid off from Swan Hunter during a 
wave of redundancies in 1978. He had also been employed 
by Charlton Leslie on six different occasions, the first 
being in 1979 on the contract for Phillips' Maureen 
field. 
But there was no hard and fast rule over labour 
recruitment, and the company's flexible manpower strategy 
meant that it was in a position to benefit from events on 
the external labour market. This was evident at the 
beginning of the Amerada Hess contract, when Louis Dobson 
was able to recruit 3 experienced superintendents, who 
had not worked for the company before, but had just been 
released by T. H. C. Fabricators at Hartlepool following 
the completion of a contract there. 
In the rundown, following the peak of a contract the 
whole of the yard's workforce faced a "redundancy 
situation": 
"When a job runs down, there is a redundancy 
situation until the end of the job when everybody is 
off site. If you've got bids coming in, then maybe 
you can hang on. If you haven't got any bid on, then 
you don't know what the gap is going to be ...... We 
are at the stage now where we know there is going to 
be quite a gap." 
[David Clarke] 
The length of service for workers during this period did 
not conform to the usual "last in, first out" policy, but 
rather redundancies were issued according to the advice 
of foremen and supervisors. For those retained, in the 
event of further contract work, the main criteria was 
usually a clean industrial relations record, quality of 
work and ability to undertake a diverse range of tasks. 
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But there had been an increasing tendency to override the 
other factors in favour of flexibility, thus good quality 
structural welders were often released in favour of those 
who could also weld pipes. 
By the loading out date, the entire offshore workforce 
was officially redundant. Although a further contract 
might be impending, the company made no attempt to hoard 
their key individuals, a policy aimed at minimising 
redundancy payments.x In doing so, not only was the 
company exploiting its position in a depressed labour 
market, but it was taking advantage of changing worker 
attitudes towards employment, a point borne out by Ralph, 
a caulker burner and shop steward for the Amerada Hess 
project: 
"If you're prepared to sit and wait, a job does 
comes along (like this) but who knows where the next 
one is coming from - this one's nearly finished now. 
It's a case of sitting and waiting or packing your 
bag. It's hard to work running into two years. Nine 
times out of ten you finish before that so you don't 
qualify for redundancy payments. That's what's 
accepted. Everyone knows the score." 
6.2.2 Easy come easy go: a note about employment 
relations at Charlton Leslie 
As we suggested earlier, 
Leslie were coloured 
employment relations at Charlton 
by the extent to which the 
employment had become marginalised with the site 
management for each contract being exposed to the same 
occupational uncertainties as the bulk of the blue collar 
workforce. In this sense, there was a collective 
experience of employment insecurity, bound up in the 
nature of the contract environment, that to a large 
extent tended to override the usual antagonistic class 
8Under the existing N.J.C. agreement individuals are 
supposed to work continuously for a firm, for a minimum 
of 54 weeks before being eligible for redundancy 
payments. 
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relations that are a feature of more stable work 
environments. 4 At the close of the Amerada Hess contract 
for example, the majority of white collar staff laid off 
received the statutory requirements and nothing more. 
Very few qualified for redundancy payments, due to the 
short duration of their employment; ln fact the majority 
had only been with the company for the length of the A-H 
contract. 
Employment relations were also aided by the fact that 
there did appear to be a certain type of person attracted 
to Charlton Leslie, 
management: 
a trend that was encouraged by 
"A lot of the lads here have worked for us on and 
off over the years. You always try and go for the 
same people because once you've got a good workforce 
you try to maintain it. The problem is you can't 
maintain it with the work going up and down." 
[David Clarke, industrial relations officer] 
The fact of the matter was that the company was "tapping" 
a certain segment of the labour market, that had grown 
use to a migratory working existence. lu Thus whilst at 
9This argument is supported by the 
Press, the most stable employer of all 
offshore fabrication firms, which also 
recent industrial relations record. 
evidence from 
North Eastern 
has the worst 
win contrast Press, with a greater continuity of 
work, offered a more stable form of employment, appealing 
to a different type of worker. In a meeting with shop 
stewards and David Clarke, during the Amerada Hess 
contract, the difference in employment relations between 
the two offshore firms that competed for labour on the 
Tyne was discussed. There was a widely held view that the 
working environment at Charlton Leslie was preferable to 
that at Press. This was despite the greater continuity of 
work available at the latter; many of the blue collar 
workforce have been there for over 10 years. David Clarke 
describes the atmosphere at Press as follows: 
"We have our problems here, but we talk them out and 
solve them. There's an atmosphere in Press's yards 
and I don't think anybody can put their finger on 
it." 
As Ralph put it: 
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one level, personnel managers could talk about the 
disadvantages of a lack of working continuity and the 
subsequent problems of manpower management, the 
workforce's acceptance of this casual form of employment 
clearly assisted the company in pursuit of its 
marginal isation strategy. 11 
"The ones there are chasing a longer period of 
work." 
This fact seemed to encourage a tenser, less congenial 
atmosphere. The shop stewards present preferred the more 
informal atmosphere characteristic of Charlton Leslie. 
Underlying this scenario are two distinctive working 
mentalities; those individuals looking for secure 
employment and those content with the freedom accompanied 
by instability that underpins the life of the journeyman. 
This fact was borne out when: 
" ... 15 welders left to go to Press because they 
thought they'd have a bigger run there. The same 15 
returned a few weeks later trying to get back here 
because they couldn't work in that environment." 
Thus although the two companies were nominally tapping 
the same portion of the labour market, in practice they 
were often drawing from different segments. 
11This is not to suggest that the yard was devoid of 
conflict. Whilst there had been a resigned acceptance of 
the casualisation of employment, one should not be left 
with the impression that management was facing a docile 
labour force. Union discipline remained strong and a 
force to be reckoned with, a point borne out by the 
solidarity expressed in a complete walkout of the work 
force at the yard during a dispute over the Amerada Hess 
contract, when the oil company attempted to manipulate 
working conditions contrary to the pre-production written 
agreement. As Tommy Brennan noted on this point: 
"When there is a stoppage, even the cat walks out. 
In fact, some of the men not employed by the 
company, subcontractors will walk out when there is 
a dispute on site." 
However, it was significant and illuminating that during 
this conflict, the animosity felt by workers was not 
directed at their own site management, but at the higher 
levels of management and rather more accurately at the 
client oil companies, who are widely regarded as the real 
force behind power relations within the industry. 
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The withdrawal of Charlton Leslie from offshore 
operations has not had an immediate employment impact, 
reduce the number of employment 
the migrant worker within the North 
other than 
opportunities 
to 
for 
East. Closure in this sense has not had the connotations 
that it would have had with a more stable employer; the 
gradual rundown of the work force during the Amerada Hess 
project tended to dilute the impact upon the local labour 
market. 
An upsurge 
epitomised by 
in construction 
the Channel 
activity during 
Tunnel project and 
1989, 
the 
Docklands development, as well as increased demand for 
labour locally by Press and yards on the Tees 12 absorbed 
much of the labour released by Charlton Leslie, 
reinforcing a comment made by David Clarke at the time of 
the closure: 
"Welders, pipefitters and electricians can all walk 
into jobs, there is that much work around. Most of 
the trades are so scarce." 
But nonetheless the lessons to be learned from the 
Charlton Leslie experience are particularly salutary for 
the future of employment in the North East and other 
peripheral regions. Here was a company and work situation 
that could have been cast as the new model of Thatcherite 
employment relations in the 1980s; the marriage of total 
flexibility in production with (relatively) harmonious 
industrial relations. In fact its success drew praise 
from the Minister of State for Energy himself, Mr Alick 
Buchanan Smith during a visit to the company in the mid 
1980s: 
"It [Charlton Leslie) has 
million not only on the U.K. 
won work worth £150 
continental shelf but 
12Notably Redpath and Davy have found it increasingly 
necessary to recruit pipef i tters from the Tynes ide area 
due to shortages in the local labour market, a situation 
departing from Teesside's industrial relations' 
traditions. 
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also in the Norwegian sector. I would like to see 
other British companies emulate that." 
{The Journal: 27.3.85: 25) 
But the company's sad fate was a particularly poignant 
reminder of the workings of capital under the present 
conditions of accumulation. As the management and 
workforce at Charlton Leslie discovered, it is not enough 
to be competitive within one industrial sector. In this 
sense, the closure decision was not linked in any way to 
events or performances in the offshore market itself, but 
to the latter's position relative to other sectors of 
accumulation. 
6.3 Strategic withdrawal at Whessoe 
The experience of Whessoe Offshore and 
serves as an interesting and appropriate 
the situation at Charlton Leslie. For 
its workforce 
comparison to 
whilst both 
companies went out of business in the aftermath of the 
1986 oil price crash under similar circumstances, the 
corporate background at Whessoe was markedly different to 
that of Charlton Leslie. In particular, Whessoe was well 
acquainted with the vagaries of the structural 
engineering sector, which had been the principal area of 
company operations for almost one hundred years. Whessoe 
had been a relatively stable and regular employer within 
the region during this period. However with the decline 
of the sector during the 1970s and 1980s, a reorientation 
of the company's operations followed that was to lead to 
a contraction in its traditional manufacturing activities 
and a movement into the higher quality end of 
engineering. It is within this context that the 
development of the offshore division must be placed. 
Whessoe's origins date back to the late eighteenth 
century, although its growth into an important local 
employer was associated with its emergence as a supplier 
of storage vessels to the oil, gas and chemical 
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industries during the early part of the twentieth century 
(see Chapter 3). In the period up until the second world 
war, Whessoe established a solid reputation within these 
markets, both at home and abroad, escaping the worst 
effects of the depression through its overseas contract 
work in various corners of the British Empire. 
Whessoe was also heavily involved in the reconstruction 
process that swept Western Europe in the aftermath of the 
second world war, primarily in the design and fabrication 
of steel plant for the oi 1 refinery and nuclear power 
station programmes. u As these developments slowed during 
the 1960s the company began a small but significant 
diversification away from its traditional activities. In 
particular this process involved the purchasing of 
Ashmore Benson Pease's South Works in Stockton in 1968 
for the design and 
collaboration with 
construction of process heaters in 
the Econ-Therm Corporation (a U.S. 
based corporation) and the procuring of Aiton & Co. of 
Derby in 1967, a company with a well established record 
for manufacturing high pressure pipework on the 
international market. Indeed the overseas orientation of 
these developments was significant in view of the decline 
in domestic demand for heavy engineering work. 
In contrast the movement of Whessoe into the offshore 
supplies sector of the North Sea in 1972 represented an 
attempt to move into a new market, serving a traditional 
form of activity. This involved the establishment of a 
production facility at Dock Point, Middlesbrough with the 
capacity to load out structures of up to 5,000 tonnes. At 
first, this facility was used purely as an assembly point 
for shop built sections from the heavy engineering plants 
13Whessoe, in conjunction with other North Eastern 
contractors such as Head Wrightson, became part of the 
Nuclear Power Group, which was involved in the 
construction of the Bradwell, Dungeness, Oldbury, Hinkley 
B and Hunterston B power stations (North, 1975: 92). 
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at Darlington and Stockton, but as the perception of the 
offshore market changed towards a longer term sector for 
accumulation the offshore yard became a fabrication plant 
in its own right. 
The 1980s saw a further shift ln the outlook of the 
Whessoe group that was to have a significant impact upon 
the offshore division. The direction of this change in 
policy was away from the manufacturing side of heavy 
engineering, which appeared to be in terminal decline, 
towards the higher quality end of production, primarily 
into design engineering, project management and systems 
analysis. 14 This coincided with the downturn in the oil 
price during 1986 and a distinct absence of offshore 
orders, a situation that was expected to continue until 
the early 1990s. It was this perceived lack of continuity 
of offshore work, and the continuing poor performance of 
the wider market for heavy engineering work (this led to 
the group as a whole recording an overall loss in 1987 as 
Table 6. 2 illustrates) that were the catalysts for the 
restructuring of the group in 1988. 
Although Whessoe plc returned to profit ln 1988, the 
heavy engineering division continued to suffer from a 
"lack of demand and intense pressure at the margins" 
(Annual Report, 1988: 3), a situation that prompted the 
board to close the fabrication facility at Brinkburn 
Road, Darlington with the loss of the 260 remaining jobs 
in July 1989 (Darlington and Stockton Times, 22.7.89). 15 
The remaining design, project management and construction 
activities of the division were merged with the company's 
successful overseas operation to form Whessoe Projects. 
14 Indeed the closure of Whessoe' s Stockton works in 
1979 was a precursor of this trend. 
15There had in any case been a gradual decline in 
employment since the early 1970s. 
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The name of the new division was symbolic 1n capturing 
the essence of Whessoe's reorientation during the 1980s; 
i.e. from being a primarily home based manufacturer to an 
overseas project management contractor, geared towards 
higher rates of profit at a reduced turnover. As such, 
the new strategy involved a withdrawal from U.K. 
manufacturing operations and a greater emphasis upon 
penetration into overseas markets. Certainly this policy 
appeared to have been effective in the short run, as this 
item from the Chairman's statement in 1990 demonstrates: 
"We were encouraged by the achievements of Whessoe 
Projects. It completed the phasing out of its heavy 
engineering fabrication activities and was awarded a 
number of substantial contracts. The most notable of 
these is a £25 million contract for the design, 
project management and construction of a cryogenic 
liquid natural gas storage facility for the Greek 
Gas Authority." 
(Annual Report, 1990: 3) 
The commitment of the company to move into more "up-
market" activities overseas was further illustrated with 
its acquisition of the Atlanta based company Coggins 
Systems in January 1990, a specialist in computer systems 
equipment for the petrochemical industries, and the 
purchase of Elcon Instruments of Milan, a manufacturer of 
industrial safety equipment. Indeed it was the familiar 
theme of jobs at home being replaced by a higher level of 
profits abroad, a trend that has characterised the 
actions of British capital throughout the twentieth 
century. 16 
16Under these conditions it 1s remarkable that the 
company should receive the backing of the local 
Conservative M.P. Michael Fallon: 
"The heavy engineering side has not been doing well 
and it makes sense for Whessoe to concentrate on 
what they do best, which is project management, 
computer systems and light engineering." 
(Darlington and Stockton Times, 22.7.89) 
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At first, it appeared that the restructuring of the 
company would have little impact on Whessoe Offshore, and 
in a direct sense it did not. For most of the 1980s, 
offshore activities had operated as the most successful 
part of the heavy engineering division. Indeed the then 
Chairman of Whessoe, Lord Erroll, was quoted in the local 
Press, describing the offshore division as: 
"one of the most prosperous parts of our business" 
(The Journal, 16.10.85) 
Furthermore the company was attempting to move into more 
up-market activity by forming a company, with another 
Middlesbrough based firm Haden Moore, Whessoe Haden 
Offshore to compete for hook up and repair work. 
Since the establishment of the offshore division in 1972, 
the company had received a regular workload (apart from a 
period in the early 1980s when there had been a delay in 
impending orders (see Chapter 4). Up until December 1985 
there was a belief that the offshore supplies sector 
would continue to be a growth industry for some time to 
come and Whessoe was likely to become a market leader. 
Such a notion was not dispelled when the company won £32 
million out of a total of £87 million worth of investment 
from Shell's Eider and Tern projects, against severe 
competition from the other major module yards on the Tyne 
and the Tees (The Journal, 11.12.85). In 1985 this degree 
of success was reflected when Whessoe Offshore was 
established as a limited company in its own right. 
But there was also a hidden agenda to this development, 
for whereas when the offshore division had been part of 
the engineering group it had received a considerable 
degree of financial backing for the tendering of 
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contracts 17 , its new independence effectively meant that 
it had been given the freedom to "sink or swim", more 
than ever reliant upon its ability to obtain a degree of 
working continuity from its offshore orders. 
A full order book from 1986 through to the first half of 
1988, allowed the company to ride out the initial effects 
of the oil price collapse (indeed the number of direct, 
as opposed to subcontract employees, actually rose from 
115 to 216 in the period 4.1.88 to 9.5.88), but with the 
culmination of the Shell Eider contract in August, it 
found itself facing an unprecedented period of inactivity 
in the offshore market, with little prospect of work in 
the immediate future. Subsequently, in October 1988, the 
main board at Whessoe took the decision to run down the 
offshore division and just keep it "ticking over". With 
the dearth of orders, it was decided to mothball the yard 
in Middlesbrough and assess the situation in the 
industry; a decision that was to prove fatal to the 
offshore division. tM Although in the early part of 1989, 
the company made a half-hearted attempt to pursue orders, 
most of that round's potential contracts had already gone 
elsewhere to companies who had maintained a strong 
17The offshore division had also benefitted 
various parcels of onshore work subcontracted out 
the rest of the heavy engineering group, notably in 
traditional market for process plant (see Table 6.3). 
from 
from 
the 
18To illustrate this point, it is worth examining the 
actions of Davy Offshore, the other Middlesbrough based 
fabricator, under similar circumstances. Like Whessoe, 
Davy had been involved in Shell's Eider and Tern 
developments, which culminated during 1988, and, as a 
result, was also facing an empty order book. But 
significantly the offshore division was given the backing 
of Davy Corporation to tender for other contracts, 
despite the fact that the division had made a loss in two 
successive years: £4.41 million in 1987-8 and £2.82 
million in 1988-9 (Financial Times, 27.6.89: 21). In the 
event, the company was awarded part of the Shell Amethyst 
contract in October 1988 which at its peak employed 800 
men. 
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offshore capability during the downturn.''~ Despite the 
promise of an upturn in the supplies market the company 
decided to close the offshore division on May 1st 1989. 
Whessoe Offshore's demise reflected a lack of 
understanding amongst the main board of the requirements 
of (or perhaps an unwillingness to understand) the 
structural engineering sector. This approach was partly 
the result of changes in the composition of the board at 
Whessoe, causing Bob Wright (personnel manager) to remark 
that ( 4 . 11. 8 8) : 
"Our board is now filled with accountants instead of 
engineers." 
Although this was said in a slightly "tongue in cheek'' 
manner, it did account for some of the changing attitudes 
of senior management within British engineering companies 
during the 1980s. Whessoe Offshore, and the structural 
engineering industry in general are, 
of changes within financial markets 
in part, 
during 
the victims 
the decade; 
the movement away from cartelisation towards a more 
competitive environment. Finance capital has become even 
more volatile as a result, favouring those sectors of the 
economy that yield the highest returns. Under these 
circumstances, the rationale behind production within 
engineering has changed from high turnover-low pro£it to 
low turnover-high profit, with a subsequent shift in to 
more up-market activity. Accompanying this process, the 
increased concentration of control within the economy has 
transferred real decision making powers away from 
managements specialised in the workings of particular 
industries to corporate planners specialised in 
maximising the rate of return from capital investment. 
19Indeed it was heavily ironic that the remaining 
contracts were too large for the offshore division in its 
diminished state, despite the fact that the Dock Point 
yard in Middlesbrough is one of the few in the United 
Kingdom to have the capacity for large integrated deck 
structures. 
288 
This situation applies directly to Whessoe, and whilst 
the offshore division remained competitive throughout the 
1980s the board was willing to leave it well alone. It 
was the onset of a pronounced period of inactivity that 
prompted the closure decision. 
6.4 The organisation of labour 
At Whessoe, the structure of the workforce reflected both 
modern and more traditional influences within the 
employment system. For whilst, on the one hand, the 
demand for labour had become increasingly dependent upon 
the requirements of individual offshore projects (there 
was no opportunity to switch labour into the onshore 
engineering division during slack periods in the offshore 
sector), at the same time there remained limited forms of 
employment stability in the organisation of labour at the 
firm, the latter largely attributable to the prevalence 
of past practices in the employment system. 
As a result of this dichotomy, the constitution of the 
work force comprised a curious mixture of employment 
forms: a core permanent management and administrative 
staff of approximately 40 personnel, supplemented by 
white collar technical labour supplied by manpower 
agencies during a contract. In contrast to Charlton 
Leslie, Whessoe was 
subcontracting firms 
Shell Eider contract 
company employed 
far more reliant upon specialist 
in production. At the peak of the 
in June 1987, for instance, the 
approximately 1,000 subcontract 
employees compared to only 535 direct blue collar 
workers. Whessoe's role in production was solely 
restricted to the fabrication of structural steel work, 
with most of the outfitting work being done externally.w 
20The principle firms used by Whessoe in production 
at its offshore yard were Tinklers (Middlesbrough) - pipe 
fabrication; Vaudales (Stockton) electrical 
installation; Steels (Sunderland) pipework systems ; 
Deborahs (Stockton) - scaffolding. 
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Although ln a forma 1 sense the only permanent positions 
were in the white collar sections of the work force, in 
practice there were implicit divisions within the blue 
collar labour segments, based upon the length of time 
served. Thus the blue collar labour force was effectively 
divided into a "maintenance" staff of retainers with a 
history of employment continuity at the firm, and a 
majority of "journeymen" employed on a single contract 
basis. 21 
In practice, 
consisted of 
this maintenance or skeletal workforce 
a handful of key individuals, either 
retained by Whessoe, or by a regular subcontractor, 
during a slack period. Brian for example had been the 
maintenance electrician at Whessoe for 15 years up until 
the yard's 
consigned 
closure in 1989. During a contract he was 
as foreman to a team (usually of 
subcontractors) to work either on insulation or module 
work. 
An alternative example was Fred, employed by the 
scaffolding firm of Deborahs on site at Whessoe. Prior to 
the yard's 
company at 
closure in 1989, he 
the Whessoe site 
had also been with the 
for 15 
security was inextricably tied in with 
Whessoe rather than that of Deborahs: 
years. His job 
the position of 
"It's always the same ...... it's not secure. My job 
is all right as long as Whessoe are here." 
At the height of the Shell Eider contract, Fred was 
foreman for over 110 scaffolders (technically employees 
of Deborahs), although when interviewed (29.11.88) he was 
the only scaffolder at the site. The company's policy of 
21 Notably 
transferred 
particularly 
Stockton. 
many of these 
from Whessoe's 
the former Ashmore 
core workers had been 
onshore operations, 
Benson Pease works at 
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maintaining a skeleton work force meant that effectively 
he was a "core" worker despite being a subcontract 
employee on the books of Deborahs. 
On the structural side, there is evidence to suggest that 
the company had a pol icy of hoarding teams of craftsmen 
for forthcoming project work. A good illustration of this 
occurred over the Christmas period ln 1987 (see Figure 
6. 2) • With the rundown in structural work on the Eider 
contract, the company had been laying off large numbers 
of welders, platers and chippers regularly, on a weekly 
basis from the beginning of October to late December. 
Significantly however the company chose to keep a 
constant number of such workers on their books between 
21.12.87 to 8.2.88 even though there was no workload, 
because of a small fabrication contract due to start in 
late February. 
Clearly Whessoe put a value on the maintenance of a 
certain form of employment stability, despite the 
dynamics of the market it was operating within. This was 
in keeping with the traditional methods of labour 
organisation in heavy engineering. Companies, such as 
Whessoe, built up a reliance on a tried and trusted 
element within the workforce to aid with recruitment and 
supervision during contracts. In return the company 
operated a 
with the 
possible, 22 
restricted 
promise 
plus the 
form of internal labour market, 
of permanent 
incentive of 
employment where 
limited forms of 
22This form of labour organisation had developed 
during the post war period, reflecting the prosperity 
brought by the construction boom. Clearly the ability to 
maintain such employment arrangements was dependent upon 
a continuous flow of orders. With the decline of the 
North East's tradi tiona 1 structural engineering markets 
and the arrival of sporadic oil developments, the ability 
of firms to offer such permanent forms of employment was 
increasingly limited to those who had linkages with other 
sectors of engineering, as we illustrate later in the 
case of Redpath Offshore. 
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promotion into lower management.n 
There was nothing philanthropic in this development; but 
rather it reflected a deep-seated belief within 
engineering construction that the best managers of men 
were recruited from within the workforce itself. The 
industry has always been introspective and distrustful of 
outsiders, who it is felt are unable to grasp the 
complexities of the industry, particularly with regard to 
labour organisation. Bob Wright puts this viewpoint 
forward from his personal experience at Whessoe: 
" .. in my opinion people like me are better (at 
I.R.). My predecessor, for want of a better word, 
was more of an academic than I am. He was very good, 
an ex-chief commissioner of pol ice, he had a lot 
going for him, he could do the paper work, but he 
couldn't do the I.R. side. On the I.R. side they 
kidded the socks off him, he didn't understand. I 
can't blame him, anyone else wouldn't. Very few can 
adapt, you have to know what you are about. You have 
to spot the subtleties of their argument or you're 
losing before you start." 
Thus a tradition of co-opting various individuals from 
the workforce had developed within the employment system 
on Teesside. 
A prime example (apart from Bob Wright) of an individual 
who had come up through the internal labour market system 
in the post war period was Stan, a materials controller 
who was interviewed whilst being employed by Redpath 
Offshore at Port Clarence in 1989. However up until 1979 
he had progressed up the job ladder at Whessoe's 
engineering works at Stockton. After completing his 
nEvidence of the operation of this system comes from 
the backgrounds of some of the managers themselves: Bob 
Wright had come through the ranks at Whessoe, starting as 
an apprentice welder at the company's Stockton works in 
1953. He was transferred to the offshore yard at Dock 
Point as a foreman in 1972. Similarly Jock McKinley at 
Davy and Lou Casson at Redpath were both managers who had 
progressed from craft apprenticeships to key positions in 
personnel management. 
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apprenticeship with the works' former owner, Ashmore 
Benson Pease in 1948, he remained with the company until 
its takeover by Whessoe in 1968, and stayed on at the 
site until its eventual closure in 1979. In between he 
was made a chargehand at the age of 21, a shift foreman 
at 28, and a shift superintendent in his middle thirties. 
From there, he became a production controller, and 
finally an assistant production manager, at the time of 
the closure. From 1979 to 1988 he led a migratory working 
existence as a project manager on various contracts for 
Davy overseas. 
Whessoe's ability to maintain some form of employment 
stability was aided by a strict "last in; first out" 
policy, towards its blue collar work force. With a good 
continuity of orders during the 1980s, this policy 
ensured that individuals with the longest period of time 
served with the company were therefore at the back of the 
queue as far as redundancy was concerned. A good example 
was Peter, a welder who had rejoined the company in 1980 
after having served his apprenticeship in the onshore 
division during the late 1960s and then left to chase oil 
money. At that time the company was reduced to its lowest 
point ever with only 9 welders on its books. With the 
upturn in activity, Peter found himself incorporated into 
the core in this way and was permanently employed until 
the yard's closure in 1988. 
Employment stability at Whessoe Offshore had been 
severely undermined in the period prior to its closure, 
as a result of its isolation from the remainder of the 
group's activities, and in particular the lack of 
financial commitment. Significantly the offshore division 
had been forced to abandon its apprenticeship scheme 
after 1986, one of the clearest manifestations of 
stability in manpower planning. 
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6.5 Redpath Offshore: in the shadow of Trafalgar 
Redpath Offshore is a subsidiary of Trafalgar House plc, 
a holding company with a diverse range of interests, from 
property to shipping, hotels to engineering. In 1987 
Trafalgar House employed approximately 32,000 people with 
a turnover of over £2 billion. Offshore activities form 
part of the construction and engineering group (see 
Figure 6.3), by far the largest of Trafalgar House's 
activities, with a turnover of £1.3 billion and 
employment of 24,410 in 1987, and has been cobbled 
together from a series of acquisitions in the past twenty 
years. 
Unlike the previous two companies studied in this 
chapter, Redpath Offshore's development has taken place 
within the context of a growth environment. The 1980s 
have seen Trafalgar House increase its involvement in 
offshore related work, attempting to become a player at 
the global level. This, as we shall illustrate later, has 
had important implications for the structuring of 
employment at Redpath. 
6.5.1 The development of Trafalgar House's offshore 
operations 
Trafalgar House's initial movement into structural 
engineering came in 1970 when it absorbed the Darlington 
based firm Cleveland Bridge, as part of its takeover of 
the Cementation group. This was a move that complemented 
its well established interests in the field of civil 
construction, providing it with an in-house supplier of 
fabricated steelwork. In 1975 Cleveland Bridge 
diversified into the offshore supplies market, when the 
company was commissioned to build a series of drilling 
rigs for the American company Loffland Brothers. 
Initially the site at Port Clarence had been established 
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for the purpose of the Al9 Tees bridge contract and as a 
load out facility for the Thames Barrier project, the 
latter involving a £60 million contract to manufacture 
and install flood gates and operating machinery. The yard 
at Port Clarence had been intended as a fabrication and 
load out facility for work that had been sub-assembled at 
Cleveland Bridge's Darlington plant. Originally offshore 
work was viewed as a bonus, but nevertheless a sideline 
to the company's main interests, which were firmly rooted 
in its traditional bridge and other constructional 
engineering markets. As such, it was commonly felt that 
the yard would be closed after the completion of the 
Thames project. However as Ian, a construction 
superintendent with the firm remembers, events took a 
different turn: 
"This place opened in late 1975 with a massive order 
for a company named Loffland (drilling company) and 
Shell wanted an accomodation module. That was it, we 
were away into the oil industry. We were led to 
believe that this yard would be open eight years for 
the duration of the Thames barrier project and that 
by then the oil would be finished. But since then, 
they have found oil wells all over the place. We 
have had a few rundowns, but were fortunate that our 
mother company was Cleveland Bridge, through them 
we've managed to get non-oil jobs." 
Consequently: 
"We have been able to hold onto a few hundred men, 
otherwise there's many a time when we could have 
been on our knees." 
Thus the link with the onshore sector was crucial in 
understanding the rationale behind the development of the 
Port Clarence yard. It was always intended as a facility 
for both onshore and offshore engineering projects and 
has remained involved in both sectors. As such it has 
been able to offer a high degree of working continuity, 
e.g. by 1977 the yard was employing approximately 1,000 
people, of which 250 were permanent staff. 
In 1982 Trafalgar House bought Redpath Dorman Long, the 
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structural engineering arm of British Steel for £10 
million. Crucially this involved the takeover of the 
corporation's two offshore concerns, the Redpath Offshore 
module yard at Linthorpe Dinsdale on the south bank of 
the Tees (originally opened in 1975) and the R.D.L. 
jacket fabrication yard at Methil in Fife (in 
collaboration with the Dutch firm de Groot). 
The addition of Scott Lithgow, a firm with experience in 
building semi-submersible vessels and acquired from 
British Shipbuilders in 1984, clearly signalled the 
direction of Trafalgar House's policy, as a feature 
article in the Financial Times recorded ( 9. 3. 84: 16) at 
the time: 
"The second [point of significance about the Scott 
Lithgow purchase] is the clue it gives to 
Trafalgar's strategy to hoist itself into the 
international big league of all-purpose offshore 
contractors capable of doing everything from design, 
building, project management, commissioning and 
hook-up of offshore structures and competing on 
equal terms with the likes of McDermott, Brown and 
Root and Bechtel of the U.S. 
"If we are not doing that in another five years time 
we will have failed," says Mr John Fletcher, head of 
Trafalgar 1 s fabrication division. "24 
In addition, Trafalgar House 1 s commitment to the wider 
sphere of structural engineering was signalled by the 
construction of a new £26 million plant at Darlington in 
1982. 
6.5.2 The consequences of merger on Teesside 
The acquisition of Redpath Dorman Long was particularly 
significant for offshore operations on Teesside. Not only 
did it bring together the two fabrication facilities at 
Port Clarence and Linthorpe Dinsdale, but also R.D.L. 's 
~With this in mind Trafalgar House also bought John 
Brown Engineering, the U.K. based design and project 
management outfit in 1986. 
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specialist installation outfit Redpath Engineering 
Services, established at Portrack Lane, Stockton in 1980. 
This has enabled the offshore yards to internalise much 
of their installation work, as Lou Casson the personnel 
manager noted recently: 
"They [R.E.S.J have a permanent office on site. When 
we tender, the clients are aware that they are our 
preferred candidates as far as subcontracting work 
in that area goes. In fact, they support us at 
tender stage, they will price the part of the tender 
that deals with the electrical side." 
It has also allowed the two offshore sites to collaborate 
on individual projects, e.g. the Port Clarence yard was 
used for the fabrication and 
accomodation module on the B.P. 
sub assembly 
Miller project 
of the 
in 1989, 
whilst most of the outfitting was undertaken at "Lin 
Din". However this remains the exception rather than the 
rule, both yards have retained full production capacity 
and the ability to tender for contracts in their own 
right. The rationalisation that has taken place was 
principally on the administrative side, bringing the 
yards together under a single management at Port Clarence 
with the loss of approximately 100 white collar jobs at 
Linthorpe Dinsdale. 
The benefits of the Trafalgar House umbrella were brought 
home poignantly during 1984 when the yards on the Tees 
found themselves without an offshore order and reduced to 
baseline employment levels: 
"If you go back to 1984 when there was no oil rig 
work coming in, this company was supposed to be in 
dire straits looking for a new agreement, a survival 
package. Because we belonged to Trafalgar House they 
were able (they'd just taken over Scott Lithgow on 
the Clyde) to bring some of the work that Scott 
Lithgow were getting bogged down with in here to 
keep the yard open. Nothing else kept the yard open. 
There was no other work." 
[Lee, EETPU shop steward, Port Clarence] 
Whilst the link with Trafalgar House was useful in 
surviving through the minor fluctuations in the oil 
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market, it could not completely compensate for the 
dramatic downturn in orders from 1986 onwards, leading to 
redundancy and reorganisation amongst the white collar 
sections of the work force (see later discussion). 
Nevertheless the link was crucial in the company's 
survival throughout 1988, prior to obtaining the B.P. 
Gyda contract in the Norwegian sector. At one point in 
July 1988 the Linthorpe Dinsdale yard was reduced to just 
22 blue collar workers. 2" Similarly the Port Clarence 
yard was reduced to a low point of just 153 blue collar 
employees at the beginning of 1988. The retention of 
these employees was largely due to the company receiving 
"filling in work" from other members of the Trafalgar 
House group, as Lou Casson (Personnel Manager at Redpath) 
noted at the time: 
"We've been doing a lot of traditional fabrication 
and construction work over the past fifteen months 
on this site. We've been doing work on Wondong, 
Cannon Bridge, the Dockland Development 
(supplementary steel work for Canary Wharf). We've 
also done a lot of work for the "Fast Lane" 
project one hundred foot girders in Glasgow. 
It's a project for the M.O.D. a huge lifting 
framework for a submarine dry dock." 
6.6 Getting by with a little help from our friends: the 
organisation of labour at Redpath 
As the previous section illustrated, the offshore 
supplies industry became an increasingly important part 
of Trafalgar House's operations during the 1980s. In 
turn, the bolstering of the offshore division against 
fluctuations in the oil market was to have important 
consequences for the stability of employment at Redpath. 
Labour organisation had been characterised by similar 
tendencies to those which had existed at Whessoe prior to 
nThese figures should be compared against the 
company's peak employment levels during the first half of 
1985 of 1500 at Port Clarence and 300 at "Lin Din". 
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1986, with a form of internal labour market operating in 
tandem with contractual employment. In the former however 
there was a greater emphasis upon employment stability. 
This undoubtedly was the result of the two yards' links 
with Trafalgar House (and with Linthorpe Dinsdale's 
earlier association with Redpath Dorman Long) . For the 
greater degree of working continuity that resulted 
allowed Redpath Offshore to maintain not only a core of 
blue collar workers, but also a considerable white collar 
staff above and beyond the usual levels of management and 
administration. 
6.6.1 The white collar internal labour market 
In essence, the organisation of white collar labour at 
Redpath exhibited all the hallmarks of a stable 
employment regime: a comprehensive training programme, 
salaried and pensionable staff, profit sharing, company 
cars for higher and middle management and clearly defined 
opportunities for promotion. Notably however such 
opportunities were not merely confined to the offshore 
division, but also allowed individuals to switch to other 
parts of the Trafalgar House group. To capture the 
essence of this situation in terms of the type of 
employment available, it is worth citing the career 
profiles of several individuals highlighted in a company 
magazine: 
"Tony Sullivan has been appointed CBE Operations 
Director at Yarm Road. Tony who has a wide range of 
experience in onshore and offshore work, began his 
career as an apprentice draughtsman at the old 
Teesside Bridge and Engineering Works in 
Middlesbrough. He left them to gain experience with 
Humphreys and Glasgow and then Furness Shipbuilding 
Co. before returning to TB & E as senior designer. 
After qualifying as a chartered structural engineer, 
Tony became senior contracts manager. The next ten 
years or so were busy and eventful. He was appointed 
the company's Project Manager at the Anchor steel 
plant in Scunthorpe, and after that Chief Projects 
Manager, which took him overseas. In 1980 he was 
appointed General Manager of the Linthorpe Dinsdale 
offshore yard. In the last three years or so he has 
acted as consultant for CBE and others in the 
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onshore and offshore industry. 
Alan Gibson, 45, a chartered engineer, has been 
appointed CBE's Production Director, confirming the 
post which he has filled on an acting basis since 
April. Alan's career with CBE began in October 1986 
when he was appointed Welding and Quality Assurance 
Manager. He had worked previously with RDL, whom he 
joined in 1969 at their Britannia Works 1n 
Middlesbrough as a Welding Engineer. In 1976 he 
moved into quality assurance and for the next five 
years was closely involved with all aspects of 
quality control, becoming Divisional Quality 
Assurance Manager. He was promoted to Works Manager 
at Warrington in April 1981, and was General Manager 
from May 1983 until he joined CBE. 
One of the longest serving men in CBE' s Yarm Road 
Works retired earlier this year. Eddie Peart began 
with the company on 3 February 1941 as a boy 
labourer in the Smithfield Road Works Template Shop, 
and in the following 48 years, with the exception of 
war service with the Royal Engineers, was involved 
in some way with every major CBE contract and most 
of its projects to modernise the plant. His last job 
was setting up the jigs and fittings in the Works 
for the Canary Wharf contract. Eddie served his time 
as a plater and worked as a contract plater until 
his promotion to Foreman plater in 1974. Four years 
later he was promoted to Works Superintendent and 
held this responsible job in the years leading up 
to, during and after the move from Smithfield Road 
to Yarm Road. He had two short breaks as 
Preparations Manager and then while setting up a 
Methods department." 
(Profile (9} (Trafalgar House company magazine], Winter 
1989} 
The point of emphasising these individual cases is to 
outline the extent to which a form of job ladder was open 
to individuals within the engineering industry on 
Teesside in the post war period up until 1970 and after 
this point, despite the onset of recession, within larger 
concerns such as Trafalgar House and Redpath Dorman Long 
at a national and even international level. In this sense 
these corporations were still able to offer 
from the hostile external labour market in 
protection 
"a job for 
life", career advancement, and opportunities for travel. 
Certainly in relation to much of the engineering sector 
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during the 1980s, companies within the Trafalgar House 
group did represent islands of employment security in a 
sea of uncertainty. But this point should not be over 
exaggerated, the Trafalgar House umbrella was only a 
partial shelter from wider recessionary forces as the 500 
employees of Trafalgar House's steel fabrication plants 
at Glasgow and Manchester found to their cost, when the 
latter were closed in 1990 following a slump in the civil 
construction sector (The Guardian, 6.1.90). 
Similarly the offshore division was susceptible to 
changes in the product market. Up until 1988 Redpath 
Offshore had enough working continuity to maintain a 
constant white collar staff of 332 at its two yards on 
the Tees. At this point, in response to a shortage of 
orders, in both onshore and offshore work, the company 
reduced this number to 202, with the main redundancies 
being in the drawing office at Port Clarence. This 
development involved a movement towards greater numerical 
flexibility, as the company became more reliant upon 
agency labour to meet its demands for specific contract 
work (see Figure 6.4) .~ 
Despite this setback the company was (and still is) able 
to offer careers for white collar staff, aimed at the 16 
year old school leaver. In particular the company 
recruits 6 apprentice draughtsmen per year, on a four 
year training course equivalent to their blue collar 
counterparts. However in comparison to the blue collar 
employees, all the white collar intake are in salaried 
permanent positions, and are clearly earmarked for a 
different kind of future than the average skilled manual 
worker. A typical example of one such worker was Neil, an 
engineer in his late twenties. He started as an 
apprentice in the drawing office in 1977, at Redpath 
Mrn doing so Redpath was able to use Trafalgar 
House's own employment agency, Lawrence Allison Services. 
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Dorman Long's bridge construction division at the 
Britannia Works. When this closed in 1979 he moved to the 
drawing office at the Teesside engineering works (also 
part of R. D. L.) . He was then transferred to Linthorpe 
Dinsdale in 1980 to work on the design of structural 
steel components. Since then he has been formally 
employed by Redpath Offshore South although he has been 
loaned out to other parts of the Trafalgar House group. 
He worked at Port Clarence on the Gyda project during 
1989, and prior to that was employed for a brief period 
(9 months) in London by Cementation, a sister company 
within the T.H. organisation during a spell of inactivity 
in the offshore division. He has also undertaken work for 
Cleveland Bridge in the past on a construction project at 
Victoria Station. 
Not only are white collar staff more highly valued by the 
company and as such 
employment security, 
guaranteed a certain amount of 
but as we suggested earlier there 
are greater opportunities for promotion. A typical career 
progression for an engineering apprentice is as follows: 
Career Progression for Engineers at Redpath Offshore 
(1989 wage rates) 
Apprentice Draughtsman (4 years): Salary = £4,500 
I 
Junior engineer: Salary= £9,000- £17,000 
I 
Engineer: Salary= £17,000 - £25,000 
I 
Project Manager: Salary = £25,000+ and company car 
Technically the content of work involved does not change 
rapidly between the time an apprentice finishes his 
training and becoming an "Engineer" as Neil notes: 
"When we arrived over the river from the drawing 
office, we were still apprentice draughtsmen. It 
took a couple of years to become a Junior Engineer, 
although we were still doing the same job. As you 
get more experienced, you become a fully fledged 
engineer. The only thing that alters is your salary. 
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You basically do the same job, once you are a junior 
engineer." 
At 30 Neil lS now in a position whereby he supervises 
others and is not directly supervised himself. On the 
north site, he has contact with the workforce, via 
superintendents, but on the south side, he has more 
direct contact. His route is typical of the majority of 
individuals in the lower echelons of management. Redpath 
(and indeed most of the structural engineering industry) 
does not recruit externally for its technical staff; at 
present there is only 1 university graduate working on 
the engineering side of operations (see also comments 
made in Chapter 5, Footnote 31). The point of entry into 
the restricted internal labour market is still the school 
leaver at 16. 
In other firms, notably Whessoe, Charlton Leslie and 
T.H.C. Fabricators, this type of career pattern had 
virtually disappeared with the advent of offshore work. 
Firms such as Press and Redpath that did manage to 
maintain such forms of organisation did so through a high 
continuity of orders, and the support of their parent 
organisations. As such their activities were perceived as 
mainstream operations rather than being peripheral to the 
main organisation. 27 Other firms were more reliant upon 
project management specialists, supplied by agencies. 
Apart from the skilled white collar workforce, Redpath 
(in common with all other offshore firms) also employ a 
permanent administrative and management staff. Apart from 
senior management, this included the secretarial staff, 
27In the case of T.H.C. Fabricators, although the 
parent company Heerema' s primary arena of operations is 
in the offshore supplies industry, the Hartlepool yard 
remains marginal in the sense that the firm is largely 
given overspill work for the Dutch operations, plus 
smaller contract work on occasions, e.g. the company 
undertook subcontract work on Charlton Leslie's Amerada 
Hess project. 
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which 1s predominantly female and continues to represent 
the primary role of women in heavy engineering. Typically 
this work is low paid, and devoid of any prospects of 
promotion or career advancement. Occasionally women did 
enter the apprenticeship scheme, notably in the technical 
rather than craft grades, although this was very much the 
exception, at Redpath there had been 2 individuals in 15 
years. The structural engineering industry is still 
considered to be a man's world and social barriers to 
female entry clearly persist, not necessarily at the 
level of the individual firm but externally, within the 
local labour market. 
6.6.2 The uncertainty spectrum: blue collar labour 
organisation 
Whilst there is a well developed internal labour market 
system within the white collar segment of the workforce, 
there is also evidence of hierarchical forms of job 
development amongst the blue collar employees. Although 
all non-supervisory blue collar workers are nominally 
categorised as hourly paid contract labour with legal 
guarantees of six weeks work and no more, a queue system 
operates within the firm that allows it to maintain a 
permanent core work force. To a greater extent than 
Whessoe, the company exhibits a form of internal labour 
market structure, through its adherence to a "last- in; 
first out" policy28 • Under these conditions there is a 
labour market queue in operation, that ensures that the 
company holds onto its longest serving employees. This 
was illustrated by a company survey in November 1989 that 
showed that there were 105 blue collar employees who had 
been with the company for over 12 years, and 595 who had 
been there for over two years. Nor was this situation 
merely restricted to the skilled worker: 
"We've got a dozen trade assistants here now who 
we've employed since 1974-75. The rest here now have 
28This is enforced by the unions. 
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been employed since 1988 and will get more 
continuity through Gannet." 
(Jon, T&G shop steward at Port Clarence] 
But there is no rigid dichotomy between short term and 
long term employees, the queue system represents a 
spectrum of uncertainty within the blue collar work 
force, contingent upon the company's ability to maintain 
a steady work load. Doug, a maintenance electrician, has 
been at the Port Clarence site since 1977. He has never 
had to work away from the North East, although there was 
a point when he almost took a job overseas, because his 
position at the company was under threat. He explains: 
"There was a time here when things weren't looking 
too bright (1981). It's last in, first out, and I 
was next to go on the payroll. I had the chance of 
another job in Saudi Arabia (advertised in a 
national paper], so I asked the senior shop steward 
what the scene was. He said, "If I were you, I'd 
take it." But I stuck it out and here I am." 
But the majority of blue collar workers are still 
recruited for single contracts, although they have 
usually served with the company on past occasions (Stan, 
convenor at Port Clarence): 
"When they (Redpath management] recruit labour they 
recruit the people who built the last module for 
them. The type of lads who were here last year, many 
of them have been here on 4-5 different occasions." 
As Davy (a GMB shop steward) acknowledges there is a 
shifting mass of workers, who migrate from firm to firm, 
contract to contract: 
such 
the 
"In this area it is basically the same men who do 
most of the work. It might be a different yard. 
There is a nucleus of workers in each yard, and the 
rest go from yard to yard, wherever the work is. 
Getting paid off is an occupational hazard." 
workers have little chance of making inroads, into 
queue at Redpath, or for that matter anywhere else 
(ibid} : 
"If you get a job at the back of a queue, you are 
first to go, if you get another job you're on 
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another queue and your first to go. On any job 
you're always used for a certain length of time and 
then you are finished." 
Not only do these individuals find themselves at the back 
of a queue, but they are often poorly regarded by other 
employers, who tend to judge a person's reliability on 
the number and length of jobs on his c.v. Davy 
illustrated this situation by comparing his own situation 
with that of his next door neighbour who has had 53 jobs: 
"If you look at my c.v. and my mate's, they'll 
[employers] say, "He chases money, he doesn't." It's 
not that easy. He's had jobs offered for six weeks". 
Stan makes a similar comparison, in noting his good 
fortune at being cushioned against the uncertainty of the 
1980s through his employment with the company: 
"I'm 34 and I've had two jobs since I served my 
time. I served my apprenticeship across the river at 
Pexham's Engineering, then I came here. The only two 
jobs I've ever had. I've got a mate the same age as 
myself and he's had 50 jobs in 14 different 
countries." 
This marginal element within the labour market 1s further 
disadvantaged because of the privileged status conferred 
upon those trained within the firm. The third and fourth 
years of the apprenticeship count as time-served with the 
company, giving them an immediate advantage over 
travelling men, probably a measure used by the company to 
retain trainees, as the following remark from Alan 
Matthews, Labour Manager at Port Clarence suggests: 
"As far as permanent is concerned we would like to 
think that the apprentices we take on are with us 
for a career." 
This system is unique to Redpath, the majority of other 
companies still have a "paying off" policy, Stan Jackson 
describes its operation: 
"The beginning of the third year of an 
apprenticeship starts in September. They have then 
got a cushion of two years. In the case of our 
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present fourth year apprentices, they came out in 
September 1988 and there were a lot of people that 
started before them that have now been paid off. So 
they've actually moved up above these people, many 
of whom were taken on again this year. This is one 
of the few places that does this." 
Significantly, there has only been one instance of an 
apprentice being paid off in the sixteen year period of 
oil related work at Redpath. 
Apprentices are still recruited from the local area (Port 
Clarence draws predominantly from the Stockton travel to 
work area whilst Linthorpe Dinsdale's catchment area is 
centred upon Middlesbrough) and are usually related to 
existing employees within the company, as Lee admitted. 
"There is a lot of nepotism, which we don't mind." 
Training at the rate of 10 craft apprentices per year, 
the company is clearly intent upon establishing and 
reproducing a core of loyal employees from this source. 
It is from this group too that the company eventually 
selects its foremen and supervisors, who are accorded 
permanent status, i.e. salaried employment, on a par with 
the skilled and managerial white collar workforce.~ 
Another similarity with the latter 1s the extent to 
which, the supervisory ranks are often transferred to 
other areas of Trafalgar House on project management 
work. 
As the examples of Eddie Peart at the beginning of the 
chapter and Lou Casson himself illustrate, the 
opportunities for the ordinary skilled worker to move 
upwards through the firm are real enough. One worker at 
present enthusiastically pursuing this route is Ian, the 
aforementioned superintendent. He is in charge of an 
~Press are the only other company where foremen are 
salaried permanent employees. 
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assembly bay at the Port Clarence yard, 
"black trades", both direct and subcontract 
supervising 
labour. The 
number of men he supervises varies, according to the 
stage of the contract, between 12 and 80. 
He has been with the company for 17 years, joining 
Cleveland Bridge in 1974. Prior to this he had worked in 
various yards and 'shops on Teesside, after having served 
his time in Furness' Shipyard (later Swan Hunter) between 
1954 and 1960 as a welder. 
In 1975 he was made foreman and transferred to the new 
offshore site at Port Clarence. Our ing his time as a 
foreman he also helped to teach new techniques to ex-
shipyard workers. He was head instructor at the training 
school in Darlington from 1976 to 1980, given this 
position because his predecessor moved to Wilson Walton. 
He was then transferred back to Port Clarence as foreman, 
becoming a superintendent on the night shift, until in 
1983 he became a day superintendent, a position he has 
held ever since. 
Although the short term future of Redpath Offshore is 
secure, given the recent number of orders available and 
the withdrawal of other U.K. yards from the sector, it 
remalns a company dependent upon the vagaries of the 
offshore market against the background of Trafalgar 
House's wider corporate strategy. At present it remains a 
stable employer, but in many senses it is the "last of 
the Mohicans". The decline in other forms of engineering 
activity, and problems currently being experienced by the 
onshore group30 highlight the fragility of the sector and 
the difficulties inherent in guaranteeing forms of 
employment stability in the future. 
3
°For example Cleveland Bridge's recent failure to 
win the contract for the second Severn Bridge. 
6.7 concluding comments 
This chapter has drawn 
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attention to the role of 
individual fabrication 
market. Crucially we 
firms ln structuring the labour 
have made the link between a 
company's relationship with its parent and its ability to 
offer forms of employment stability. Thus the continued 
existence of employment opportunities 1 in the offshore 
industry, within the North East is not merely contingent 
upon the region's firms' performance in relation to their 
competitors in the 
increasingly) upon 
accumulation network 
boundaries) . 
narrowest sense, but also (and 
their position with the global 
(across geographical and sectoral 
Added to the evidence presented ln Chapter 4 there appear 
characteristics of the to be two key determining 
relationship between fabrication firms 
organisations: firstly the sheer 
and their parent 
size of capital 
to withstand the organisation, larger firms are able 
often substantial losses that are inherent in the 
contracting and secondly the centrality of 
offshore operations to overall corporate strategy. 
In turn 
engenders 
this diversity of corporate relationships 
a range of employment circumstances within 
firms. Thus whilst at the global level employment has 
become increasingly marginalised, labour organisation 
within individual firms is underpinned by the specifics 
of each situation. Charlton Leslie, although part of the 
31 This point was brought home by the recent 
experience of Davy Corporation which, although committed 
to offshore operations, was not large enough to withstand 
losses from its disastrous Shell Emerald project intact: 
"A larger group would have been able to withstand 
such shocks, and cope with the inevitable cost 
overruns which occasionally occur in this kind of 
contracting business. Davy was too small, and took 
excessive risks. Now it has paid the penalty." 
(The Guardian, 21.6.91: 17) 
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huge industrial holding group B.T.R, had never been 
considered as a long term opportunity for growth, but 
merely an alternative avenue for profit during a 
recession in other markets. During the latter half of the 
1980s, Charlton Leslie became increasingly peripheral to 
the latter's mainstream operations and unable to compete 
with the revival in consumer goods markets. As such, the 
degree of commitment by the parent concern was minimal 
(as events ultimately illustrated), fixed capital 
investment after 1986 was virtually zero, whilst labour 
organisation became completely casualised and open to the 
vagaries of the external labour market. 
Alternatively Redpath Offshore has benefitted from both 
the extensive financial umbrella of Trafalgar House and 
the latter's continued involvement in the offshore 
sector, which lS still viewed in terms of growth 
potential at the global level. Subsequently, Redpath is 
able to maintain forms of internal labour market both 
within the blue collar and white collar elements of its 
work force, through the support of the wider corporate 
network, which forms a bulwark against oil market 
fluctuations. 
Whessoe Offshore suffered from the dual problem of 
belonging to a smaller engineering group (compared to its 
competitors) , which was at the same time disinvesting 
from manufacturing operations within the U.K. to 
concentrate upon project management work overseas. This 
fostered a situation where the offshore division was no 
longer able to undertake work subcontracted by the 
onshore engineering division to counteract fluctuations 
in the oil supplies market. As a result its labour 
organisation was increasingly characterised by the 
replacement of a relatively stable employment regime with 
more short term and contractual forms of work. 
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11 Islands 11 of stable employment opportunities 1 such as at 
Redpath and Press do remain within the engineering labour 
markets of the North East 1 but their importance to the 
overall employment environment are diminishing. The 
dominant trend within this system is the increasing 
marginalisation of work around a shrinking core work 
force, as outlined in Chapter 5. This has been brought 
about not just through the short term recruitment 
strategies of firms such as Charlton Leslie, but also 
through the intensification of the labour process and the 
changes, both quantitative and qualitative, in the 
composition of the supply side of the labour market 
(mostly clearly manifested by the decline of the training 
environment) . It is these developments, and their 
importance in constructing present and future divisions 
of labour, that are at the crux of this study and 
therefore form the major part of the discussion ln the 
following and concluding chapter. 
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Table 6.1 
Charlton Leslie's annual turnover, 1987-88 
Sector Turnover (millions) 
Offshore £30 [average £15 - 20) 
Onshore £30 [average £25) 
Electrics £12 
Bodyshop £5 
Total £77 
Note: the figures were distorted from a 
the huge Amerada Hess contract to 
conventional fixed rig into a "floater". 
(Source: management interviews] 
normal year 
transform 
by 
a 
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Table 6.2 
Whessoe Plc: Turnover, Profits (pre tax), 
Dividends and Employees 1985-1990 
Year Turnover Profit Dividend 
(million) (million) (per 
1985 99,981 5,025 
1986 94,619 4,748 
1987 93,093 -1,703 
1988 99,600 3,554 
1989 58,444 4,784 
1990 47,169 6,506 
Note: Profit figures are pre-tax 
(Source: Company Annual Reports] 
share) 
5.5p 
5.5p 
1. Op 
4.0p 
5.0p 
6.25p 
Employees 
(average) 
2,736 
2,412 
2,218 
1,510 
1,120 
929 
Year 
1979 
1979 
1980 
1980 
1984 
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Table 6.3 
Onshore Contracts undertaken at Whessoe's 
Offshore's Yard 1979-84 
jclient Project structure 
Mobil/Kellogg Coryton Deisobutiniser 
Refinery Column 
ICI/Foster Wilton acid 3 stainless 
Wheeler plant steel silos 
II II 13 preassembled 
units 
BP/CJB Sullom Voe Onshore oil/gas 
processing 
facility 
CEGB/SSEB Hey sham & 4 roof liners & 
Torness 4 gas baffle 
Nuclear Power assemblies 
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Figure 6.1 
Organisational Structure at Charlton Leslie, 1989 
B.T.R. (plc) I 
I 
!charlton Leslie Engineering Ltdl 
I 
finance personnel quality control engineering 
Wall send 
l 
I I 
lOffshore Operations J !onshore Operations 
I I 
fabrication fabrication 
Wall send South Shields Wall send 
I I 
1 
I I 
electrical body shop 
site based Wall send 
Figure 6.2 Employment change in the 
basic trades at Whessoe: October 1987-
February 1988 
Employment 
200~----------------------------------------------~ 
150 
ltl ~ 100--
50 
0 
12.10.87 Week 29.2.88 
.. Welders -Chippers D Platers 
!Source: Company Records] 
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Figure 6.3 
The position of Redpath Offshore within Trafalgar House 
Trafalgar House plc 
I 
I I l I 
Construction Property & Shipping & Oil & 
& Engineering Investment Aviation Gas 
Offshore and 
Structural 
I I I 
Redpath Offshore R.G.C. Offshore Scott Lithgow 
Port Clarence Methil Pt Glasgow 
Linthorpe Dinsdale 
Offshore Engineering Services 
Portrack Lane, Stockton 
I 
OverseasJ Jstructural 
I I 
Cleveland Bridge & Engineering Redpath Dorman Long 
Darlington Manchester (closed 
Januaryl990} 
[' 
...., 
M 
Figure 6.4 The dynamics of e,mployment 
structure at Redpath Offshore 
(January - December 1988) 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION: OFFSHORE FABRICATION AND DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN 
THE EMPLOYMENT SYSTEM: 1970 - 1990 
7.1 Introductory remarks 
One of the central tenets to this thesis has been that 
existing patterns of employment within a region can only be 
interpreted through an understanding of the specific nature 
of capitalist historical development within that region. In 
the North East, a particular form of employment 
organisation grew up to serve the single unit based capital 
goods industries of shipbuilding and structural 
engineering, centred upon a craft division of labour and a 
shifting workforce between the various yards and workshops 
in the region's coastal districts. Although as we have 
noted in Chapter 3 there were changes to this system in the 
post war period, particularly a movement towards more 
stable forms of employment as the number of firms within it 
declined and labour supply problems arose, there was no 
fundamental restructuring of the labour process in the 
region prior to the development of oil related activity. 
The advent of offshore work has brought with it both 
continuity and change to the prevailing system. on the one 
hand, the production rationale for the offshore f-abricatien 
industry is similar to that for traditional activities, 
encouraging the incorporation of existing forms of labour 
process, whilst on the other, the dynamic nature of the 
offshore supplies market has encouraged firms to casualise 
large elements of the workforce and set in reverse the post 
war trends towards a more stable employment environment. It 
is the consequences of this process that form the main 
theme to this concluding chapter. 
After firstly restating the nature of the political economy 
under which the employment system serving offshore 
fabrication has evolved in the past twenty years, we 
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consider some of the key aspects of change to the working 
environment during this period. We argue that the 
marginalisation of an increasing number of the workforce, 
has helped to bring about considerable changes in the role 
of trade unions within the labour market. This leads us to 
suggest that there are new divisions developing within the 
labour market, based upon levels of employment continuity 
and the ability to obtain a skills based qualification. 
Under these conditions it is pertinent to examine some of 
the issues involved in the collapse of the apprenticeship 
scheme, the traditional mechanism by which skilled labour 
has been reproduced in the past. We illustrate that the 
breakdown of the training environment is as much the result 
of ineffectual government policy as the decline in a stable 
employment environment. 
Finally, in the concluding sections of the chapter, we draw 
out the implications of this study, firstly in terms of 
theoretical developments in the study of employment, and 
secondly with regard to policy response. 
7. 2 The political economy of North Sea offshore-related 
developments in the North East 
In the post war period (from 1945 through to 1970), the 
North East's structural engineering industry operated in 
markets that were primarily focussed at the national level 
(in for example, the construction of power and industrial 
plant, and refinery developments) as part of a government 
stimulated reconstruction process. With the decline of 
these traditional markets and the increasing importance of 
the offshore supplies sector during the 1970s and 1980s, 
engineering companies found themselves operating under 
entirely different circumstances, a decision making 
framework that operated at the global level and was 
contingent upon a dynamic market environment, rather than 
a strategic national interest. It was a system in which 
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(with the absence of effective state intervention) supply 
companies found themselves hostage to the demands of the 
international oil companies. 
Although during the late 1970s and early 1980s the 
development of the independent sector in the North Sea 
briefly challenged the hegemony of the international 
companies, bringing marginal fields into production and 
some continuity to the offshore supplies industry, the oil 
market crash of 1985/6 precipitated a restructuring process 
which has reincorporated the U.K. oil sector into a global 
framework. 
This situation has been exacerbated in the North East by 
the extent to which the majority of oil-related firms have 
remained in peripheral activities within the offshore 
supplies industry, such as in the fabrication of modules. 
Moreover even those that have attempted to move into the 
core activities, such as Press Offshore face an uphill 
struggle against well-established American and Dutch 
private contractors (often with special relationships with 
the international oil companies) or state supported 
entities from France and Norway. 
Alongside these developments in the offshore supplies 
market, the North East's firms have also been subject to 
the general centralising tendencies of British industrial 
capital since the 1960s (Massey, 1988), and an accompanying 
process of rationalisation during the 1970s and 1980s that 
has decimated much of the region's engineering base. 
7.3 The changing nature of employment under offshore 
fabrication 
The most obvious feature characterising the employment 
system, serving shipbuilding and structural engineering, 
since the advent of offshore-related work has been the 
decimation of employment overall. Although as we noted in 
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Chapters 4 and 5, the region experienced a brief boom in 
this type of employment, related to oil-related 
developments, during the mid 1970s, the subsequent decline 
was severe and unrelenting. The number employed in 
shipbuilding and shiprepair work for the Northern region 
(including Cumbria) declined from 33,912 in 1978 to 8,029 
in 1987 (NOMIS). Whilst the decline in Industrial Plant and 
Steelwork was less during this period, from 15091 to 7,709, 
the real decline of traditional work was masked by the 
creation of oil-related jobs. 
Whilst the decimation of the shipbuilding industry was 
associated with the closure of individual firms, brought by 
nationalisation and the subsequent attempt to rationalise 
production in the face of a declining product market and 
stiff competition from overseas, the erosion of the 
employment base in structural engineering was a feature of 
a more complex restructuring process. This was geared 
towards disinvestment 1n traditional manufacturing 
activities at home and reorientation towards higher value 
added operations, such as project management, abroad (with 
Davy and Whessoe providing the two obvious examples). 
In this sense, the replacement of traditional and more 
secure forms of activity with oil-related work represented 
a drift towards a more unstable working environment. From 
the outset offshore fabrication has been a more itinerant 
form of employment, recruiting labour by poaching from 
established companies through the lure of higher wage 
rates. The transition that this has brought about is best 
illustrated through the decline of the craft training 
system, which as we have stressed throughout is a clear 
indicator of stability within an employment regime. Between 
1976 and 1985 the numbers achieving the Certificate of 
craftsmanship awarded by the E. I. T. B. in the North East 
declined from 2,183 to 353 (see Table 7.1). 
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The decline in the opportunities available to the (male) 
school leaver, that this process has entailed, presents 
perhaps the most significant long term problem for those 
areas that have been traditionally dependent upon 
employment in structural engineering. In addition, these 
changes have taken place against the context of diminishing 
job opportunities elsewhere in the region as the recession 
deepened. 1 Indi victuals seeking work in the labour market 
since the late 1970s have found it increasingly difficult 
to find stable forms of employment in their local area and 
instead are forced to look outside the North East for 
employment continuity. 
Whilst there have been profound changes in employment 
opportunities at the level of the labour market, as a 
consequence of recession, there has not been a similar 
widespread process of restructuring within production. The 
labour process introduced through offshore fabrication has 
not departed radically from traditional methods of work in 
shipbuilding and structural engineering. Production has 
remained labour intensive and skill based, and the absence 
of new technology has precluded the introduction of more 
flexible systems. Flexibility has been established within 
existing frameworks rather than supplanting them. Craft 
erosion and worker displacement has been confined to the 
more peripheral trades and the unskilled sections of the 
workforce. The skilled core workers, typically platers and 
welders have accepted increased flexibility in the 
knowledge that their highly specialised roles in production 
are not under threat, even given 
restructuring. Indeed were there 
widespread 
to be a 
technical 
technical 
restructuring of production in offshore fabrication, it 
would further strengthen the hand of this group of skilled 
workers, at the expense of other groups. 
1For an excellent empirical account of the problems 
facing young people seeking work in the North East, see 
Coffield et al (1986). 
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This point was borne out in 1982 when Trafalgar House spent 
£26 million constructing a new onshore steel fabrication 
plant at Darlington for Cleveland Bridge (Chapter 6), at 
the time described as the "most modern of its kind J..n 
Europe" (Northern Executive, 1982: 17): 
"The new works employ roughly the same number of 
people as the old one although there has been an 
increase in skilled jobs with a commensurate reduction 
in semi-skilled and unskilled labour. The Unions 
involved have adopted a positive attitude and flexible 
working arrangements are being used in the new works." 
(ibid) 
These processes of change in the employment environment 
have also brought changes in the relationship between 
unions and employers, a 1 though there has not been the 
collapse of union bargaining power reported elsewhere. 
Despite the huge reduction in union membership during the 
1980s the offshore fabrication industry (and structural 
engineering in general) remains dominated by the three 
major unions (A.U.E.W, E.E.T.P.U. and G.M.B.). 
Employers seeking to introduce changes in production, even 
during the depths of the recession, remain aware of the 
need to seek union co-operation, whilst the "closed shop" 
still regulates the labour market for unskilled workers as 
well as trades. But on the other hand, the unions have 
increasingly collaborated with firms to secure offshore 
orders against a background of severe market competition, 
and in this sense their role within the labour market is 
less confrontational than it has been in the past. However 
at the same time, it would be wrong to suggest that such 
developments in union attitudes are solely the result of 
the scale of the recession during the 1980s or the new 
power relations brought by oil-related work. As we noted in 
Chapter 3, union awareness of the scale of the problem 
facing engineering and shipbuilding activities in the 
region, and the realisation that this problem was 
increasingly one of global dynamics replaced the 
traditional more parochial class conflicts with a concern 
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for the survival and reproduction of local employment 
structures. Thus local union officials will now applaud 
individual firms' decisions to increase apprentice numbers, 
whereas in the past this type of development would have 
been seen as a strategy to undermine the role of the 
craftsman in the production process. 
Apart from co-operation over piecemeal changes within 
production, there have been two other directions in which 
union collaboration with management has been focused. 
Firstly unions have offered firms advantageous industrial 
relations' agreements to obtain contracts. The GMB for 
example co-operated fully with Davy's unsuccessful attempt 
in 1989 to secure the Occidental Piper Alpha replacement 
contract. The union, enticed by the possibility of the 
2,000 jobs that would have accompanied it, agreed a 2 year 
"no strike" agreement with Davy that allowed the latter to 
approach Occidental, with an industrial relations coup. A 
similar deal was conceded by the same union on Tyneside for 
Charlton Leslie's Amerada Hess contract in 1987. But this 
co-operation between management and unions now extends both 
ways. With the worsening skill shortages during the late 
1980s, it became commonplace for companies such as Davy and 
Redpath to notify the unions in advance of a major 
redundancy situation. Similarly companies were becoming 
concerned enough about long term labour recruitment to 
develop informal mechanisms for the transfer of labour 
amongst themselves. 
Another growing trend has been the extent to which unions 
increasingly operate as informal employment agencies 
supplying skilled labour from the North East to areas of 
labour shortage both nationally and internationally. 
Recently for example Tony Finn, G.M.B. Regional Organiser 
on Teesside was approached by a firm in Canada. 
"We've just had a phone call last week. They want 30 
coded welders for Canada on a permanent basis, 
emigrating." (This is for the construction of a 
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petrochemical plant.) 
This kind of package lS still rare, although it does 
illustrate the extent to which the North East is becoming 
increasingly renowned, at the global level, as a region 
with a surplus of skilled labour. But more commonplace are 
~· :.-. 
transfers of labour at the national level on a temporary 
basis. For example, the R.G.C. yard at Methil, in Fife was 
facing acute supply shortages a few years ago (ibid): 
"About 4 years ago at Methil (1985], they were 
desperate for boilermakers. My counterpart up there 
contacted me and said they had a shortage of 
boilermakers and couldn't recruit them. They used this 
office to get men up there." 
The changes ln the union role outlined above reflect to a 
certain degree the new realism of the leaders of labour 
during the 1980s. But what this more conciliatory and 
harmonious approach to industrial relations and work issues 
also denotes is the changing nature of class relationships. 
New divisions of labour are being established within the 
region. The old bipartisan politics of class conflict are 
being replaced by a more complex set of interest groups. 
Under these circumstances the craft unions in the North 
East no longer represent the wide constituency of labour 
interests that they did in the post war period. Whilst 
their basis has always been sectional, the decline of 
employment stability and the subsequent erosion of the 
membership has resulted in a significant change in 
emphasis, a return to a narrower role in the labour market, 
the protection and consolidation of a core group within the 
sphere of production. Policy has becoming increasingly 
reactive and defensive, on the one hand an alliance with 
local management to preserve existing forms of employment, 
whilst on the other seeking working continuity for its 
itinerant membership outside the local labour market. Thus 
the recent restructuring 
collectivities of interest, 
has 
that 
brought 
are best 
terms of changing divisions of labour. 
with it new 
described in 
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7.4 The changing employment structure: a declining core and 
widening divisions within the labour market 
The advent of offshore related work has not radically 
transformed the basis of the employment system ln the North 
East's coastal districts. It continues to represent a 
system based heavily upon an occupational labour market, 
horizontally segmented (although to a reduced extent due to 
the erosion or some of the more peripheral craft 
positions), and without the well developed internal labour 
market mechanisms that characterise labour organisation in 
other parts of the economy. Despite the ravages of 
recession and the increasing marginalisation within the 
employment system during the 1980s, a semblance of 
stability remained within the employment system during the 
1980s. As the previous chapter has shown, for some 
individuals, both manual and non-manual, skilled and 
unskilled, the experience of North Sea oil developments 
coincided with stable permanent employment and relative 
prosperity, and even 1n a few cases limited forms of 
promotion. Thus whilst the labour market as a whole became 
increasingly composed of a shifting mass, moving from one 
contract to another, from one employer to another and 
becoming increasingly geographically dispersed in the 
search for work, there remained enclaves, pockets of 
permanency, within individual firms where a significant 
continuity of orders had allowed the development of a small 
core work force, around a peripheral majority. 
The new divisions of labour are perhaps best understood in 
terms of a "growing trichotomisation of society" (Martin, 
1988: 221; Therborn, 1986) . 2 Increasingly contemporary 
2Therborn introduced this concept in relation to the 
continued high levels of unemployment in western 
industrialised societies: 
"···mass unemployment is likely to become a permanent 
feature of most advanced capitalist countries, 
somewhat reduced in years of boom, higher in years of 
recession and probably with a rising trend. This would 
produce a society like a richer and somewhat more 
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capitalism is divided into a high income professional and 
managerial elite with "real" decision making powers; a 
middle strata of stable employment forms, with a 
predominantly skilled basis and limited forms of promotion; 
and an unskilled and underemployed residue. 
Within the North East's structural engineering employment 
system, the first group increasingly operate externally to 
the region, the result of the general process of the 
centralisation of capital in U.K. manufacturing industry, 
allied to the peripheralisation of employment within North 
Sea oil power relations. 
The second group represents those "islands" of stable 
employment referred to in Chapter 6, although stability for 
this group is a relative concept as the redundant 
management at Charlton Leslie and Whessoe will testify. 
Included in this group are the middle and lower rungs of 
management in most fabrication firms, involved in the day-
to-day production process but divorced from the corporate 
decision-making environment. 
This developing schism within management lS reflected in 
the pattern of recruitment at the two levels. As we saw in 
Chapter 6, production managers continue to be predominantly 
recruited from the traditional channels at the local level, 
i.e. white collar apprenticeship schemes, followed by a 
progression through the internal labour market. Those who 
succeed to higher corporate management status typically 
have a university degree and a grounding in non-productive 
forms of management such as accountancy, finance and 
marketing/sales. 
humane Brazil, with increasing trichotomous socio-
economic divisions." 
{1986: 32) 
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against the background of a substantial training shortfall 
throughout British industry. 
It is the unskilled elements however that are likely to 
suffer from the long term repercussions of employment 
decline and labour restructuring. This group is growing and 
demographically concentrated at the lower end of the labour 
market, i.e. the youth segments deprived of the training 
and employment opportunities of their forefathers. 3 
Individuals within this sub-group are in the most marginal 
positions in the labour market and are reliant upon picking 
up "on the job" skills such as crane driving that are 
valued by employers and are transferable between industries 
to improve their employment continuity and therefore life 
chances. At the same time, the opportunities open to the 
unskilled and semi-skilled are shrinking, as a result of 
the erosion of their role within the production process, 
through the acceptance of increased flexibility amongst 
their skilled counterparts. Under these circumstances their 
work experience is likely to return to the pre 1939 
employment scenario of casual employment, "as and when 
required": 
"It's just like the old labour markets in the 
shipyards. The "gaffer" used to come out every morning 
and say "Right, I'll give you work, you work and you 
work, the rest can go home." Here they say "I'll give 
you a day's work and you six months work, the rest we 
don't want." It is the same system." 
(Davy, G.M.B. Shop Steward, Redpath Offshore) 
7.5 Failing the training test: government policy and labour 
market realities 
3This is not a problem that is specific to the 
employment system in structural engineering but is a 
feature of local labour markets throughout the North East 
as a result of the decline of the traditional industrial 
base (see for example Hudson et al, 1984). 
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Divisions of labour within the North East are greater today 
than at any time during the past sixty years. This is a 
division, not expressed in terms of differential wage 
rates4 , but in the continuity of employment and 
subsequently the overall earnings potential. For those 
with, or in the process of receiving, a craft training 
employment prospects within structural engineering remain 
high in the light of current trends, whilst the unskilled 
in the labour market face an increasingly grim future of 
life at the margins: 
"There is a growing hard core of unskilled people in 
this area, and especially the younger ones, who 
haven't had the apprenticeship scheme. The YTS doesn't 
replace it. So that type of labour still exists, 
although skilled men have been taken off the market. 
God knows how many electricians from Tyne and Wear are 
working in London. You can't go into a pub near Canary 
Wharf and not see someone you know. There are also a 
lot of pipefitters there. Others are working in the 
Southampton area [Fawley Refinery) , where there is 
also a lot of work. But, you still have a hard core of 
unemployed, unskilled; there's no market for them. The 
problem is, how do you convert them into a level of 
skill that you can utilise in this industry." 
[Lou Dobson, Personnel Manager, Charlton Leslie) 
Indeed it is a savage irony that under contemporary labour 
market conditions engineering companies are having problems 
recruiting skilled labour following an upturn 1n 
production. Whilst during the recession of the early 1980s, 
there were enough unemployed craftsmen on the labour market 
to meet the short term needs of engineering companies, the 
long term structural effects of a crisis of supply are now 
being felt. To circumvent this problem, Redpath Offshore 
has even begun to retain certain key trades on its books 
even during slack periods, "laying off" employees at £4.13 
per hour (as opposed to the basic rate of £6.64) rather 
than issue redundancies. Hence there is the apparent 
4See, for example, the diversity in rates between the 
skilled and unskilled in shipbuilding in 1914 (Table 3.6), 
compared to those for offshore related work in 1989; at 
Redpath, £6.64 per hour for skilled and £5.15 per hour for 
unskilled. 
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paradox of labour shortages coinciding with high levels of 
unemployment along the North East's coastal districts. 
Apart from the general effects of employment decline, the 
problem has been exacerbated by government policy towards 
youth training which, in brief, has been to disband 
existing forms of compulsory craft training, replacing them 
with schemes such as the widely derided Y.T.S. and self-
regulating mechanisms, epitomised by the recently created 
T.E.C.s. This is a totally inappropriate response, for it 
substitutes well established industry level training 
procedures with watered down forms of basic training. 
In particular, the two year YTS scheme is incapable of 
producing workers of the right calibre and is derided by 
both managers and shop stewards alike. Jock McKinley, 
Personnel Manager at Davy Offshore, had this to say on the 
subject: 
"You're not going to train anybody in two years. The 
present government is being unrealistic; too busy 
trying to con people onto the YTS." 
The underlying feeling of those in the offshore fabrication 
industry, both employers and unions, is that their 
requirements are not understood by either government 
ministers or educationalists, and therefore new schemes are 
proving deficient. In particular, such people could not 
grasp the concept that craft training extended beyond the 
formalised periods of apprenticeship: 
"Employment Training is not touching the problem at 
all. Individuals are not of immense value to a company 
until they are 26 or 27, hence they still need some 
form of supervision after they have become qualified 
journeymen." 
[Lou Casson, Personnel Manager at Redpath Offshore) 
Similarly: 
"If you talk to a lot of the module constructors and 
other people looking for up-market platers and 
burners, they know what they want, but it is difficult 
to define to government minsters or educationalists." 
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[Tony Finn, G.M.B. Regional Organiser, Teesside) 
Overcoming the perceptions of outsiders about the skill 
requirements of structural engineering companies 1n the 
wake of the dismantling of the various industry training 
boards is a problem that 1s likely to intensify in the 
future. Tony Finn provided an amusing if rather extreme 
story, which depicts the depth of the misunderstanding 
between industry and governmental agencies: 
"I had a crazy bloke coming here, who set up some 
Employment Training agency. He'd said he had an 
abundance of plating, welding people and he wanted me 
to use my influence to get these people placed in the 
module construction yards and at Rolls Royce, where 
they also do fabrications. I said, "It sounds 
interesting, who are these people? I can get tradesmen 
fixed up. We've got refresher courses such as NETA at 
Portrack and with the EITB, so if people are "ring-
rusty", they've been out of a job for 12 months, we 
can get them pushed up." 
He said, "Oh no. These are young people, 22 and 23 
years old (and he has this girl with him, blonde, all 
rings, taking notes). I'm a school teacher, this girl 
is a civil servant. We've set our own business up and 
we've got to give them on-the-job training." So I 
said, "What qualifications have these people got? What 
market are you aiming at?" He said, "These are young 
people who have never had a job since leaving school." 
So I didn't understand what he was getting at. He 
said, "I happen to have known a lot of them at school; 
I taught them metalwork." 
So he thought I was being awkward by telling him that 
he was wasting my time. Because if I phoned Davy 
Offshore and Redpath and said "I'm sending you some 
people, potential boilermakers down from this guy on 
the E.T. scheme", they'd think I was out of my mind. 
This bloke needs to see a psychiatrist! But you 
couldn't convince him." 
The previous system of industrial training boards, whereby 
it was a statutory requirement for firms to train 
apprentices is still the one that has most support, not 
least because it was an internal regulatory arrangement. 
Indeed it is significant that the engineering construction 
industry is retaining its own independent levy system to 
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ensure that a minimal level of training is pursued. But a 
further problem in many of the North East's old industrial 
areas is that there is no longer the continuity of work to 
provide the experience to support a largescale system of 
trade apprenticeships. One possible solution is that 
currently being pursued --on the north bank of the Tyne, 
where Press, Charlton Leslie (prior to its closure), Swan 
Hunter and North Tyneside Borough Council have opted out of 
government-led schemes altogether setting up a locality-
based training system. 
7.6 Reinterpreting employment change 
The most important conclusion to be drawn from this 
research, on the subject of conceptualising employment 
change, has been to re-emphasise the importance of the 
specific over the general. This is not to encourage a 
movement towards naked empiricism, but rather to argue for 
a theoretical approach that is more empirically informed. 
In Chapter 2 we warned against the dangers of abstracting 
a single unilinear model with which to chart the progress 
of capitalist production over the past 150 years. Thus both 
a conception of employment change, hinging upon a 
deskilling thesis (Braverman, 1974), or upon a movement 
from a fordist to a more flexible mode of work organisation 
(Piore and Sabel, 1984) are at odds with labour market 
realities. As Braverman himself has admitted capital ism 
"weaves a web of myriad threads"; there are a wide range of 
market conditions under which production can take place, 
which in turn has repercussions for the nature of the 
labour process. As such, it is necessary, for the present 
anyway, to reject approaches that view capitalist 
development in terms of a single form of work organisation. 
There is evidence that this process is already under way; 
Lash and Urry's (1987) "The End of Organized Capitalism" is 
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a significant stepping stone in this sense, by noting 
differences in patterns of national development within an 
historical materialist framework. But this needs to be 
taken further, the criticism of Lash and Urry remains in 
that they still feel obliged to divide capitalism up into 
a series of epochs based upon a dominant type of production 
system. 
The argument advanced here is not fundamentally opposed to 
such global approaches, but merely suggests that a great 
deal more empirical historical work needs to be done before 
such claims can be justified. What this study has shown is 
that in the North East of England, the driving forces 
behind capital accumulation were not fuelled by a fordist 
mass production system, but on a totally different 
rationale, founded upon single unit production, and a set 
of regionally and sectorally 
reach this conclusion is to 
specific circumstances. To 
reiterate Hudson's (1989a) 
remarks refuting the acceptability of a universal form of 
production under capitalism in peripheral regions: 
" Fordism (either in the narrow sense of a 
particular method of organising production, or in the 
broader sense of a regime of accumulation) has never 
established more than a tenuous hold in many of those 
regions." 
Undoubtedly it is important that theorists become more 
circumspect in their terms of reference. It is necessary to 
be clearer about the level of analysis: plant, enterprise, 
industry, regional or national level; and the limitations 
that scale imposes upon our explanations. As Wood (1989) 
has noted: 
"Too many theories predicting a major transformation 
of work seem to jump too readily from the production 
system to the basic structure of economies, or even 
capitalism, or vice versa." 
Whilst it is important not to reject certain central 
tendencies underlying capitalist social relations; in 
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particular the profit motive, and the contradictory and 
unequal exchange relations between labour and capital, it 
is important to recognise the possibility for different 
outcomes. Thus students of the changing nature of work in 
industrial societies should avoid the tendency to 
extrapolate from a specific set of historically constructed 
circumstances at the local level, an all embracing account 
of employment change at the global level. This, in turn, 
has important implications for policy prescription, for 
solutions themselves can only come from an awareness of the 
specific problems of any 
accumulation. 
one region under capital 
7.7 Stabilising the employment environment: reversing the 
decline in the North East 
" ... socialism, seen with the eyes of a realistic 
historical materialism, is not likely to be achieved 
in one blow on the day after tomorrow, but will be a 
complex and contradictory epochal transformation, 
which has already begun and which, if ever, will take 
a long time to be brought about. As long as a large 
part of the (potential) working class is unemployed 
and marginalized, no further advances are likely. 
People on the dole will not bring about socialism." 
(Therborn, 1986: 36) 
It is easy after a decade of inexorable Thatcherite 
progress to feel a sense of despair and despondency about 
the future of the working environment. The reversal of post 
war trends, towards greater protection of the individual 
worker and the participation of organised labour (albeit in 
a minor sense) in decision-making in the process of 
production, has been so severe and unequivocal as to 
encourage a climate of fatalistic pessimism amongst those 
who recognise free market capitalism for what it is. 
But it is necessary to reject any notion that the 
development and spread of Thatcherism across the industrial 
and political landscape was inevitable, and that its 
achievements are set in stone. Tony Benn's recently 
published diary of the mid 1970s, in somewhat paradoxical 
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fashion, reminds us of this.·' Prior to the winter of 
discontent, the developing monetaristic nature of the 
Labour government's economic strategy was increasingly 
being questioned in the party's ruling circles, and a swing 
to a more radical approach was still a possibility. At the 
same time, the spread of industrial democracy was viewed as 
an inevitability even within those bastions of the 
mainstream capitalist press, The Times and The Financial 
Times. 
From this perspective, the Thatcherite hegemonic project 
was an opportunistic one, seizing upon the long term 
structural problems of the British economy, so clearly 
manifested in the wake of the Oil Crisis and widespread 
global restructuring, and the short term difficulties of 
the Labour government. Its radical alternative to 
corporatist politics, and its ability to identify a 
scapegoat {in union power) for the country's problems 
struck a cord with large sections of traditional Labour 
voters, particularly skilled manual workers in the South 
East {Coates, 1989: 76), which ensured its electoral 
victory in 1979. 
Despite repeated electoral successes 1n the 1980s, the 
basis for this project has been increasingly undermined. 
The continuing malaise of the British economy has brought 
home the point that a belief in free market forces alone is 
not enough to revive the patient in the present global 
climate. As Judge and Dickson note {1987:171): 
"Thatcherite commitment to international competition 
rests upon the assumption that free trade is the 
dynamic of the international system. In practice this 
assumption does not hold. As witnesses from major 
manufacturing companies repeatedly informed the House 
of Lords Select Committee on Overseas Trade: "Free 
Trade ... was a dead duck and it seemed as though only 
the United Kingdom had failed to recognise that fact". 
5Benn, T. (1989) Against the Tide, London, Arrow Books. 
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With the recent developments in national politics and the 
wider European Community it lS possible once again to 
envisage a more socially oriented future, and specifically 
with regard to this thesis, a reappraisal of policy towards 
the problems of industry and employment in peripheral 
regions. 
The specific problem for the North East is its increasingly 
peripheral role in global capitalist accumulation, and as 
a result the continuing marginalisation of large elements 
of the active working population. Against this background, 
a "labour comeback scenario" (Therborn, 1986: 36) will 
initially involve some form of stability in the protection 
of existing jobs within the labour market as an immediate 
goal on the path towards full employment. 
The North East has in the past been described as a "state 
managed region" (Hudson, 1989b: 380) reflecting government 
intervention in the post war period to maintain full 
employment. In the event of the obvious failure of such 
policies (largely through their inability either to 
recognise, or confront the realities of the changing 
dynamic of capitalism) the argument advanced here is for a 
dual approach to the problem, operating at the local and 
the supra-national level. 
At the local level, the intention would be to save those 
remnants of traditional industry associated with the 
engineering and shipbuilding employment system within the 
coastal districts. This would take the form of locally 
based combines with fully integrated production complexes 
(see Byrne, 1989), from research and development to final 
assembly, with a commitment to largescale training 
programmes and a more permanent employment environment. 
On the Tyne it is still possible to envisage a marine 
engineering combine centred upon Press Offshore and Swan 
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Hunter, whilst a similar entity committed to both onshore 
and offshore structural engineering based upon Trafalgar 
House's various operations is feasible on the Tees 
(enhanced by the recent bid by Trafalgar for the Davy 
Corporation's structural division). 
This is not ~ nationalisation mark 2 scenario, but a form 
of "regionalisation 11 mark 1, and is contingent upon an 
accompanying process of political and financial devolution 
(presently under consideration by both the Labour Party and 
the Liberal Democrats) . 
The mechanisms for such development are already in place, 
through informal (but nonetheless strong) channels of 
communication between both individual firms and between 
firms and union organisations as we illustrated earlier in 
the chapter, whilst recent rationalisation within the 
offshore fabrication industry in the region also favours 
such a solution. Added to the shared sense of both an 
industry and regional identity amongst local management and 
workers, the time would appear ripe for this radical 
departure. 
These changes in organisation at the local level need to be 
accompanied by intervention a-t the supra-national level, in 
this case through the auspices of the European Community. 
This would involve the regulation of the respective 
industries, through restricting production to existing 
complexes rather than allowing fly-by-nights to enter the 
market on "one-off" projects, and destabilise the 
employment environment. 
Furthermore there is a good argument for a form of 
intervention to stabilise the capital goods' markets (given 
their highly cyclical nature) served by shipbuilding and 
structural engineering firms, geared towards the use of 
resources for a European strategic interest rather purely 
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in the pursuit of profit. Such measures would find greater 
support given the growing interest in environmental issues, 
whilst at the same time providing the opportunity for forms 
of production outside a capitalistic framework, and the 
possibility for a different set of employment relations 
that would involve greater worker representation at all 
levels of decision-making. 
Although the solution offered above entails huge logistical 
difficulties, not least of which is the current political 
acceptance of such a programme, whilst at the same time it 
cannot hope to solve the wider problems facing peripheral 
regions, it does offer the potential for a reversal in the 
decline of a particular employment environment and an 
avenue of hope against a backcloth of terminal decline. 
Andrew Cumbers (July 1991) 
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Table 7.1 
Numbers achieving certificate of CraftsmanshiP in North 
East, 1976-85 (year of commencement of training) 
Numbers Year 
2,183 1976 
2,014 1977 
2,105 1978 
1,998 1979 
1,826 1980 
1,494 1981 
1,038 1982 
766 1983 
657 1984 
353 1985 
(Source: EITB Annual Report and Statistics, 1987/8). 
341 
Bibliography 
Abrams, P. (1982) Historical Sociology, Shepton Mallet, 
Open Books. 
Ahrari, M. (1985) "O.P.E.C. and the hyperpluralism of the 
oil market" International Affairs 62(2). 
Allen, E. Clarke, J. McCord, N. and Row, D. (1971} The 
North East Engineers Strikes of 1871: the Nine Hours' 
League, Newcastle, Frank Graham. 
Almond, J. Harrison, B. Harrison, K. and Owen, J. (1979) 
Cleveland Iron and Steel: Background and Nineteenth 
Century History, B.S.C. 
Amin, A. (1989} "Flexible Specialisation and small firms in 
Italy: myths and realities", in Antipode April. 
Anderson, G. (1982) "Some aspects of the labour market in 
Britain, 1870-1914", in Wrigley, C. (ed) A History 
of British Industrial Relations 1875-1914, Brighton, 
Harvester Press. 
Andreasjan, R. (1989} "World energy crisis and the Middle 
East", in Ferrier, R. and Fursenko, A. (eds) Oil in 
the World Economy, London, Routledge. 
Anon (1981} "What became of the Energy Crisis", Petroleum 
Economist 48(1}. 
Anon (1988) "The bid for Britoil", Shield 2. 
Aglietta, M. (1979) A Theory of Capitalist Regulation, New 
Left Books, London. 
Armstrong, P. Glyn, A. and Harrison, J. (1984} Capitalism 
since World War II: the making and breakup of the 
342 
great boom, London, Fontana. 
Arnold, G. (1978) Britain's Oil, London, Hamish Hamilton. 
Ashton, D. Green, F. and Hoskins, M. (1989) "The training 
system of British capitalism: changes and prospects" 
in Green, F. (ed) The Restructuring of the U.K. 
Economy, Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Atkinson, J. ( 1984) "Manpower strategies for flexible 
organisation", Personnel Management, August. 
Atkinson, J. (1985) Flexibility, Uncertainty and Manpower 
Management, IMS Report No. 89, University of Sussex. 
Austin, T. and Beynon, H. (1980) Global Outpost: the 
Working Class Experience of Big Business in the North 
East of England, University of Durham (Mimeo). 
Baran, P. and Sweezy, P. (1966) Monopoly Capital, 
Harmondsworth, Penguin. 
Benn, T. (1989) Against the Tide, London, Arrow Books. 
Benwell Community Development Project ( 1978) The Making 
of a Ruling Class, Final Report (6). 
Berger, S. and Piore, M. (1980) Dualism and Discontinuity 
in Industrial Societies, Cambridge University Press. 
Berrefjord, 0. and Heum, P. (1983) Olje-Politikk. 
Oljepolitikken og Leverenseparsmaelet, Oslo, Tiden. 
Beynon, H. ( 19 8 7) 
for Labour" 
Politics of 
Macmillan. 
"Closures: the threat and the future 
in Dickson, T. and Judge, D. (eds) The 
Industrial Closure, Basingstoke, 
343 
Beynon, H. Hudson, R. Lewis, J. Sadler, D. and Townsend, 
A. ( 198 5) "Middlesbrough: contradictions in economic 
and cultural change", Middlesbrough Locality Study: 
Working Paper No. 2, University of Durham, Departments 
of Geography and Sociology. 
Beynon, H. Hudson, R. and Sadler, D. (1986a) 
"Nationalised industry policies and the destruction of 
communi ties: some evidence from the North East of 
England", Capital and Class 29. 
Beynon, H. 
and 
Hudson, R. and Sadler, 
internationalization of 
D. (1986b) "The growth 
Teesside's chemicals 
industry", Middlesbrough Loca 1 i ty Study, Working Paper 
No. 3, University of Durham, Departments of Geography 
and Sociology. 
Beynon, H. and Wainwright, H. (1979) The Workers Report 
on Vickers, London, Pluto. 
Bina, c. (1985) The Economics of the Oil Crisis, New 
York, St. Martin's Press. 
Bluestone, B. ( 197 o) "The 
markets and the working 
Resources" 5. 
tripartite economy: labour 
poor", in Poverty and Human 
Bluestone, B. and Stevenson, M. (1981) "Industrial 
transformation and the evolution of dual labour 
markets: the case of retail trade in the United 
States", in Wilkinson, F. (ed) The Dynamics of Labour 
Market Segmentation, London, Academic Press. 
Bonney, N. (1986) "Aberdeen and Dundee: a tale of two 
cities in the oil era", in Cooke, P. (ed) Global 
Restructuring: Local Response, London, E.S.R.C. 
344 
Braverman, H. (1974) Labour and Monopoly Capital: the 
Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century, New 
York, Monthly Review Press. 
Brecher, J. (1979) "Roots of power: Employers and workers 
in the electrical products industry", in Zimbalist, A. 
( ed) Case studies on the Labour Process, New York, 
Monthly Review Press. 
Burawoy, M. (1979) Manufacturing Consent, University of 
Chicago Press. 
Burawoy, M. (1985) The Politics of Production, London, 
Verso. 
Byrne, D. (1989) Beyond the Inner City, Milton Keynes, 
Open University Press. 
Cairns, W. and Rogers, P. (eds) (1981) Onshore Impacts of 
Offshore Oil, London, Applied Science Publications. 
Cameron, G. ( 1964) "Post-war strikes in the North East 
Shipbuilding and Shiprepairing industry", British 
Journal of Industrial Relations, 15. 
Cameron, P. (1986) The Oil Supplies Industry, a 
Comparative Study of Legislative Restrictions and 
their Impact, London, F.T.B.I. 
Carney, J. Lewis, J. and Hudson, R. (1977) "Coal combines 
and interregional development in the U.K.", in Massey, 
D. and Batey, P. Alternative Frameworks for Analysis, 
London, Pion. 
Chandler, A. and Daems, H. (1979) "Administrative 
coordination, allocation and monitoring: Concepts and 
comparisons", in Horn, N. and Kocka, J. (eds) Law and 
345 
the Formation of the Big Enterprises in the 19th and 
Early 20th Centuries, Gottingen, Vandenhoeck and 
Ruprecht. 
Chapman, K. (1976) North Sea Oil and Gas, London, David 
and Charles. 
Chevalier, J. (1975) The New Oil Stakes, London, Penguin. 
Clarke, J. ( 1987) "Labour in Wearside shipbuilding", in 
Potts, A. (ed) Shipbuilders and Engineers, North East 
Labour History society. 
Clawson, M. (1980) Bureaucracy and the Labor Process, New 
York, Monthly Review Press. 
Clegg, H. (1979) The Changing System of Industrial 
Relations in Great Britain, Oxford, Basil Blackwell. 
Cleveland County Council (1975) The Economic Impact of 
North Sea Oil in Cleveland, Cleveland County Council 
Planning Department. 
Clunies-Ross, A. (1986) "The United Kingdom's experience 
with North Sea oil and gas", I.D.S. Bulletin, 17(4}. 
Coates , D . ( 19 9 0 ) -=T=h'-"e=----=C=r-=i=s~i=s=----=oc..:f~-=L=a=b'-'o~u=r=--=-: ---=I=-=no..:.d=u=s--=t=r"-"1=-· a=l 
Relations and the State in Contemporary Britain, 
Oxford, Phillip Allen. 
Coffield, F. Borrill, c. and Marshall, s. (1986) Growing 
up at the Margins: Young Adults in the North East, 
Milton Keynes, Open University Press. 
Cohen, S. (1987) "A labour process to nowhere?", in New 
Left Review, 165. 
346 
Cook, P. (1985) "The offshore supplies industry: fast, 
continuous and incremental change" in Sharp, M. Europe 
and the New Technologies, London, Pinter. 
Cook. P. and Surrey, J. (1983) Government Policy for the 
Offshore Supplies Industry: Britain compared with 
France and Norway, S.P.R.U. Occasional Paper Series 
No. 21, University of Sussex. 
Cousins, J. and Brown, R. (1970) "Shipbuilding in the 
North East", in Dewdney, J. (ed) Durham County and 
City with Teesside, London, British Association for 
the Advancement of Science. 
Cowling, C. ( 1986) "The internationalisation of 
production and deindustrialisation", in Amin, A. and 
Goddard, J. (eds) Technological Change, Industrial 
Restructuring and Regional Development, London, George 
Allen and Unwin. 
Croll, D.O. (1980) "The Majors in transition" Petroleum 
Economist, 47(5). 
Crouch, C. ( 1982) The Politics of Industrial Relations, 
London, Fontana. 
Deakin, s. (1986) "Labour law and the developing 
employment relationship in the U. K", Cambridge Journal 
of Economics, 10(4). 
Delacour, J. and Champlon, D. ( 1988) "Offshore outlook: 
the European side" , ....,R:.::e,_,vuc.=e::::...._ _ .=Io..!.n.._,s"'-t=i-'=t'-"u""'t,__~F"'--.:r-"'a~n.!..:c:::.a==i:.::s"---_,d~u 
Petrole 43 (4). 
Dougan, D. (1968) The History of North East Shipbuilding, 
London, Allen and Unwin. 
347 
Dougan, D. (1975) 
Graham. 
The Shipwrights, Newcastle, Frank 
Earney, F. ( 1982) "Norway's offshore petroleum industry", 
Resources Policy, June. 
E.I.U. (1984) The North Sea and British Industry: the New 
Opportunities, London, Economist Intelligence Unit. 
E.I.T.B. (1988) E.I.T.B. Annual Report and Statistics 
1987-88, Watford, Engineering Industry Training Board. 
Edwards, R. (1979) Contested Terrain, New York, Basic 
Books. 
Edwards, R. Reich, M. and Gordon, D. (1975) Labor Market 
Segmentation, Lexington, Mass, D.C. Heath. 
Elbaum, B. ( 1989) "Why apprenticeship persisted in 
Britain but not in the United States" in The Journal 
of Economic History, 49(2). 
Elbaum, B. 
(1979) 
Marxist 
3 ( 3) . 
Lazonick, W. 
"The labour 
theory" in 
Wilkinson, F. and Zeitlin, J. 
process, market structure and 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 
Eldridge, J. and Roberts, G. (1968) "An official dispute 
1n the constructional engineering industry", in 
Eldridge, J. (ed) Industrial Disputes, London, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Elger, T. (1982) "Braverman, capital accumulation and 
deskilling", in Wood, s. (ed) The Degradation of Work? 
Skill, Deskilling and the Labour Process, London, 
Hutchinson. 
348 
Elger, T. (1989) "Change and continuity in the Labour 
Process: Technical Innovation and Work Reorganisation 
in the 1980s", paper presented at Anglo-German 
Conference, Manchester. 
El-Mokadem et al (1984) O.P.E.C. and the World Oil Market, 
1973-83 Surrey Energy Economics Centre, 
Eastlords. 
London, 
Friedman, A. (1977) Industry and Labour: Class Structure 
at Work and Monopoly Capitalism, London, Macmillan. 
Gallie, D. (1988) Employment in Britain, Oxford, Basil 
Blackwell. 
Gamble, A. (1988) The Free Economy and the Strong State, 
Basingstoke, Macmillan. 
Gately, D. (1986) "The prospects for oil prices 
revisited" Annual Review of Energy, 11. 
Ghadar, F. (1977) The Evolution of O.P.E.C. Strategy, 
Massachusetts, Lexington Books. 
Goodman, J. (1989) "Industrial relations 
restructuring: three case studies in the 
Kingdom", International Labour Review 128 (5). 
and 
United 
Goodrich, c. (1975) The Frontier of Control, London, 
Pluto Press. 
Gordon, D. Edwards, R. and Reich, M. (1982) Segmented 
Work, Divided Workers: the Transformation of Labor in 
the Twentieth Century, Cambridge University Press. 
Gourvish, T. ( 1979) "Mechanical Engineering" in Aldcroft, 
D. and Buxton, A. (eds) British Industry in the Inter 
349 
War Years, London, Scolar Press. 
Hall, s . ( 1 9 8 4 ) "The r1se of the 
representative/interventionist state 1880s - 1920s", 
in McLennan, G. Held, D. and Hall, S. (eds) State and 
Society in Contemporary Britain: an Introduction, 
Cambridge, Polity Press. 
Hallwood, C. ( 1988) "Host regions and the globalization 
of the Offshore Supply Industry", International 
Regional Science Review, 11(2). 
Hamilton, 
the 
A. -(1978) 
-·British 
North Sea 
economy, 
Impact: Offshore Oil and 
Guildford, International 
Institute for Economic Research. 
Hann, D. (1986) Government and North Sea Oil, New York, 
St Martin's Press. 
Harris, A. Lloyd, M. McGuire, A. and Newlands, D. (1985) 
The Distributional Impact of Incoming Industry: A Case 
Study of Aberdeen, University of Aberdeen, Department 
of Political Economy Discussion Paper, 85 (06). 
Harrison, R. (1986) "Technology and occupational change 
in the United Kingdom shipbuilding industry" in 
Chapman, K. and Humphrys, G. (eds) Technical Change 
and Industrial Policy, Oxford, Basil Blackwell. 
Hinton, J. 1982 "The rise of a mass labour movement: 
growth and limits", in Wrigley, c. (ed) A History of 
British Industrial Relations, 1970-1914, Brighton, 
Harvester Press. 
Hobsbawm, E. (1964) Labouring Men, London, Weidenfeld and 
Nicholson. 
350 
Hobsbawm, E. (1984) Worlds of Labour, London, Weidenfeld 
and Nicholson. 
Homburg, H. (1983) "Scientific management and personnel 
policy in the modern German enterprise 1918-1939: the 
case of Siemens", in Littler, C. and Gospel, H. (ed) 
Managerial Strategies and Industrial Relations, 
London, Heinemann. 
Hagwood, B. (1979) Government and Shipbuilding: the 
Politics of Industrial Change, Farnborough, Hants, 
Saxon House. 
Holbrook Jones, M. ( 1981) Supremacy and Subordination of 
Labour: the Hierarchy of Work in the Early Labour 
Movement, London, Heinemann. 
House, J.D. (1980) "Oil companies in Aberdeen: the 
strategy 
Shapiro, 
Scotland: 
of incorporation", in Parsler, 
D. (eds) The Social Impact of 
a Contribution to the Sociology 
Farnborough, Hants, Gower. 
R. and 
Oil in 
of Oil, 
House, J.W. (1969) Industrial Britain: the North East, 
Newton Abbot, David and Charles. 
House of Commons Select Committee on Energy (1987) The 
Effect of Oil and Gas Prices on Activity in the North 
Sea, London, H.M.S.O. 
House of Commons Select Committee 
United Kingdom Independent 
H.M.S.O. 
on 
Oil 
Energy (1988) The 
Sector, London, 
House of Commons Select Committee on Energy (1989) 
=B:....:•:....:Pc....:..... ~-L=B~r'-"i,__t,_o=i'-'"l'-':,____--"J::...:o=b--=L=-=o~s=s=e=s'---=a:..:.n=d=--_,A'-'-""s-==s:..::e"-'t"'--_,S"'-a==l'-"e~s , London , 
H.M.S.O. 
351 
Hudson, R. (1988) "Labour market changes and new forms of 
work in "old" industrial regions", in Massey, D. and 
Allen, J. (eds) Uneven Re-Development: cities and 
Regions in Transition, London, Hodder and Stoughton. 
Hudson, R. ( 1989a) "Labour-market changes and new forms 
of work in old industrial regions: maybe flexibility 
for some but not flexible accumulation", in 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 7(1). 
Hudson, R. (1989b) Wrecking a Region, London, Pion. 
Hudson, R. Peck, F. and Sadler, D. (1984) Undermining 
Easington: Who'll Pay the Price of Pit Closures, 
Easington District Council, Easington, Co. Durham. 
Hudson, R. and Sadler, D. (1985) "The development of 
Middlesbrough's iron and steel industry, 1841-1985", 
Middlesbrough Locality Study, Working Paper No. 2, 
University of Durham, Departments of Geography and 
Sociology. 
Humphries, J. 
of the 
and Rubery, 
supply side 
J. (1984) 
of the 
"The reconstitution 
labour market: the 
relative autonomy of social reproduction", in 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 8(4). 
Jacoby, N. {1974) Multinational Oil: A Study in 
Industrial Dynamics, London, Macmillan. 
Jenkin, M. (1981) British Industry and the North Sea, 
London, Macmillan. 
Jessop, B. (1983a) "The democratic state and the national 
interest", in Coates, D. and Johnston, G. (eds) 
Socialist Arguments, London, Martin Robertson. 
352 
Jessop, B. (1983b) "Capitalism and democracy: the best 
possible political shell?", ln Held, D. et al ( eds) 
States and Societies, Oxford, Martin Robertson. 
Jones, B. and Rose, M. (1986) "Redividing labour: factory 
politics and work reorganisation in the current 
industrial transition", in Purcell, K. Wood, S. Waton, 
A. and Allen, S. (eds) The Changing Experience of 
Employment: Restructuring and Recession, Basingstoke, 
Macmillan. 
Judge, D. and Dickson, T. (1987) "The British state, 
governments and manufacturing decline", in Dickson, T. 
and Judge, D. (eds) The Politics of Industrial 
Closure, Basingstoke, Macmillan. 
Keegan, W. (1985) Britain Without Oil, Harmondsworth, 
Middlesex, Penguin. 
Landes, D. ( 1969) The Unbound Prometheus. Technological 
Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe 
from 1750 to the Present, Cambridge University Press. 
Lash, s. and Urry, J. (1987) The End of Organised 
Capitalism, Cambridge, Polity Press. 
Lazonick, W. (1979) "Industrial relations and technical 
change: the case of the self-acting mule", Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, 3(3) 
Lazonick, W. ( 1983) "Technological change and the control 
of work: the development of capital relations in the 
U.S. mass production industries", in Littler, c. and 
Gospel, H. (ed) Managerial Strategies and Industrial 
Relations, London, Heinemann. 
Lazonick, W. (1990) Competitive Advantage on the Shopfloor, 
353 
London, Heinemann. 
Lee, D. (1979) "Craft unions and the force of tradition: 
the case of apprenticeship", 
Industrial Relations 17 (1). 
British Journal of 
Lee, D. (1982) "Beyond deskilling: skill craft and 
class", in Wood, S.(ed) The Degradation of Work? 
Skill, Deskilling and the Labour Process, London, 
Hutchinson. 
Leitch, M. (1989) FT Guide to North Sea Operators: a 
Company by Company Review, Third Edition, London, 
F.T.B.I. 
Lind, T. and Mackay, G. (1980) Norwegian Oil Policies, 
London, Hurst. 
Lipietz, A. ( 1987) Miracles and Mirages: the Crisis in 
Global Fordism, London, Verso. 
Littler, C. (1982a) The Development of the Labour Process 
in Capitalist Societies, London, Heinemann. 
Littler, C. (1982b} "Deskilling and changing structures 
of control", in Wood, S. (ed) The Degradation of Work? 
Skill, Deskilling and the Labour Process, London, 
Hutchinson. 
Littler, C. (1983) "A comparative analysis of managerial 
structure and strategies", in Gospel, H. and Littler, 
C. (eds) Managerial Strategies and Industrial 
Relations, London, Heinemann. 
Littler, c. and Salaman, G. (1984) Class at Work, 
London, Batsford. 
354 
Littler, c. (1990) "The Labour Process debate: a 
theoretical review 1974-88", in Knights, D and 
Willmott, H. (eds) Labour Process Theory, Basingstoke, 
Macmillan. 
Lorenz, E. (1983) The Labour Process and Industrial 
Relations in the British and French Shipbuilding 
Industries, from 1880 to 1970: Two Patterns of 
Development, unpublished PhD. thesis, Cambridge. 
Lorenz, E. and Wilkinson, F. (1986) "The shipbuilding 
industry", in Elbaum, B. and Lazonick, W. (eds) The 
=D-=e=-=c~l=-=i-"-'n=e'--~o'-'f"--_t-=-h=-=--=e'------=B=r'--'l"--. t-=-=i-=sc=.h-=---=E=-c=--=-o-"-'n=-=o=m"-y"- , 0 x ford , C 1 are n don 
Press. 
Loveridge, R. and Mok, A. (1979) Theories of Labour 
Market Segmentation: a Critique, Den Haag, Martin 
Nijhoff. 
Macinnes, J. (1987) Thatcherism at Work, Milton Keynes, 
Open University. 
MacKay, D. and Mackay, G. (1975) The Political Economy of 
North Sea oil, London, Martin Robertson. 
Mandel, E. (1968) Marxist Economic Theory, London, 
Merlin. 
Manners, G. (1984) "North Sea oil: benefits, costs, 
uncertainties" Geoforum, 15(1). 
Manpower Services Commission (1974) 
Offshore Oil and Gas: Manpower 
Overview, MSC Unpublished Paper. 
The Discovery 
Implications. 
of 
An 
Marsh, A. and Coker, E. (1963) "Shop steward organisation 
in the engineering industry", British Journal of 
355 
Industrial Relations, 1(2). 
Martin, R. (1988) "Industrial capitalism in transition: 
the contemporary reorganisation of the British space-
economy" in Massey, D. and Allen, J. (eds) Uneven Re-
development: Cities and Regions in Transition, London, 
Hodder and Stoughton. 
Marx, K. (1970) Capital, a Critical Analysis of 
Capitalist Production, Volume 1, London, Lawrence and 
Wishart. 
Massey, D. (1988) "Uneven development: social change and 
spatial divisions of labour" in Massey, D. and Allen, 
J. (eds) Uneven Re-development: Cities and Regions in 
Transition, London, Hodder and Stoughton. 
Massey , D . ( 19 8 4 ) ~s.tp~a~t"""i~a=:!-:.l_~D-=ic..!v~i~s:..cl,_· o""'-'-'n'-"s'--...!:o~f=----"L"'"'a""'b=o_,u'""'r'-':'---'S"'-'o,_c""-"'i-"a'-=-l 
Structures and the Geography of Production, 
Basingstoke, Macmillan. 
Massey, D. and Meegan, R. (1982) The Anatomy of Job Loss: 
the how, why and where of employment decline, London, 
Methuen. 
McBarnett, A. (1980) "The North Sea oil story: 
government, the oil industry and the press", in 
Parsler, R. and Shapiro, D. (eds) The Social 
Impact of Oil in Scotland: a Contribution to the 
Sociology of Oil, Farnborough, Hants, Gower. 
McClelland, K. and Reid, A. (1985) "Wood, iron and steel: 
technology, labour and trade union organisation in the 
shipbuilding industry 1840-1914", in Harrison, R. and 
Zeitlin, J. (eds) Divisions of Labour, Brighton, 
Harvester. 
356 
McCord, N. (1979) "North East England: the 
Development 1760-1960 11 , London, Batsford 
Press. 
Region's 
Academic 
McGoldrick, J. (1983) "Industrial relations and the 
division of labour in the shipbuilding industry since 
the war", in British Journal of Industrial Relations, 
21. 
Melling, J. (1983) "Employers, industrial welfare and the 
struggle for workplace control 1n British industry 
1880-1920", 1n Gospel, H. and Littler, C. (eds) 
Managerial Strategies and Industrial Relations, 
London, Heinemann. 
Melling, J. (1987) "Employers and the rise of supervisory 
unionism", in Wrigley, c. ( ed) A History of British 
Industrial Relations, Vol. 2, Brighton, Harvester 
Press. 
Mess, H. (1928) Industrial Tyneside: a Social Survey, 
London, Earnest Bevin. 
Michon, F. (1987) "Segmentation, employment structures 
and productive structures", in Tarling, R. (ed) 
Flexibility in Labour Markets, London, Academic Press. 
Mikdashi, Z. (1986) Transnational Oil: Issues, Policies 
and Perspectives, London, Frances Pinter. 
Moore, R. (1980) "Northern notes towards a sociology of 
oil", in Parsler, R. and Shapiro, D. (eds) The 
Social Impact of Oil in Scotland: a Contribution to 
the Sociology of Oil, Farnborough, Hants, Gower. 
Moore, Robert (1981) "Urban development on the periphery of 
industrialised societies", in Harloe, M. (ed) New 
357 
Perspectives in Urban Change and Conflict, London, 
Heinemann. 
Moore, Roger (1981) "Aspects of segmentation in the U.K. 
building industry labour market", in Wilkinson, F. 
(ed) ~T~h~e~~D~y~n~a~m~l~·~c~s~~o~f~~L~a~b~o~u~r~~M~a~r~k~e~t~~S~e~g~m~e~n~t~a~t~i~o~n~, 
London, Academic Press. 
More, C. (1982) "Skill and the survival of 
apprenticeship" in Wood, S. ( ed) The Degradation of 
Work? Skill Deskilling and the Labour Process, London, 
Hutchinson. 
Morgan, K. and Sayer, A. (1984) A Modern Industry in a 
Mature Region: the Re-making of Management-labour 
Relations, Working Paper No. 39, Urban and Regional 
studies, University of Sussex. 
Morgan, K. and Sayer, A. (1988) "A "modern" industry in a 
"mature" region: the remaking of management-labour 
relations" in Massey, D. and Scott, J. (eds) Uneven 
Re-Development: Cities and Regions in Transition, 
London, Hodder and stoughton. 
Mortimer, J. ( 1973) History of the Boilermakers Society, 
Vol. 1 1834-1906, London, George Allen and Unwin. 
Mortimer, J. ( 1982) History of the Boilermakers Society, 
Vol. 2 1906-39, London, George Allen and Unwin. 
Motamen, H. (1983) Macroeconomics of North Sea Oil in the 
U.K., London, Heinemann. 
NEDC (1972) Oilfield: the Market Place for Northern 
Firms, North East Development Council. 
NEDO (1985) Offshore Supplies: Performance and Prospects, 
358 
London, National Economic Development Office. 
Nichols, T. (1986) The British Worker Question: a New Look 
at Workers and Productivity in Manufacturing, London, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Noreng, 0 (1980) The Oil Industry and Government Policy 
in the North Sea, London, Croom Helm. 
North, G. (1975) Teesside's Economic Heritage, Cleveland 
County Council. 
Odell, p (1979} British Oil Policy: a Radical 
Alternative, London, Kogan Page. 
Odell, P. (1986) Oil and World Power, Middlesex, Penguin. 
Okayama, R. (1983} "Japanese employer labour policy: the 
heavy engineering industry in 1900-1930", in Littler, 
c. and Gospel, H. (eds) Managerial Strategies and 
Industrial Relations, London, Heinemann. 
Osterman, P. (1984) Internal Labour Markets, Cambridge, 
Mass, MIT Press. 
Palmer, G. (1983) British Industrial Relations, London, 
George Allen and Unwin. 
Parkinson, (1979) "Shipbuilding", in Aldcroft, D. and 
Buxton, A. (eds) British Industry in the Inter War 
Years, London, Scolar Press. 
Parsler, R. and Shapiro, D. (eds) The Social Impact of 
Oil in Scotland: A Contribution to the Socioligy of 
Oil I Farnborough, Hants, Gower. 
Pelling, H. (1987} A History of British Trade Unionism, 
359 
Basingstoke, Macmillan. 
Penn, R. (1982) "Skilled manual workers in the labour 
process", in Wood, s. (ed) The Degradation of Work? 
Skill, Deskilling and the Labour Process, London, 
Hutchinson. 
Peppin, T. (1990) Restructuring of the Demand for Labour: 
a study of Labour Market Adjustment Mechanisms ln 
"""S--"t'""o"""c~k_,_t=o-'-'n'-----'o::::.:n'-'---_,T,_,e=:.:e"'-s""' , u n i ve r sit y of Durham , u n pub 1 ish ed 
PhD thesis. 
Piore, M. (1980) "Dualism as a response to flux and 
uncertainty", in Berger, S. and Piore, M. (eds) Dualism 
and Discontinuity in Industrial Societies, Cambridge 
University Press. 
Piore, M. and Sabel, c. (1984) The Second Industrial 
Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity, New York, Basic 
Books. 
Pollard, S. and 
Shipbuilding 
Press. 
Robertson, P. (1979) The British 
Industry 1870-1984, Harvard Univerity 
Pollert, A. ( 1988a) "Dismantling f lexibi li ty", in Capital 
and Class, 34 Spring. 
Pollert, A. {1988b) "The Flexible Firm: fixation or fact", 
ln Work, Employment and Society, 2 (3). 
Price, R. (1986) Labour in British Society: an 
Interpretative History, Beckenham, Croom Helm. 
Purdy, D. {1988) Social Power and the Labour Market, 
Basingstoke, Macmillan. 
360 
Redclift, N. and Mingione, E. (eds) (1985) Beyond 
Employment: Household, Gender and Substance, Oxford, 
Basil Blackwell. 
Reich, M. (1984) 
hypothesis and 
"Segmented labour: time series 
evidence", in Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, 8(1). 
Robertson, D. (1954) "Labour turnover in the Clyde 
shipbuilding industry", Scottish Journal of Political 
Economy 1. 
Robinson, c. and Morgan, J. (1978) North Sea oil in the 
Future, London, Trade Policy Research Centre. 
Robinson, F. (ed) (1988) Post Industrial 
Newcastle upon Tyne City Library. 
Tynes ide, 
Roncaglia, A. (1985) The International Oil Market: a Case 
of Trilateral Oligopoly, Basingstoke, Macmillan. 
Rubery, J. (1978) "Structured labour markets, worker 
organisation, and low pay", in Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, 2(1). 
Rubery, J. (1986) "Trade Unions in the 1980s: The case of 
the United Kingdom", in Edwards, R. 
Todtling, F. (eds) Unions in Crisis 
Caronna, P. 
and Beyond: 
Perspectives from Six Countries, Dover, Mass, Auburn 
House. 
Rubery, J. (1989) "Labour market flexibility" in Green, F 
(ed) The Restructuring of the U.K. economy, London, 
Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Sadler, D. ( 1985) Born ln a Steel town: Class Relations 
and the Decline of the European Steel Industry, 
361 
University of Durham, unpublished PhD thesis. 
Sadler, D. (1986) "The impacts of offshore fabrication in 
Teesside", Middlesbrough Locality Study, Working Paper 
No. 5, Departments of Geography and Sociology, 
University of Durham. 
Salmon, A. and Walker, J. (1986} The Oil Price Collapse; 
Some Effects on the Scottish Economy", Royal Bank of 
Scotland, Unpublished Report. 
Sampson, A. (1975) The Seven Sisters, London, Hodder and 
Stoughton. 
Saul, S. (1968) "The engineering industry", in Aldcroft, 
D. The Development of British Industry and Foreign 
Competition 1875-1914, 
Sayer, A. (1984) Method in Social Science: a Realist 
Approach, London, Hutchinson. 
Schoenberger, E. (1991} "The corporate interview as a 
research method in economic geography", Professional 
Geographer 43 (2). 
Shapiro, D. (1980) "The industrial relations of oil", ln 
Parsler, R. and Shapiro, D. (eds) The Social Impact 
of Oil in Scotland: a Contribution to the Sociology of 
Oil, Farnborough, Hants, Gower. 
Shapiro, D. (1981) "Industrial relations in the 
wilderness", in Harloe, M. (ed) New Perspectives in 
Urban Change and Conflict, London, Heinemann. 
Shapiro, D. (1985a) "Explaining peripheral change", ln 
The Lancaster Regionalism Group Localities, Class and 
Gender, London, Pion. 
362 
Shapiro, D. (1985b) "Policy, planning and peripheral 
development", in The Lancaster Regionalism Group 
Localities, Class and Gender, London, Pion. 
Smith, N. (1978) "The offshore supplies industry: the 
British industry in its wider context", in The 
Business Economist, Autumn. 
Southall, H. (1988) "The origins of the depressed areas: 
unemployment, growth and regional economic structure 
in Britain before 1914", in Economic History Review 41 
( 12) . 
Stark, D. ( 1980) "Class struggle and the transformation 
of the labor process: a relational approach", in 
Theory and Society, 9. 
Surrey, J. and Cook, P. (1983) Government Policy for the 
Offshore Supplies Industry: Britain compared with 
Norway and France, SPRU Occasional Paper Series, No. 
31, October. 
Tarling, R. and Wilkinson, F. {1987) "The level, structure 
and flexibility of costs", in Tarling, R. (ed) 
Flexibility in Labour Markets, London, Academic Press. 
Therborn, G. (1986) Why Some Peoples are More Unemployed 
than Others, London, Verso. 
Thompson, P. (1990) "Crawling from the 
labour process and the politics of 
Knights, D. and Willmott, H. (eds) 
Theory, Basingstoke, Macmillan. 
wreckage: the 
production", in 
Labour Process 
Tighe, T. (1979) Tees Side Bridge: the Rise, Fortunes and 
Dissolution of a Private Company, B.S.C. Teesside. 
Todd, D. 
and 
363 
(1983) "Strategies 
rationalisation ln 
of growth, diversification 
the evolution of the 
concentration in British shipbuilding", in Regional 
Studies 18 (1). 
Towers, B. (1989) "Running the gauntlet: British trade 
unions under Thatcher, 1979-1988", in Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review, 42(2). 
Townsend, A. (1983) The Impact of Recession, Beckenham, 
Croom Helm. 
Tugendhat, C. and Hamilton, A. (1975) Oil: The Biggest 
Business Revised edition, London, Eyre Methuen. 
Turner, L. (1978) Oil Companies in the International 
System, London, Allen and Unwin. 
Vatne, E. (1987) "Organisational and regional changes in 
industrial systems: integration of the oil industry 
into an advanced economy" ln Hamilton, E. (ed) 
Industrial Change in Advanced Economies, London, Croom 
Helm. 
Villa, P. (1981) "Labour market segmentation and the 
construction industry in Italy", in Wilkinson, F. (ed) 
The Dynamics of Labour Market Segmentation, London, 
Academic Press. 
Villa, P. (1986) The Structuring of Labour Markets: the 
Steel and Construction Industries in Italy, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press. 
Warde, A. (1985) "Spatial change, politics and the division 
of labour", in Gregory, D. and Urry, J. (eds) Social 
Relations and Spatial Structures, London, Macmillan. 
Warren, K. 
Buxton, 
364 
(1979} "Iron and Steel", in 
A. (eds) British Industry 
Years, London, Scolar Press. 
Aldcroft, D. and 
in the Inter-war 
Weinstein, B. and Cross, H. (1987) "Spatial and 
structural consequences of industrial change: the 
American Gulf Coast Petrocrescent", in Hamilton, 
F.E.I. (ed} Industrial Change in Advanced Economies, 
London, Croom Helm. 
Wood, s. (1982) The Degradation of Work: Skill, 
Deskilling and the Labour Process, London, Hutchinson. 
Wood, s. (1989} "The transformation of work? Skill, 
flexibility and the labour process", in Wood, S. (ed) 
The Transformation of Work, London, Unwin and Hyman. 
Wilkinson, F (ed.). (1981) The Dynamics of Labour Market 
Segmentation, London, Academic Press. 
Wilkinson, F. (1983) "Productive Systems" in Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, 7(4). 
Williamson, H. Andreano, R. Daum, 
The American Petroleum 
University Press, Evanston. 
A and Klose, G. ( 1963) 
Industry, Northwestern 
Williamson, 0. ( 1975) Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis 
and Anti-trust Implications, New York, Free Press. 
Withington, J. (1989) Shutdown: the Anatomy of a Shipyard 
Closure, London, Bedford Square Press. 
Wright, E. (1978} Class, Crisis and the State, London, 
New Left Books. 
Wrigley, c. (1982) "The government and industrial 
365 
relations", in Wrigley, c. (ed) A History of British 
Industrial Relations, Brighton, Harvester Press. 
Zeitlin, J. (1985) "Engineers and compositors: a 
comparison", in Harrison, R. and Zeitlin, J. (eds) 
Divisions of Labour, Brighton, Harvester Press. 
Zeitlin, J. (1983) "The labour strategies of British 
engineering employers, 1890-1922 11 in Gospel, H. and 
Littler, C. (eds) Managerial Strategies and Industrial 
Relations: an Historical and Comparative Study, 
London, Heinemann. 
... 
... 
366 
Appendix 1 
Location of North Sea Oil and Gas Fields, 1985 
UK CONTINENTAL SHELF 
Spring 1985 
(Source: Brown Books] 
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Appendix 2 
A Brief Geology of the North Sea Basin 
Contrary to popular belief, hydrocarbons are widely 
distributed over the earth's surface. However most areas lack 
the geological conditions under which sufficient quantities, 
worthy of commercial exploitation, can accumulate. 
Petroleum is petrified carbon in liquid form, resulting from 
the collection of organic matter between rocks. Under certain 
circumstances, this material moves along permeable strata 
until it becomes deposited in an "oil trap". These traps are 
created either by faults and intrusions or by anticlines, 
preventing further movement. Where such traps are large enough 
extraction becomes economically viable. 
It is likely that the North Sea was created between 350 
million and 2 million years ago during the Carboniferous, 
Jurassic and Tertiary periods. Essentially it is the submerged 
portion of a major sedimentary basin that stretches from 
Poland to Eastern England. But during these periods of 
geomorphological activity marked irregularities within the 
basin were formed creating the necessary oil-bearing strata. 
The most significant of these features is the Mid North Sea 
High, extending from the Southern Uplands in Scotland to the 
Ringkobing Fyn High off the western coast of Denmark. This 
forms the barrier between the shallower waters of the southern 
North Sea and the deeper north. 
In the south the area can be further subdivided into the 
Anglo-Dutch and German basins, whilst to the north there are 
a series of troughs and platforms which have provided the most 
favourable conditions for the large-scale oil deposits that 
exist. The most notable of these is the Norwegian Trench, over 
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200m deep, which prompted animated discussion regarding the 
maritime boundary between the U.K. and Norway during the 
1950s, and was also an obstacle to pipeline developments from 
the Norwegian coast to the Ekofisk field. 
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Appendix 3 
The Research Process underlying the Thesis 
The practice of undertaking research in the social sciences lS 
perhaps best described as an ongoing iterative process. This is 
because a methodological perspective is not merely informed by a 
priori knowledge of the "real world", but is in effect constantly 
reacting to, and being reproduced by, "real world 11 events. As a 
consequence the end product of a research programme seldom 
resembles its originally conceived form. Whilst empirical evidence 
may on occasions confirm and indeed strengthen the initial 
theoretical position taken by a researcher, it is more likely to 
require a degree of reformulation of hisjher position. In addition, 
the more practical restraints involved in undertaking research in 
an uncertain world, the laboratory of the social sciences, present 
their own obstacles to the ongoing research process. In the 
following pages an account lS given of the research process that 
lay behind the compilation of this thesis. The first two sections 
explain how its methodological perspective developed and changed as 
a consequence of both practical and theoretical considerations 
during the course of the research programme, whilst the final 
section describes and accounts for the research methods that were 
used. 
1. The development of an early theoretical and methodological 
position 
At the outset (October 1987) my terms of reference were set 
firstly, by the title of the E.S.R.C. sponsored "linked" award, 
that this thesis was based upon; "The Impact of the Offshore 
Industries upon the North of England"; and secondly by the 
geographical perspective that I brought to bear on the study. In 
essence the thesis was interested in questions to do with 
industrial location. The focus of the research project was the 
issue of regional development within capitalist societies, and more 
specifically the employment impact resulting from the development 
370 
of a significant offshore construction industry, as a result of 
North Sea oil and gas operations, within the North East. 
At the time I was heavily influenced by the work of a radical 
strand within economic geography (exemplified by the work of 
Massey, 1984} which, departing from traditional neoclassical and 
behaviouralist theories, sought to link questions relating to 
industrial location within the context of wider processes of 
capital accumulation. Effectively this represented a marriage 
between geography and the traditional Marxist perspective on 
capitalist production in industrial societies; location decisions 
were recast as another variable in the inexorable search for 
surplus value. Through changes in technology and composition, 
capital was becoming increasingly mobile, so that to a greater 
extent than ever before, location decisions were made according to 
spatial variations 1n the quality and availability of labour. As 
Warde has remarked in his critique of Massey's work (1985: 196): 
"The logic of Massey's account is that capital has come 
to use spatial differentiation as a resource in the 
competitive search for profit. There lS a search for 
spatial advantage. Such advantage is most readily 
obtained by discriminating between available labour 
forces. This, a point of general agreement among recent 
structural accounts, acknowledges that capital lS 
nowadays highly mobile." 
In this sense the geography of production and subsequently 
employment was linked to changing spatial divisions of labour over 
time. Contemporary economic restructuring was associated with the 
emergence of a new international division of labour (clearly 
articulated by Frobel et al, 1980). Changes within the U.K. space 
economy, which Massey described as a new geography of production, 
were linked to this wider pattern of restructuring in the world 
economy. One of the features of this scenario was the extent to 
which older industrial regions, such as the North East, were 
becoming increasingly peripheral to the major centres of capitalist 
production. Generally speaking the implications of this for these 
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regions were twofold: firstly traditional manufacturing industries 
were in long term decline, being undermined by newer producing 
regions (using cheaper forms of labour) in the developing world, 
and secondly, the new industries that had developed were 
characterised by branch plant production and as such functionally 
separated from the decision making core. 
It was with this type of perspective that I originally interpreted 
the arrival of the offshore construction industry in the North East 
of England. How had the establishment of a sizeable oil-related 
sector reversed the reg ion's retreat into the periphery of the 
international division of labour? In answering this question, it 
was necessary to understand the role of those companies that became 
involved in North Sea oil operations, within the international 
division of labour. As a corollary to this, a second task was to 
locate the new jobs associated with North Sea oil within the 
functional hierarchy that constituted the spatial division of 
labour. 
This was the main purpose of the empirical research during the 
thesis, but before embarking upon this course, it was necessary to 
account for the arrival of North Sea operations within the context 
of the international oil industry. This was achieved through a 
literature review during the first six months of the research, 
between October 1987 and March 1988. 
During this period I was concerned with answering two related 
questions concerning the nature of the oil industry. The first of 
these was to understand the structure of the international oil 
industry, and the coincidence of events within it that spawned the 
development of North Sea oil. A second task was to develop an 
understanding of the political economy of oil in the U.K. sector of 
the North Sea, in particular aimed at the relationship between the 
government and the oil industry. This would then enable me to 
establish a conceptual framework with which to embark upon the two 
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central themes of the thesis: the role of the North East's firms 
within the oil industry (and the wider international division of 
labour); and the implications of this for the nature of employment 
developments. The bulk of this material eventually formed the basis 
for Chapter 1. 
Having established the background to oil developments within the 
region, I was then faced with the more onerous task of developing 
a specific methodological strategy for the thesis. At the outset of 
the thesis I had been aware (from the examination of previous 
studies) of the basic structure of the offshore construction 
industry in the North East. In March 1988 the industry revolved 
around the activities of six large fabricators (Charlton Leslie, 
Davy Offshore, Press Offshore, Redpath Offshore, T.H.C. Fabricators 
and Whessoe Offshore) who as principal contractors to the oil 
companies represented the apex of a pyramid of suppliers and 
subcontractors. 
At this juncture I was faced with the not uncommon predicament of 
having a whole array of interesting research questions that could 
have formed the basis for a thesis. These ranged between two poles. 
a) At one level there was a strong case for examining the offshore 
construction sector of the region as a whole, perhaps focusing upon 
the linkage network between the fabricators and their suppliers. 
b) Conversely, an equally useful thesis would have been to assess 
the role of a single firm and its workforce within the political 
economy of the oil industry. It was with the aim of resolving this 
impasse that I decided to undertake a period of preliminary 
empirical study (from March to August 1988) in order to define in 
more concrete terms the parameters of the offshore construction 
industry. This involved interviews with management at both the 
large fabrication firms and their leading suppliers and 
subcontractors. 
The evidence that emerged from this piece of research reinforced my 
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perception of the large fabricators as the principal agents in the 
restructuring of employment within the offshore construction 
industry. It was the relative success of these firms, in obtaining 
contracts from the oil companies, that determined the degree and 
nature of offshore related activity in the North East. But, in 
addition, there was strong evidence to suggest that the level of 
employment in offshore related work was not merely contingent upon 
the ability of these firms to obtain contracts from the North Sea, 
but also upon their position within their own corporate framework. 
The first round of interviewing had not only revealed wide 
variations in the organisation of labour between firms, but also 
that the explanation for this was probably rooted in a firm's 
relationship with its parent company. 
In the light of this evidence, I decide to embark upon a 
comparative study of selected companies as the principal focus for 
the thesis. In doing so, I was opting for a variant of b) by 
investigating the relationship between corporate background and the 
organisation of labour within the firm. With regard to this the six 
large fabricators were visited again in the first two weeks of 
October 1988, after which three firms were chosen for in-depth 
study, the main criterion being to reflect a diversity of corporate 
circumstances. The first of the three selected, Charlton Leslie, 
was owned by the multinational conglomerate B.T.R., for whom the 
offshore industry was a departure from its normal sphere of 
operations. As such the local management at Charlton Leslie had a 
large degree of control over the day to day production decisions, 
but was marginalised from strategic decision making. The second 
firm, Whessoe, was a locally based firm, largely confined to the 
engineering • sector and with a tradition that dated back to the 
1790s. The third company selected, Redpath Offshore, was owned by 
the huge property and construction group Trafalgar House. Although 
key strategic decision making within the group was external to the 
North East, the offshore construction sector represented one of 
Trafalgar House's core growth areas during the 1980s. 
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Whilst the diversity of corporate circumstances was central to the 
selection decision, it was also important that those firms chosen 
reflected the geographical concentration of offshore activity in 
the North East, as my remit was still to study the industry at the 
regional level. In choosing two firms from the Tees (Redpath and 
Whessoe) and one from the Tyne (Charlton Leslie) this aim was 
accomplished. In rejecting the other three firms the governing 
factor was one of practicalities. To a large extent all three would 
have been interchangeable with those chosen: Davy shared many 
features in common with Whessoe, the employment environments at 
Charlton Leslie and T.H.C. Fabricators were markedly similar, 
whilst Press and Redpath were both owned by parent companies with 
a strong degree of commitment to the offshore sector. Ultimately 
though, I was reliant upon managerial co-operation, and whilst this 
was forthcoming at Press Offshore, I had been the recipient of both 
obstruction and indifference at Davy and T.H.C. which did not auger 
well for future research opportunities. 
The main thrust of the research strategy from this point onwards 
was to build up a comprehensive picture of labour organisation at 
each of the three firms, and in each case to relate a firm's labour 
strategy to its wider corporate environment. In this way I was 
hoping to open up the ''black box" of managerial decision making, to 
shed new light upon the processes behind employment restructuring. 
The findings would then be interpreted in terms of their 
implications for the ongoing theoretical debate about the spatial 
division of labour. 
1.1 The interview programme 
The main phase of interviewing took place in a 14 month period from 
November 1988 to February 1990, the bulk of which occurred at the 
construction sites of the respective firms, through the auspices of 
management. 
objectivity, 
Whilst this inevitably entailed problems of 
it was probably the only way of obtaining suitable 
information given the time constraints and the ephemeral nature of 
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the offshore industry and the individuals who work in it. 
The interview programme was based around three types of respondent: 
managerial, employee and trade union. 1 
i) Managerial interviews 
The original intention had been to interview the personnel managers 
from each of the three firms at the start of every two month 
period, concerned with ongoing recruitment strategies and past 
forms of labour organisation, both within the offshore industry and 
as far as possible in the period prior to oil-related developments. 
Respondents were encouraged to relate and explain manpower 
strategies, as far as possible, in terms of the wider corporate 
environment within which their firms were located. 
ii) Interviews with employees 
The interviewing of employees took place with the collaboration of 
management in the intervening period between managerial interviews. 
These interviews were undertaken with a representative sample of 
workers (on the basis of material supplied by management) to 
reflect the constitution of the work force in terms of age, gender 
and skill levels. The data from these interviews was used in two 
principal ways: firstly to corroborate and complement the 
managerial material concerning the organisation of labour within 
firms, and secondly to understand the experience of work for the 
various groups within the work force. For each firm the aim was to 
interview 20 - 25 individuals for a period of approximately one 
hour in each case. 
iii) Trade union interviews 
To obtain the view of organised labour and offset the problems of 
objectivity inherent in a company based study, interviews were 
1A more detailed description of the interviewing phase is given 
in the section covering research methods. 
376 
conducted with local trade union officials from the two principal 
unions (E.E.T.P.U. and G.M.B.). These interviews took place at two 
levels: firstly with local district officials for both the Tees and 
Tyne, and secondly with the relevant shop stewards and convenors at 
the individual firms. Typically these interviews lasted for between 
two to three hours. In addition, two group discussions were also 
held with shop stewards, one at Charlton Leslie's South Shields 
yard, towards the end of the Amerada Hess contract in April 1989, 
and the other at Redpath's Port Clarence yard in January 1990. 
Unfortunately, the original interview programme was frustrated by 
the premature closure of two of the firms selected. This forced a 
reappraisal, not just of the research programme, but also of the 
methodological and theoretical framework behind it. 
2. Changes to the methodological approach 
In the period between January and May of 1989 both Charlton Leslie 
and Whessoe, for separate reasons outlined in the main text, 
withdrew from the offshore industry. Whilst this sequence of events 
undermined the ongoing comparative study, it was far from being a 
terminal blow to the research project. Plant closure had been a 
fairly characteristic feature of contemporary economic 
restructuring during the 1980s, and more especially had been a 
recurrent theme within the offshore construction industry. 
Furthermore I was presented with a unique opportunity to interview 
disgruntled and disillusioned managerial staff (having had their 
shackles removed) in a less wary and more relaxed climate, once 
closure decisions had been announced. 
Nevertheless, there remained serious questions about the future 
direction of the thesis. At both Whessoe and Charlton Leslie I had 
been unable to complete the original quotas for workforce 
interviews, and in addition Whessoe's Middlesbrough yard had closed 
before contact with the shop stewards had been made. 
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Under these circumstances I was faced with several avenues for 
progress. There was the possibility of continuing some form of 
comparative approach by returning to two of the three discarded 
firms, although in practical terms this may have proved difficult. 
As I have already noted, the management at both Davy Offshore and 
T.H.C. Fabricators had expressed a large degree of hostility and 
scepticism to my earlier entreaties, whilst the latter firm was 
without an offshore order at the time. Whilst this situation was 
also in itself a characteristic feature of the offshore industry, 
it was inappropriate for my own purposes. Press Offshore, as the 
largest and most successful firm, would have been a useful 
comparison to make with Charlton Leslie or Whessoe, but was too 
similar to the remaining firm Redpath Offshore in its operational 
set up and labour recruitment practices, to merit a comparison in 
the terms in which the methodological strategy had been framed. 
Alternatively it would have been possible to concentrate upon 
Redpath as an individual case study, perhaps investigating more 
fully its relationship with other companies within the Trafalgar 
House organisation. However this was rejected because it would have 
required the abandonment of much of the earlier empirical material, 
and also a great deal of additional interview preparation at an 
advanced stage in the lifetime of the thesis. 
A third alternative (and the one that was eventually chosen) was to 
revert to an approach that was considered at the outset (a) by 
switching the emphasis away from the analysis of individual firms' 
behaviour, to a wider study of the fabrication sector within the 
North East as a whole. In doing so I was able to "make the best of 
both worlds", for whilst much of the information that had already 
been obtained had been firm specific, there was a significant 
amount of material relating to the organisation of labour within 
the industry as a whole. This was largely attributable to the fluid 
composition of those segments of the local labour market serving 
offshore construction, with a large mass of mobile workers 
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constantly moving between the different firms on the basis of 
individual contracts. 
Given this situation, I decided to complete my sample of employee 
respondents by interviewing an additional number of workers at 
Redpath, thereby establishing a wider and more complete picture of 
local labour market dynamics than would be possible in a different 
industrial context. Thus, by focusing intensively upon the 
workforce resident at a single firm for a particular period, I was 
able to interview individuals who had worked for all the various 
firms in the area. For example, many workers taken on by Redpath on 
the Gyda and Miller contracts for B.P. during 1989 had just been 
released following the completion of contracts at Davy and Whessoe. 
There remained a problem of geographical representation, as the 
empirical research was now concentrated upon Teesside, to the 
detriment of Tynes ide. This was partially overcome by a highly 
informative three hour group discussion with the six principal shop 
stewards just before the culmination of the Amerada Hess Rob Roy 
project at Charlton Leslie's South Shields yard, coupled with a 
substantive amount of additional information from the newly 
redundant managerial staff of the same firm. Although the interview 
data in Chapter 5 is still biased towards a Teesside perspective, 
I do not feel that this detracts from the overall value of the 
project. Alternative evidence, from media sources and other studies 
of Tyneside, tends to substantiate most of the material from my own 
interviews. 
The decision to switch to a wider level of analysis required a 
reformulation of my epistemological position, and deserves a 
thorough explanation at this point. This thesis, before and after 
the changes that I have just described, has always been concerned 
with the subject of employment change. However, to reiterate my 
earlier remarks, at the outset the perspective, though 
incorporating some of the basic tenets of Marxist theories of 
employment relations, was essentially a geographical one, concerned 
379 
with questions of industrial location. Thus, employment 
restructuring was essentially viewed as a manifestation of the 
changing geography of production, driven by the imperative of 
capital to locate to the best advantage. In this sense the original 
thesis methodology was not an examination of employment per se, but 
was rather an examination of the role of firms and regions within 
the global division of labour, expressed through the medium of 
employment change. 
In taking the emphasis away from one that was concerned with 
individual firm strategies towards employment, to one that focussed 
upon labour market change at a wider regional level, I was, in 
effect, deciding to study employment "for its own sake". This was 
a movement away from spatial relations towards an analysis of 
changing social structures over time, in this case the changes in 
employment within the region brought by North Sea oil developments. 
In doing so I found that it was necessary to draw more heavily upon 
other academic insights, because geographers (with the possible 
exception of Kevin Morgan and Andrew Sayer) have not as yet dealt 
satisfactorily with the issue of the impact of incoming industry 
upon existing employment structures. 
In particular I was impressed by the analytical approach used by 
sociologists and economists working in the labour process tradition 
(e.g. the work of Friedman, 1978 and Littler, 1982 and more 
recently Lazonick, 1990), where greater emphasis is placed upon the 
historical development of employment structures. However, this 
should not be taken as a criticism of the approach used by Massey 
and others, who are well aware of the importance of an historical 
materialist approach to social scientific analysis. Massey's use of 
the geological metaphor explicitly recognises that contemporary 
spatial patterns are the result of past and ongoing rounds of 
accumulation. But Massey's central purpose is to demonstrate that 
(1988: 21): 
''·· class relations do not ... exist on the head of a pin" 
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but are in fact organised over space. 
But my emphasis however had altered, away from a concern primarily 
with spatial divisions of labour towards one of employment change 
within a particular location. In this sense I had become more 
concerned with changing employment structures in one location than 
with employment relationships between locations. This required a 
greater analysis of the specific historical development of work 
within the North East itself, for the present not only carries with 
it the imprint of the past, but is conditioned by it, and as such 
can only be understood with reference to it. As Abrams remarks in 
his appraisal of the historical materialist approach in social 
science, its importance lies in the recognition of the: 
" .. two sided dynamism of the relationship of action and 
structure and the consequent necessity of understanding 
that relationship historically." 
(1982: 64} 
Indeed the value of a more historically based approach was borne 
out by much of the evidence that emerged from interviews with both 
employers and workers as part of the ongoing research programme. 
For whilst the future of offshore related employment in the North 
East is ultimately dependent upon the strategies of contemporary 
capital (in the shape of either the oil companies or large 
conglomerates such as B.T.R. and Trafalgar House), the employment 
environment within which these agents operated was heavily 
influenced by traditional working practices and forms of labour 
organisation. 
It was against this background of practical constraints, empirical 
revelations and ensuing theoretical reformulation, that I decided 
to pursue an approach which integrated incoming oil operations 
within the context of the historical evolution of work in the 
region. In doing so I was recognising that oil-related forms of 
employment were not imposed upon the region from outside, but were 
instead fundamentally shaped by existing employment structures 
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within the region. These employment structures in their turn were 
created by an historical process of incremental change. The impact 
of North Sea oil upon employment cannot therefore be understood 
without reference to this process. 
The recognition of this fact required an explanation of the 
specific set of social relations, that shaped the employment 
environment in the North East prior to the arrival of North Sea 
oil. In turn this involved a much greater period of study into 
primary historical material in the region's various libraries and 
archive centres than was originally anticipated, and is manifested 
in the lengthy historical analysis in Chapter 3. Such a departure 
however did not represent the absolute demise of the comparative 
element within the thesis, but rather its diminishing importance to 
the overall project. Instead of forming the central thrust of the 
thesis, a comparative analysis of the selected firms' experiences 
with North Sea oil is undertaken in Chapter 6 to illustrate the 
reaction of individual actors when faced with a particular set of 
historically constructed circumstances (or constraints). As such it 
reinforces the interactive view of the relationship between 
structure and agency in the social sciences. 
3. The use of research methods 
Method in the social sciences is inextricably linked to the 
epistemological framework within which it takes place. By asking a 
particular set of questions, one is unavoidably setting the terms 
of reference in which an interpretation of the empirical world must 
take place. A methodology that is concerned with descriptive 
questions, the "what", "where" and "when" questions, is better 
served through quantitative techniques, than one which seeks 
explanation behind empirical events in asking the "how" and the 
"why" questions. 
Throughout the study, despite the changes described above, my 
concern has been with what Schoenberger (1991: 181) has described 
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as "strategic interrelationships", in particular with a series of 
inter-locking relationships at different levels: inter-regional 
disparities, inter-firm and intra-corporate variations, as well as 
the relations between managers and workers, and finally different 
groups of workers within individual firms. This involves the 
theoretical recognition in the first place that such power 
relationships exist and are fundamental features of economic 
reality. 
Not only does the identification of these strategic relationships 
require an explanation, involving questions of "how" and "why", but 
it also necessitates a research strategy that is centred upon 
elements of degree, rather than absolute magnitude. Under these 
circumstances the most relevant approach is likely to be one based 
predominantly upon qualitative interviewing techniques rather than 
numerical data gathering exerc1ses. This is not to decry the 
importance of more formal, standardised techniques, but merely to 
define their limitations and put the case for a less rigid and more 
flexible approach to the research process. 
Whilst much of the material for this thesis was obtained by using 
informal interviewing techniques, more standardised methods have 
been used where appropriate. In particular standardised 
interviewing predominated in the early phases of the research 
project, when the aim was to define the structure and extent of the 
offshore construction industry. Such questions were concerned with 
description rather than explanation, in identifying features such 
as: the contractual 1 inkage networks between firms; corporate 
status of individual firms; and the proportion of temporary to 
permanent employees (similarly skilled labour to unskilled) within 
firms. Less structured techniques were used to untangle the complex 
workings of the industry. For whilst a series of standardised 
questions can provide us with details at a superficial level, this 
type of approach reveals little about the strength and degree of 
strategic relationships. This kind of information is best solicited 
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in a less structured interview scenario in which a key respondent 
is encouraged to think about hisjher position within the workplace 
in a strategic sense. 
During the early part of the research programme a formal 
interviewing approach was used, whereby key managerial respondents 
(in most cases the senior personnel managers) from the six large 
fabricators were asked a set of standard questions, relating to 
ownership, firm size, relationship with subcontractors, workforce 
composition, etc. It was therefore an exercise in "mapping" out the 
bare bones of the industry within the region, as a prelude to more 
in-depth investigation. To complete this "mapping" exercise, 
managerial respondents from the 20 principal "named" subcontractors 
(within the North East) were also interviewed, again being asked a 
set of standard questions. In doing so I used respondents from the 
commercial staff, rather than the personnel departments of the 
companies involved, for I was interested in establishing the degree 
of involvement of these firms in the offshore market and by 
implication the magnitude of the industry as a whole. 
In the ensuing management interview stages the approach became less 
standardised as questions were directed at the experience of 
individual firms. Thus, although at the beginning of each 
interview, a standard set of questions would be asked, concerning 
matters such as levels of employment, prospects for new contracts, 
etc, as the research programme progressed the interviews were 
increasingly concerned with enterprise-specific matters. A similar 
situation pertained for the interviews with trade union officials; 
the first part of the interview would be taken up with issues of 
scale and scope, to be superceded by less quantifiable topics such 
as labour relations, working conditions and internecine conflict 
over matters such as job demarcation. 
The same type of pattern was in evidence for the interviews 
conducted with individual workers. From the outset of these 
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interviews a central important objective had been to interview a 
reasonably stratified sample that was representative of the total 
labour force in terms of skill levels, gender, age and period of 
employment. 2 In doing so I was primarily interested in the 
qualitative experience of work for the individual, but I also used 
these interviews to build up an understanding of the magnitude of 
offshore operations. Thus although the bulk of the interview 
usually revolved around individual worker experiences both in the 
labour process and in the labour market I did ask a set of standard 
questions at the beginning of the interview about individual work 
histories. 
The manner in which some of the interview material is presented in 
Chapters 5 and 6 may appear anecdotal, and might invite criticism 
for being both unrepresentative, and open to the bias of the 
individual researcher. In defending the approach adopted here, I 
believe there are two important justifications. The first of these 
concerns the issue of validity. In the first instance, it has 
already been noted that the interview material for individual 
workers was itself selected in a stratified manner, to emphasise 
the position of particular groups within the labour market. More 
importantly these comments are not used in isolation but as 
illustrative components of an overall theme. In each case the 
remarks of individuals form one corroborative part of an argument 
that is constructed using a variety of source materials. 
A second question concerns the issue of interpretation. The 
accusation of bias implies that there exists the possibility for an 
objective social science; that the social world can be viewed in 
terms of one reality. This is self-evidently not the case. As 
Sayer (1984: 43) notes: 
II social science should not be seen as developing a 
2This type of information had been supplied by management in 
earlier interviews either in verbal or written form. 
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stock of knowledge about an object which is external to 
us, but should develop a critical self-awareness in 
people as subjects and indeed assist in their 
emancipation. It does this by first remembering that its 
"object" includes subjects, that the social world is 
socially produced and hence only one of many possible 
human constructions." 
The social world is a matter of individual interpretation, and 
explanations within social science should be treated as such. In 
this sense then the form in which evidence is presented in this 
thesis should be examined, in its own terms, for the extent to 
which it supports the overall argument. 
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Appendix 4 
Index of Abbreviations 
Amalgamation of Shipwrights and Boilermakers 
Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers 
British National Oil Corporation 
Computer Aided Design 
Central Electricity Generating Board 
Constructional Engineering Union 
Compagnie Francaise des Petroles 
Confederation of Shipbuilding and 
Engineering Workers 
Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunication 
and Plumbing Trades Union 
Engineering Industry Training Board 
Economist Intelligence Unit 
Ente Nationale Idrocarburi 
erect, procure, install and produce 
General, Municipal, and Boilermakers Allied 
Trades Union 
Higher National Diploma 
International Management and Engineering 
Group 
Industrial Reorganisation Commission 
Metal inert gas (welding) 
North East Development Company 
National Economic Development Office 
Northern Engineering Industries 
North East Marine 
North East Shipbuilders Ltd 
National Joint Council (for the engineering 
construction industry) 
National Online Manpower Information Service 
National Shipbuilders Security Ltd. 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
Shipbuilding Employers Federation 
South of Scotland Electricity Board 
T.E.C. 
T.G.W.U. 
T.T.W.A. 
Y.T.S. 
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Training and Enterprise Council 
Transport and General Workers Union 
Travel-to-work-area 
Youth Training Scheme 
